

farmers. Or a small group may manage to control the production and price of steel when the growth of the population puts heavy demands upon the steel supply for low-rent housing. Or one race may dominate another. In each and every case there will be conflict: the farmers against the landowners; those who own the steel-mills against those who want cheap housing; the Negro against the white. In each of our sections the prevalence of conflict is obvious—serfs against landowners, the middle classes against the landed gentry, industrialists against workers. Such a conflict is one that we usually refer to (without being able to define very accurately the term) as *class conflict*. A class is generally defined in terms of the dominant role it plays in a society usually through control of property or other economic resources.

GROUP CONFLICT. But we will also find that within a class, and often cutting across classes, there is another prevalent form of conflict: group conflict. Groups consist of persons who have *common interests*. This brings up the word "interest"—a word that has preoccupied political scientists and sociologists for a long time. For interest can be defined in very narrow terms to mean "material interest," and in a very broad sense to mean "purpose." *We shall understand it to mean a common set of material interests and common goals.* Both are usually present. Material concerns without goals are hardly ever organized, and goals without common material concerns can hardly sustain a group for long. Material concerns account for the organization and action of many groups—such as trade unions, farmers' associations, business groups. But there are groups that do not appear to have immediate material interests: the antislavery society, a church, a university may be held together without any tangible material interest on the part of its members. Extreme cases omitted, however, common purpose and material concern will induce in the greatest

number of cases, persons to form a group or an association.

However elevated the goals or however sordid the interests on the part of a group, their expression provokes friction with other groups. First, because two may radically clash about the same goals; second, because some groups may give higher priority to their ends as compared to those held by others. The conflict, sometimes highly structured and organized, sometimes totally unstructured, may or may not be contained. It may disrupt a society—this has happened in the cases of tribal conflicts in Africa, and powerful social conflicts in the period of the Industrial Revolution in Europe. Sometimes it may attain a sort of balance—as when competing groups are strong enough to maintain their positions, but not strong enough to overcome those with whom they are in conflict. Sometimes one group may triumph over another. And finally, the conflicting groups may reach a compromise. ~ {All four cases are possible.

What concerns the student of politics is not to identify only the source of conflict, but primarily to study the manner in which it is resolved. To take two illustrations: in Russia, the workers and the farmers, under the leadership of a small group of intellectuals, deposed the landed aristocracy by force. In England, the workers gradually assumed an organization and a style of action that gave them by-and-large what they asked for without having to resort to violence. In France the workers, after resorting to violence, were unable to satisfy their own demands, and for a long time their effort to influence the government proved equally frustrating. As a result, they have been unable *as yet* to choose between revolutionary and democratic methods.

It is not easy to tell when and why a group resorts to force; when and why another compromises; and when and why a third one allows or invites the government to step in and provide for a solution. Generally the man-

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Roy C. Macridis and Robert E. Ward EDITORS

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Preface

This second edition and the accompanying revised comparative Asian government series is a by-product of a continuing process of revaluation in the field of comparative political analysis that began at an Inter-University Research Seminar sponsored by the Social Science Research Council in 1952. We would like to take this occasion to acknowledge our debt to Dr Pendleton Herring, the Council's President. We as a group and comparative politics as a discipline are to an unusual degree beholden to him for his unfailing understanding and support of scholarly efforts to advance the level of both theory and practice in this field. We are similarly indebted to the Committee on Comparative Politics, and to Dr Kenneth Thompson, Vice-President of the Rockefeller Foundation, for the personal encouragement and Foundation support a number of contributors received over a period of years.

This volume represents an attempt to translate our own versions of some of the recent theorizing and writing in the field of comparative politics into a text for American undergraduates. We have retained the traditional "country by country" format, since this fits best the organization and needs of existing courses. While treating each political system or groups of systems separately, we have also tried to utilize a common framework of exposition and analysis. We conceive of politics as a system for the identification and posing of

problems and the making and administering of decisions in the realm of public affairs. Political systems are part of a larger social system which actually generates the conditions, attitudes, and demands that constitute the basic working materials of politics. In this book, therefore, we have made an especial effort to place politics and government in their appropriate historical, social, economic, and ideological setting.

Such an approach makes little sense if it does not also help the student to understand the more general political problems of our time. It is our hope that this volume will stimulate interest in and genuine intellectual curiosity about these problems that will extend beyond the classroom. The fate of parliamentary institutions, the challenge of totalitarianism, the politics of emerging nations, the explosive forces of rising expectations and demands among the new nations, the perennial contradictions between stability and change, the role of expert knowledge and leadership, are problems that influence our lives and shape the kind of world in which we live. If we succeed in introducing such issues to the student and in stimulating some better-informed and more systematic attention to the conditions and forces which underlie them, we shall have achieved our major goal.

The editors are grateful above all to the authors for their cooperation and patience. Particular thanks in this case are also due the publishers. James J. Murray III has been a source of constant help and encouragement, and Mrs. Marjorie Graham of the Project Planning Department of Prentice-Hall aided us greatly in the completion and improvement of this volume. Responsibility naturally lies with the editors and authors. While assuming it cheerfully, we are conscious that the magnitude of the undertaking leaves room for many errors.

October 1, 1967

Waltham, Mass.

R . C . M .

Ann Arbor, Mich.

R . E . W .

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Introduction

The study of politics has been going through a period of reevaluation. Many believe that it can become a science, like the natural sciences—that is, develop laws that are empirically verifiable for all political systems and for all times. They do not, however, expect that regularities and laws can yet be found, but rather that their discovery must be an ultimate intellectual concern. If an overall theory cannot be developed as yet, it is often suggested that correlations between types of political behavior and other manifestations of social behavior—family life, child rearing, class, income, status, etc.—may be established. Thus we may at least arrive at some generalizations—generalizations that apply to a fairly large group of phenomena *and* to a fairly large number of empirical situations. Discovery of correlations, such as “when X (income) goes up, Y (the birth rate) drops,” lead to descriptive generalizations. We do not know why Y follows X, and we cannot be sure it always will. But if and when correlations between two discrete variables occur in many systems and over a period of time, then we are close to a descriptive generalization.

This volume is most definitely not concerned with the discovery of “laws” and the verification of hypotheses. We are more concerned in this volume with empirical generalizations (of limited value, to be sure, since they apply to only four countries). But even this may be too ambitious. Perhaps all we can do is to identify trends, point to differences, and show their relevance. If the generalizations we make and the trends we identify appear exciting enough, then the reader may try to discover whether they are valid elsewhere. All our authors are concerned with the phenomenon of action (that is, governmental action), which means the concerted effort to bring about results, i.e. modernization in the Soviet Union, political consensus in France, constitutional government in Ger-

many, and equality in Great Britain. For each one of these countries, the policy goals of the government are closely examined, its performance assessed, and the conditions under which it operates carefully studied.

We concentrate a great deal on the condition and scope of governmental action, and study its history and analyze it in terms of the existing alternatives and limitations. This ought to be quite obvious, since we are studying systems wherein education is widespread and in which the citizens view and demand government action as a means for overcoming obstacles and providing solutions to problems. If there are riots in our cities, we believe that government action will put an end to them; if millions are poor, again we believe that, with the help of the government, there is a way out. Unemployment—a great social blight in the years between the two wars—called for concerted action, and it seems that governments now have adequate means to cope with it. The Soviet, German, French, and British political leaders are imbued with this voluntaristic aspect of politics—so often disregarded by students of politics. Yet this shows the limitation of our discipline. We can never tell on the basis of verified knowledge what sort of action is desirable and how responsible leaders are likely to act. In all societies, when the problem or the evil has been identified, people disagree about the cure. The doctor, *without* the benefit of laws, has enough empirical data to know how to treat a patient, and how to adjust his empirical knowledge to an individual case. We do not. Take, for instance, the naïve notion that economic aid to underdeveloped societies would lead to stability and democracy. The opposite has often been the case. Or that a majority electoral system would eliminate small parties; or that recruitment of civil servants on the basis of merit would do away with its upper-class characteristics. None of those “political actions” has brought about the desired or ex-

pected result. Yet the most ubiquitous political phenomenon in all modern political systems is governmental action—to defend the nation, to plan its economy, to educate its people, to provide welfare, leisure, and security.

THE FOUR COUNTRIES

This book is devoted to four European powers—Great Britain, France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union. All four are today, despite the rapidly changing nature of the world, major powers. They are leaders in science, technology, industry, and art. They account for one-quarter of the world's total industrial production; their citizens enjoy a standard of living that ranks them among the most prosperous inhabitants of the world. As of 1965, the average income of an English citizen was \$1,698 per year; of a French citizen, \$1,600; of a citizen of West Germany, \$1,700; and of a Russian, over \$1,000. These nations—with the exception of Great Britain—have had among the world's highest rates of industrial growth since the end of World War II, and the highest rates of urbanization of any countries in the world in the last 50 years. Illiteracy is virtually nonexistent, and involvement in politics on the part of the citizenry is widespread. The people in each of these countries are generally articulate about their common purposes and goals, and they share a deep sense of common destiny and nationality with their fellow citizens and abide by common rules through which ideological and social conflicts are settled. In dealing with these four countries, we shall be concerned with “the politics of modernity.”

Despite certain common traits, the countries we have chosen differ profoundly in many respects. England, which became the center of the Industrial Revolution that began in the latter part of the eighteenth century, maintained a position of industrial, political, and naval su-

premacY almost until World War II. In the name of economic liberalism, she acquired a far-flung empire and used her Navy to keep the seas free so her Merchant Marine could import raw materials and foodstuffs and export manufactured goods to every corner of the earth. But, *most important, the representative and parliamentary institutions that originated in feudal times gradually secured wide acceptance first among the British nobility, then among the rising middle class, and finally, in the nineteenth century, among the working class.*

By the time the Industrial Revolution arrived in England, Britain had developed a political system that carried all the seeds of a healthy democratic state: respect for individual rights, representative institutions, responsible and limited government, and, above all, the art of compromise and gradual change. Largely because the political system was capable of overcoming sharp social conflicts, *Britain is the only country that has not experienced a major revolution since the middle of the seventeenth century.* The strains and stresses of the twentieth century and her diminished status as a world power have not affected the strength of her political institutions at home.

Even more remarkable, the British system has been able to cope with the independence movements of her colonies. In the nineteenth century, Britain ruled more than a quarter of the population of the world, in an Empire that stretched from New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Malaya, and India through the Middle East, the Nile Valley, and Africa, and into North America. Some of her colonies were settled by English-speaking peoples who were given their full independence after World War I. In others, colonial rule continued until 1945, and it is only in the last decade and a half that a peaceful "liquidation" of the British Empire has been achieved. But here again the British have shown their genius in political adaptability. Most of the colonies, after becoming

independent, have joined the British Commonwealth, a community of member states that are linked together by a number of informal ties and in most cases by a common acceptance of the British Crown.

In a period of declining power and colonial disengagement, *Great Britain has been able to give us, like the Scandinavian countries, a genuine example of democratic socialism.* After World War II, the Labour Party received a large parliamentary majority and proceeded to overhaul the British economy and social structure, it nationalized a number of key industries, took over the control of the levers of economic activity, established a National Health Service to provide medical care to all as a matter of right, and attempted to narrow income inequalities. This "peaceful revolution" was accomplished without violating parliamentary procedures and individual rights. What is more, after the defeat of the Labour Party in 1951, the major reforms were accepted by the Conservatives, thus diminishing party strife and accentuating the broad area of agreement that typifies the British political system.

French democracy has not fared as well. The Industrial Revolution hit France just in time to sharpen the already existing ideological divisions that stemmed from the French Revolution. The Third Republic (1871-1940) was unable to cope with urgent problems of social and economic reform. By 1940, it was ripe for the demise that defeat at the hands of the German Army made inevitable. The Fourth Republic, established in 1946 after the Liberation of France, was a projection of the Third Republic and perpetuated and reflected ideological and class cleavages. The result was a stalemate on many basic issues that confronted the country. But even more important, a long colonial war in Indochina and later in Algeria gave to the military the opportunity to assume important powers and to defy the authority of the republican state. It was in the wake of a military

uprising in Algeria against the government of the Fourth Republic that General de Gaulle was returned to power and given sweeping powers to overhaul the parliamentary institutions. On September 28, 1958, the French people accepted the new Constitution—the Fifth Republic—under which the old parliamentary government has disappeared in favor of presidential leadership.

Political and constitutional instability has also accounted for the lack of a clear-cut policy with regard to the French colonies. Only in the last years of the Fourth Republic were reforms made toward colonial autonomy, but it was only under de Gaulle, and on the basis of his own personal popularity, that the African Republics were granted their independence. The Army was brought under control and Algeria became independent on July 3, 1962. De Gaulle returned to play the role of Cincinnatus—to settle the Algerian war with which the Republican institutions were unable to cope. In November, 1962, and again in March, 1967, the Gaullist forces won the election and it is likely that the Fifth Republic will continue.

The instability of democratic institutions in France before World War II was symptomatic of a general decline of democracy throughout the whole of Europe in the period between the two World Wars. With the exception of the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, democracy and parliamentary institutions were abandoned or seriously qualified in every country on the Continent. In Germany, the Weimar Republic (1918–33) gave way to a one-party government. Constitutional limitations were set aside, individual rights were abandoned, and the state, controlled by the National Socialists, claimed total control over the minds, conscience, and lives of German citizens. In the name of racial supremacy, Germany set out to conquer Europe, attacked the Soviet Union, and challenged Great Britain and the United States. In the very heart of Europe, the Nazi move-

ment threatened the most cherished traditions of Western European civilization—individual freedom and limitations upon government. It denied the rational assumptions on which democracy rests and came close to destroying Western civilization.

The defeat of Nazism by the Allied powers was followed by the division of Germany into two parts—the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. The German Federal Republic, commonly called West Germany, reintroduced constitutional and parliamentary government and in the last decade or so has enjoyed an unprecedented prosperity and political stability. The German Democratic Republic, under Communist rule, has been unable thus far to rival West Germany in economic prosperity, and its existence depends on Soviet support. At this point, the political future of Germany is a burning issue, and one not confined within the borders of the country. Conflict between the two Germanies, subsumed under the broader conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, may create tensions that will put an end to the democratic experiment of the Federal Republic. As in the past, democracy and parliamentary government retain a tenuous foothold.

The Soviet Union, naturally, presents a special case. Russia was an underdeveloped society governed by a despotic regime until the end of the nineteenth century. In 1917, after some half-hearted reforms had been made in the direction of parliamentary government and democratic freedoms, the Bolsheviks came to power. Inspired by Marxism, they introduced Communism to Russia and established a ruthless party dictatorship—under Lenin until 1924 and under Stalin until 1953. The major effort of the Communist Party has been devoted to the task of industrializing and modernizing what was primarily an agrarian society. This has meant that the Soviet Union has had to concentrate on building heavy industry, on speeding

up the process of urbanization, and on improving its educational system. Under an authoritarian government, the Soviet leaders greatly accelerated industrial development in the U.S.S.R., and now claim they will surpass even the United States in the near future. They have thus challenged not only the democratic West, but have provided a new model of development for the former colonial nations of the world.

The Soviet Union provides us with a political system that rivals democratic norms and values. Under Soviet totalitarianism, ultimate authority resides with a small elite within a one-party system, but the whole society is mobilized to attain certain goals. Social and political mobilization is achieved not only through terror but through the manipulation of a number of incentives—income, ideology, social mobility, and others. The Soviet system introduced new political techniques to achieve socialism rapidly, to gain in one generation what the West attained gradually and in the context of democratic values. In accomplishing this rapid modernization, the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union has been a "success," and we are today faced with a number of puzzling questions about the U.S.S.R. Is totalitarianism in the Soviet Union a permanent mode of government? Can totalitarianism be considered a transitional system that can lead a backward society rapidly toward modernization? Is totalitarianism likely to evolve gradually into an open society once the country is modernized and has gained prosperity and the comforting benefits of economic security?

Our task in this volume, then, is to analyze four political systems: the highly stable British parliamentary system, the unstable parliamentary institutions of the French Republic, the very recent development of a successful parliamentary democracy in West Germany, and the outright totalitarian system of the Soviet Union. Why and how shall we attempt to compare these four widely divergent systems?

I. COMPARISON

The whys of comparative politics are many and persuasive for student and teacher alike. Comparison, to begin with, for any student, and more particularly for the American college student, is like a *guided tour of foreign lands*. It shows that human beings living in different societies differ in their political behavior. They differ in the political values they hold dear; in the ways in which they apprehend each other and the outside world, in the manner in which they solve similar problems. Thus those who study comparative politics come to realize that health services may be a completely nationalized service in one country and based on one's ability to pay in another, that trains controlled and run by the government may be just as efficient as trains run by private companies, that individual liberties are highly valued in one system but that the interests of the group or the state are more esteemed in others. The student who reads about the governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan, or China begins to gain perspective on his own political system, to re-examine attitudes and practices long taken for granted, and to scrutinize his own political institutions and those of others. Habit and intellectual conformism give place to critical evaluation and appreciation, the mark of an educated man.

Political differences, naturally, raise the questions, "Why?" Why did Marxism strike such firm roots in the Soviet Union? Why have so many underdeveloped Asian societies flirted with Marxism or established one-party governments? Why has the parliamentary system brought stability to British politics but not to French politics? Why so many parties still in France but only two in England and, for that matter, in the United States and Japan? Why do certain peoples accept readily the

notion of state ownership and management of their economy and hold this compatible with democracy and freedom, while others do not? Finally, why do some political systems repudiate democracy and representative institutions while others deem them essential? To answer these questions, it is not adequate simply to recognize and list the individual differences that separate one political system from another. Descriptive identification of national differences is important, but not enough. We must also explain them. We must search for regularities and differences in political behavior and try to account for them.

The types of explanation we give to the national political differences we note may vary. In some cases, similarities or differences may be explained in terms of the history of the countries involved. For instance, it may well be that parliamentary institutions developed a remarkable viability in England because they were established before the Industrial Revolution. In France and Germany, on the other hand, industrialization preceded any very significant experience with parliamentary institutions. This is an essentially *historical* explanation.

Complementing the historical explanation, we have what may be called the *structural-functional* explanation. It views all political systems both in terms of certain common indispensable functions which must be performed—recruitment, communication, the maintenance of order, the adjudication of conflicts, etc.—and in terms of certain structures or institutions which perform them. In different political systems, a given function may be associated with quite different structures and institutions. For example, the adjudication of conflicts may be handled by a formal judiciary in one society and by private mediators, village elders, or a priesthood in others. Such differences may in turn be accounted for by variations in social and economic organization, in value systems and prevalent ideologies, or (and this approach is

far from incompatible with historical explanations) in specific historical circumstances.

If we were to compare, for instance, the political systems of certain underdeveloped countries that had formerly been colonies, a knowledge of the traditions and institutions implanted in each by their former imperial masters would be indispensable to an understanding of present differences. Thus, present political differences between Malaya and Indonesia to some extent relate to differences in the histories of the British and Dutch colonial systems. But beyond this they also relate to differences in social structure, population characteristics, levels of literacy, leadership characteristics, and economic circumstances in the two states. Similarly, differences between French and British parliamentary institutions relate to contemporary ideological variances, relative degrees of industrialization, different configurations of interest-groups, and a variety of other factors, in addition to historical differences.

The structural-functional approach, in other words, strives toward a sophisticated definition in depth of political systems, the identification of the most important institutions in each system, and the classification and explanation of their political differences and similarities. It leads us to formulate hypotheses about political behavior and governmental performance in terms of which we can compare diverse political systems. For instance, it might be posited that in societies lacking serious ideological conflicts with majority electoral systems, a two-party system will tend to develop. Or, it might be said that within a given society industrialization and prosperity will, all other conditions being equal, lead to a decrease in political conflicts over abstract or general issues and the development of a political system primarily concerned with the solution of concrete and specific problems. Again, it might be hypothesized that significant and sizable groups

II. BASIC CONCEPTS

The two basic considerations that have guided us in this volume are to analyze and study "behavior" and to describe and explain, if possible, "governmental action." The two are related. [By behavior we mean the large array of social, economic, cultural, psychological, and historical factors within which the government operates—the interests, the beliefs, the aspirations and goals, and the perception of the community itself, and the attitudes about the government that people in any given society have.] By "governmental action," on the other hand, we mean the specific political institutions and structures through which decisions are made and carried out. Specifically, we include the parties, the Legislature, the Executive, the Civil Service, and the Judiciary.]

The Political Culture

Conditions of governmental action are determined by the broad framework of the society as a whole. The family life; the way in which people earn a living; the manner in which income is distributed; the traditions of the past; the training, skills, and values that people get through the family, the school, or other organizations; the way and the manner in which people view the role and functions of government: all these things and many more constitute what we call the foundations of politics. Professor Aspaturian explains, for instance, that Russian dominance over all other ethnic groups in the Tsarist Empire continues to shape behavior today—it is a "foundation." Professor Macridis points to the most pervasive trait of French political history—lack of agreement on a Constitution—and tries to assess the importance of the actions taken by a small group of contemporary political

leaders to change this. The gradualist character of British politics, that Professor Finer describes, is based upon a set of behavior patterns; it is a foundation that makes for stability and hinders quick action. And Professor Deutsch shows the ambivalence of past traditions and habits in the German political history that makes it so difficult to predict trends, and even to identify them with any assurance.

It is impossible to encompass *all* the determinants of behavior and relate them to governmental action, even if we knew all about them. There is no doubt that they all have some relevance—but some have greater and others have less. We have to be arbitrary regarding what we choose and what we discard. Most behavior in any given society is apolitical. There is no society in which politics appears to be very exciting or interesting to more than a small minority. People are interested in other forms of self-expression: art, family life, economic production, sex, etc. *Behavior becomes politically relevant only when it is addressed to governmental action* demanding it or trying to impede it. The French farmers throw their produce in the Rhone River to force the government to do something about prices and each and every confrontation between "KKK" and "Black Power" advocates is very much related to competing attitudes and expectations about the government. Any form of behavior can assume at a given time a politically relevant character only to subside into an apolitical stance again. This is another reason why we cannot tell in advance what aspects of the total behavior are politically relevant and which ones are not.

But while virtually every and any kind of behavior in society *may* at any given time become politically relevant, some always are. [Those that are always politically relevant we call the "political culture." All beliefs, attitudes, and orientations about the organizations, the goals and scope of government action and the

manner of implementing them by the government constitute the political culture of a system. They tell us what people believe about their government, whether they value it or not, what limits, if any, they put upon its action and what they expect of it.

Political Culture and the "Constitution"

¹The basic political "act" (and for this reason one of the crucial topics in the history of political thought) is the creation of a government. For some, government has been established as a means to protect individual (often called "natural") rights, for others, to disarm the individual and establish a single police force to keep order and peace so that citizens might live to a ripe old age while pursuing their interests; for still others, the *raison d'être* of government has been to maximize the welfare of all, while yet another school of thought has seen in government the instrument by means of which a dominant group of persons may maintain their position of control.

The desire to set up a government implies an acceptance of some basic rules and procedures—what we commonly call a *constitution*. We should not take "constitution" in a restrictive literal sense to mean a document signed by those who drafted it, but rather to signify the embodiment, however tentative and fragmentary, of a desire on the part of a society to have some understanding about some rules that affect directly the way in which their government is organized and acts—about *what* their government should do, and *how*. When agreement relates to *what*, we say that this is a *substantive agreement*. For instance, it may be agreed that the government can raise an army and can levy taxes, or that the government cannot interfere with economic or religious freedoms. When we say that there is an agreement on *how*, we say that there is a *procedural agreement*. A constitu-

tion usually involves an agreement on *both* what and how. When a government has reached a very comprehensive and stable agreement on both of these, we see this as a sign of a "consensual" society; when agreement appears to be fragile and is not widespread, we talk about "nonconsensus" or "a low level of consensus"; if the conflict about the constitution is sharp, we speak of outright "dissensus." All literature on political culture is about the how and the what—even if it rarely mentions the word "constitution."

Few indeed are the societies that have attained full agreement on the procedures of governmental action and on its substance. Even among the oldest and most developed polities (four of which we discuss in this volume) such a comprehensive agreement is rare. France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union have not fully attained it yet. Only England is a consensual society; the others exhibit either a limited consensus or a low level of consensus, and have often experienced civil war. Professor Aspaturian constantly tries to show the progress made in the direction of consensus-building in the Soviet Union, while Professor Macridis indicates the still fragmented character of the French society and tries to identify the factors that may lead to consensus. So long as an answer has not been given to the problem of German reunification, consensus in West Germany is, at best, conditional.

Two "Models"

"Agreement," or lack of it, then, is the most important trait of the political culture. It relates, as we have already pointed out to some extent, to attitudes and beliefs—a complex set of psychological orientations, to be sure—about the government. More specifically, these orientations involve the following: (a) the degree and extent of individual acceptance and obedience; (b) the degree and extent to which the

individual values the government as an instrument through which he can satisfy interests and demands; and (c) the degree and extent to which the individual considers that he can play an active role in promoting or impeding governmental actions.

✓ *Acceptance and obedience.* The individual does not entertain the thought of leaving and usually finds the system in which he lives to be the best. Many of the rules limiting or supporting governmental action have become more or less part of his own personal life. He knows and *accepts* what he is not supposed to do, and gladly does what he is asked to do. He does not have to be forced to do one and avoid the other. The use of governmental force to exert compliance is almost alien to such a system. It is like an insurance policy people take in case an individual might resort to a private use of force. Constraints and supports are "*internalized*."

✓ *Instrumental character.* Wherever "problems" develop, internal or external, the individual expects that the government ought to take action. Unemployment, air pollution, urban squalor, low income for some—are problems that concerted action through the government can settle. This does not mean that government is considered to be the exclusive instrumentality for their solution, but is accepted as one—the most important one.

✓ *Role of the individual.* The individual takes it for granted that he is an active participant in the system. He can demand things from the government and he can, in case it fails, change those that make the decisions.

The perfect model of a consensual society, then, is one in which the people *value, accept,* and *use* the government according to widely accepted and internalized rules. And it follows that the model *nonconsensual* society has a government which operates either under no rules, or else under rules that are not valued or accepted; one that is not considered an instrumentality for the solution of problems; and

finally, one that the individual either does not want to use or is unable to use for the solution of such problems. There is no consensus, and therefore no government except one that relies upon outright force.

Neither of the two models exists in reality. Disagreements about the scope of governmental action (substantive rules) and about the manner of governmental action (procedural rules) are always prevalent. In every society a minimum (even if highly fragile) agreement on certain rules—substantive and procedural—exists. For instance, the Communist Party is developing some rules guiding the dismissal of its leaders and the appointment of new ones, and the crux of the Fifth Republic is whether De Gaulle's successor will be allowed to use the powers De Gaulle disposes of. No serious disagreements seem to disturb the serene façade of the British constitution, but the discontent with economic policy and the decline of British power indicate potential sources of friction.

This book is directly addressed to the study of consensus and dissensus. The social structure, the ideology, the configuration of interest, and the organization of the economy are discussed at length, not because they have a political character in themselves, but because they relate to major political orientations and governmental action. A number of hypotheses are implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, made by the authors. One can be summed up very crudely as follows: Societies with an uneventful history tend to be consensual. To put it bluntly, in societies that have not experienced invasion of their territory, or frequent and immediate threats upon their territorial integrity, the people are likely to have developed habits and attitudes that account for a benevolent attitude toward their government. Interestingly enough, England, the United States, Switzerland, and some of the Scandinavian countries fit this proposition.

The reader should not rush to the conclu-

sion, however, that all societies that have not been invaded or have not experienced continuing threats upon their territorial integrity are consensual. Other requirements are necessary, and Professor Finer discusses them in pointing out that, for example, the British government and the rules surrounding it show two rather distinct features: they are old and have changed gradually. Parliamentary monarchy is perhaps as old as the Magna Carta, but it came into its own only at the close of the seventeenth century. Within its form, new forces were poured to mould the constitution—but the fundamental dispositions of the individual toward the government were not radically altered. Gradually, through their government, the people began to participate and express their demands and ask for solutions to the problems that began to emerge. Rarely in British history was the government openly defied. When serious economic and social problems emerged, the attitudes of the people crystallized into an acceptance of their government—a willingness to obey, to value, and to use. These attitudes were shared by all, so that they shaped and often overcame the intensity of conflict. When for instance the interests of the landowners and the middle classes were sharply at odds, conflict was imminent. One group argued for high agricultural tariffs to protect their produce from imports, and the other for no tariffs so as to import foodstuffs and sell them cheaply—and thus pay low wages. The conflict was settled by Parliament, and the landowners gave in rather than defy the system they valued highly.

Contrast the British situation with those of France, the Soviet Union, and Germany. All three political societies have been only too frequently invaded, all of them have experienced drastic changes in their rules concerning the actions and limits of government (i.e., their constitutions), in all of them, participation of the citizens to express their interests and satisfy their demands through the government has at

times been denied or impeded. In all three of them, the citizens have at one time or another been unable to use the government and rely upon it in order to solve their problems. Only too frequently, conflicts of interest and class, *instead of being settled by the government within the framework of the constitution, have spilled over into conflicts about the constitution.* And, as different constitutions have succeeded each other (this has been the case in France, and in part in Germany), or, as people have felt that their interests and demands could not be settled through the government (the case in Russia before and perhaps up to a certain point, even after the Revolution of 1917), apathy, indifference, or downright hostility have followed

Conflict and Interest

In all societies at all times, one of the most prevalent phenomena is conflict concerning things people want or value. This is the guts of politics—not because all conflicts become political and invite government action, but because the most important ones do. These latter are generally the ones that relate to the allocations of scarce resources, the distribution of power, the fulfillment of expectations, and the maintenance of things that are highly valued

CLASS CONFLICT. Because even the wealthiest society will manufacture symbols and artifacts that cannot be shared by all, conflict is not limited to the area of material resources only. The dream of a classless society may come true, but that of a conflictless one is hard to imagine. Let us limit our discussion to internal conflicts, even though international ones certainly affect very seriously both consensus and governmental action. There are enough illustrations we can use from every political system we examine. To cite a few examples: a tiny minority may own the land, and the great majority labor on it as agricultural workers or tenant

ner in which the conflict will be resolved depends upon the political culture. In a consensual society where the government is valued and the level of participation is high, the solution will come from the government in the form of a decision that is legitimate. Where consensus is low or nonexistent, the government may be unable to solve the conflict, and in fact may become its victim, this was the case with France a number of times, with the Tsarist government, and with a number of regimes in Germany.

Interest and in general, group action is then interwoven with the political culture. An interest that accepts its basic values becomes "politicized," or, rather, domesticated, in the sense that it will attempt to realize its goals in a manner compatible with the set of values and procedures we called the political culture. But interest-group behavior, as well as the behavior of social classes and status groups, help in turn to shape the political culture. By shedding their absolute and rigid demands, they accept and invite the mediation of the government. In England this has been the case over a long period of time. In France, on the contrary, interests shaped their posture in terms that brooked no compromise, and the lack of an agreement on the limits and procedures of governmental action gave them a free hand. Continuity of a stable governmental form in the one case, and sharp discontinuities in the other, account for the different way in which interests act.

But the political culture accounts for more. Participation in and acceptance of the government in England has given to the interest groups—and this is the case with the United States, too—a feeling of effectiveness which has generated a better organization and a greater degree of participation. On the other hand, until recently, recurrent conflicts and distrust of the government created apathy, disinterest, and opposition to government action in France and in Russia. Professor Finer points to the large

membership, strong organization, and effectiveness of the British interest-groups, and Professor Macridis to their fragmentation, lack of organization, and relative ineffectiveness (at least until very recently) in France. Professors Deutsch and Aspaturian indicate that there are the beginnings of mutual trust between government and interest groups in both the Soviet Union and Germany.

The Political Traits of Pluralism

Before we discuss the ultimate purpose of interest-group action—power—it may be well to raise another important question: Does the variety and number of interest groups tell us something about the political culture? No individual has one single preoccupation or goal. Each one of us has in fact many: to keep our church going; to see that our tennis club flourishes; to meet with fellow veterans and students; to see that our air is not polluted and that our insurance companies charge less. The more advanced economically the society, the greater the number of occupations, the greater the congeries of interests, and the broader the horizon of goals that can be attained. If you belong to only one organization—church, party, or interest-group—your life is committed to it, you would consider the defense of your groups to be your own defense and its success your success; further, you would be prone to develop a state of mind (we can call it an ideology) that fully identifies with the objectives of your own group and tolerates no others. However, if you belong to many groups and associations you are bound to give to each and all a lower degree of commitment and identification, to balance within your own mind the various manifestations of the interests involved, to consider your attachments a matter of more-or-less, rather than everything or nothing, and finally, you are likely to establish priorities of loyalty that do not call for one choice to the exclusion of oth-

ers. A man who belongs to many groups is the best representative of the Aristotelian middle virtue. He is neither a hero nor a scoundrel, but a moderate man who does not like excesses and can balance and compromise his many interests and loyalties. He is also open-minded because, knowing his own many interests and loyalties, he understands and tolerates those of others. Hence he becomes a tolerant man. Such a man is the exact opposite of the man that, according to Professor Macridis, the French Revolution fashioned; he is the exact opposite of the revolutionary envisioned by Lenin, as Professor Aspaturian portrays him, or of a German Nazi. He is fairly close to the tolerant and judicious Britisher who shuns extremes and who since the early days of the nineteenth century has virtually excluded violence as a form of political expression. Even at the risk of being tautological, we shall say this about a society in which there are many interest groups (in the broad sense in which we have defined "interest"): that it is, or at least is likely to be, an open democratic society characterized by a high degree of consensus.

The Configuration of Power

Interest groups and all associations are the *dramatis personae* of politics. Always "on stage," they act not for applause but for influence, which is their central goal no matter how they couch it. Influence is simply the ability to make somebody else do what you want him to do—and if you have that ability you have power. The tyrant who can order a person over the cliff has power only if he is able to influence his officials to push the man over the cliff. He cannot do it himself, since it is quite likely that at least some of his victims or one of his officials may be stronger physically than he is. A tyrant is strong only if his followers obey—and only if he can make them obey him. He must develop a network of influence

through which his command can be made to stick.¹

The same applies to all groups and government officials. The KKK in the South cannot rely upon force (though they do not avoid it) in order to "keep the Negro in his place." It must create a state of mind that will be receptive to its goals. It must influence as many people as possible. But the same thing is true for "Black Power," General de Gaulle, the leaders of the Soviet Union, the British Prime Minister, and the German Chancellor. Their power is commensurate with their influence. (Even the most "powerful" office in the world, that of the President of the United States, is subject to the same rule, despite its formidable prerogatives.)

If power, then, is influence over others, what are its most important instruments? Political power, the central phenomenon of politics, stems almost always from extra-political sources. Its ingredients throughout the ages have not differed very much. Power stems from *wealth*, from *status*, from control over *the means of coercion*, and from *support*. The first three are easy to identify.

WEALTH. The man of wealth can influence others directly or indirectly. He can "buy" followers, or coerce by threatening deprivations, but more often his influence is indirect: he can play a role behind the stage and tell some of the important actors—the policeman, the judge, the legislator, the civil servant, or even the Cabinet Ministers, up to the very top—what to do. Very often he will not allow others to get up on the stage and vie for influence. The basic cause of the Bolshevik Revolution was the unwillingness of those who held power (the aristocracy, supported by some other groups), to let the common people (the merchants, workers, and farmers) to get up on the political stage.

¹Without attempting to be paradoxical, this is the basic reason why tyrants are really weak and why they do not live long!

STATUS What has made wealth extremely influential is that it "legitimized" itself, both politically and socially. A wealthy man was portrayed as a good man or a superior man. The poor and the many learned to respect him and defer to him. The Protestant Ethic in England, in this country, and also in Holland and some of the Scandinavian countries, created a mythology that equated wealth with goodness or virtue. Therefore, the wealthy man acceded also to the second ingredient of power: *status*. People deferred to him, or—to put it more mildly—he could influence people because they had been taught to respect him. Status and position in the government went hand-in-hand. Since the wealthy man was competent and wise, who could govern better than he who knew how to take care of his affairs best?

The wealthy man and the government official often became one, and in Great Britain (at least until the turn of the nineteenth century) this was taken for granted. After the Crimean War, for instance, it was argued in England that it was perfectly proper for "gentlemen" to "buy" commissions because the country could be best defended by those who had a stake in it and therefore a great interest in preserving it—the wealthy. In the Soviet Union this was the accepted arrangement until the Bolshevik Revolution. In France and Germany, however, although seriously defended over a long period of time, the combination of status and wealth was never fully accepted. All our authors take particular pains to find out what are the status groups and what, if any, is the role of wealth, in each country studied herein. They do so because they are trying to find exactly where the power, in the sense in which we defined it, lies.

The holders of status and wealth (i.e., power) were able to pass it on from generation to generation. Wealth begets wealth, and status begets status—at least in the vast majority of

cases. Leadership remained ascriptive: people usually were born into it. Political competition was for long a sham, for even if new actors were allowed on the stage, they were assigned clearly subordinate roles.

INSTRUMENTS OF COERCION. The holders of status and wealth often managed to control the third ingredient of power, the instruments of coercion. The most important among them have been the police and the Army, and in many countries the Judiciary. For a long period of time—and again, the political history of the four countries we are studying tells the story—wealth, status groups, and the Army were in the same hands. The British "squire" was the judge and the most powerful political boss in the village, and it is enough to read any nineteenth-century Russian novel to know who really made the decisions: it was the landowner, the aristocrat, and the officer-gentleman. Even in France, despite the Revolution of 1789, those who recovered their land and their title of nobility became mayors or at least controlled the mayors in the rural areas. The Army officer corps, recruited from among the wealthy and the status groups, became an effective instrument with which to inculcate obedience and distil deference on the part of the common people to those who held power.

SUPPORT Status, wealth, the control of the instruments of coercion—the three most common ingredients of power—began to be undermined by the middle of the nineteenth century, and definitely blunted with the turn of the century. The growth of the population and the rise of new occupational groups spurred by the Industrial Revolution began to weaken the control of the landowning aristocracy and the wealthy. The slogan of the French Revolution and the success of the American experiment provided important ideological weapons to the new social groups. They demanded access to pol-

itics. In some countries they were excluded, but in others they were grudgingly admitted. Soon the mass of industrial workers began to press upon the stage. It was at this juncture (somewhere between 1870 and 1910), that political organization and massive political participation began to delineate the present-day source of political power: *support*. Leadership no longer remained ascriptive, nor could it rely exclusively upon status, wealth and force; it shifted to those with the ability to command the support of large groups of people.

The transition from the limited and exclusive instrumentalities of power to that of popular support is not only fascinating, but tells us a lot about the political cultures of the systems we study. To put it simply, in Russia the transition took place by violence and has not as yet been fully realized. The wealthy and the status groups, unwilling to make concessions, were challenged by force and ousted, to be replaced by an organization (the Communist Party) that claims popular support and solicits it, but has not as yet fully institutionalized it. In England, on the other hand, the transition took place smoothly and gradually. As Professor Finer shows, many symbols of status have been maintained there, but influence and power has shifted to the party that has the majority in Parliament, and to its leaders. In France the violent conflicts of the nineteenth century made the transition difficult. The result was that even when all were given the freedom to organize, form political parties, and support their political leaders, sections of the population demurred—the conservatives rejecting the Republic, and the workers distrusting it. In Germany the same was true. But both Professor Macridis and Professor Deutsch point out that present developments indicate a growing attachment to the logic of popular support. So we can again offer a proposition: *The system in which the transition from the old status groups to popular support took place gradually and without*

violence has a consensual political culture in which support has become the mainspring and source of power.

Just as "power" stemming from wealth and status came to be structured and organized in different ways, popular support has come to take different forms and has generated new roles and groups that have replaced the old status groups. For the "people" cannot give or withhold their support without preparation, education, organization, and information. *The dominant institution through which the people give or withhold their support is the party, and the new "influential" groups that have emerged are the party leaders, the organizers, the manipulators.* These are the new "elite" groups that we discuss at some length in this volume.

III. POLITICAL PARTIES

We have discussed thus far the "foundations" of politics—the political culture, the interest articulation, the configuration of power, and the ingredients of political power. They are directly related to politics because they both invite and shape governmental action. The link between the "political culture" and the "government" is the political party. The party has become a ubiquitous organization, and all four sections of this book devote long chapters to the study of their history, functioning, and role. The reader who covers these sections will have studied *three* major party systems: the British two-party one, the French and to some extent the German multiparty system, and the Soviet one-party system. Although these three do not exhaust the variety and the diversity of party systems, they nonetheless give us adequate material with which to speculate and generalize about parties.

Interests, we have seen, are demands, and in one or the other manner seek satisfaction in the form of governmental action. The way to gain it

is to get power. With the disappearance of the old status groups, or at least with the significant erosion of their position, power has shifted to those who receive support. With the growth and diversification of interests in an industrial society, no single interest has the remotest chance of providing singly the needed support. The use of force is very uneconomical, and persuasion appears to be the most acceptable channel. Thus interests must unite, and must convince as many persons and groups as possible about the validity of their demands. This has become the most general form of political activity, especially in the political systems we are studying here—including the Soviet Union. It takes place through the political party.

The party represents interest, aggregates it, mobilizes it, provides for possibilities of compromise among competing ones, converts it into policy and, finally, recruits the political leaders who, by assuming control of governmental offices translate it into governmental action. The party is like a train—interests and demands feed its engine; it converts it into energy and drives the government to a predetermined place. The analogy, like all analogies, must, of course, be taken with a grain of salt—very often the place where the party wants to go to is not so definite as Grand Central Station, and quite frequently the party leader takes liberties with the *program of the party* that no self-respecting conductor would or can afford to take, with regard to the destination of the train.

Representation of Interest

To exert influence, the interests must make the government act or not act; they must either control it or greatly influence it. To do this, they must find a way to make the people vote for the candidates for government positions likely to be most in tune with them. To

select such a government they must "appeal to the public" and spread their net as wide as possible and persuade as many people as possible that the particular candidates for governmental position are the best possible candidates *for the country as a whole*. It is at this stage that the party steps in. The party men become a critically important link between the government and the interests—solidly planted in both, or at least carefully looking in both directions; it bridges the two. The party assumes the function of a spokesman for one, or rather, for many interests—the farmers, the trade unions, the pacifists, the veterans, etc. It speaks for each of them, but in order to be fairly successful, it must also speak for all of them. Thus the representative function is not to be construed in literal terms—otherwise there would be a party for every interest and a single interest for every party.

Aggregation and Brokerage

The party attempts to bring together and represent as many interests as possible—but it is not a mere piling up or juxtaposition of interests. It would be hard, for instance, for the party to advocate at one and the same time racial equality (as a spokesman of the Negro) and racial supremacy (as a spokesman of the Southern or perhaps the suburbanite white). It would be hard for the British Labour Party to speak for both free enterprise and welfare benefits for all workers. It would be also difficult for a party that wishes to win popular support to take a very rigid ideological position on any given issue, even in the Soviet Union, where there is only one party, the Communist Party is unwilling to adhere to a rigid ideological position, and the French parties are finding it increasingly difficult to both maintain ideological orthodoxy and gain popular support. The party must find an area—as large as possible—where there is a congruence of in-

terests: better housing, higher wages, urban renewal, improved education, increased welfare benefits, for instance. The party, in other words, must compromise in order to represent. It acts as a broker. It takes more from one and less from another to give each as much as possible without alienating any. It not only aggregates, but synthesizes the various interests and demands into one product that the greatest possible number of consumers will buy at the political supermarket—the election. The product is the program, a set of promises of what the government will do and what it will not do.

Mobilization

But interest, at least in the narrow sense of the term (economic interest) is not always as aggressive as people think. And interest in its broadest sense (purpose) may slumber for a long time. The party, under the appropriate conditions and circumstances, mobilizes and awakens both. Interest and purpose, thanks to the party, move from a state of latency into actualization. We shall see how a small movement in France crystallized what was a diffuse discontent among the small merchants and artisans into a party that gained over 2 million votes. Professor Finer shows how the interests of the workers in the trade unions were mobilized thanks to the Socialist intellectuals—whose purpose was the construction of a new society—to form the Labour Party. Thus the party plays a creative role: it evokes response to demands or goals that have not as yet fully developed. In so doing, the party also restructures support and invites new forms of governmental action.

Clarification of Issues and Selection of the Government

It is the platform that provides the ultimate synthesis and evokes participation and

support. But this depends upon the party system. Under a multiparty system like the French one, the platform appeared often as an ideological statement rather than a careful compromise among interests. Under two-party systems, the parties appear to be more pragmatic and more comprehensive. The differences stem in part from the underlying motives for which popular support is sought. In a two-party system, like the British one, while clarification of issues is important, perhaps even more important is the election of a government—and at times of one man. An intensely ideological and partisan position will make victory difficult; a comprehensive and pragmatic one will make it easier to produce a larger and more attractive package. In a multiparty system, on the other hand, an election often amounts to selecting only representatives who will in turn attempt, on the basis of their own compromises and agreements, to form a cabinet—i.e., nominate the government. The parties in a multiparty situation, therefore, try to maintain their electoral clientele by the specific appeal to specific interests and ideologies. This has been the case with many of the parties in France under the Fourth Republic.

The purpose of the reform which provides for the direct election of the French President by popular vote is precisely to break up the exclusiveness of many of the parties and force them to coalesce around two candidates, so support may be linked directly to the power of the President. This was also the purpose of electoral reform in West Germany. The more the parties are involved in the direct selection of the President or a government (as in the U.S.A., England, and recently in Germany and perhaps France), the more comprehensive is their appeal, and progressively the less ideological are they bound to be over a given period of time. (Occasional ideological flare-ups cannot, of course, be avoided—in England or in the United States.) In contrast, the greater the

preoccupation of the parties with securing a representation in the legislature in order to participate with others in the formation of a government, the greater is their commitment to special electoral clientele, and the greater their propensity toward ideological orthodoxy.

[The parties of the two-party system recruit and train leaders and finally make it possible for them to gain popular support and govern. In the multiparty system, emphasis is put on representation and deliberation, and not on government.]

Recruitment

The same is true for recruitment. The two-party system trains its members over a long period of time for governmental tasks. From the moment the "backbencher" (as Professor Finer calls the party member with little status and influence) enters the House of Commons, *his eye is set upon the Treasury bench—the place reserved for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Members. His performance, his loyalty to the party, his ability to gain the support of his associates, will slowly bring him closer to it.* Every Member of Parliament is preoccupied with what the Government does. Legislation is taken for granted, and deliberation is relatively unimportant. The important thing is to govern, and for the Opposition party to replace the Government. The Soviet Communist Party recruits for the same ultimate purpose. The rules and the criteria of performance differ, but the purpose is to make room for, and finally to select, the men who will gain the top decision-making jobs and govern under the scrutiny of the party.

The same concern with recruitment does not apply to the multiparty systems, notably with France and Germany under the Weimar Republic. First, because it was and continues to be unlikely for one party to gain a majority and thus make it possible for its leaders to govern, secondly because the party leader was not allowed to gain ascendancy within the party, and thirdly because the legislatures distrusted government leadership, and through rules and procedures not only discouraged but discredited it as well.

IV. THE GOVERNMENT

Interests and demands, acting through the political party, try to grab the leverage of power: the government. Even when limits are imposed upon it, even when there are sharp constitutional restrictions upon what it can do, even if its functions are internally divided, the prize is worth having. For, invariably, what the government can do is much more than what it is prevented from doing. This is a generalization that the student must take for granted. *All governments are becoming more comprehensive in their functions, and more powerful in implementing them.*

In the systems we discuss here, government has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the executive branch. In all of them, there has been a corresponding diminution of legislative powers and functions. The British system may well be the prototype, since the functions of the legislature have become increasingly restricted to criticism on the part of the Opposition. Even the French legislature finds itself become increasingly a forum—indulging in a debate between the "majority" and "the opposition"—or, more accurately, "the oppositions."

The Executive

The executive arm of the government includes the institutions formally responsible for governing a political community and applying its binding decisions, to the formulation of which the executive institution may themselves contribute a greater or lesser share. The structure,

terests: better housing, higher wages, urban renewal, improved education, increased welfare benefits, for instance. The party, in other words, must compromise in order to represent. It acts as a broker. It takes more from one and less from another to give each as much as possible without alienating any. It not only aggregates, but synthesizes the various interests and demands into one product that the greatest possible number of consumers will buy at the political supermarket—the election. The product is the program, a set of promises of what the government will do and what it will not do.

Mobilization

But interest, at least in the narrow sense of the term (economic interest) is not always as aggressive as people think. And interest in its broadest sense (purpose) may slumber for a long time. The party, under the appropriate conditions and circumstances, mobilizes and awakens both. Interest and purpose, thanks to the party, move from a state of latency into actualization. We shall see how a small movement in France crystallized what was a diffuse discontent among the small merchants and artisans into a party that gained over 2 million votes. Professor Finer shows how the interests of the workers in the trade unions were mobilized thanks to the Socialist intellectuals—whose purpose was the construction of a new society—to form the Labour Party. Thus the party plays a creative role: it evokes response to demands or goals that have not as yet fully developed. In so doing, the party also restructures support and invites new forms of governmental action.

Clarification of Issues and Selection of the Government

It is the platform that provides the ultimate synthesis and evokes participation and

support. But this depends upon the party system. Under a multiparty system like the French one, the platform appeared often as an ideological statement rather than a careful compromise among interests. Under two-party systems, the parties appear to be more pragmatic and more comprehensive. The differences stem in part from the underlying motives for which popular support is sought. In a two-party system, like the British one, while clarification of issues is important, perhaps even more important is the election of a government—and at times of one man. An intensely ideological and partisan position will make victory difficult; a comprehensive and pragmatic one will make it easier to produce a larger and more attractive package. In a multiparty system, on the other hand, an election often amounts to selecting only representatives who will in turn attempt, on the basis of their own compromises and agreements, to form a cabinet—i.e., nominate the government. The parties in a multiparty situation, therefore, try to maintain their electoral clientele by the specific appeal to specific interests and ideologies. This has been the case with many of the parties in France under the Fourth Republic.

The purpose of the reform which provides for the direct election of the French President by popular vote is precisely to break up the exclusiveness of many of the parties and force them to coalesce around two candidates, so support may be linked directly to the power of the President. This was also the purpose of electoral reform in West Germany. The more the parties are involved in the direct selection of the President or a government (as in the U.S.A., England, and recently in Germany and perhaps France), the more comprehensive is their appeal, and progressively the less ideological are they bound to be over a given period of time. (Occasional ideological flare-ups cannot, of course, be avoided—in England or in the United States.) In contrast, the greater the

preoccupation of the parties with securing a representation in the legislature in order to participate with others in the formation of a government, the greater is their commitment to special electoral clientele, and the greater their propensity toward ideological orthodoxy.

{The parties of the two-party system recruit and train leaders and finally make it possible for them to gain popular support and govern. In the multiparty system, emphasis is put on representation and deliberation, and not on government }

Recruitment

The same is true for recruitment. The two-party system trains its members over a long period of time for governmental tasks. From the moment the "backbencher" (as Professor Finer calls the party member with little status and influence) enters the House of Commons, his eye is set upon the Treasury bench—the place reserved for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Members. His performance, his loyalty to the party, his ability to gain the support of his associates, will slowly bring him closer to it. Every Member of Parliament is preoccupied with what the Government does. Legislation is taken for granted, and deliberation is relatively unimportant. The important thing is to govern, and for the Opposition party to replace the Government. The Soviet Communist Party recruits for the same ultimate purpose. The rules and the criteria of performance differ, but the purpose is to make room for, and finally to select, the men who will gain the top decision-making jobs and govern under the scrutiny of the party.

The same concern with recruitment does not apply to the multiparty systems, notably with France and Germany under the Weimar Republic. First, because it was and continues to be unlikely for one party to gain a majority and thus make it possible for its leaders to govern; secondly because the party leader was not allowed to gain ascendancy within the party; and thirdly because the legislatures distrusted government leadership, and through rules and procedures not only discouraged but discredited it as well.

IV. THE GOVERNMENT

Interests and demands, acting through the political party, try to grab the leverage of power: the government. Even when limits are imposed upon it, even when there are sharp constitutional restrictions upon what it can do, even if its functions are internally divided, the prize is worth having. For, invariably, what the government can do is much more than what it is prevented from doing. This is a generalization that the student must take for granted: *All governments are becoming more comprehensive in their functions, and more powerful in implementing them*.

In the systems we discuss here, government has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the executive branch. In all of them, there has been a corresponding diminution of legislative powers and functions. The British section may well be the prototype, since the functions of the legislature have become increasingly restricted to criticism on the part of the Opposition. Even the French legislature finds itself become increasingly a forum—indulging in a debate between the "majority" and "the opposition"—or, more accurately, "the oppositions."

The Executive

The executive arm of the government includes the institutions formally responsible for governing a political community and applying its binding decisions, to the formulation of which the executive institution may themselves contribute a greater or lesser share. The structure,

function, and character of the executive have varied widely over time, and no single conceptual framework will disclose all of those changes and their consequences for the present. Yet certain fundamentals are clear, and on these we can concentrate our attention. The two most prevalent structural forms of the executive are the Presidential and the cabinet systems. The source of executive power has shifted from hereditary right, cooptation, and the use of force, to support—through election, either direct or indirect. The primary functions of the executive have become increasingly carried out by specialized structures: today representation, leadership, deliberation, decision-making, control and supervision of subordinate decision-making, and enforcement are the principal functions of the executive.

The executive office (the President's Office or the Prime Minister and his Cabinet) is responsible for the overall performance of the functions associated with it. The number of officials is generally small—20 or at most 30. If we include top Civil Service personnel, heads of planning agencies and nationalized industries, top scientists, and defense officials who participate in deliberation and decision-making, the number rarely goes beyond 100. While the executive is a collective entity, ultimate responsibility for decision-making is sometimes lodged in the hands of one man. This is notably the case with Presidential systems, and in many of the cabinet systems where a well-disciplined party controls a majority in the legislature. In a totalitarian one-party system like the Soviet one the leader of the party is either in law or in fact (and often in both) in charge of the executive. On the other hand, in a number of multi-party parliamentary democracies, notably in the Scandinavian countries, the coalition cabinets account for a genuine collegiality of decision-making and responsibility. In fact, viewed from the point of decision-making and responsibility, and depending upon the formal constitutional

arrangements, the prevalent norms in the society, and adventitious factors such as personality and circumstances, there is a continuum between genuine one-man rule and genuine collegiality. The structures are generally flexible enough to allow for one or the other, and for a movement from the one in the direction of the other within the same political system. (This, incidentally, is true both for Cabinet and for Presidential systems.)

Despite these formal differences, universal suffrage, the growth of national parties, and the progressive adoption of a majority electoral system account for striking similarities. In Presidential or cabinet systems the immediate source of executive power is support—election and party. In the cabinet system, the leader of the majority party becomes Prime Minister. If the party is disciplined, it is unlikely, as we shall see, that it will overthrow the Prime Minister. Thus while the Prime Minister is technically responsible to the legislature, he is just as immune to it as the President. In the one-party totalitarian systems that have adopted the cabinet system—and again we use the Soviet Union as the prototype—it is the party that sustains executive leadership. As long as the leader controls the party (as Stalin did) or is accepted by the higher party echelons, (the Central Committee and the Politburo) he also controls, as Professor Asparutian points out, the legislature, and is technically immune from legislative scrutiny. If there are dissensions within the party or if the leader loses his support in the Politburo and Central Committee, he can no longer hold his position. (This is what happened to Khrushchev.)

Many trends since World War II account for the reinforcement of the political executive. Among them, the most significant ones are the widespread adoption of the majority electoral system and constitutional reforms establishing the ascendancy of the executive over the legislature. The two most notable cases are West

Germany and France, which we discuss. In West Germany, proportional representation was greatly modified by the requirement that half the members of the legislature be elected by majority vote. Executive stability and independence were strengthened by the provision that the Chancellor cannot be removed from office by an adverse vote of the legislature unless it is accompanied by a positive vote in favor of a successor. In France, proportional representation in legislative elections was abandoned in 1958. In the Presidential election, if none of the candidates receives an absolute majority on the first ballot, then the contest is narrowed to only two candidates on the second. As for executive-legislative relations, Parliament was "rationalized" stringent restrictions were placed on the vote of censure by the National Assembly, the executive was given control over legislative business and legislation, the committee system was simplified and the powers of the committees drastically reduced, and the President was given the right to dissolve the National Assembly and call for an election.

The trend has been significantly the same in Great Britain, where the control of the executive over Parliament is made effective through the control of the majority party, and in the United States, where legislative initiative has passed into the hands of the Chief Executive, and party discipline in Congress has been greatly tightened.

From an organizational viewpoint, all executive structures of the countries we discuss in this volume display striking similarities. The Prime Minister or President is surrounded by concentric circles of advisers, and staff and line agencies. The first is the immediate circle of personal advisers and liaison agents, the second consists of specialized coordinating agencies with functions that cut across departmental or ministerial responsibilities (economic planning, national security, atomic energy, space pro-

grams, administrative re-organization); the third is the Cabinet, consisting of top officials responsible for policy-making and administration of functionally defined governmental activities (foreign affairs, trade, labor, welfare, defense); a fourth circle consists of an increasing number of independent or semi-independent agencies with regulatory and supervisory responsibilities, some of which operate or control economic services.

Functions of the Political Executive

The political system, as we have pointed out, is a mechanism through which interests and demands are translated into decisions. Since the political executive plays an important role in transforming interests and demands into decisions, it has, first and foremost, decision-making functions. It is the most important organ within the government. However, since it also represents and accommodates major social and interest groupings, it plays an integrative role as well. And in addition to being the central policymaking organ, it also supervises and controls all the subordinate deliberative and enforcement organs.

DECISION-MAKING AND DELIBERATION. Political theory has long distinguished between legislative and executive acts. This formal distinction is no longer adequate. First, the political executive at the head of the party dominates the legislature. Secondly, it possesses independent powers—for instance, in foreign policy and defense. Thirdly, the practice of delegated legislation has given vast, albeit subordinate, legislative powers to the executive. Finally, the law enacted by the legislature is initiated, prepared, and drafted by the political executive, policy initiation has become an executive prerogative. In the totalitarian systems that have adopted cabinet government, legisla-

tive scrutiny is of no significance. Generally, this is virtually the case with all cabinet systems that have a strongly disciplined party system. Only in the United States does the legislature continue to have genuinely independent power of legislative scrutiny and initiative.

In order to initiate, decide, and act, the executive must deliberate. As a result intelligence, fact-finding, liaison, and staff agencies have mushroomed. This has been the case particularly with new governmental activities that do not fit the traditional organization of the executive into Departments and Ministries: problems of economic planning and supervision; coordinating the preparation of budgetary policy; providing administrative reform to create new structures that can cope with new functions; and considering national security matters from a variety of governmental points of view. Thus new layers of agencies and offices have developed to constitute what is now called the Office of the President or the Office of the Prime Minister. The trend is universal, but it is especially clear in developed societies where industrialization has created the imperative of regulation, and international conflict has emphasized coordination and preparedness for quick action. It also reflects a concomitant trend in favor of developing new procedures to provide for deliberation prior to a decision. Given the sheer bulk of matters that call for a decision, and the need for specific knowledge and information in order to make one, decision-making becomes a matter of following deliberative and consultative processes.

SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT. While the classic distinction between deliberation (legislature) and execution (executive) is no longer tenable, it is still true that the political executive is the agency of execution in the narrow sense. It supervises and controls all subordinate organs. However, execution, properly speaking, is within the purview of the bureauc-

racy. Executive decisions are general and comprehensive in scope, and their detailed implementation is in the hands of the Civil Service and the various subordinate agencies. The political executive remains, however, responsible for the organization and reorganization of the machinery of government. It can create and reorganize departments and agencies, establish the rules of advancement and recruitment within the Civil Service, and set down procedures for making subordinate decisions. Ultimate responsibility for lack of efficient execution will be focused upon the political executive.

Executive Restraints¹ and Responsibility²

The growth of executive power and the increasing scope of initiative and decision-making calls for a discussion of the existing restraints and of the manner in which responsibility is institutionalized.

The restraints appear to be relatively few: first, there is the burden of persuading the elite, common to all political Executives, including totalitarian ones. Secondly, there are systemic restraints: no leader can attempt a synthesis of policy objectives and goals that does not reflect up to a certain point the existing demands and aspirations of the community. To go too far in suggesting policy goals is to become separated from supporters; to stand still is to alienate the interests and the demands that could provide for support. To be effective and to gain approbation and support, the executive must gear its actions to the interests and demands within the system. As was pointed out earlier, the limits of initiative and freedom of action may be wide, and it is the task of leadership to discover them. But failure to do so, or miscalculation, may lead to disapproval and rejection. Third, there are various types of constitutional and procedural limitations that trace the contours of executive

power and provide for executive responsibility. We already mentioned the formal responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature. In Presidential systems (e.g., in the United States) and to a certain degree in France, where the chief executive is not responsible to the legislature, a system of checks and balances (separation of powers, judicial review, legislative scrutiny, and, in some instances, the direct association of one or the other of the houses of legislature in the exercise of executive prerogatives) imposes restraints.

The substance of executive responsibility,^a however, lies in the party system and in periodic elections through which it gains support. The party is both an instrument at the disposal of the leader to attain power and carry out policies, and a device that controls him, since without the support of the party, he is invariably helpless. As long as the party acquiesces or agrees, the political executive is omnipotent in virtually all political systems, despite procedural limitations. In democratic societies, where basic freedoms are respected, an election is the most effective instrument of control, and ultimately of executive responsibility. It gives the electorate the opportunity to approve or disapprove of the policies of the incumbent and to choose among competing parties and leaderships.

As we shall see, the burden of decision-making thrust upon the political executive has grown immensely. The effective performance of executive leadership calls for an unprecedented balance between leadership and technical know-how, information and evaluation, specialization and coordination. Political structures must adjust to new environmental demands. How well have they managed to do it? Our special chapters on the performance of government give to the reader an appreciation of the problems involved and of the manner in which the various governments have coped with them.

V. PERFORMANCE

It is not easy to evaluate the performance of government. From a general point of view, performance correlates with responsiveness: the more the decision-making machinery responds to the demands and the interests articulated within the system, the higher the level of performance. By the same token, the more the government allows new socio-economic groups to participate in the system and make their interests heard and their demands satisfied, the greater the legitimacy and stability of the system. But since governmental decisions are made about the allocation of scarce resources or benefits, priorities must be established. Some may get more and others less. Thus, some demands are likely to be fully met, others only in part, and some not at all. The greater the number of demands satisfied, the greater the rate of governmental performance. Thus, if defense is the highest demand, failure to be prepared against aggression would be an indicator of nonperformance. Prolonged unemployment (i.e., failure to meet the demand for full employment) would amount to nonperformance. Prolonged nonperformance would lower the attachment of many groups to the government and ultimately to the system, thus providing for instability that takes the form of a widespread rejection, not only of the government but of the system itself. Thus, failure to heed the interests and demands of a minority may account for its disaffection and the ultimate rejection of the political system on its part.

It is possible, therefore, to set up as criteria of performance and nonperformance the following questions

- ✓(a) Does the system allow for the open participation of all groups? Is the government responsive to their demands?

(b) Does the government translate, within limits, demands into policy? Has it failed to do so over a prolonged period of time for some groups rather than others?

(c) In making decisions, does the government attempt to provide for a balanced allocation of scarce resources to as many groups as possible, or has it consistently favored some to the exclusion of others?

(d) Has prolonged performance on the basis of the above, resulted in growing legitimization and stability of the system, or has continued non-performance accounted for the reverse?

Examination of the four systems leads us only to tentative conclusions. The British system satisfied the criteria of performance and stability. Ever since the Industrial Revolution the new groups spawned by it have found access into the system, thus gaining participation, pressing for the realization of their demands, and in general getting satisfaction, thanks to the action of the government. Thus the historical legitimacy of the British political system has been enhanced by the performance of the government.

In France, performance has alternated with nonperformance. A number of issues were not readily settled by the government; a number of groups did not gain access into the system without having to resort to violence; groups with conflicting points of view did not find in the government a ready vehicle of a balanced allocation of resources, and as a result either remained locked in conflict or, having developed a deep distrust for the government, rejected it as an instrument of reconciliation and compromise, thus undermining the legitimacy of the system. Lack of government responsiveness often undermined the thin thread of historical legitimacy only to produce serious constitutional instability. Only in the period of the Third Republic was there some consensus on the institutions—at least until the beginning of World War I. The same is generally the case for Germany, as so well shown in Professor

Deutsch's discussion of the ambivalences of the German national character and political culture.

The Russian system suffered until the Revolution both from instability and nonperformance virtually on the basis of all the criteria we have discussed: new groups were not allowed access; the government remained unresponsive to all interests except those that had status and wealth, and hence its performance from the standpoint of all other groups was pitifully inadequate. Disaffection or outright violence was the rule, and it culminated in the Bolshevik Revolution. Professor Aspaturian shows that whatever the difficulties encountered by the Communist Party, and whatever its shortcomings, Russia under the Soviet regime, and thanks to the party, has attempted to restructure and legitimize the new political system it established. While using outright force against some groups that were literally eliminated, it has progressively opened the door to increased participation and has attempted to become increasingly responsive and representative. The discussion of the interplay of new groups and their vying for benefits and influence within the Communist Party is adequate evidence that interests are being heard and that the governmental performance is becoming increasingly a test of legitimization. Although there is no conclusive evidence that the test has been met, there is enough to allow us to say that every effort is being made to meet it.

From an overall point of view, governmental performance relates to the manner in which over a given period of time the government meets and copes with specific social and environmental problems and also anticipates them. Planning, technical expertise, the development of research and information-gathering agencies become, as we noted in our discussion of the executive, the preconditions of performance. It is not unlikely, however, that careful study might indicate that interests and individual pressures for a given decision may be difficult

or impossible or even "unwise" to heed. This is the perennial philosophic problem of evaluating and distinguishing what appears to be asked by all and what is proper. It is a difficult question which we shall not attempt to answer. But the point is obvious: most of the groups and interests may demand a medium of transportation for instance, which in the long run may be socially very expensive or undesirable, the vast majority of groups and interests may be in favor of massive social expenditures when outside threats jeopardize the very survival of the system. Excessive responsiveness—performance geared to meeting interest demands—may very well defeat, in the long-run, the very meaning of the term. This may, for instance, be the predicament of the British political system, as Professor Finer intimates. The governing elites, trained over a long period of time to respond to specific and broad interest and constituency demands, and the tendency of the governmental machinery to adjust to them in order to provide for compromises, have accounted for a situation in which only marginal and incremental decisions are being made while important issues or demands are being evaded. As with the French political system under the Fourth Republic, and perhaps even more so, there has been a marked "immobilisme" on the part of each and all of the British Cabinets that have succeeded each other since World War II.

Political Leadership

While it is easy to identify "immobilisme," it is far more difficult to specify the conditions—if they can ever be clearly identified—under which the government overcomes the constellation of group interests and their demands, to make decisions that are based upon considerations that transcend them. The crux is political leadership, and the necessary condition is its ability to convince the existing interests and the public, and seek new supports.

Leadership has therefore a dynamic and positive role to play. But in anticipating or in making decisions, a leader cannot evade the rule of political power that we discussed earlier—that is, he needs to find supports. He must create new supports by restructuring opinion and group attitudes, by presenting the issues in advance, and by suggesting solutions on the basis of which opinion and group supports may be elicited. This was, as Professor Macridis notes, de Gaulle's great merit with regard to the Algerian war. Despite the ambiguities and equivocations, he gradually moved opinion to support Algerian independence.

When does political leadership emerge? How, and under what conditions can it manage to restructure opinion? What techniques does it use to gain supports without strongly antagonizing or alienating powerful interests? Frankly, we do not know. Highly stable and responsive systems may become the victims of their success and equate performance with mere responsiveness. Under certain terms, leadership in heretofore highly unstable and inefficient political systems may provide levels of performance that will generate supports and gradually legitimize the system.

The distinction between developed and underdeveloped political systems is often based upon these criteria of stability and performance. In the developed system, governmental capabilities are great, in the underdeveloped ones, small. In the first, supports exist or can be easily mobilized, in the second, they are virtually nonexistent and the communication mechanisms through which they can be mobilized are poor. In the developed societies the governmental institutions are differentiated on the basis of concrete and clearly understood functions that relate to tasks that ought to be performed, in the underdeveloped ones the tasks remain undifferentiated, with a resulting confusion of roles and confusion in the performance of tasks. In the developed societies


the individual generally values and uses his government; in the developing ones legitimacy is low, and people have not learned yet to use their governments.

"Government," in the last analysis, is a learning process. Within the systems we are studying here, despite many conflicts and disagreements, the people communicate with and support the system; the government in turn communicates with them and mobilizes their support and responds to their needs. In all of them the government is an organization to

translate interest into decision and purpose into action. Relying upon the requirements for supports and the need for performance, contemporary governments, after thousands and thousands of years of societal life, still strive to find ways to maximize both. Their histories and practices of internal evolution, of alternation between stability and instability, of legitimacy and revolution, of immobility and dynamic leadership and action, continue to challenge all who seek to identify regularities and find an explanation.

R.C.M.

R.E.W.



GREAT BRITAIN

Samuel E. Finer

I

Introduction

Britain is a tiny country. Taking up a mere 0.2% of the earth's land area, it ranks seventy-fifth in area among nations. With a population of 54 million, she stands tenth in total population and fourth in density of population. She imports one-fifth of the world's output of raw materials and, in return, exports one-sixth of the world's manufactured goods that are shipped in international trade. She is the third largest trading nation in the world. Her people are comparatively rich; they enjoy an annual per capita income that is among the top ten among the wealthiest countries in the world. Economically, therefore, Britain is a considerable nation. Diplomatically, Britain sits alongside the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., France, and China as one of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, but, militarily, her capacities are dwarfed by those of the United States and the Soviet Union, although she is the only country besides these to possess operational H-bombs.

Up to 1947, Britain ruled a world-girdling Empire of some 15 million square miles. To day, the majority of the former dependencies have become self-governing states, and most of the remainder are soon to follow; almost all of them, however, have chosen to remain linked with the United Kingdom as members of the Commonwealth. Britain's cultural achievements at least equal those of any of her European neighbors. A French poet has celebrated France as the "mother of the arts, of arms and of the law," but Britain fills the description just as well. Newton and Faraday bear witness to her scientific achievements; Chaucer and Shakespeare and Milton to her literature; Wren and Gainsborough to her role among the arts, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume to her contributions to philosophy.

In the long perspective of history, however, Britain's pre-eminent contribution to civiliza-

tion may well come to be listed as the common law and the invention of parliamentary democracy. Except possibly in Sweden, every such system in the world today has been modeled directly or indirectly on the British pattern. This even includes the American presidential system, which was derived from the British Constitution as it was understood in the eighteenth century.

Britain began her rapid economic ascent after the political "Settlement" of 1689, which established parliamentary supremacy and secured the position of the mercantile interests and later of the industrial middle class. Cheap credit, maritime enterprise, and a vigorous trade, themselves the reflection of secure internal conditions and a benevolent government, began to enrich the country. A century later came the quick succession of agricultural advances, improved internal communications, and mechanical inventions that go under the name of the Industrial Revolution. Between 1815 and 1911, Britain's population leaped from 11 million to 45 million. Between 1832 and 1913, her exports soared from £36 million (\$117,000,000) to £525 million (\$1,400,000,000),¹ her iron production from 0.7 million to 10 million tons, her coal production from 26 million to 287 million tons. And the country became increasingly urbanized; in 1851, one male in every six still worked on the land, but by 1911 the ratio had increased to become one male in every 20.

The acme of British industrial supremacy came between 1815 and 1870. Britain was then the most highly industrialized power in the world. After this period, although she became

richer and more urbanized with every decade, other countries began to catch up. In 1880, she still produced more coal than all the rest of the world put together; by 1900, the United States had equaled her in coal output and has since forged ahead. In pig-iron production, by 1900 the United States equaled Britain's output and Germany almost did, but now both have surpassed her. And the same is true in steel. As Britain slipped in relative production, however, she turned to the export of capital and became the greatest investor in the world. Today, Britain is economically comparable with West Germany and France, while the United States and the Soviet Union have far outstripped her in gross industrial production and population. But she is still a formidable industrial and commercial power and, in terms of gross national product and per capita income, she is richer than ever before.

Britain's political and military power paralleled her economic ascent. Although threatened by the larger and more populous powers of France and Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Britain was easily able to preserve her independence. As her economic power waxed in the eighteenth century, she became a major European power and intervened in Continental affairs whenever any single state seemed likely to dominate Europe. She made up for her lack of military manpower by the gold she used to finance her allies. After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the *pax Britannica* settled over the globe until about 1870. The only world rival to Britain's power was Imperial Russia, and the nineteenth century was essentially a conflict between Russia, the great land power pressing down to the Balkans, to the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Yellow Sea, and the great British sea power pressing up to meet the challenge wherever shore and water touched. Britain was so strong that she lived in "glorious isolation," and had no need for permanent alliances.

This phase, like her industrial supremacy,

¹From 1939-49, the English pound was worth about \$4.00; in 1949, it was devalued to \$2.80. On November 18, 1967, it was devalued again, to \$2.40. Dollars in text represent the £ = \$2.80 rate. To convert pound values as given in the text to the current rate in dollars, multiply by 2.40 (or, more roughly, multiply by five and then divide by two). Where a British salary or sum of money is quoted in a dollar equivalent, the figure in the text should be increased by approximately one-seventh.

also began to pass away after 1870. By her triumph over France in that year, Germany became the dominant power on the European mainland, and Britain was gradually forced into ententes with Germany's enemies, France and Russia. By 1914, then, Britain had to share her power with several other European nations. Today, following two devastating world wars, Britain's relative strength has declined even further. She is in the process of liquidating her last extra-European military commitments, and in diplomatic and military terms is a medium power, alongside France and the German Federal Republic.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH

Britain's rise to imperial status was both the cause and effect of her economic and military advances. Always a maritime nation, she challenged the Spanish and then the Dutch claims to power in the Americas and in the East Indies, but her aim was to trade with these territories, not to acquire them. She colonized North America herself, and the "first" British Empire consisted of the American colonies, then the areas won in battle from the French (Canada and India) and, later, Australia, New Zealand, and a foothold in South Africa. After 1782, in the period of the so called "Second British Empire," she exported millions of settlers to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, endowing these countries with representative institutions, at the same time, she consolidated her hold on India, which she governed efficiently but autocratically. The third great wave of expansion, into Africa and Southeast Asia, occurred after 1870. By 1914, the British Empire comprised 14½ million square miles of the earth's surface, and by 1919, it was even larger, as "mandated territories" were entrusted to the British government by the League of Nations.

This vast Empire has today, for the most part, become a free association of completely independent sovereign states the Commonwealth (The basic law defining the terms of this independence is the 1931 Statute of Westminster). It includes (in order of their adherence) the United Kingdom itself, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (the last three being sometimes referred to as "the Old Dominions"), and India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaysia, Nigeria, Cyprus, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, West Samoa, Jamaica, Trinidad, Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Zambia, Gambia, Singapore, Guyana, Barbados, Botswana and Lesotho.

These states are linked, if at all, by cultural, technological, and economic ties rather than constitutional ones. Excepting Canada, all the members are inside the sterling area and maintain their balances with the Bank of England. Their products enter Britain duty-free, or, if they do not, receive preferential tariff treatment as compared with products of other lands. (In some cases certain members give Britain reciprocal preferences, but these "Commonwealth preferences" are of declining importance.) One-third of Britain's imports come from the Commonwealth and one-third of her exports go to its members. Nearly all Britain's bilateral economic aid, and two-thirds of her current private investment, goes to the Commonwealth, also. So, too, does most of her technical assistance. Britain sends member states technicians, teachers and administrators. She provides military missions and training programs, and exchanges staff officers with many of the Commonwealth countries also. Most of these appoint High Commissioners (similar to Ambassadors) to Britain, and the written and personal communications between them and British Ministries on matters of trade, services, finance and labor are of very great importance in keeping the Commonwealth together. These High Commissioners meet periodically with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and a Foreign Office Minister in London,

as well as arranging *ad hoc* meetings with them.

But the common institutions that existed in 1931 when the Commonwealth numbered only five states have all but disappeared, as it has come to encompass 25. Not all members owe allegiance to the British sovereign, for most of them are republics, and Malaysia even has a sovereign of its own. In all these countries the Queen is simply "the Head of the Commonwealth." Nor is there a common nationality: each member state defines its own citizens by its own laws and almost all restrict the entry of citizens of other member states. While a few of the members choose to recognize a British court (the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) as a final court of appeal in constitutional issues, the great majority do not. There is no common line on foreign policy. Indeed, member states fight one another (India versus Pakistan, 1965) or take opposite lines in the UN (India was one of the most embittered antagonists of Britain's Suez intervention in 1956). The most important common institution is the customary Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Three factors have contributed to making Britain one of the most successful democracies of the world: geography, the continuity of her history, and industrialization (the latter will be discussed in the next chapter).

Geography

Geographically, Britain² is a group of islands, cut off from the Continent at the nearest point by 22 miles of sea—the English Channel. The last foreign occupation of British soil

was the Norman invasion of 1066. Since then, the British have successfully staved off would-be European conquerors: the Spanish Armada of Philip II in 1588, Napoleon in 1804, Hitler in 1940. Britain is the only nation of Europe that has been unconquered for so many centuries. Her institutions have been developed over 900 years by her own peoples behind the ocean moat.

Being a set of islands, Britain has not, till recent years, required a large standing army. The only British experience of military revolution and despotism occurred during the Great Rebellion (1642–60) and the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell. This encounter with military rule proved so odious it created a prejudice against standing armies that endured as a live factor in politics almost to the present day. Her monarchs were thus deprived of the instrument by which the despots of the Continent were able to centralize administrative machinery and crush political opposition. The absence of an army prevented political dissidents from taking it over and subverting the country by violence.

The sea not only closed the enemy out, but shut the various nationalities of the United Kingdom in. The Kings of England, the most wealthy and populous of its four nations (Wales, Ireland, Scotland, and England), were able to extend their dominion throughout all the British Isles. Wales was conquered by the fourteenth century. Scotland united with England and Wales in 1706 to form "Great Britain," through a freely negotiated treaty by which both stages agreed to be represented in a single Parliament.

The Scots, as citizens of a former sovereign state, retained, as they do to this day, their own legal system, their own educational and local government systems, and, above all, their own national church—the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. Significantly, for the sea lay between, Ireland was never culturally absorbed. Conquered, colonized, and (in 1800) annexed to the political structure of Great Britain, she remained partly alien. (Here the fact that the bulk of the population is Catholic, while most of the

²"Britain" is the popular name for what is officially "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland." "Great Britain" itself is an official expression: it means the Union (1706) of Scotland and England-and-Wales.

population of England, Wales, and Scotland is Protestant, was of great significance.) The rulers of Great Britain could never decide whether Ireland was the farthest bit of Britain or her nearest colony. Although incorporated into the United Kingdom, Ireland was never assimilated. The break came with the rebellion of 1919 and the subsequent secession of the southern counties to form the Irish Free State in 1922.

The Continuity of History

Long united under the English Crown, the nationalities of Britain gradually adjusted to one another. The fact that Henry VII, the founder of the Tudor dynasty, was himself a Welshman played a large part in reconciling the Welsh people to becoming a mere region in a unitary state. Scotland remained a separate kingdom even after she was united with England and Wales, in the person of her own King, James VI, who became, in 1603, the king of both countries. She retained her laws and her church even after the union of 1706. Not till the nineteenth century was cultural assimilation advanced. Only the Irish Catholics remained outside the British "community" that developed in the nineteenth century, although the Protestant Ulstermen of Northern Ireland were always and still are an integral part of it.

Time has likewise bound up the wounds of religious intolerance. Henry VIII's break with Rome, in 1534, cast the Catholic faithful into a persecuted minority. The national church (the Anglican Communion) established by Henry VIII and his successors, however, proved too Roman for the more thoroughgoing Protestant sects. These religious differences added bitterness to the fierce political struggles of the Great Rebellion of 1642-60 and the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688-89 that put an end to the King's absolutism and that established parliamentary supremacy. In the eighteenth century, therefore, both Catholics and nonconformist Protestants (that is, those who did not accept the Established Church of England) were dis-

criminated against politically as well as socially. The nineteenth century saw the successive removals of restrictions on religious freedom. The chief political disabilities imposed on the nonconformist religious minorities were removed in 1828 and those on Catholics in 1829. In the nineteenth century, there occurred a great revival of Roman Catholicism, as well as a revival of Protestant dissident groups, which was accompanied by an increasing measure of religious tolerance.

THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION

The British Constitution is a democratic one, but poured into an antique medieval mold. It is still full of official titles, terminology, and procedures that originated in the Middle Ages. The government is called the Queen's government, ministers are the Ministers of the Crown, the armed forces are the armed forces of the Crown; and officers in any branch hold their rank by virtue of a Royal Commission. The courts and the judges are Her Majesty's Courts and Her Majesty's Judges. High officials still bear titles like Lord Chancellor, Lord Privy Seal, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, which all go back over 600 years.

The importance of this tradition is that it has preserved not only the medieval form, but the medieval *essence*, which in sum said, the King governs—but conditionally, not absolutely. At the heart of the British political system, there has always been a group of officials who formulated policy and saw that it was carried out. Except during the rule of the Long Parliament (1640-49), the opponents of the government have never sought to destroy this group, only to *control* it. British constitutional history is, simply, the story of the struggle for the control of this administrative machinery. Originally, it was the King and his officials versus the barons in the Great Council or Magnum Concilium. Today, it is the Prime Minister and his Ministers in the Cabinet on one side and the Com-

mons (or, more realistically, the Opposition party) on the other. The form of an Act of Parliament links the present to the remote past and attests to the underlying continuity of the medieval conception of government. An Act always begins with these words: "Be it enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in this present Parliament assembled and by authority of the same. . . ." In present-day Britain, it is the Prime Minister and other Ministers, the Cabinet, that really enact, but "by and with the consent" of the Commons.

The evolution of the Constitution took place in two stages. First came the long and persistent effort of the more powerful of the King's subjects to control and direct his officers, and thus his policy. In the "Settlement" of 1689 and 1701, the age-old power of the Monarch to govern on his own responsibility was terminated. Henceforward, he could act only through an official who could be impeached or dismissed by the Parliament and who could not plead the royal command as an excuse for his actions. The second stage, which began with the loss of the American War of Independence and has continued through the years ever since, has been the struggle to democratize the Parliament, which in 1689 had emerged triumphant from its contest with the Crown.

The "Settlement" of 1689 determined that Parliament and not the King would be pre-eminent. But Parliament at that time was not a very democratic institution. The House of Lords, by definition, was composed of the great landlords. The House of Commons consisted largely of the nominees of these great lords, or of wealthy men who had bought themselves a seat, or of Members who sat owing to the Ministers' manipulation of the votes (although there were always a great number of independents sitting also). The great landmark in the development of the British system toward democracy was the Reform Act of 1832. It increased the electorate from half a million to

some three-quarters of a million people, allowed many of the members of the growing middle class to vote, eliminated many of the so-called "rotten boroughs" (boroughs entitled to send one or two members to Parliament despite the fact that in the course of the years their population had been drastically reduced), and created additional electoral districts in the new urban centers. This weakened the hold of the nobility and the landed gentry over Parliament and paved the way to the representation of the new industrial centers from which the country was beginning to derive most of its wealth.

After 1832, the extension of the franchise to wider sections of the population continued. The 1832 Act enfranchised 7% of the population over 20 years of age. The 1867 Act, enfranchising chiefly the artisans of the towns, extended the vote to 16% of the population over 20 years old. The Third Reform Act, in 1884, extended the franchise to the rural workers, enabling 28% of the population to vote. In 1918, the Representation of the People Act extended male suffrage still further and gave the vote to women aged 30 and above. With this, 78% of the population over 20 was entitled to vote. Finally, in 1928, the voting age for women was reduced to 21, the same as for men, and the electorate now comprises about 97% of the population over 20 years of age.

This century-long movement to expand the franchise changed the Constitution in three important ways. First, it divested the Sovereign of all real political power. Today she retains certain personal prerogatives, but she "reigns but does not govern." Next, it made the House of Commons predominant over the House of Lords, whose veto power over bills was terminated in the case of financial bills and reduced to two years for other bills in 1911. Since then, its power to delay non-financial bills has been reduced (by the Parliament Act of 1949) to only one year, and if it used this right in a serious conflict with the Commons it would in all probability see its delaying power curtailed

still further or entirely removed. Finally, from about 1885, it caused the political parties to become more and more organized and disciplined. Since the power of the Cabinet depends on the discipline of its supporters in the Commons, this tendency led in turn to the supremacy of the Cabinet over its own parliamentary supporters, and today to the Prime Minister's increasing dominance over his Cabinet Ministers.

The Salient Features of the Modern British Constitution

The modern British Constitution is characterized by six features

✓1. It is uncodified There is no single document in Britain, as there is in France, Germany, and the United States, which purports to prescribe all the most important rules relating to the government. To find out the constitutional position on any particular point in Britain, one must consult all or any of five particular sources. First, there are Acts of Parliament, such as the Parliament Act of 1911 which limits the life of any one Parliament to five years. Next there are the decisions of the courts of law. Thirdly, there are certain principles of the common law, for instance, the basic freedoms—e.g., of speech or of association—are derived from the common law. Fourthly, there is the law and custom of Parliament (*lex et consuetudo Parliamenti*), among other things, this prescribes the special privileges attaching to Parliament and to an individual Member. Finally, there is an entirely unwritten element, the *conventions* of the Constitution.

The conventions are rules of practice. The Constitution depends very largely upon the conventions. Examples of some of the more important of them are (1) Parliament must meet at least once a year, (2) the Monarch does not attend Cabinet meetings, (3) Ministers who lose the support of the Commons on a major policy issue must either resign or seek to reverse the opinion of the Commons by advising the Monarch to dissolve Parliament and so permit a General Election in which the electorate can be called upon to make a decision, and (4) the Cabinet is *collectively* responsible to Parliament on matters of policy.

Conventions are not laws. They could be broken without incurring a legal penalty. Sometimes they are, but this is most infrequent. The conven-

tions are one of the most conservatively regarded elements of the Constitution.

✓2. It is flexible No greater legislative sanctity attaches to a law of constitutional significance than to any other law. Laws altering the succession to the Crown or the status of political parties would be passed in exactly the same manner as a Wild Birds Protection Act.

3. Britain is a unitary, not a federal state Parliament is supreme over the whole of the United Kingdom. No localities exist whose governments have co-equal legal status with that of Parliament. Local authorities such as County Councils or Borough Councils can be altered or abolished altogether by an Act of Parliament.

4. Parliament is sovereign The Law courts recognize that Parliament's Acts are law and that they therefore must apply them as such. The Parliament is therefore the supreme organ of authority. No authority in the kingdom is competent to override it or to set it aside, but Parliament can override or set aside any other authority in the kingdom. It can legislate on any matter it chooses. It can repeal or amend any Act of any former Parliament. It can pass Acts of Attainder and *ex post facto* laws. It can legalize past illegalities. It can illegalize past legalities.

5. The separation of powers In the American sense, this principle does *not* operate in Britain. Parliament unites the executive and legislature and it itself is the "High Court" of Parliament. In another sense, the principle *does* operate, the legislature does not interfere with the day-to-day workings of either the judiciary or of the civil servants. And only Ministers, not the civil servants in the Ministries, are responsible to the Houses of Parliament. The tenure of judges is guaranteed during "good behavior," and the Crown (effectively, the government) can remove them only on a joint address from both Houses. In practice, this has guaranteed them immunity from political pressure. In addition, the judges enjoy considerable judicial immunities for the things they say or do in their official capacity.

6. A Cabinet system The late L. S. Amery has said that the Constitution still consists, as in medieval days, of "a continuous parley or conference in Parliament between the Crown, i.e., the directing and energizing element, and the representatives of the nation." Today, the essential parley or conference occurs between the Prime Minister in his Cabinet on the one side, and the Commons, chiefly the Opposition side, on the other. This forms the subject of Chapter V, and will be discussed there in more detail.

II

Foundations of British Politics

THE CLIMATE OF BRITISH POLITICS: AN ABSENCE OF IDEOLOGY

Pluralism

Underlying British political behavior is the acceptance of pluralism—that many different viewpoints are reflected in the community, and that each has a right to exist and to be heard. These various sections of the community, as long as they are not breaking the law, or planning to do so, enjoy the common law rights of all British subjects to speak, publish, and associate freely, even if their cause is considered odious by the majority of the public. Democracy is seen as a set of procedures to get things done.

British politics is emphatically not the politics of all or nothing; it is the politics of less or more. Few wish to exterminate the capitalist class, but many wish to see more public ownership or control of industry, heavier taxation on high incomes, and the like. Few wish to destroy the trade unions but many would like to see restrictions imposed on their power to strike in vital industries. In the last decade, politics has even become a matter of a *little* less and a *little* more: Should a greater or a lesser share of the national income go to the workers, the middle classes, the old-age pensioners? Should there be a greater or a lesser pace in the emancipation of the colonies? And so forth.

This pragmatic attitude toward political issues is reflected in a third feature of British politics: the virtual absence of effectual ideological conflict. Ideologists are in evidence in the country, as is attested by the popularity of the Left-wing weeklies, the *New Statesman* and *Tribune*, and by the emergence of the group of young men and women who publish the *New*

TABLE 2-1
*Indicators of Interest and Participation
in Government, U. K. (in percentage)*

Total electorate	100%
Total voting (1966)	76
Interested in politics ¹	68/70
Members of voluntary associations*	47
Knowledgeable ²	42
Party membership (estimated)	25
Activists in voluntary associations ³	13
Local party activists (estimate) ⁴	0.5
Influential elected and nominated officers, local and central government ⁵	0.12

¹"Sometimes talk politics with others" — 70 percent; "Follow politics regularly or from time to time" — 68 percent.
²By the low standard of their ability to name four or more party leaders.
³I.e., those claiming to be or to have been officers in such organizations.
⁴Assuming about 150 apiece in the Labour and Conservative local constituency organizations, and about 50 apiece for the Liberal ones.
⁵For breakdown, see Table 2-2.
*Derived from Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton University Press, 1965).

FACTORS
THAT ASSIST CONSENSUS

The Nature of Regional Differences

Only 17% of the British population live outside England: 5% in Wales, 9% in Scotland, and 3% in Northern Ireland.
English regional differences are slight and not electorally significant. After a recent survey, Geoffrey Gorer concluded:

In the three years during which I have been occupied with the data on which my study has been founded I have been increasingly more impressed with the basic unity of the people of England. The upper-middle and lower working classes, the mother-centered North West and father-centered North East depart to a somewhat marked extent from the habits and attitudes of the rest of the country: but in the main, the English are a truly unified people, more unified, I would hazard, than at any previous period of their history.¹

¹G. Gorer, *Exploring English Character* (London: Cresset Press, 1952).

But Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales are ethnically, culturally, and historically very different indeed from England, and these differences do manifest themselves politically. Northern Ireland is dominated by its Protestant majority who, in their fear of absorption into the overwhelmingly Catholic Irish Republic, habitually vote for the local brand of Conservatism: that is, for the "Unionist" candidates, which is to say those who stand for continued union with Great Britain. For local matters Northern Ireland has its own Parliament, established in 1922, but for national and "reserved" matters it forms a part of the United Kingdom and returns 12 Members to Parliament.

Scotland and Wales both have a vital sense of nationhood. The historical fact that Scotland

TABLE 2-2
Local and Central Top Decisionmakers, U. K.

I Elected personnel	
M.P.'s	630
Local Councillors	(approx.) 30,000
II Appointed personnel: local	
(Approx. 50 senior officers per major local authority.)	(approx.) 6,500
III Appointed, co-opted, and consulted personnel: national*	
Highest civil service	169
Judiciary	77
Military leaders	319
Boards of nationalized industries	345
Industrial directorate:	
(a) Top companies: capital £1 million and over	245
(b) Medium companies: capital £200,000-£1 million	6,100
Boards of major banks and insurance companies	340
Governors of major autonomous and semiautonomous agencies	150
Principal government advisory committees	330
Leaders of science and learning	200
Leaders of major economic pressure groups	53
Trade union leadership	60
Spokesmen of the professions	40
Heads of churches	70
Total	45,628

*Derived from W. L. Guttsman, *The British Political Elite* (London: Allen & Unwin 1963), p. 328.

joined England and Wales as an independent state, coupled with her retention of her own native legal, educational, and (above all) religious institutions, forms the basis of Scottish nationalism. This is fed by restiveness at "London government," a tendency which has become marked as the state has extended its say in the running of society, and especially the economy. Historical tradition plus a rich, indigenous literature and the survival of the Welsh language (spoken as the preferred tongue by some 26% of the population), provide the basis for Welsh nationalism, and this, too, has fed on restiveness at Whitehall centralization.

But so far, except sometimes in bye-elections (when minor parties occasionally fare much better than they do in General Elections), these local nationalisms have failed to establish a mass basis. The Scottish Nationalist Party, and in Wales the *Plaid Cymru* ("The Welsh Party"), which respectively seek independent statehood for their countries, have—as Table 2-3 illustrates done badly in General Elections.

Since 1945, only twice has there been a Labour majority of seats in England—in 1945 and in 1966—however there has *always* been a Labour majority of seats in Wales. The Conservatives have only *once* won a majority of seats in Scotland—in 1955, in Northern Ireland, on the other hand, they have *always* won a majority of seats.

Wales, and to a lesser degree Scotland, have indeed twice provided the crucial margin of seats that brought Labour to power, in 1950 and

again in 1964. In 1950, the Conservatives won 252 seats in England as against Labour's 251. They won 10 of the Northern Ireland seats (out of 12), thus providing themselves with a majority of 11 seats in all against Labour in these two areas. But in Scotland, Labour led them by 49 seats to 45, thus reducing this majority to seven. Wales clinched the matter, for there the Labour party won 27 seats to the Conservatives' four. This Labour margin of 23 seats turned the Conservative lead into a Labour lead of 16 seats nationally.

In 1964 the Conservatives, with 262 English seats to the Labour Party's 246 had a lead of 16 increased to 28 by winning the 12 Northern Ireland seats. In Scotland, Labour led them by 43 seats to 24, an edge of 19 which cut their lead down from 28 to nine. In Wales, however, Labour led by 28 seats to the Conservative six—a 22-seat lead which gave them a national majority of 13 seats over the Conservatives, and enabled them to form the government.

Religious Differences

Religion no longer drives divisive wedges into British society, nor does it emphasize political differences as it did up to the First World War. In the last 50 years, the coincidence of party allegiance and religious affiliation has continually declined. Estimates of the number of religious denominations differ, but this is probably an accurate count of the membership of the largest ones: the Church of England, the

TABLE 2-3
Percentage of Votes Cast, per Seat Contested: Scottish Nationalist Party and Plaid Cymru

General Elections	Scottish Nationalist Party		Plaid Cymru	
	Seats contested	Average percentage of total vote, per seat	Seats contested	Average percentage of total vote, per seat
1959	5	7.0%	20	9.7%
1964	15	10.7	23	8.4
1966	23	14.7	20	8.7

Church of Wales, and the Church of Ireland (total 28 million); the Roman Catholic Church (5 million baptized members); Presbyterians (1¼ million); Methodists (1 million full members); Congregationalists and Baptists (each with about a quarter of a million). About one-fifth of the adult population belongs to a religious association of some kind. Evidence indicates that, with the exception of the Roman Catholics, there has been a decline in church-going over the last half century. Of all the marriages celebrated in England and Wales in 1962, some 47% were in the Anglican communion, 23% in churches and chapels of other denominations, and 30% were civil marriages in a Registry Office. In Scotland, the proportions were: Presbyterian, 54%; Roman Catholic, 17%; other churches, 9%; Registry Office, 20%.

The Mass Media

Local, regional, and religious differences, such as they are, are increasingly eroded by the mass media—notably the press, radio, and television. Despite regional editions of newspapers, a flourishing provincial press, and regional radio and television broadcasts that emphasize the interests of Scotland, Ireland, and Wales (including many Welsh language items), the effect of the mass media is overwhelmingly to standardize tastes, outlooks, and even accents—and accents, whether *liltin* Scots, *sing-song* Welsh, *nasal* Cockney, or broad

Midlands, are the most obvious way, in Britain, of distinguishing between natives of one region and another.

THE PRESS. The salient facts about the British press are (1) that the country has more newspapers per head (506 copies for every 1,000 people) than any other country in the world, and (2) that circulation is dominated by the great London newspapers. They all purvey a type of national, as opposed to regional, news, but they differ in character from “popular” or “tabloid” to “quality” papers, and they also differ politically. Table 2-4 lists them, with the most recent circulation figures (1965), according to their political attitudes.

RADIO. Radio is organized quite differently from the way it is in the United States. One single corporation (the British Broadcasting Corp.) is responsible for all sound broadcasting, although provision is made for regional variations in programs. The B.B.C. is a public corporation whose directors are nominated by the government, and its charter stipulates that it must use its services to disseminate information, education, and entertainment. It is forbidden to accept commercial advertisements, must refrain from expressing any editorial opinion, and is expected to be impartial in presenting current affairs and politics. From time to time, each political party is given facilities for a “Party Political Broadcast,” the proportion ac-

TABLE 2-4
Circulations and Political Affinities of the British National Dailies, December, 1965

Labour and Independent Labour		Conservative and Independent Conservative		Liberal/Labour	Independent		
Sun	1,274,000	Daily Telegraph	1,337,000	* Guardian	230,000	Times	254,000
Daily Mirror	5,019,000	Daily Express	3,987,000			Financial Times	146,000
		Daily Mail	2,464,000				
		Daily Sketch	844,000				
Total	6,293,000		8,632,000				400,000

corded to each party being decided after consultation among them. Politically and socially, the effect of the B.B.C. is prodigious, especially since it is a monopoly and is neutral, for practically every household has a receiving set.

TELEVISION. Until 1954, the B.B.C. enjoyed a monopoly of television as well as of radio broadcasting. Since then, it has had to share the field with a second body, the Independent Television Authority (I.T.A.). The I.T.A. owns and operates television stations for programs which are provided by outside companies. The programs are not sponsored, as in the United States, but the program companies sell time for spot announcements at intervals throughout their broadcasts. The I.T.A. is responsible for regulating the system and for securing proper standards in the programs. It must see, for example, that the companies are impartial in presenting matters of political controversy, and accurate in news reporting. Political advertising is forbidden, and the I.T.A. has been extremely strict in interpreting this provision. For instance, it refused to sanction an advertisement for the Communist *Daily Worker* on the ground that it was a political rather than a commercial advertisement.

Today, 85% of the families in Britain have television sets. Special provision is made for regional variations of programs—notably for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (I.T.A. goes further in this respect than the B.B.C. does.) Yet the main effect of television is to emphasize and to create uniformities. It brings national leaders rather than local ones into the home. By excellent documentary features such as "Tonight" and "Panorama" (both B.B.C.), it focuses wide attention on national issues. Television has thus become one of the most potent instruments of "nationalization" in British society.

URBANIZATION AND WEALTH. The Industrial Revolution, which made Britain "the

workshop of the world" in the mid-nineteenth century, both brought about the most profound transformation of her formerly mercantile and agricultural economy, and effected revolutionary changes in her social structure. These changes have worked in two directions, some provoking conflict, others promoting consensus. Among those that have done the latter stands urbanization. [The Industrial Revolution turned the British into a society of town-dwellers and town-workers, thus consolidating social attitudes and greatly narrowing the range of social problems with which government had to deal.] Today Britain is more urbanized than any other country in the world. This can be seen from the table below, which takes on added significance when we realize that 40% of the entire population live in seven urban centers that account for less than 4% of the country's area. Also, industrialization made Britain wealthy—and wealth makes it easier to close the gap between extreme poverty and extreme riches by equalizing income through taxation and social services, and by providing additional benefits for the masses. Although the British standard of living falls woefully short of that of the U.S.A., it is rich by European standards, and fabulously wealthy by Asian or Latin-American standards.

Furthermore, between 1951 and 1964 the living standard rose visibly. Consumers' income per head during those years rose by 40%, which was more than for the entire previous half century.

TABLE 2-5
Percentage of Population in Towns of over 100,000 in the United Kingdom Compared with Other Countries

- U.K.	51.0%
- Germany	30.7
- U.S.	28.4
- U.S.S.R.	23.5
- France	16.8

Source: See Appendix

Moreover, redistributive taxation and social services spread this somewhat more equally than before the war. Too, the post-war relaxation of consumers' credit controls allowed working people to spend their swollen earnings on consumer durables—washing machines, television sets, cars, houses. (The proportion of householders owning the homes they lived in rose from 29% in 1951 to 44% in 1964.) And more than twice as many people were taking their holidays abroad in 1964 as had done so in 1951.

Like that of the U.S.A., British society has been called "the affluent society," and informed observers wonder aloud whether the capitalism of the nineteenth century, the capitalism that divided Britain into "two nations, rich and poor," still exists or whether it has not in fact transformed itself into something else which has not yet received a name. Perhaps, they submit, the current phase in British society ought to be termed "post-capitalist." The very fact that such a question can be widely raised is a sign that one legacy of the Industrial Revolution—the sharp cleavage of society into the wealthy and the indigent, the owners and the industrial proletariat—is beginning to disappear and is certainly no longer what it was even 20 years ago. The transformation of the labor force also points in this direction.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LABOR FORCE. There has been a long-term trend away

from heavy manual labor and toward organizational, clerical, and distributive occupations, and from wage earning to salary earning. Between 1891 and 1951, metals, machinery, and vehicles rose from using 4.3% of the labor force in the manufacturing industry to using no less than 45.5%, while textiles and clothing fell in the same respect from 53% to 19.5%. These are the largest changes. The most notable of the others are the rise in the proportion of the chemical industry's labor force (from 1.7% to 5.1% of the total), and the increase in the food, drink, and tobacco group (which more than doubled, from 4.1% to 8.7%). In the period 1954–1962 these changes continued. Engineering still expanded the most rapidly, while agriculture, coal mining, and textiles continued to lose labor.

Of great importance is the continued growth in the services, including distribution, as well as in the food, drink, and tobacco group. With these changes go striking increases in the non-manual occupations. All together, only 41% of the total labor force are engaged in mining and manufacturing, and even of these, just under one-quarter are administrative and clerical workers.

Between 1951 and 1961 the most striking increases among male workers lay in the professional and technical occupations—especially the latter: the number of mechanical engineers rose from 25,000 to 46,000; electrical engineers from 20,000 to 40,000; chemical and other natural scientists from 9,000 to 20,000; and male clerical workers from 862,000 to 1,045,000. Similar trends occurred in the female labor force. This had increased globally, but the most striking increases lay in the numbers of clerks and typists (from 1,270,000 to 1,780,000) and among the professional and technical occupations (from 523,000 to 707,000).

In short, the labor force is becoming more "technical" and more "white-collar." This can be seen from the 1961 census breakdown of the population into 16 socio-economic groups.

TABLE 2-6
Standards of Living: 1956, 1964

Percentage of households owning:	1956	1964
Automobile	25%	40%
Telephone	16	24
Television set	40	85
Refrigerator	7	40
Washing machine	19	57
Vacuum cleaner	51	78

(Note that the accompanying list relates to England and Wales only, not to the whole of the U.K.)

TABLE 2-7
Socio-Economic Groups in England and Wales; 1961

	Percentage
1 Employers and managers, large establishments	3.6%
2 Employers and managers, small establishments	5.9
3 Professional workers, self employed	0.8
4 Professional workers, employees	2.8
5 Intermediate nonmanual workers (ancillary to professions)	3.8
6 Junior nonmanual (e.g., clerical, sales, communications)	12.5
7 Personal service (food, drink, and clothing, occupations, etc.)	0.9
8 Foremen and supervisors—manual	3.3
9 Skilled manual workers	30.4
10 Semiskilled manual workers	14.7
11 Unskilled manual workers	8.6
12 Own account workers (not professional)	3.6
13 Farmers—employers and managers	1.0
14 Farmers—own account	1.0
15 Agricultural workers	2.3
16 Armed forces	1.9
Unclassified	2.9

Source: *Census of England and Wales 1961*

The first seven groups represent the non-manual proportion of the labor force, it totals 30.3%. A calculation for 1965–66 based upon the survey data in the National Readership Survey (*Institute of Practitioners in Advertising*) produces a figure, for the nonmanual occupations, of 32%. The British labor force is today more white-collar and perhaps “middle class” than at any time in the past, and it is becoming more so. For, in manufacturing industries, the proportion of administrative and clerical workers is increasing by 0.5% annually, and, as noted there is a drift from primary manufacturing into secondary and tertiary occupations, so that it is reckoned that by the late 1980’s over

half the entire labor force of the economy will be engaged in white-collar occupations. The sharp polarization between “capitalist” and the “industrial proletariat” becomes blurred during this process.

FACTORS MAKING FOR CONFLICT

“Socialism,” so it is widely repeated in Britain, “is about equality.” So is British politics. Britain is still in many ways an unequal society.

Distribution of the National Income

Britain’s national income grew from nearly £5 billion in 1938 to over £30 billion in 1965 (Table 2-8). Even after the necessary adjustment for the inflation of prices, this represents a leap from £13.5 billion to nearly £26 billion at 1958 prices. Between 1948 and 1965, the percentage increase in real terms was 40%. The labor force, only 19 million at the census of 1931, had risen to over 25 million by the end of 1965.

Together with these developments have gone various leveling factors. For one thing, a greater

TABLE 2-8
*Britain’s Gross National Product,
1945–1965*

Year	Pounds* (millions)	Dollars (millions)	Population (millions)	Dollars per capita
1945	£ 8,750	\$ 24,500	43.7	\$ 561
1946	8,787	24,604	46.8	526
1950	11,695	32,746	50.2	652
1955	16,936	47,421	51.0	932
1965	30,401	85,128	54.4	1,564

*£1 = \$2.80

Source: *Economist Daily* 1967

share of the national income now goes to those who are employed, and a lesser share to those collecting rents, dividends, and interest: the former took 60% of the total in 1938, but 70% in 1966, while the latter, which took 22.5% in 1938, took only 11.5% in 1966. Secondly, and particularly since the war, the wages and salaries of the less well-paid have risen proportionately more than those of the better-paid, and even more than professional earnings. These two factors are reflected in Table 2-9, which shows the proportion of the national income taken by various classes of persons in 1938 as compared with 1955. As you can see, the richer had become less rich, the poor had become better off. For example, the top 100,000 per-

sons in income in 1938 received 11.7% of the nation's income, but in 1955 they received only 5.3%. In 1957 this trend ceased. (Table 2-10 is not entirely comparable to the preceding one (Table 2-9), but the pattern is clear enough.)

In the period between 1949 and 1957, the top 10% of the incomes' proportion fell from over 33% to 28% of the national total; the proportion of the middle range of 11%–70% of the incomes grew from 54% to nearly 61%; and the proportion of the lowest group fell slightly. Thus there was a shift to the middle range from both the rich incomes and the poorest incomes. But in 1957 this trend disappeared, and from then on, no significant change occurred in the proportions going to any of the groups of incomes *except* that the proportion of the total going to the poorest 30% fell, very slightly, from 11.3% of the total to 9.7%. And, even when we consider income *after* taxes it appears that, from 1957 on, dividends, rents, and interests increased faster than all other sources, self-employed income faster than income from employment, and salaries faster than wages.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND EDUCATION. In Britain, one of the principal hallmarks of "class" is occupation. The 1951 census divides the population into five main classes (Table 2-12). Class I explains itself. Class II consists largely of lesser professional, administrative,

TABLE 2-9
Distribution of Personal Income before Taxes, Prewar and Postwar

Population, in order of income	Percentage of total national income before taxes	
	1938	1955
First 100,000	11.7%	5.3%
First 500,000	21.5	12.3
First 1,000,000	27.8	17.4
First 5,000,000	51.6	42.6
Remainder	48.4	57.4

Source: Carr-Saunders, Jones, and Moser, *Social Conditions in England and Wales* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 181.

TABLE 2-10
Percentage Distribution of Incomes before Tax, Postwar (1949–1963)

Group of income recipients	1949	1957	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Top 1%	11.2%	8.2%	8.4%	8.5%	8.1%	8.1%	7.9%
2–5%	12.6	10.9	11.5	11.4	11.1	11.1	11.2
6–10%	9.4	9.0	9.5	9.8	9.7	9.7	9.6
11–40%	34.9	37.6	38.4	38.5	37.6	38.6	39.0
41–70%	19.2	23.1	22.5	22.1	23.5	22.6	22.6
Bottom 30%	12.7	11.3	9.7	9.8	10.0	9.8	9.7

Source: R. J. Nicholson, "The Distribution of Personal Incomes," *Lloyd's Bank Review*, January, 1967.

and managerial occupations, and of farmers, shopkeepers, and small employers. Class III consists of skilled manual workers, shop assistants, typists, foremen, and the like. The last two classes comprise, for the most part, the operatives and workmen in field, factory, and workshop—all "manual working class."

In 1950, Prof. D. V. Glass and his associates completed an extensive survey into the degree of social mobility in Britain. He used a scale based on the census, but with seven divisions instead of five. His investigations showed that in the two top classes, 54% stayed in the same class as their parents, and 46% fell to a lower class. In the two bottom classes, 53% rose and 47% stayed in their parents' class. Thus there was extensive mobility, but it produced a similar structure, since the movements largely balanced one another. In Britain, social class and status is strongly influenced by one's occupation, and occupation very largely depends on education. Current arrangements afford far greater educational opportunities than at any time in the past, and yet in a measure they reflect the present stratification of society and help to perpetuate it.

In England and Wales, which contain some nine-tenths of the school population (the Scottish school system is different), the present arrangements are these: (1) Some 6% of the school population go to independent fee-paying schools, among these are the prestigious so-called "public" schools. The social importance of this sector is out of all proportion to its size. (2) The state provides free and compulsory education from the age of five up to the age of 15. But pupils may stay on after that date. (3) Children at state primary schools have hitherto had to undergo some test of ability at the age of 10 or 11 to determine the type of secondary school for which they seem suited. But a beginning has been made toward abolishing this arrangement and today 8% of the state school population go automatically to "comprehensive" schools at the age of 11. (4) At the

TABLE 2-11
*Census Classification
of Males by Occupation: 1931, 1951, 1961*

Social class	1931	1951	1961
I Professional occupations	2%	3%	4%
II Intermediate occupations	13	14	15
III Skilled occupations	49	52	51
IV Partly skilled occupations	18	16	21
V Unskilled occupations	18	15	9
	100	100	100

Source: Censuses of England and Wales for corresponding years

age of 15 or 16, pupils may take the "Ordinary" General Certificate of Education, an important qualification for skilled occupations and a necessary one for certain professional ones, especially for university entrance. At ages 17, 18, and even 19, pupils may take the Advanced-level General Certificate, an essential (in all but exceptional cases) for university entrance. (5) In Great Britain there are now 42 universities. Although these are independent corporations, they receive 70% of their funds from the central government via the University Grants Committee, on which the universities are strongly represented. The universities lay down their own standards for admitting students, usually based on the students' results according to the Advanced-level General Certificate, school reports, and (often) a personal interview. Competition is so severe that at least one in two applicants are turned away. In short, there is an unofficial "17+ or 18+" test, (as well as the "11 + test,") to determine entrance to a university. Once students are admitted, however, they can apply for scholarships which provide not only tuition but full maintenance. The amount awarded depends on parents' means. In practice, over 90% receive grants, of which some 90% are in the full amount.

The expansion of educational opportunity is evidenced by the 1961 census, of those born in

and before 1896, only 10.8% had received education beyond the age of 15, while among those born between 1931 and 1941 the proportion was 31.8%. Of the pre-1897 generation, only 2.8% had received education beyond the age of 20, while among the 1931 to 1941 generation no less than 8.1% had done so. The following table (Table 2-12) is not exact because changes in the educational system make comparisons difficult, but it does illustrate the trend:

TABLE 2-12

Proportions of the Population Attending School Full-time, in England and Wales

Age group	Number per 1,000 in		
	1921	1951	1964
10-14 (roughly, "elementary")	809	984	996
15-19 (roughly, "secondary")	62	148	200
19+ (university students)	10	26	36

Source: Jones, Carr-Saunders, and Moser, *Social Conditions in England and Wales* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); and British Department of Education and Science, *Statistics of Education*, 1965.

This educational opportunity is not equally shared among all classes of the population, however. To some extent it follows existing inequalities, and to some extent it even perpetuates them.

To begin with, the private sector—which is confined to the wealthier minority of the population—is a far better avenue for social advancement than the state sector is. Included in this private sector are the so-called "public" schools, which in fact are private. These are the most prestigious and offer the best education. The greatest of them (Eton, Harrow, Winchester, and the like) enjoy national reputations. They inculcate their pupils with an intense group loyalty so that the "old school tie" and the "old-boy network" proves a significant factor in their later careers. Only about 4% of the

school population attend these schools—yet they supplied *one-fifth* of the entrants to universities in 1961-62; and (in 1960) 51% of the officer cadets admitted to Sandhurst, as compared with only 23% supplied from state schools. They provided 31% of the entrants to the top (i.e., the "Administrative" grade) of the Home Civil Service in the 1948-56 period, and 37% in 1957-63. During the entire 1918-51 period they never provided less than 42.5% of the M.P.'s in the House of Commons, and once (1931) provided as many as 65%. In 1955 they provided 51%; in 1959, 50%; in 1964, 49%; and in 1966, 47%. Most of them sit on the Conservative benches: 72% of Conservative M.P.'s in the 1959 Parliament; 72% again in 1964; and 86% in 1966—but the Labour Party also contains a sizable proportion, varying from 17% in 1964 to 18% in 1959 and 1966.

The explanation lies in the social character and academic excellence of the schools. They are socially selective, but they also demand good academic standards from the pupil. Their teaching lays stress on character building, leadership, and corporate loyalty; and the success of their graduates in public life stems from the inculcation of these qualities. Very often, therefore, the positions which graduates hold are the result of excellence. But the fact remains that this excellence is produced by an education to which all but a small minority are too poor to have success, and this has generated bitter egalitarian resentment against the system. These schools, born of the Victorian cleavage between what were then called "the classes and the masses," are seen over a century later as perpetuating it, and are therefore widely regarded as so many "islands of privilege."

A second source of inequality arises from the arrangements for public secondary education—i.e., education beyond the age of 15. According to his performance in the "test" at the age of 10 or 11 to which we have referred (and which is known throughout England and Wales

as the "11+"), the child is assigned to a secondary school of a distinctive type. Only 8% of the school population go straight from their primary school to an all-embracing school, usually styled "comprehensive." The majority—those who have "failed their 11+"—are assigned to so-called "secondary modern schools" (for instance, 55% of the total in 1964 wound up there). Three per cent are assigned to technical schools, another 24% go to regular secondary grammar schools, and yet another 4% go to a special and prestigious type of grammar school. Unlike the others, this lattermost institution charges fees for its pupils but makes a proportion of free places available to pupils from the local primary schools, and again unlike the others, it is not maintained and controlled by the local education authority but receives its grants directly from the Department of Education and Science in London. For this reason it is known as a "direct-grant school".

Now, whether the child goes to a grammar school rather than a "modern," and how long he stays there after the age of 15, both relate to his family background. In the first place, the higher the occupational background of the parent, the more likely it is that the child will pass his "11+" and be assigned to the grammar school

So it is less likely that the child of manual working-class parents will get to the grammar school than the child of nonmanual working-class parents. And it is in the same way that those children of manual working class parents are less likely to stay on at a grammar school, even if they have managed to be assigned there, than are the children of parents in nonmanual occupations. Of those continuing at school after age 15, 26% were from professional and managerial families, and only 8% from unskilled manual working-class background. Only 15% of the children from managerial and professional families left school to take up skilled manual work, and only 18% of those whose parents were in other nonmanual occupations, but 28% of the children of a skilled manual worker did so, and 36% of those whose fathers were unskilled manual workers.

The same social selectivity works upon the passage from school to university. There has been a vast expansion in university student numbers—from 63,000 in 1939 to 120,000 in 1959 and to 157,000 in 1965 and this trend is continuing. But this has been shown to be highly correlated with attendance at grammar school, and less so, but still very positively, to the father's occupation and education.

How far the social selectivity we have been discussing operates on university entrance is seen first of all by the proportion of those who enter a university from schools of the types discussed. In 1961–62, no less than 22% of the entire university intake came from the independent schools (overwhelmingly, "public schools" among these), another 15% came from the "direct grant" schools (with a school population of only 4% of the entire state school population), and 62% came from the grammar schools. This factor can be seen again in a breakdown of the occupations of parents of university entrants (1961–62). Higher professional family background accounted for 18%; other professional and managerial family back-

TABLE 2-13
*Occupations of Fathers of Children
in Grammar/Technical Schools
and in Modern Schools, 1960*

Father's occupation	Gram/Tech school	Modern school
Professional and managerial	18%	4%
Clerical and other non manual	19	11
Skilled manual	41	49
Semi- and unskilled manual	10	23
Dead, or retired, or occupation not known	12	13
	100	100

Source: 15 to 18 Vol. 2 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office (H.M.S.O.), 1960)

ground for 41%; clerical occupational background for 12%. Thus the nonmanual-class families, making up some 30% of the total working population, accounted for 71% of the university entrants. In contrast, only 18% of the entrants came from a skilled manual occupational background, and only 6% from semiskilled, while the children of unskilled manual working-class parents accounted for a mere 1% of the total.² Thus, students whose parents were manual working-class made up only 25% of the total. This is almost identical with the proportion for the years 1928–1947, which was 23%.

As we have said, the educational system is closely tied in with the social divisions of English life, and does little to alter them. It is small wonder therefore that the cry of "unequal opportunity" should have been raised and that the system has become a political issue between the Labour and Conservative parties. With the victory of the Labour Party in 1964, confirmed by its sweeping majority in 1966, emphasis is put on providing for equal opportunities. One committee of inquiry is investigating the status of the "public" schools, and another the anomalous status of the "direct-grant" schools. Meanwhile, the "11+" selection system is being abolished, and local authorities have been directed to go over to the "comprehensive" system. As this change is effected, all children in the state primary schools will proceed to a single type of secondary school that will make provision for every one of them, irrespective of ability and aptitude—and provide for this by its own internal arrangements.

SOCIAL CLASS. Thus far we have talked about wealth and education and occupation but these are all related to a fourth factor, social class. The essence of social class lies in the notion of superiority-inferiority, in the idea that

some people are considered to rank (by some criterion or other) higher or lower than other people. There are two elements in establishing the rank-order of social class. The first is the *objective* element; granted that certain people are more esteemed than others, by what external characteristics (*wealth, dress, speech* etc.) are they recognised as such? The second is the *subjective* element: given that certain people are, say, wealthier or pursue a certain type of occupation, how does society view them?

WEALTH. It should be remembered that these groupings differ from each other in a number of ways, not just in occupation. Wealth is extremely unequally distributed in Britain,

TABLE 2-14
Classes in Britain (Those aged 16 and above)

Class	Occupations	Percentage of population
1. Upper middle	Doctors, company directors, senior university teachers, research scientists	4%
2. Middle	Factory managers, headmasters, technicians with professional qualifications, etc.	8
3. Lower middle	Schoolteachers, junior civil servants, small shopkeepers, skilled clerical workers, medical auxiliaries, etc.	18
4. Skilled working	Foremen, skilled workmen, shop assistants, etc.	35
5. Working	Unskilled laborers, agricultural workers, railway porters, cleaners, etc.	25
6. Very poor	Lowest-paid workers, state pensioners, widows, etc.	10

²Four percent were of unknown occupational background. See Committee on Higher Education, Cmmd. 2154.

Source: Adapted from Readership Survey (Institute of Practitioners in Advertising), 1966.

and much more markedly than income. Figures subsequent to 1956 are not available; but in that year Dr. Mark Abrams (see later references) found that net assets varied from about \$28,000 in the first and second of these classes, to about \$2,000 in Class 4 and \$850 in Class 5. While the money values of these sums would have changed (upwards, due to inflation) in the last 10 years, the relative values of highest and lowest is unlikely to have altered much, if at all. Thus, among the 12% who constitute the two top classes, the average wealth is some 30 times that of the working-class families of Class 5, despite death duties of great severity for large estates.

INCOME. In 1965 the solid middle-class earners tended to make over £1,750 a year, and most of them made over £2,500. The lower middle-class range was £1,000–£1,750. The upper working-class range was £750–£1,300, and the lower working class range below £750.

DURABLE CONSUMER-GOODS There is a marked correlation between class and the possession of the most expensive consumer durables (that is, automobiles and houses). The 1964 figures show the following distribution

TABLE 2-15
*Ownership of Automobiles and Houses
by Social Class, 1964*

Class	Percentage owning houses	Percentage owning automobiles
Upper middle	88%	89%
Middle	80	78
Lower middle	60	55
Skilled working	38	42
Working	24	22
Very poor	26	3

Source: Institute of Practitioners of Advertising.

EDUCATION Despite the extended facilities under the 1944 Education Act and the fig-

ures already quoted, it was still true in 1965 that although 70% of the children of solid middle-class families stayed at school beyond the age of 15, only 7% of those of the lower working-class remained at school after that age.

There are, however, certain important *similarities* between the classes. The educational difference stated above should not be overstressed. Looking at the educational statistics another way, we see that 35% of the solid middle class and 68% of the lower middle class had a similar educational experience to that of the working class; i.e., they, too, left school at age 15.

POPULAR ENJOYMENTS AND TASTES. To a marked extent the middle classes and the working classes share the same tastes in newspapers, in films, and in television shows. "In at least one sense," wrote Richard Hoggart, "we are becoming classless—that is, the majority of us are being merged into one class. We are becoming culturally classless".³

Whereas the public as a whole agree on the existence of social classes, and on which occupations "belong" to which classes, individuals differ considerably when asked to which class they assign *themselves*. When members of the public are asked to assign themselves to a class, the procedure is called *self-rating*, and all opinion surveys demonstrate that the numbers in classes as self-rated differ importantly from the numbers as rated objectively by the census or by sociologists. For instance, according to the table we have been using so far, the percentage of middle classes to the total population is 30, and that of the working classes, including the "very poor" is 70. Using a different breakdown as ascertained by the British Institute of Public Opinion, the "well-to-do" and "middle" classes combined amount to 27% of the total population, and the working classes plus the very poor constitute the remaining 73%. Yet, according to

³R. Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (London, Pelican, 1961), p. 284.

the British Institute polls, the self rating of individuals is markedly different from this. In 1955, only 53% of the respondents assigned themselves to the working class; in March, 1959, only 49% and later in that year (on the eve of a General Election), not more than 52%. Just before the General Election of 1964, only 51% assigned themselves to the working class.

Social class is perhaps the most important factor in British *political* behavior. The class to which the voter is objectively assigned, and even more importantly the class to which he assigns *himself*, is the most significant single indicator of whether he will vote Labour or Conservative.

The Political Role of Social Class

The following table gives the extreme variations in the voting attitudes of the social classes in each of the General Elections of 1945, 1950, 1951, 1955, 1959, and 1964; and adds (in parentheses and italics) the proportion so voting in the last General Election, that of 1966.

It is clear that the upper middle class are overwhelmingly Conservative; the middle class

are also Conservative though somewhat less so; the working class, consisting of the bulk of the electorate, consistently favours Labour; and so, to much the same extent over the whole period, do the "very poor." But these figures, especially when the variations of range are taken into account, show also that British parties are by no means based exclusively on objective class differences. Some middle-class voters vote Labour, and many working-class and "very poor" electors vote Conservative. This point is made more obvious in Table 2-17, which shows the percentage contribution by each social class to the total vote of each party.

It will be seen that the Conservatives drew from 57% to 59% of their total vote from the working classes and the "very poor." But from these same two classes the Labour party drew as much as 92% of its vote in 1959, and 84% in 1966. We have to conclude that the Conservatives made a considerable appeal to voters in all classes, while the Labour party rests primarily on the support of the lowest two; and that over half the Conservative strength comes from the two lower classes.

But *subjective* (self-rated) classification pro-

TABLE 2-16
*Parliamentary Voting by Social Class**

Class	Percentage voting Conservative	Percentage voting Labour	Percentage voting Liberal
Upper middle (6% of total electorate, 1964)	76-90(72)%	6-14(14)%	2-14(8)%
Middle (22% of total electorate, 1964)	61-77(56)	16-24(30)	2-15(7)
Working (61% of total electorate, 1964)	32-44(32)	52-57(52)	2-14(8)
Very poor (11% of total electorate, 1964)	24-44(24)	54-68(59)	2-12(6)

Source: British Institute of Public Opinion.

*Range of percentages voting for Conservative, Labour, and Liberal parties in General elections, 1945-1966; percentage for 1966 General Election in parentheses and italics.

TABLE 2-17

*Percentage Share of Each Class**in Voting for the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Parties, 1959, 1964, 1966*

Class	Conservative			Labour			Liberal		
	1959	1964	1966	1959	1964	1966	1959	1964	1966
Well-to-do	9%	10%	10%	—%	2%	2%	5%	5%	6%
Middle	34	34	31	8%	11	14	28	27	20
Working	52	50	52	76	75	70	56	61	65
Very poor	5	6	7	16	12	14	11	7	9
Total vote	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: British Institute of Public Opinion. In 1959, the B.I.P.O. used only "quota" samples; in 1964 and 1966 it used both quota and random. To obtain consistency with 1959, only the quota figures have been used.

vides an even better clue to voting behavior. And one outstanding authority on self-rating, the aforementioned Dr. Mark Abrams, has contributed to an understanding of the self-rated classes by merging two categories of persons who overwhelmingly rate themselves as "middle class": the managerial executive and professional voters (12% of the electorate) and the "lower middle class" (nurses, clerks, laboratory assistants, and the like 18% of the electorate), making altogether 30% of the electorate.⁴ In this class, Conservatives outnumbered Labour supporters by over three to one, and less than 16% of its members were willing to describe themselves as "working-class." Abrams first considered those who both by his (objective) rating and their own (subjective) rating were "middle-class." Over half of these had been educated beyond the age of 15. They usually justified their self-rating of "middle-class" by referring to their incomes, or their occupation, or their better education. And only 11% of these voted Labour and these were the members who had received *more* full-time education than was average in the whole of this middle-class group. Next he considered those who, by his reckoning, were middle-class but who assigned *themselves* to the working class. Less than

one-quarter of this small group had been educated beyond the minimum age. They justified their self ascription of "working class" by either the nature of their occupation or by their poor education most turned out to be middle- or low-grade office workers. But of these self-rated "working-class," one-third voted Labour. Thus the proportion of objective middle-class electors who voted Labour was three times as high among those who called themselves "working class" as among those who called themselves "middle-class."

Among the skilled working-class, Labour supporters outnumbered the Conservatives by a little over three to two. In this class as a whole, Labour supporters formed 42% and Conservative supporters only 26%. Among those describing themselves as "working-class," 47% were Labour supporters and 21% Conservative supporters. But among those describing themselves as "middle-class," only 31% were Labour supporters, and 38% were Conservative supporters!

The same is true of the non skilled working-class electorate. In the class as a whole, Labour supporters outnumbered the Conservative supporters by 43% to 22%. Among those who assigned themselves to the "working class," this disparity was further pronounced: 49% of this group were Labour supporters as compared

⁴M. Abrams, "Social Class and Politics," *Twentieth Century* (Spring, 1965), pp. 35-48.

the matter of qualifying for the state grammar schools, opportunity is now based strictly on intellectual quality, family background can adversely affect the child's chances as well as the likelihood that he will stay at school long enough to take the increasingly important General Certificates of Education examinations.

To both summarize and repeat ourselves somewhat, education, skewed in favor of the wealthier, is the key to occupation, which in turn is the key to social and economic class. Consequently the higher ranks of industry, the armed forces, the public services, and the benches of the House of Commons are still disproportionately manned by the products of the public schools. At the other end of the so-

cial scale the inhabitants of certain manual occupations, such as the dockers and miners, are so fiercely aloof from the rest of the society that their occupational loyalty is almost tribal. In between these two poles, however, is to be found the new phenomenon: the "rising working-class"—the manual wage earners who regard themselves as moving up the social scale into the middle class. Shifts in occupation, and the partial equalization of wealth and educational opportunity, have produced this group. Its emergence indicates that a less hierarchical and unequal society is on the way. But it is, as we have seen, slow to emerge: and that is why at election time the various classes call in the aid of politics to "give history a shove."

III

Pressure Groups

The electoral process and the political parties provide one channel of popular representation, and the pressure groups provide another. The first provides political representation, the second functional. The first, by way of a solid party majority in the House of Commons, provides, for possibly five years, the general program of the government. The second, however, qualifies it. Without a disciplined majority to aggregate group demands, and a powerful Cabinet able to override them if necessary, policy would be incoherent. Without the pressure groups to influence or resist the Cabinet's program, government would be tyrannical. In any case, it is erroneous to consider parties and pressure groups to be mutually isolated. They interpenetrate each other. They may be distinguishable, but they are interconnected. Pressure groups interact with all parts of the machinery of government: with the Ministers, with the civil servants, with the parties, with Parliament. It is difficult to overestimate their importance in the actual working constitution of today. They are, in short, a second or auxiliary circuit of representation (the parties and elections being the first). Each circuit would be infinitely poorer and ineffective without the other. The British political system requires both.

It has already been noticed that 47% of a national sample replied that they belonged to some private association or other. By no means will all of these, or even a majority of them, normally have the slightest concern in what the government is up to; but at any point of time they *might* be so concerned, and *might* wish to try to influence its policy. Any organized group (and this includes firms and businesses) which tries to influence the policy of public authorities in its own chosen direction (though, unlike the political parties, never themselves prepared to undertake the direct government of the country) is a pressure group.

Pressure groups in the United Kingdom fall into two main types with a hybrid in between. Some—like business groups, cooperatives, and trade unions—defend economic interests, while others promote special causes such as pacifism, nuclear disarmament, the protection of children or animals. In the one case it is the protection of material interest that counts, in the other the defense or promotion of a cause.

Certain hybrid groups combine the features of both interest- and promotional groups. A good example is the Roads Campaign Council, which advocates more and better highways. It is overtly financed by organizations that have a material interest in roads—for instance, the Automobile Assn and the Royal Automobile Club—and also by such bodies as the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. It is, therefore, the propagandist spokesman of certain interest-groups. In addition, many interest-groups (for instance, the National Union of Teachers) have a promotional side to their activities. The N.U.T. believes that education should be improved, but the group also enhances its own interests by promoting this worthy goal.

THE MAJOR PRESSURE GROUPS

Employers

There are at least 2,500 organizations in Britain that serve the many needs of commerce and industry. In a special category is the powerful National Farmers' Union, with 200,000 members, some 75–80% of all the farmers of England and Wales. Another special association is the Institute of Directors: in mid-1965, its membership was 41,000. Its object is to ease legal and financial restrictions on executives—e.g., to reduce corporate taxes and death duties. It has jokingly described itself as the "bosses' trade union."

Until September, 1965, there used to be three major industrial associations. The British

Employers' Confederation consisted of 270 individual employers' negotiating bodies. It provided for consultation among its members, and acted on general matters, but its constitution forbade it to interfere with its members' functions. The Federation of British Industries (F.B.I.) and the National Union of British Manufacturers (N.U.B.M.), which were rivals, both had a dual membership—partly individual firms and partly trade associations. The F.B.I. attracted the large firms, claiming to represent six out of seven of the firms employing over 11 workers, and unquestionably was the more important of the two. Its membership in 1965 was 8,607 individual firms and 280 trade associations, as opposed to 5,000 firms plus 53 trade associations for the N.U.B.M.

In 1965 these three bodies amalgamated to form the Confederation of British Industries (C.B.I.). With 180 trade associations and 12,500 individual firms, and a highly professional bureaucracy of some 300 officials, this immense concern is the largest unified employers' association in the world. Whereas the C.B.I. represents manufacturers, we find that merchants, insurance houses, shippers, truckers, and the like are associated locally in Chambers of Commerce, of which there are 100 in the country, and nationally in the Association of the British Chambers of Commerce (A.B.C.C.), which is a very influential body representing about 60,000 firms.

The Trade Unions

Excluding the armed forces, approximately 24 million persons are at work in Britain. Nine and a half million belong to trade unions, and in 1966 of these, 8,867,000 were affiliated with the Trade Union Congress. Although the constituent unions are autonomous, the Congress has developed an important headquarters staff that draws up policy, and acts on mandates received from the Congress. The Congress does not negotiate wages; that is the

concern of the individual unions. But, in the period of "severe restraint" of prices and incomes which began in 1967, the Congress, doggedly resisting the government's desire to control wages and salaries, acquired powers to "vet" its members' claims—i.e., recommend them to the government on their merits.

The Co-operative Movement

In 1962 there were 801 retail distributive societies in Britain, with a total membership of over 13 million. There were also four wholesale societies and 33 productive societies. In 1962 the sales turnover of the distribution societies amounted to 11% of the national total. Almost all the societies were affiliated with the Co-operative Union, the principal organization of this movement. The Co-operative Party, supported by 503 of the societies, with 90% of the total membership of the co-operatives, fights the political battles for the movement.

The Professions

Another group of interests consists of the professions. Three large professional organizations are often in the news: the British Medical Assn. (B.M.A.), the National Union of Teachers, and the National and Local Government Officers' Assn. (none of these is affiliated with the T.U.C.). Although the B.M.A. is not the only body representing the interests of doctors, it is by law the negotiating body *par excellence* for the profession, representing as it does some 84% of the general practitioners. The N.U.T. does not have a monopoly of representation either, but it does include in its membership about 85% of the teachers in state schools.

The National and Local Government Officers' Assn., which recently celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, caters to the clerical and administrative grades of the local government service,

not to the manual workers. It counts in its membership about 200,000 out of some 338,000 such employees.

Civic Groups

Among the interests that may be styled "civic groups" are charities (temperance societies, societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or to animals, family case-work agencies, and the like), various bodies that defend particular groups in government (the Magistrates Assn., the Association of Municipal Corporations), and large organizations that advocate specific public policies and aspire to a mass following.

The most influential civic group in the last few years has been the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (C.N.D.). Founded in 1958, the C.N.D. seeks to persuade the British government to lay down its nuclear weapons "unilaterally," i.e., without waiting for the U.S.S.R. and the United States to disarm. The group also wants Britain to deny bases to the United States for nuclear missiles, aircraft, and submarines, and to withdraw from N.A.T.O. unless this alliance agrees to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. By coining attention-getting slogans, distributing eye-catching printed matter, organizing public marches, holding rallies in Trafalgar Square, and such, the C.N.D. used to win thousands of supporters to its cause. Indeed, in 1960 it proved so influential in the trade unions that many of the largest ones declared their support for "unilateralism", and later in that year the Labour Party Conference rejected the official policy of its leaders and declared for a unilateralist policy. The decision was reversed in 1961 and 1962, however, and the movement declined. The election of a Labour government in 1964 and 1966—towards which party most of the members were sympathetic—paradoxically put the axe to it: its members were cross-pressured between their anti-nuclear commitment and their Labour Party loyalties.

PRESSURE GROUPS IN ACTION

The groups or associations that habitually work closely with the government or with local authorities can exert pressure simply by breaking off relations, although this recourse is used only rarely. Pressure groups direct their fire at the executive, the legislature, and the general public.

The Executive Level (Government Departments)

Government departments and private associations generally cooperate with one another, since both sides stand to gain through such activities as the exchange of information and the sharing of each other's goodwill. Since the Department of Economic Affairs wants to control the level of wages, it needs both the advice and the goodwill of the trade unions. Likewise, it cannot clamp down on prices without the advice and active cooperation of thousands of firms, and therefore seeks it from their trade associations and the CBI.

Between government administrators and private associations there is an extensive system of both formal and informal contact. The formal arrangements comprise three chief methods.

1. By official inquiry, such as Royal Commissions, departmental inquiries, courts of arbitration, and the like. All interested parties put their views before such bodies.
2. By special advisory committees. Over 500 of these committees are attached to their appropriate Ministries and bring together civil servants and representatives of all the interested associations. They have meetings throughout the year, at which relevant matters are discussed.
3. Finally, there is the method of prior consultation. Ministries sometimes consult associations in advance of action. Bodies such as the Association of Municipal Corporations and the

County Councils' Assn. have become almost official revising bodies for the administrative departments that make rules and orders affecting local government.

The formal contacts, however, are not nearly as important as the extensive informal contacts that continuously take place. Many of the arrangements are like those in a football match, where each player picks a particular man on the other side to attack. The director or secretary of a trade association "works to" certain civil servants in the various departments he frequents over a period of years, and is often on the best of personal terms with them.

Pressure can be, and often is, generated at the departmental level. To pursue a certain program, a director of a trade association might first go to his "opposite number" in the department and give "advice." If noncontroversial, this might be acted on. But if it is not adopted, the association might send a more high-powered delegation, and its "advice" would become open advocacy. If this also failed to move the civil servants or the Minister, the association might decide upon even more drastic action. It might sever relations with the governmental department, and withdraw cooperation. But this would be most abnormal, its usual alternative would be to go to the top and try to influence Parliament.

The Parliamentary Level

Members of Parliament frequently are representatives of special "interests" themselves. They may belong to an outside association, such as the Institute of Directors, they may be approached by some interest—e.g., the textile or pottery industry—that is prominent in their constituency, they may be asked by an outside interest to sit on its "Parliamentary Panel" (i.e., to act as its spokesman in Parliament).

More importantly, the two great parties themselves incorporate many important inter-

ests. As we shall see later, 79 Trade Unions are affiliated with the Labour Party; they provide it with much if not most of its money, they finance individual candidates, and they command an overwhelming majority of votes at the Party Conference. All of 132 of the Labour Party's 362 seats in the present Parliament are held by Trade Union-sponsored candidates. Similarly, 18 are held by Co-operative-sponsored candidates. No interest-groups are affiliated with the Conservatives, although most of the organizations of employers, industry, trade, and commerce must be regarded as being aligned with the Conservative Party. The link is not, as in the Labour Party, by organizations *qua* organization; it is a personal linkage. Members of these organizations are often members of, or give support to (by money or assistance), the Conservative Party.

A group that has failed to get satisfaction from the Minister or the civil servants (i.e., the executive) may try to exert pressure by raising the matter in the House of Commons. Pressure of this sort is usually checked by the very firm discipline exerted on each party by the Whips, but sometimes a particular interest may win enough sympathy in Commons, with both the majority party and the Opposition, to force a Minister to change his mind. The legislative influence of pressure groups is often focused on the committee and report stages of bills, when detailed amendments are introduced. It is here, particularly, that little "caves" of Government backbenchers and/or Opposition members come together and try to secure specific changes.

It is impossible to insist too strongly that the effectiveness of the Opposition, in the comparatively rare instances of its securing substantial concessions from the Government, is nearly always a function of the effectiveness of pressure groups which have already made their representations to Ministers and are exerting further pressure through the Opposition. This organizes and deploys their representations, more or less effectively; but persuasive argument

achieves little unless it is known by the Government to represent strongly-held views of influential outside interests. This was most strikingly demonstrated in the passage of the Finance Bill of 1965, in the course of which the government made 440 amendments to its measure. The Opposition (the Conservatives) secured their greatest successes where important outside interests stood behind the amendments. In cases of this kind the "Esau" phenomenon operates: the party is speaking for outside groups, and it is them, not the Opposition as such, which the Government is seeking to conciliate. "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau."

The Constituency Level

The third and widest area of political pressure is at the level of the constituency. In Britain (unlike in the United States), pressure groups operate comparatively rarely at this level. Such activity is most effective at election time, but in British elections, party candidates stick to the party line laid down by the party headquarters. Individual promises to local groups are discouraged by the central headquarters of both the Labour and the Conservative Parties. It is therefore unknown for pressure groups to operate at the constituency level to the degree that occurs in America or France, where party structures are so different.

Pressure groups conduct two kinds of publicity campaigns: the *selective* type and the *saturation* type. The selective campaign is directed at the individuals who are the "opinion-makers" in their field: local journalists, churchmen, schoolteachers, university teachers, doctors, members of Rotary Clubs, Chambers of Commerce, Trades Councils. Both the N.U.T. and the National Farmers' Union carry on sustained activities of this kind. The saturation campaign (or "grass-roots lobby") is comparatively rare and (apparently) relatively ineffective. Most of the saturation campaigns have been those used by capitalist interests against nationalization,

but there is increasing evidence that these campaigns were quite unsuccessful. (See below, pages 67-68.) One reason may be that one does not get very far in Britain by simply advertising in the press, and, as we have seen, neither radio nor television can be used to transmit political propaganda.

Sometimes a pressure group will operate at the executive, the parliamentary, and the constituency levels simultaneously. For instance, when the Conservative government introduced a bill to subject agreements to impose fixed retail prices to court jurisdiction (the "Resale Price Maintenance Bill"), pharmacists were particularly anxious to secure exemption. Their associations sent a joint memorandum to the Minister in charge of the bill (Mr. Edward Heath, Leader of the Conservative Party at the time of this writing), they published protests, individual pharmacists brought pressure upon their M.P.'s, and they mounted a formidable pressure in the Commons, where they brought the Government's majority of 100 down to one vote only. Most pressure groups, however, concentrate on the administrative level, chiefly because the Cabinet is pre-eminent in Parliament. *If the Cabinet is prepared to espouse a policy, it usually is adopted. Even if only an individual Minister or the civil servants favor a program, it is likely to be put into effect.*

A second reason for the importance of the administrative level is that the Ministries are in an excellent position to evaluate differing viewpoints. They consult with committees of inquiry, which are set up to enable interested parties to an issue to present their arguments, and with permanent advisory committees, on which civil servants and their opposite numbers in the pressure groups sit together. One of the *first things a pressure group tries to do is to acquire "consultative status"*—that is, to get the Ministry to recognize that it is widely representative of a point of view, and therefore worthy to be brought in for "advice and consent." This relationship is eagerly coveted, and organizations work hard to achieve it. It is regarded

in Britain as the ideal tie between government departments and outside bodies.

An informal code governs this relationship. As the director of one trade association described it:

The recognition which government departments give to any particular association depends primarily on the statesmanlike way with which the association handles its problems and on the confidence inspired by the staff in their dealings with government officials. Under such conditions mutual cooperation and understanding can be established on a basis which is not only satisfactory to both parties but can be very beneficial to the industry, the government officials will trust the staff sufficiently to inform and consult them on matters which are still highly confidential, without prejudice to the ultimate action of either party, but if there is the slightest suspicion that the associations staff had failed to maintain the confidential nature of the information imparted to it, the government officials will shut up like clams and it will be a very long time before the association's staff is entrusted with inside information. . .¹

Not surprisingly, therefore, the most influential pressure groups tend to be the ones that are most silent. The Confederation of British Industries or the County Councils Assn. or the Trades Union Congress usually achieve their results by consultation and discussion with the civil servants and Ministers. Bodies like the C.N.D., however, since they have no "foot in the door," must resort to public clamor. Nearly always, the noisier an interest group, the less effective it is!¹

THE VALUE OF PRESSURE GROUPS

In pursuing their own goals, the pressure groups actually perform several vital services in the functioning of British democracy. (1) They provide both Parliament and the ad-

¹Industrial Trade Associations (London, Allen & Unwin, for PEP [Political and Economic Planning], 1957), pp. 75-76

Secondly, the information on which the agreements have been reached, and the arguments that justify them, have been discussed behind closed doors, not in public hearings.

Finally, some of the deals are so complicated that no single important item could be altered without changing the nature of the whole compromise, thus forfeiting the agreement of the outside parties to it. The annual review of farm prices which takes place between the N.F.U. and the Ministry of Agriculture and the Treasury is of this highly complicated kind; so are such negotiations as have occurred between the Ministry of Health and the B.M.A. about a new "Doctors' Charter" to redefine the status and conditions of doctors in the National Health Service; and so too are such negotiations of extreme delicacy as those conducted between the Department of Economic Affairs and the T.U.C. and C.B.I. over the future of the national prices and incomes policy. Where such deals are put before it, the House finds itself without a role. In the (picturesque but true) words of the *Times'* political correspondent, "The legislature is already in some danger of becoming more like a pianola than a pianist, mechanically rendering tunes composed jointly by departments of state and whatever organized interests happen to be affected." Nothing better justifies the opening words of this chapter, which said that the pressure-group system ought to be regarded as a second and alternative circuit of representation which exists side-by-side with the party-cum-electoral system (which is the one traditionally associated with the working of a parliamentary democracy).

Extreme policies of the pressure groups are modified, finally, by the shared *beliefs* of the British community. These beliefs (one, for instance, is that it is the duty of government to promote full employment) are broadly held by all sections of the nation, and pressure groups whose claims conflict with these deep-seated views will invariably be thwarted in their goals. No pressure group can afford to argue that its

policy is "good for the trade." It must show that it is "good for the country," for most Britons believe there is a "public interest" that must be respected, and feel a sense of outrage when it is not. In his essay, *In England, Your England*, George Orwell, that pitiless but discerning critic, pointed out the essence of this characteristic:

Here one comes upon an all-important English trait: the respect for constitutionalism and legality, the belief in "the law" as something above the State and above the individual, something which is cruel and stupid, of course, but at any rate, incorruptible. . . . The totalitarians' notion that there is no such thing as law, there is only power, has never taken root.³

BIG BUSINESS IN POLITICS

Some observers, while agreeing that the producers' organizations are more influential than other groups in Britain, would go on to argue that those representing business are far more influential than those representing labor. One common complaint is that the business groups claim to be non-political but really do, in fact, enter the arena of political controversy. What about this issue of political participation? Who is "political" and who "nonpolitical" in British public life?

The only bodies that belong organically to a political party and that contribute to its policy-making are those 79 individual Trade Unions that are affiliated with the Labour Party, and the co-operative societies that are affiliated with the Co-operative Party. Outside these, no particular groups belong to, or participate formally in, the policy-making of any political party. In this respect, the Confederation of British Industries and the Institute of Directors are in exactly the same position as the T.U.C. The T.U.C. is not affiliated with the Labour Party and has made it quite plain in public pronouncements that it does not regard itself as

³George Orwell, *Selected Essays* (London: Penguin, 1957).

a politically motivated body. Nevertheless, it does discuss matters of public controversy, it undoubtedly espouses the cause of nationalization and social welfare benefits, and it advises its members to vote Labour. Yet strictly speaking, since it is not party affiliated, it is in exactly the same position as any business group.

The term "political" can also be used to mean that a particular group is habitually aligned with one party or another. The business groups certainly tend to be aligned, through personal connections, with the Conservative Party. Yet the groups representing the owners or entrepreneurs in a particular industry sometimes make common cause with the Trade Unions representing the workers in that industry. They form a faction by banding together against the rest of the sectors of the economy. The most recent examples of this, having political repercussions, occurred in the aircraft industry in 1964-65, when the new Labour Government cancelled the TSR-2 airplane, and in the automobile industry in 1966, when the government clamped its economic "squeeze" on consumer credit.

A more serious criticism is that "business," through its wealth, has an unfair advantage in industry and politics. Business groups and certain publicity organizations they support (such as the "Aims of Industry" or the "Economic League") do, indisputably, spend much more than labor organizations. But the effect of such expenditure is grotesquely overrated. Certain bodies like the NUT have had much success with successive post-war governments, but have done little spending to achieve it. The medium open to the capitalist groups is limited to the press, for neither radio nor television is available for political purposes in Britain. And, since these latter, more influential media are barred from presenting political advertising, Britain is assured that those with the longest purse do not invariably win.

In any case, it is doubtful whether radio and television would tip the balance. In 1959,

Messrs Trenamen and McQuail studied the effects of the mass media on the 1959 General Election. It was currently believed that it was possible to "sell political policies as one would sell soap." Their study demonstrated that this was precisely what was not possible. Personal political prejudices create a barrier, and are of such a nature that the individual selects what he wants to select. The only appreciable effect of the mass media was to reinforce or to crystallize political attitudes, not to alter them.

As to the effects of *press* advertising, it is possible to be more categorical still, for the massive campaign against steel nationalization in 1963-64, the pre-election year, constitutes a case study. During this period the steel companies and a public-relations agency, acting in the same interest, spent the massive sum of £1½ million to persuade electors not to support the nationalization of steel as the Labour Party made it clear it intended to do. The British Institute of Public Opinion asked a standard set of questions on nationalization at regular six-month intervals for the whole of the two years preceding this election, and the results are as shown in Table 3-1.

It will be noticed that the mammoth expenditure not only failed to dissuade the public, it ended with more people favoring nationalization than at the beginning of the campaign!

Although business groups and firms are economically very powerful (employers and managers by-and-large direct the strategy of industry in the country), labor is not without the influence of power. It has weapons it can and does use—and, as a last resort, it can go on strike. Industrial *economic* power, therefore, rests on *both* sides of the economic fence.

The charge that business, and business alone, is politically powerful is a "power elite" theory (according to which power resides in the hands of a small, close knit clique). True, the capitalist groups were politically significant between 1951 and 1964, but that was only to be expected because they were aligned with the Con-

TABLE 3-1
Public Opinion on Nationalization, 1963-1964

<i>Opinion</i>	<i>March 1963</i>	<i>September 1963</i>	<i>March 1964</i>	<i>September 1964</i>
For more nationalization	18%	16%	17%	22%
For more denationalization	26	28	29	24
For "leaving things as they are"	43	40	43	43
Don't know what to think	13	16	11	11

Source: Gallup Political Index, 45:51-54.

servative Party, which was in power. *This alignment was the result, and not the cause, of the popular verdict rendered at the General Elections.* Nevertheless, Left-wing critics tirelessly repeated that there was an improperly close personal link between the Conservative Party, including the Conservative Ministers who formed the government, and outside business interests. They even complained about business influence in government during 1945-51, when not the Conservatives, but Labour was in power, and there was an organic bond of sorts between the Labour Party, the Labour Government, and the Trade Unions and Co-operatives. And, true to tradition (if not to habit), they still objected in the same vein when Labour was returned to govern in 1964 (having suffered a 13-year lapse from power).

The fact of course is that the influence of business on even Conservative governments is not absolute, but conditional. It is qualified by the voting power of the working class, for the Conservative Party has to keep the support of some 7 million working-class voters (including about 1½ million Trade Unionists) in order to stay in power.

Because of the inherent "veto" power of business and labor groups—their power, by noncooperation, to thwart the government—these groups always exercise some influence over the government of the day. Generally speaking, labor *does* have more influence with a Labour government, and business with a Conservative government, but neither frame the policy of the government, but only qualify it. We repeat: neither business nor labor groups can impose policies on the government that would not be tolerated by the electorate. The parties must "sell" their programs to the people, and thus what they can adopt from their pressure groups is always qualified by this central feature of British politics.

The influence of business or of labor waxes and wanes according to the complexion of the government, and this is decided by the electorate. If business is influential with a Conservative government, or if the unions are influential with a Labour government, it is so by the verdict of a free election. And it is the parties, *not* the pressure groups, that mobilize the electors, fight the election, and organize the House of Commons. To these we must now turn.

IV

Political Parties and Elections

The two major parties in Britain are both highly disciplined, and they both enjoy a hard core of electoral support that since 1945 has never sunk below 40% of the total electoral vote. The candidates of both parties must agree to support their party's platform, and they must be accepted by their party headquarters if they are to enjoy the help of the national party machine at election time—and without it they are most unlikely to win. In the House of Commons, the party members act, for the most part, with iron discipline, abstention from voting with the party is not common, and cross-voting is almost unknown.

The two-party system is the key to understanding the present operation of the British government. This system is responsible for the following factors:

1. The near-certainty that one party or the other will be returned with a clear and working majority in Parliament.
2. The formation of a Cabinet drawn from the majority party.
3. The stability of the Cabinet, since its party majority is disciplined.
4. The assurance that the Cabinet can last out the full term of Parliament's life.
5. The unambiguous responsibility of the Cabinet for all that has happened during its period of office.
6. The presentation to the electorate of a clear choice between the Government party, running on its performance, and the Opposition party, running on its promise.

The importance of the two party system in British government cannot be overstressed. British government is government by the Cabinet. The Houses of Parliament act as a checking and controlling force, but the directing and energizing element is the Cabinet, which is collectively responsible for its policy to Parliament, and beyond Parliament to the people. This collective responsibility for policy is

based on the monolithic nature of the party majority that supports it. In France, until the coming of the Fifth Republic, the Cabinet was never really a collective unit (although the Constitutions of the Third and Fourth Republics said that it had to behave like one) because its parliamentary support fluctuated. If Cabinets in Britain were regularly overthrown by temporary combinations of various parliamentary groups, as indeed they were between 1851 and 1868, the legislature would, in effect, formulate policy. Legislative initiative would prevail and not, as at present, Cabinet initiative. Such was the character of the French parliamentary system under the Third and Fourth Republics. And such was the character of British government in 1923–24 and in 1929–31, when minority Labour Cabinets held office and were liable at any time to be defeated by a combination of their Conservative and Liberal opponents. The short lives of those two Cabinets, compared with the usual duration of some four-and-a-half years, tell their own story.

THE HISTORY OF THE PARTIES

Today the two main parties are the Conservative and Labour Parties. The Liberal Party is a remnant left over from earlier days of power and responsibility. The strength of the Communist Party is negligible.

1688–1830: Whigs and Tories

The parties really began just before the Revolution of 1688, although some trace them back past the Restoration of 1660 and into the time when the conflict was King versus Parliament (1640–60).

The whole period 1688–1830 was dominated by these two factions, or alliances: the Whigs and the Tories. The backbone of the Whigs was the family connection of the great

landed magnates, who formed a veritable oligarchy. Their allies among the humbler folk, which gave them a national backing, were the Protestant sects (known as Nonconformists) who were outside of and opposed to the established Church of England, together with the traders, and the commercial interests who had recently backed the newly-founded central Bank of England. The Tories were mostly drawn from the lesser landholders (squires), and were closely allied with the Church of England. For some time after 1714, when the Whigs engineered the accession of the German King of Hanover (George I) to the throne instead of the son of the last Stuart King, James II, whom the Tories had tried to bring back, the Tories were tainted with a suspicion of treason to the dynasty. After 1760, George III turned out his Whig Ministers and installed the Tories. With three brief intervals, they governed Britain from 1760 to 1830.

✓1830–1846

The Tory majority in the Commons dissolved in 1830, and, amid widespread popular excitement, which later turned into agitation and rioting, the Whig aristocracy formed a Cabinet pledged to reform the corrupt electoral system that had permitted the Tories to perpetuate their power between 1760 and 1830. With the Reform Bill of 1832, the modern history of the parties begins, as we have seen. First, the Whigs were in power (1830–41), then the Tories, who began to call themselves Conservatives. The Whigs, supported by the M.P.'s from Ireland and by Left-wing radicals, were the party of non-conformity, of commerce, and of the new industry. The Tories stood for the Church of England and for the agricultural interests, but Sir Robert Peel, the Tory Prime Minister in 1841, began to move his party closer to the manufacturers. In 1846, however, his Conservative government split into two factions when he decided to bow to the free-trade views of the manufacturers and repeal the

protective duties on corn. One band consisted of his own devoted followers (notably William Gladstone), and the other of a rabble of inarticulate squires led by the young Jewish-born Benjamin Disraeli

1846-1868

The split ushered in a period of predominantly Whig rule, to which the Peelites after Peel's death in 1851 tended more and more to adhere. The amalgam of Whigs and Peelites and radicals gradually became known as the Liberals. The Tories slowly gathered strength and soon abandoned protectionism, but in other respects their devotion to the Anglican Church and to the land remained as before, while the Liberals increasingly depended on nonconformity, industry, and commerce. This was primarily a period of three- or even four-party rule: Whigs, Peelites, Radicals, and the Irish formed a rather loose alliance, with the Conservatives in opposition. The period ended with both main parties espousing a new Reform Act (1867). By enfranchising the artisan class of the towns, and expanding the electorate from 1 million to 2¼ million people, the Act broke the political deadlock. The parties had to find new and popular issues to attract the new electors, and they also had to organize them. Contemporary party structure may be said to have begun with the election of 1868.

1868-1886:

Liberal and Conservative

This period was the heyday of Gladstone, the Liberal leader, and Disraeli, who led the Conservatives. Governments were stable and long-lived, strengthened as they were by somewhat more disciplined majorities. Of the two parties, the Liberals were the less homogeneous. When Mr Joseph Chamberlain and his Radicals joined the party on its extreme left, they alienated the old Whig aristocrats and left

Mr Gladstone with the job of healing the breach in the party.

The rise of Irish nationalism, led by Charles Parnell, provoked a catastrophic shift in party alignments. Parnell removed his Irish Party from association with the Liberals and made it an independent force. In 1886, Gladstone decided to introduce a Home Rule bill for Ireland, which had the effect of driving both his Left wing (the Chamberlain Radicals) and Right wing (the old Whigs) out of the party, to the other side of the House. This brought his government down and ushered in a period of "Unionist" rule. "Unionist" denoted the supporters of the Act of Union of Ireland and Great Britain (passed in 1800), who were thus opponents of Home Rule. The group comprised both the original Conservatives plus the refugees from the Liberal Party. Gradually these groups merged into the "Conservative and Unionist Party," which is the official title of the Conservative Party today.

1886-1915

The Liberals stood for Irish Home Rule, for free trade, and, increasingly, for the trade unions. The Conservatives became the party of Union with Ireland, of imperialism, and, increasingly, of high tariffs. The Conservatives dominated politics until 1906, when they were badly defeated by the Liberals, who ruled from 1906 to 1915.

Meanwhile, however, the trade unions had begun to break away from their dependence on the Liberal Party. In 1900, some of them formed the Labour Representation Committee, with the object of attaining independent working-class representation in the House of Commons. This move succeeded in forcing the Liberals to negotiate a number of electoral deals with the Labour Committee. In 1906, 29 Labour M.P.'s were elected, and the Labour Representation Committee changed its name to the Labour Party. Thus a third party was born. After the first 1910

election, the Liberal Party commanded a majority of the House only with the support of Labour and the Irish (who had, since Parnell's death, returned to their alignment with the Liberals).

✓ 1915-1922

World War I brought the Liberals and the Conservatives together in an uneasy coalition in 1915. The Coalition fought and won the "khaki" election (1918), but the Liberal Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, in his electoral arrangements with his Conservative allies, decided not to endorse a number of Liberal candidates among them the leader of the Liberal Party and former Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. This maneuver widened a split in the Liberal Party which had opened during the war, one group being led by Lloyd George, the other by Asquith. In 1922, the Conservative backbenchers decided to quit the Coalition and fight the next General Election of their own (Fig. 4-1). Lloyd George, having no majority behind him, resigned. Parliament was dissolved, and a General Election took place.

✓ 1922-1940

Contesting the election as a divided party, the Liberals lost so heavily that the new Labour Party emerged as the second largest party and supplanted the Liberals as the official Opposition. The Conservatives won and formed the new government. In the 1923 election, the Conservatives lost their absolute majority and were defeated in the House. The King called on Labour leader Ramsey MacDonald to form a Cabinet. Since this first Labour government was a minority one that rested on tacit Liberal support, when this support was withdrawn in 1924 the Labour government was defeated in the House, and the Prime Minister, getting the King's consent for a dissolution of Parliament, called for a General Election. The Conservatives were returned with an absolute majority;




FIGURE 4-1 British Cabinets since 1918.

the Labour Party lost some seats; but the Liberals sank from 159 seats to 40. Its annihilation as a major political force dates from 1924.

In 1929, Labour came back as the largest of the three parties and formed the second (minority) Labour government. Caught almost immediately in the Great Depression, the government foundered in 1931, and another coalition of Conservatives and Liberals, and a few Labour Members, called the National Government, was formed, with Ramsey MacDonald as Prime Minister. Some Labour and half the Liberals left in 1932 when the Conservative-dominated Cabinet decided to introduce protective tariffs. From then on, the so-called National Government was really the Conservative Party especially after 1935, when MacDonald quit the Prime Ministership, and the Prime Ministers were Conservatives.

✓ 1940-1945

The disastrous handling of the beginning of World War II by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain led to a much-reduced vote in the House in 1940, a demonstration of hostility that forced him to resign and make way for Winston Churchill, who presided over a Coalition government of Conservatives, Labour, and Liberals, until the end of the war.

1945-1960

Labour was returned in 1945 with an enormous majority (see Table 4-1). In the 1950 election, however, the Conservatives staged a powerful revival, and the Labour Party had an absolute majority of only six seats. Nevertheless, it managed to endure for 18 months. In the election of 1951, although it polled more popular votes than the Conservatives, it was defeated, and the Conservatives ended up with an absolute majority of 16 seats. Despite this slender majority, they maintained office and soon began to gather strength, a develop-

ment that was much assisted by the division in Labour ranks, between the bulk of the party led by Clement Attlee (the former Prime Minister) and the rebellious Left wing led by the late Aneurin Bevan. In 1955, Churchill resigned the Premiership to Anthony Eden. In the election of 1955, the Conservatives triumphed again, their majority rising to 61, a good working majority. In January, 1957, Eden resigned and Harold Macmillan became Prime Minister in his place. In the election of 1959, the Conservatives did what no party since 1832 had ever done won three elections in a row. This time they increased their majority to 101.

From 1961, however, the Conservatives became increasingly unpopular, the voters at first showing their discontent by voting Liberal in bye-elections. From 1963 onwards, the Labour Party became the main beneficiary of voters' approval, and in October, 1964, led by Harold Wilson, it narrowly won the election, with 317 seats to the Conservatives' 304 and the Liberals' 9. Its overall majority was only *four*. Clearly, another election could not be long delayed. Seizing a moment when the opinion polls favored him, Prime Minister Wilson dissolved Parliament in March, 1966, and was returned with the large majority of 363 seats to the Conservatives' 253, the Liberals' 12, and two others—an absolute majority of 96.

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

The Conservative Party can trace its pedigree back to the seventeenth century. Deeply conscious of its long heritage, the party regards itself as a national institution, yet it is remarkably skilful in adapting itself to new political conditions. The Whigs' Reform Act of 1832 appeared to have destroyed forever the basis of its electoral support, but within two years a Conservative government was in office again, and within nine years the party had overwhelmingly defeated its Whig rivals at the

TABLE 4-1
British General Elections since 1945

	Total electorate	Total voting	Per-centage voting	Conservative and allied vote	Per-centage of votes cast	Labour and allied vote	Per-centage of votes cast	Liberal votes	Per-centage of votes cast	Other votes	Per-centage of votes cast
1945	32,836,419	24,082,612	73.5%	9,577,667	39.8%	11,632,891	48.3%	2,197,191	9.1%	674,863	2.8%
1950	34,269,764	28,769,477	84.0	12,101,983	43.5	13,295,736	46.4	2,621,489	9.1	350,269	1.9
1951	34,645,573	28,595,668	82.5	13,717,538	48.0	13,948,605	48.8	730,556	2.5	198,969	0.7
1955	34,858,263	26,760,493	76.8	13,286,564	49.7	12,404,970	46.4	722,405	2.7	346,554	1.2
1959	35,397,080	27,859,241	78.7	13,749,830	49.4	12,215,538	43.8	1,638,571	5.9	255,302	0.9
1964	35,892,572	27,655,374	77.1	12,001,396	43.4	12,205,814	44.1	3,092,878	11.2	374,914	1.1
1966	35,964,684	27,263,606	75.8	11,418,433	41.9	13,064,951	47.9	2,327,533	8.5	452,689	1.7

polls. Shatteringly defeated in 1945 by the Labour Party, it drew almost level by 1950, and governed the country for 13 years, from the General Election of 1951 until that of October, 1964.

The party has the advantage of broad support from all classes of society—rich and poor, dustmen and duchesses—and its empirical approach to politics has enabled it to appeal to all these classes at once. Historically, the party still is associated with the Crown and the aristocracy, and also (though this is of minor importance today) the Church of England. Again, it used once to be the party of imperial expansion, and still *is* the party of national self-assertion and self-interest. It continues to be associated with the landed interest; but it is pre-eminently the businessman's own party. And at the same time it is the party of paternalistic concern for the lower middle class and the working class, and it is remarkably adept at altering the emphases of its tradition to catch the moods of the moment. Its principles are broad, its tactics highly pragmatic.

The Conservative party was swept away at the polls in 1945, but made a remarkable recovery. Thrown back upon itself, it reorganized its structure, re-examined its principles, and came up with a program that created the impression of a progressive party and appealed particularly to "the rising working-class" that is

in a hurry to "get on in the world." This formula enabled it to win three successive elections. Out of power since 1964, it is again reorganizing and examining itself.

"Ideology"

Conservatives are not guided by ideology but by a set of traditional attitudes, and by principles that are highly elastic. In any predominantly two-party system, such as exists in Britain today, each of the two main parties is bound to be so comprehensive that it includes a wide spectrum of individual interpretations of these broad basic principles and attitudes; and so it is with the Conservative Party. Few Conservatives profess complete *laissez faire*, but none favor a fully-planned economy. Few if any nowadays regard war with equanimity, but none are pacifists. Few wish to dismantle the welfare state, but none wish to get rid of voluntary service and private self-help. Few openly advocate "privilege and property," but none are egalitarians. The bulk of the party takes a line midway between the leveling, socializing, and pacifistic pressures arising out of the British class structure and politically expressed by the Labour Party, and the defense of the existing social order. There is and in the past there always has been tension inside the party between its "ultras" and its moderates, and there is to-

day. Except for the period 1906-14, the moderates have won. But both wings can and do co-exist within the very broad traditional principles of this historic party, as a glance at these reveals.

The core of Conservative belief is the unity of the nation. To Conservatives, social classes are both necessary and natural, given the differing abilities of men, but these classes ought not to be founded on the accidents of wealth or birth, but on ability. To this end, they seek an equal opportunity for all to move forward and upward. They are—and never more so than to-day, when the titled aristocracy have quite lost their hold on national admiration—the *Meritocratic* Party. The classes, founded on quality, are, in their view, essential organs of the nation that transcend all personal differences. Hence they deplore appeals to class warfare, which they consider a wanton attack on national unity, and they challenge the assumption that there is a basic enmity between employer and employed, holding that both are partners in industry. They accuse the Labour Party of favoring one class above all others. They themselves claim that they are the party of all classes, of the whole nation.

According to the Conservative point of view, the development of character is founded on the individual's freedom to choose. The wider the choice, the greater the development of self-reliance. From their preference for voluntary effort over public assistance stems their insistence on free enterprise in industry, their hostility to nationalization, their defense of the profit motive, and their advocacy of indirect rather than direct taxation, the latter in their eyes reducing individual incentive. Favoring giving local authorities responsibility wherever they can be substituted for the central government, the Conservatives tried to decentralize the nationalized industries and to introduce competition from the outside wherever possible. Their slogan, "a property-owning democracy," reflects their faith that private property is

both a safeguard of the individual's independence and an incentive to his personal effort.

This is not to deny the state any part in the conduct of industry. Conservatives will even nationalize an industry if they think the facts warrant it—e.g., the publicly-owned B.B.C. (1927) and the Central Electricity Board (1926) were both Conservative creations. But they bitterly opposed any further nationalization after 1951, especially of the steel industry. On the whole, they maintain that detailed physical controls encumber rather than help the economy. And they feel that the state ought certainly to prevent monopolies and restrictive practices, to safeguard individuals and firms against calamitous occupational risks, and to act to ensure full employment and the proper geographical distribution of industry. Lastly, nothing in the Conservative tradition bars them from providing social welfare services. In the nineteenth century, the Conservatives championed the Factory Acts and workmen's compensation for injuries. However, they believe such services must be a "springboard rather than a sofa," a "ladder rather than a net."

In foreign affairs, the Conservative party is as cool towards the U.N. as circumstances will permit. It regards this world body as ancillary to, not a substitute for, a policy of national strength, military preparedness, and defensive alliances. The Conservatives used to be the advocates of Empire and imperialist expansion—yet during their 13 years in office they conceded independence to the colonies even faster than did the Labour governments of 1945-51. Since the former Empire has been liquidated, and since the Commonwealth has to an overwhelming extent become an association of former dependencies largely inhabited by colored peoples, the mass of the party has become increasingly disenchanted with overseas possessions. Instead, it has turned towards the European Economic Community as a realistic means of maintaining Britain's economic and diplomatic power. In 1961 the Macmillan govern-

ment opened negotiations to join the E.E.C. and, although these failed (owing to General de Gaulle's veto in early 1963), the party, remains quite firmly committed under its Leader, Edward Heath, to accession to Europe. Though this is not to the taste of a few traditionalists, it commands the overwhelming assent of the Annual Conferences and the bulk of the membership.

At home, the Conservatives accept the state's duty to provide full employment and to exercise a general regulation of the economy in the public interest. They have accepted the duty to provide social services, also, but differ with the Labour Party over the mode of administering them. These services are still largely based on the Labour reorganization of 1945-51, and provide for a flat rate of benefit for each recipient. Conservatives regard this as wasteful of the limited resources available, and would prefer to vary the payments to each individual by some test of personal need.

In industrial matters, the Conservative governments of 1951-64 abolished Labour's physical controls on prices and output, denationalized the steel and trucking industries, and encouraged competition from the outside against nationalized industries wherever possible—as, for instance, in the television and in the air transportation industries. They broke up price-fixing in industry with the Restrictive Practices Act of 1956, and challenged, by means of the Resale Price Maintenance Act of 1964, the right of manufacturers to fix prices for their retail products. Reluctant to act against the trade unions while in office, since 1964 they have demanded that the courts offer individual members some protection against their unions, and that steps be taken to abolish restrictive union practices in industry. This is not the same thing as demanding an end to the unions. To the contrary: the Conservatives oppose the Labour government's efforts to take collective bargaining over wages and conditions out of the hands of employers and trade unions and impose their own settlements.

The quest for incentive and opportunity, the stress on rewarding ability, is also to be seen in the party's educational policy. Unlike the Labour Party, which is taking steps to curtail or even destroy the "direct-grant" schools, the Conservative Party wants to have more of these. Against a great wash of intellectual opinion and the professed actions of the Labour government, it equivocates over "comprehensive" neighborhood schools, and favors the policy of sending the ablest children to the grammar schools where, it holds, they will "get on" faster and better. These rival policies in education well point up the differences between the two parties on the meaning of "equality," and illustrate what Conservatives mean when they talk of the "opportunity state."

Structure

The organization of the Conservative Party reflects its historical development and is tighter than a superficial look would suggest. The party is composed of three different organizations (Fig. 4-2). The first is the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Assns. A federation of the constituency parties, it was established in 1867 and was re-shaped between 1884 and 1886. The second component is the party in the Houses of Parliament, the Parliamentary Party, an autonomous body. The third is the Central Office, which was formed in 1870 as the secretariat of the Leader of the party, a role it has retained.

The National Union, as the name suggests, is a union of the constituency associations; there is one association for every constituency (electoral district). Its governing body, the Central Council, consists of 3,600 persons and meets once a year, in a sort of annual semi-conference. This Central Council has an Executive Committee of 150 persons, which meets every two months, but is so unwieldy that the General Purposes Committee of 56 persons, which meets frequently, makes most of the executive




FIGURE 4-2 *The organization of the Conservative Party*

decisions. The most important duty of the General Purposes Committee, perhaps, is to compile the agenda for the annual meeting of the Central Council of the Conference and of the National Union.

But it would be naive to think that the Union is run just by its Council or its Executive Committee or its General Purposes Committee, for a number of advisory committees help the Union to chart policy: the Women's, the Young Conservatives', the Trade Unionists', and those of the Local Government, and the Political Education and Publicity Committees. Among the advisory bodies that are not responsible to the Union, the most important are the Advisory Committee on Policy, the Central Board of Finance, and the Advisory Committee on Candidates. In theory, no candidate may be endorsed by a constituency association until this

Committee is satisfied as to the candidate's personal character, party loyalty, past record and experience, political knowledge, speaking ability, and financial integrity. In practice, constituency parties enjoy extremely wide latitude. More significantly, the committee maintains a list of approved candidates that is available to the constituency organizations. The effective decisions on candidates are in practice largely in the hands of one of the Vice-Chairmen of the party organization, who reports to this Committee. This Vice-Chairman is especially responsible, in the Central Office, for the candidates' file. He is appointed by and responsible to the Leader, but by tradition is a respected backbencher of the Parliamentary Party.

THE CONSTITUENCY ASSOCIATIONS In both the Conservative and the Labour Parties,

these associations are a vital element and, indeed, play a significant role in the political life of the country. The functions laid down for them in the Conservative Party's Model Rules show why: the associations are expected to provide an efficient organization for the Conservative Party in each constituency; to spread knowledge of the party's principles and policy; to promote the interests of the party in the constituency; to support, in local government elections, those candidates for the council chosen by the party; and to watch over the revision of the constituency register of voters.

The constituency party also has the important function of choosing the parliamentary candidate. The executive committee of the constituency association appoints a selection committee. Before a candidate is recommended for adoption, his name must be submitted to the National Union Standing Advisory Committee on Candidates, but it is extremely rare for this to withhold approval. Nevertheless, the procedure ensures that the people who are permitted to stand as candidates (and this is true also in the Labour Party) are "seeded"—that is, they have already pledged themselves to support the party's policy and its election manifesto.

Since 1950, the constituency's selection committee has been forbidden to ask intending candidates for financial contributions, and a maximum scale for these is laid down. The most a candidate may contribute to the general running expenses of the association is £25 per year, and the most to the association's election-fighting fund also is £25; so £50 in all. When contesting the seat, however, he may also be asked to contribute £100 for "personal expenses." Nevertheless, the local associations have been just as keen as before to pick their candidates from the higher professions and from business rather than from the working class, and have continued to prefer candidates with a public-school and Oxford or Cambridge education. The most marked effect of the reform has been its encouragement to young men

to come forward in much larger numbers than before.

THE LEADER AND THE CENTRAL OFFICE. The Leader of the party is the nominee of the Parliamentary Party and, once chosen, falls heir to the Central Office. He appoints the Chairman of the party organization and (since 1964) its full-time Deputy Chairman, who is also Secretary to the "shadow cabinet";¹ its two vice-chairmen; and the treasurers, chairman, and vice-chairman of the Policy Committee. The Central Office, which is virtually his personal secretariat, consists of several sections which handle constituency organization and finance, publicity and propaganda, and speakers. The Central Office also includes (since 1965) the Conservative Political Center—a propaganda and education organization—and the highly influential Research Department. The Central Office appoints the regional officials of the party, and these (the Regional Agent, the Regional Women's Organizer, and so forth) represent the Central Office in the constituencies. Constituency associations appoint their own election agents and officials, who are Central Office-trained and have direct access to headquarters in London but are encouraged to deal with the regional staff as much as possible.

The Central Office must therefore be regarded as a national organization of highly-skilled professional partisans. Their duty is to assist the party leadership in the formulation of policy, to carry out decisions, and to act as an intelligence network, advising the constituency associations on the views of the leadership, and in turn advising the leadership on the outlook, morale, and preparedness of the voluntary workers in the constituencies. This party machine is kept in an advanced state of readiness at all times. Local elections and constant bye-elections keep it on the alert, and every defeat provokes a reassessment of the party's prepared-

¹ A "shadow cabinet" consists of those men likely to serve as Ministers if the party were to form a government.

ness for the object of the entire enterprise to fight and win the next General Election.

THE CONFERENCE The National Union and its associated organs, and the Leader and his headquarters, meet together at the Annual Conference. Each constituency association is entitled to send seven persons, irrespective of its size (unlike the Labour Party, wherein representation is proportionate to membership). Furthermore, the persons sent are representatives, not (as in the Labour Party) mandated delegates. In addition, the Parliamentary Party, the official candidates, election agents, and certain members of the Central Office, also attend. About 6,000 are entitled to attend, but only about 4,500 turn up—still too many for effective policy-making. This group is by no means the supreme policy-making body of the party, in its advisory capacity, it can pass resolutions, but they are not binding. They are “conveyed” to the Leader (as the phrase goes), and if he does not want to adopt them, he need not, for the party’s rules clearly state that policy is the responsibility of the Leader. Mr Heath has upgraded the importance of the Conference by attending all its sessions. Previously, the Leader came after the Conference had concluded, his speech being its closing feature. At best a sounding board, the Conference is usually listened to by the Leader, for it would be very unwise of him to ignore its views altogether.

THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY Now let us turn to the truer policy-making mechanism of the Conservative Party, the Parliamentary Party, consisting of the Conservative Members of Parliament. In February, 1965, the Conservative Party adopted a formal election procedure for selecting its leader (Hitherto, informal “soundings” had been the custom.) This specifies that to win on the first ballot, the candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes of the Conservative M.P.’s, and 15% more votes than the runner-up. If he does not, provision is

made for a second ballot (51% of the vote sufficing), and at this point, new candidates may come forward. And finally, this procedure provides for a third ballot with preferential voting. In July, 1965, Sir Alec Douglas-Home resigned as leader, and in the ballot that followed, Mr. Heath, though obtaining an absolute majority of votes, was certainly not 15% ahead of his rival, Mr. Maudling. But the latter immediately withdrew.

The Leader is appointed for an indefinite period. There is no annual election of the Leader, as in the Labour Party, but the Leader does not automatically serve for the rest of his life. He has to live with his party and give it good (i.e. successful) service. If he does not, he is liable to face intolerable pressures that will force him to resign. The Conservative Party can be very tough on its Leaders and has, in the past, removed many of them. It got rid of Arthur Balfour before the First World War, Austen Chamberlain immediately after it, and Lord Home in 1965.

The Leader has, nonetheless, formidable powers. If he is Prime Minister he, of course, selects his Cabinet. In Opposition, unlike his own Labour counterpart, he selects his own “shadow cabinet.” He appoints his Chief Whip and the Junior Whips, who serve as his right-hand men in the House of Commons. And it is the Leader who ultimately fixes policy. These powers give him a much stronger constitutional position *vis à vis* the rank-and-file members of the Parliamentary Party, the backbenchers, than the Leader of the Labour Party in Opposition. Yet this authority is by no means absolute. It is qualified by the other party Members of Parliament, who are highly organized. A full meeting of the backbenchers, called the “1922 Committee,” convenes every Thursday for about an hour or more. The Chief Whip is always present, and reports the results of the meeting directly to the Prime Minister (or, when in Opposition, the Leader).

In addition to the 1922 Committee, there are

several specialized committees, about 30 in number. They have their honorary officers and any Member may attend, but, when the party is in power, Ministers are not members. In Opposition, these bodies play an important role, for attached to each of them is a special Secretary who is a member of the Conservative Research Department. The Research Department prepares briefs (sometimes from information supplied by outside bodies) and passes them on to the appropriate backbenchers' committee. When the party is in power, a different kind of situation tends to occur. It is then that, for instance, a Minister (say the Minister of Agriculture or the Minister of Fuel and Power) tends to encounter backbencher opposition on a particular bill. The appropriate backbencher committee might then invite him to explain to them his position. The Minister might have to decide to moderate his policy, or he might be able to persuade the backbenchers to come around to his viewpoint.

Crucial in the organization and work of the Parliamentary Party are the Whips. The Whips' office is the party's nervous system. Through the Whips, the Leader knows just what the mood of the party is, and he can transmit back through them his own reactions. He must rely on the Whips' techniques of cajolery and persuasion to keep the party loyal to him.

Do not suppose that the backbenchers on the Conservative side are a pack of sheep, for they can be very touchy and very fractious, and need careful handling. This is true even when the party is in power and discipline is normally tighter than in Opposition, as examples from the last Conservative spell in office will show. In December, 1961, when the Government had agreed to meet a U.N. request for 1,000-pound bombs to supply its forces in Katanga, the backbenchers forced it to reverse its decision. On July 27, 1963, when Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister himself, was trying to justify his conduct in the protracted, involved, sordid Profumo affair, and when his very continuance as

Prime Minister was at stake, no less than 27 of his backbenchers refused to give him their confidence, and abstained from voting. In March, 1964, on the Second Reading of the Resale Price Maintenance Bill, some 20 backbenchers abstained, and 20 actually voted *against* the government—the most serious revolt in the party during its 13 years of office. And later, in the Committee stage, so many voted against one particular item that the government's majority, which was nominally 100 fell to 1.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY. The candidates of the Conservative Party fall into three main groups: professional men, members of miscellaneous occupations, and businessmen. Of those actually elected to the House of Commons, professional men and businessmen predominate. In 1966, if classified according to their first and hence formative occupation, 46% were from the professions, 30% were businessmen, and some 12% were from "miscellaneous" occupations (mostly journalists). Farmers made up another 11%. But this and similar reckoning grossly underestimates the proportion of businessmen, since many lawyers, in particular, have business interests. In addition, the party draws very largely from the more exclusive public schools. In 1966 no less than 77 of the 253 Conservative Members came from Eton, Harrow, and Winchester, and 204 came from some kind of public school. Well over half the Parliamentary Party had been to Oxford and Cambridge. In short, the party is composed of businessmen and professional people, with almost no representation from the manual working class.

One recent study of the Parliamentary Party of 1955–59 discovered a close relationship between the backgrounds of M.P.'s, and the attitudes they assumed. The age of the candidate and the year he entered Parliament appeared to be decisive factors in his attitude toward Europe and the Commonwealth. The younger the member and the more recently he

entered Parliament, the less disposed he was to put the needs of the Commonwealth before those of Europe. Again, interestingly, the younger the candidate and the more recent his election, the more humane he was likely to be on penal matters.

Problems of the Conservative Party

The Party has just lost two elections —how can it win the next? All its problems stem from this dilemma.

THE DEFEAT OF 1964. In retrospect, the 1964 defeat is seen to be decisive despite Labour's narrow majority, because the Labour Prime Minister could pick the date for the next election. He did so in March of 1966, and the Labour Party won a large majority.

Why did the Conservatives lose in 1964? In the absence of quantitative opinion research findings, the following considerations are relevant.

First, the Conservative success, 1951–59, was founded on four factors. (1) Their policies of economic self-advancement dazzled the rising working-class living standards rose in the 13-year period 1951–64 more than in the whole previous half-century. (2) Until 1966, as opinion polls show, Conservatives were more determined to see their party win than Labour supporters were. (3) By rapidly accepting and expanding welfare provisions, by decolonizing, by trying to accede to the E.E.C., and by adopting professional standards and public relations techniques in the party organization, the party showed itself far more adaptable than the Labour Party. (4) For the whole of this time up to 1962, the Labour Party was tearing itself into pieces over the meaning of socialism and over the issue of defense, while its organization was inefficient and amateurish.

All these advantages slipped away after mid-1961, when a sterling crisis brought yet another cycle of business activity to an end and

inaugurated the "pay pause." Intensified by the severe winter of 1962, this pay pause, when added to increasing unemployment, infuriated the trade unions, alienated the middle classes whose mortgage rates increased, and irritated the business community.

Secondly, the party's famed adaptability went to unexpected lengths. This ex-imperial party decolonized faster than the Labour Party had done, this pro-Commonwealth party sought to enter the European Economic Community in 1961, this free-enterprise party in 1962 established the National Economic Development Council and tried to negotiate a national incomes policy as parts of what it chose to call "Conservative planning", and this on-the-whole traditionalist party adopted in 1964 a slogan of "modernization." These new moves divided the party, muddling its traditional supporters and bewildering the electorate. Conservative empiricism had been carried too far, and on the eve of the election of 1964 the party seemed to be governed by no intelligible principle.

Thirdly, the hitherto respectable party enveloped itself in public scandal and discord. The Vassall spy case of 1962 suggested that its security precautions were lax, but a subsequent inquiry into the matter seemed somehow to turn into an investigation of the press—and from that point on, Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister, forfeited its support. Consequently, he received no mercy when the Profumo scandal broke out in 1963. (Briefly, this involved his Minister of War, Mr. Profumo, who was rumored to have had relations with a "model" who was also having intimate relations with the Soviet Naval Attaché.) Despite the restiveness of the Conservatives, Mr. Macmillan was determined to lead his party at the next election, and all was set for his appearance at the Conservative Conference in October, 1963, when he was struck down with illness and announced his intention of resigning. He was replaced by a peer, the Earl of Home, who became Prime Minister. Two prominent members of the Mac-

millan Cabinet, Messrs. Macleod and Powell, ostentatiously refused to serve under him.

All this happened at the same time that the Labour Party, which from early 1963 had elected as its leader Mr. Harold Wilson (in succession to Mr. Gaitskell, who had died) was finding an impressive unity, and was renovating its organization and its public relations. Central Office, on the other hand, was in no position to formulate a distinctively Conservative policy until the early summer of 1964—only a few months from the General Election. As its public-relations adviser said, "It's tricky to advertise a product if you don't know what that product is."

PARTY REORGANIZATION FROM 1964. After its defeat in 1964, the Conservative Party set about reorganizing its Central Office, reformulating policy, and regularizing the leadership succession. Three main changes are occurring in the party organization. First, it has been centralized. Hitherto, the Research Department and the Conservative Political Center (publishing house and organizer of a study-group program) had been independent. Now both have been brought into the Office, with the significant addition that the Head of the Research Department has also been made Deputy Chairman of the Party Organization.

The second main change in the party organization relates to the grass roots, where the party has always leaned heavily on the Election Agents. Steps are now being taken to upgrade their status by regarding them as the "managing directors" of the local branch, while their salaries have been raised to a norm of £2,000, a career structure has been created, and a staff college is to be set up.

The third change relates to finance. Conservatives claim that 80% of their income comes from small subscriptions and they are likely to rely more on those in the future.

POLICY MAKING. A great deal of hard thinking is going on about policy. It is embodied

in a document published and presented to the Party Conference in October, 1965, under the title *Putting Britain Right Ahead*. This Conservative statement of aims was, necessarily, of a general nature. It recognized at the outset that the economy was in trouble (due, it suggested, to Labour's mistakes) and that little could be done immediately except to scrutinize and limit public spending, and to take anti-inflationary measures. But for the near future it sketched out an approach based on the three conservative principles of private incentive, freer enterprise, and a restoration of national self-confidence. More particularly, it formulated general plans for enhancing personal productivity, for encouraging industry, for reforming labor relations, and for reshaping some of the welfare services.

As to the first: incentives to the individual would be provided by altering the fiscal system. There would be less direct, and more indirect taxation; the Corporation and the Capital Gains Taxes would be amended so as to provide relief for small and family businesses; and the cost of social-security provision would be removed from the central exchequer and transferred to the employers, thus encouraging them to economize on labour. At the same time, industry would be assisted by a general revision of company taxation—e.g., improved methods of paying subsidies. It would be induced to compete by further antimonopoly legislation. Administrative and financial help would be made available to small businesses. As to the nationalized industries, more private firms would be allowed to compete with them, while they themselves would be subjected to rigorous cost-analysis procedures.

On labor relations, the document saw two problems. One was labor mobility; and to improve this it suggested (1) making occupational pensions transferable from any one firm to any other, and (2) better retraining facilities. The other problem arose from the status of the labor unions, long a Conservative target. The document suggested that union rules, including

questions on membership, discipline, the election of officers, and finance, should be approved by a Registrar, and that, on the giving of such approval, employers should recognize and negotiate with the unions where a majority of the employees so desired. For some issues, like dismissals, or demarcation disputes between rival unions, Industrial Courts should be established. At the same time, collective agreements, at least on matters of procedure, should be legally enforceable.

When the document turned to social welfare matters it moved cautiously. It recognized for instance that the national health service was "top heavy," but at first proposed to tackle this only by setting up pilot schemes. It was ambivalent about school education: it condemned both the total supplantment of grammar schools by comprehensives and the "11+ examination. On housing it promised more houses to let, but also more houses for private purchase, it was prepared to retain rent control in towns where this was deemed necessary, certainly it opposed the Labour Government's "nationalization" of land by the Land Commission on the grounds that this would restrict and not increase the supply of building land, but it did favor a tax on profits from the sale of land for building purposes.

An apostrophe should be added. Although, as we have shown, most of the document dealt (and sometimes rather ambiguously) with domestic issues, its final pages spoke out unequivocally for entrance into the European Economic Community, on which it felt the wealth and diplomatic strength of the country would come to depend.

LEADERSHIP In response to demands for a regular procedure to select the party leader, it has been decided to let the Parliamentary Party do so. In July, 1965, Mr. Heath was elected Leader, his nearest rival was Mr. Maulding. This appears to have settled the leadership issue for the time being. But doubts in Mr. Heath's capacity have steadily deepened. His

rating in the polls continued to decline until in February, 1966, they had reached an all-time low for the leader of any national party: only 29% of the electorate regarded him as a "good leader of the Conservative Party."

Able and resolute, with a vast capacity for work, Mr. Heath is, unfortunately, diminished by television, while his rival, Mr. Wilson, is one of the finest television "naturals" known to British politics. Again, in the House of Commons, Mr. Heath is not usually a match for the Prime Minister, who for long has been regarded as the finest and most caustic debater in the House. And, Mr. Heath led the party to defeat in 1966. However, Mr. Heath *has* held his party together at a very difficult time, and has wisely avoided a tendency to drift to the Right, a course that would prove embarrassing as the next election draws near. And, he has identified the major political issues—economy, Europe, social services—with accuracy. All in all, there is not the slightest evidence that any other person could have done Mr. Heath's job better, and some evidence that any other probably would have done worse.

Mr. Heath is a new phenomenon for the Conservatives. Under Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, and Douglas-Home, the party was governed by its patricians, from the *Center Right*. Mr. Heath is not a patrician. He comes of middle-class parentage, his school was a grammar school, he went to Oxford on a scholarship. Mr. Heath is the first Conservative leader to lead the party from the *Center-Left*.

THE LABOUR PARTY

Although the Labour Party was officially founded in 1900, it has antecedents in such organizations as the Independent Labour Party (founded in 1893), the Fabian Society (founded in 1883), the Social Democratic Federation (founded in 1881), in the ideals of the Trades Unions, whose history goes back still further into the nineteenth century; in the

Co-operative movement, founded in 1844; and in the working-class political tradition spanning the years of Owenism in the 1830's and Chartism in the 1840's to the mass strikes and the new trade unionism of the 1880's. It was not avowedly Socialist, but merely an amalgam of Socialist and trade-union elements; it was not a unitary body, but a federation of societies and Trades Unions which individuals could join only through membership in one of the component organizations. There was no doctrine except the goal of establishing a distinct Labour group in the House of Commons.

The Labour Representation Committee (as it called itself until 1906) was transformed into a socialist party in 1918, with the adoption of a constitution that is still in effect today. Individual members were allowed to join directly, and the party headquarters organized constituency Labour Parties that systematically covered the whole country. The new constitution declared that the object of the party was to "secure for the producers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry and service. . . ."² This statement is from the famous "Clause IV" of the party's objectives, which we will cover later.

Today the Labour Party governs Britain. Its voting support rose steadily from 1906 (except in the special circumstances of 1931) to 1951, then dropped, to rise again in 1966 (see Table 4-2). The history of increases and decreases in its membership are shown in Table 4-3.

*Ideology, Image,
and the 1966 Program*

IDEOLOGY. Although its program is basically Socialistic, the Labour Party has never

²In 1927 the words "and exchange" were added, following "distribution."

TABLE 4-2 Votes Cast for Labour, 1906-1966			
1906	323,195	1935	8,510,566
1910 (Jan.)	450,969	1945	12,149,605
1910 (Dec.)	370,802	1950	13,266,592
1918	2,370,240	1951	13,948,605
1922	4,251,011	1955	12,404,970
1923	4,508,504	1959	12,215,538
1924	5,483,088	1964	12,205,814
1929	8,389,512	1966	13,056,951
1931	6,648,023		

been the prisoner of an all-embracing Marxist ideology, as have some of the Socialist parties of continental Europe. Many elements have shaped its viewpoint. At an early stage, Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation introduced Marxist ideas, but these were not influential. The Independent Labour Party was a much more important component, and its philosophy derived largely from the religious nonconformity of the working classes, embodying a disgust for the class injustices of a competitive society and a plea for a more just and humane society based on fellowship and cooperation. Another ingredient was introduced by the small but extremely influential Fabian Society, which favored gradualism. The Fabians wanted to bring industry under public ownership and control and to redistribute the nation's wealth so as to provide all citizens with the minimum requirements for a decent and civilized life. [Syndicalism (called, in its British form, Guild Socialism) espoused workers' control of their employers' industries. At different periods in the party's history, different views have been uppermost. In the 1920's, for instance, it was the idealistic desire for fellowship and cooperative living; in the thirties, there was a stronger flavor of Marxism; and throughout the forties, the party laid its main stress on the need for economic planning, of which nationalization of the basic industries was an essential part. This latter stress, together with a zeal for social equality,

TABLE 43
Labour Party Membership, 1900-1960

	Total	Individual membership*	Trade union membership	Socialist societies
1900	375,931	—	353,070	2,286
1905	921,280	—	904,496	16,784
1910	1,430,539	—	1,394,402	31,377
1913	2,093,365	—	2,053,735	32,828
1920	4,359,807	—	4,317,537	42,270
1925	3,373,870	—	3,337,635	36,235
1930	2,346,908	—	2,011,484	58,213
1935	2,377,515	419,311	1,912,924	45,280
1940	2,571,163	304,224	2,226,575	40,464
1945	3,038,697	730,224	2,510,369	41,281
1950	5,920,172	908,161	4,971,911	40,100
1955	6,483,994	843,356	5,605,988	34,650
1958	6,542,186	888,955	5,627,690	25,541
1959	6,436,986	847,526	5,564,010	25,450
1960	6,328,330	790,192	5,512,688	25,450
1965	6,439,893	816,765	5,601,982	21,146

*In addition to trade union members listed as individual members

are its driving forces today

Just as the Conservative Party still contains Right-wing elements who believe in British imperial supremacy, so the Labour Party contains a very small Left-wing faction that maintains a strong attachment to orthodox Marxism. This group believes in the class struggle of the workers against the capitalists. It wants to remove the capitalistic order altogether by placing the whole economy under public ownership, and in foreign affairs it advocates the unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons and a neutralist foreign policy for Britain

The essential philosophy of the Labour Party springs from a belief that man is inherently good and that institutions and society are mostly to blame for making him behave badly and live miserably. Economic institutions are particularly guilty because of the enormous influence they exert over the size of the national income, over the way its rewards are distributed, and over the social priorities that are established as the economy's goal. Democracy

must therefore be extended from politics into economic affairs. Using the processes of parliamentary and local democracy, in which the party fervently believes, the electorate should bring firms and enterprises under the ownership or control of the people. The objective, therefore, is to create a cooperative fellowship in place of the scramble for private competitive gain

In home affairs, therefore, the party has four major objectives: the "democratization" of the economy by means of the nationalization of key industries, and public regulation of the rest, a more equal distribution of wealth, by means of death duties, taxation of unearned incomes, and sharply progressive income-taxes on earned incomes, universal social welfare services, and the elimination of class differences. It sees the public schools as a privilege of the wealthy, it deplors the academic segregation of children at the age of 11, and it favors large, comprehensive schools for all

In the field of foreign affairs, the Labour Party would like to see collective cooperation

among the nations replace national sovereignty and self-interest. To this end, it is far warmer toward the United Nations than is the Conservative Party. Also, its members have a pronounced aversion to the threat or use of force in world affairs, unless employed to support the U.N. The Labour Party opposed the Conservative Government's landings in the Suez Canal zone in 1956, and the British air-drop in Jordan in 1958, but supported the U.N. action in Korea and, later, in the Congo.

The advent of nuclear weapons has caused a sharp conflict of conscience inside the Labour Party. Since 1955, when the British government first contemplated making an H-bomb, a minority in the party has protested against the manufacture, then the testing, and finally the stockpiling of British nuclear weapons. The "unilateralists" wish to renounce the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons unconditionally without international agreement; in addition, they would deny the United States any British bases for the employment of nuclear weapons, and if necessary withdraw from N.A.T.O., unless this alliance also agreed to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. Again, they form a minority of the party.

Finally, the Labour Party is strenuously anti-colonialist. It supports the speediest emancipation for the colonies, and also believes it is the duty of the richer and more powerful nations like Britain to give material assistance to the weaker and underdeveloped countries.

IMAGE. By 1959-60 the public image of the party was increasingly that of a humorless and aging party of zealots and puritans clinging to the old-fashioned, home-spun virtues, and more and more given over to nostalgia for the epics of its past. It had lost three elections in a row. It was demoralized. And for the next two years it tore itself open in fruitless controversy over the precise meaning to be attached to "socialism" and over the question of nuclear weapons. The first controversy took the form of a

debate over the meaning of the aforementioned Clause IV of the constitution of the Labour Party: was this to be taken literally or did it permit a mixed, public-*cum*-private economy? It was never really settled. The second led the Conference of 1960 actually to vote the unconditional and unilateral renunciation of Britain's nuclear armory. This in turn led to internal strife in which the party Leader, Mr. Gaitskell, refused to abide by the Conference's resolution.

Then all changed. The 1961 Conference abandoned its unilateralist stance, and in 1962 Mr. Gaitskell, by denouncing the Conservative government's moves to take Britain into the European Economic Community, brought the party's Left wing behind him. Unity was at last restored. The honeymoon spirit was fostered by Conservative difficulties—the pay pause, unemployment, the efforts to join the European Economic Community, the failure of its weapons policy (the "Skybolt" missile), and then De Gaulle's veto on British accession to Europe.

All seemed lost again in January, 1963, when Mr. Gaitskell died of a mysterious illness. A tried leader had gone, and the contenders for the succession, Mr. Brown and Mr. Wilson, represented the Right and the Left of the party, respectively. However, a sufficiency of Right-wingers brought themselves to vote for Wilson because (to quote the remark of one of them to the author) "he looks more like a Prime Minister." As the Conservatives moved into the mire of the Profumo scandal and the dubious maneuvering that surrounded the election of Sir Alec Douglas-Home as its new Leader, the Labour Party consolidated its lead in the opinion polls.

Meanwhile, decisions taken in headquarters as far back as 1960 began to take effect. The most important was the adoption in 1961 of a policy document called "Signposts for the Sixties." It concentrated on three main points: the poor economic growth-rate, and the subsequent necessity for economic planning; regional and urban development; the crisis in education

— particularly higher and technological education; and the decay of the social services. To advance it, the party now adopted the Conservative's tactic of using public relations and advertising. The new program, the new publicity, and the new leader dissipated the old home-spun image. By 1964, Labour was seen as a vigorous and young party of modernization, in touch with the new technological age.

THE PROGRAM OF 1966 The Labour Party is inclined to draft more specific election manifestos than the Conservatives, and it also adopts the "mandate" theory of elections. that, if elected, the party not only has the right but the duty to carry out each and every one of the promises included in its manifesto. For these reasons the Manifesto of 1966 both illustrates how the ideology of the party looks when translated into practical proposals, and indicates what this party must achieve if it is to have a good chance of being returned to power at the next election, hence it is relevant to our later discussion of the problems of the Labour Party.

The Manifesto of 1966 was entitled "Labour a Time for Decision." The title reflects the theme of the Labour appeal—"You know Labour Government Works," said their posters. In 1966 the party was asking for a clear mandate to carry out its former program and so consequently, there was no major change between the 1964 bag of promises and that of 1966.

The essential item to notice in the Manifesto is this promise "*In the next five years, living standards . . . will rise by 25%.*" All turns on this. If the party does not manage to deliver, it will face an internal crisis and may lose the next election.

(a) *The economy* The balance of payments will be restored by tax and credit aids to exporters and by cutting overseas expenditures and investments. Productivity will be increased by tax changes on the one side, and by an "early-warning system," designed to slow down

price and income increases, on the other. Regional planning will stop the congestion in the West Midlands and Southeast while restoring prosperity to the high-unemployment areas, and physical building controls will assist. The steel industry will be nationalized, and the aircraft industry will be rationalized with a large public stake in its equity. Existing nationalized industries will be encouraged to branch out into adjacent fields. An Industrial Reconstruction Corporation will help rationalize small firms with government money and assistance. The National Coal Board (a nationalized industry) will be assisted by writing off \$1 billion debt.

(b) *Taxation.* The 1964 promises to levy a capital-gains tax and a corporation tax, and to disallow business expense accounts were already enacted. In addition, there will now be a betting and gaming tax, and a levy on speculative gains from land development.

(c) *Social provision.*

Housing A Land Commission will be set up to acquire land under "eminent domain" procedure for house-building purposes, and will levy taxes on land-development values. Office building will continue to be restricted. Subsidies to public housing will be increased. The target number for new houses will be expanded to 500,000 per annum.

Full employment To help redeployment of labor, restraining programs will be improved, while payments will be made to those dismissed from work.

Social Security (Old-age pensions had already been raised.) A scheme of earnings related benefits will be introduced.

Health (The 24¢ charge for each drug prescribed under the National Health Service had already been removed.) The expenditure on hospital building will be doubled.

Education There will be smaller classes and more schools, and the school-leaving age will be raised to 16 in 1970. The "11+" examination will be abolished, and all state schools will go over to the "comprehensive" system. A committee will

inquire into the future of the "public schools." Higher education will be expanded and a television and radio "university" will be set up.

Rents and mortgages: The level of rents will be controlled by law, and local assessment committees will decide on the fairness of rents. The law of leasehold will be changed so that the million or so tenants who lose their houses without compensation when their long lease ends will in the future either receive compensation or have the chance of buying the house. Mortgages will receive some tax concession.


(d) *External affairs.* The Manifesto deplored the bloodshed in Vietnam, declared its support for the U.N. and for N.A.T.O., and stated the party's intention of working for nuclear-free

zones, internationalization of the British nuclear force, and a non-proliferation treaty. Defense spending was to be fixed at 6% of the national income. As to the European Common Market, the government declared its willingness to enter, but only "if essential British and Commonwealth interests are safeguarded."

Structure

Basic to the structure of the Labour Party is the difference between *individual party members*, who are organized in the constituency Labour parties (the C.L.P.'s), and the *affiliated members*, mostly trade-unionists from the unions

FIGURE 4-3 The organization of the Labour Party.



that have affiliated with the party (Fig. 4-3). These unions collect a political levy, part of which goes into the party's coffers. Both types of membership are represented at the Annual Conference. The trade unions and local constituency Labour parties both send one delegate for every 5,000 members. Also entitled to be present, *ex officio*, are the National Executive Committee, the whole of the Parliamentary Party, and all the candidates. But these *ex officio* members have no votes. Usually some 1,000 to 1,200 persons attend. Resolutions are introduced by the delegates, and then are debated and voted on by the Conference. Since inevitably too many resolutions are presented for the Conference to discuss adequately, the "platform" tries to have them boiled down into "composite" motions. Of some 30 possible resolutions about the Prices and Incomes policy for instance, three might reach the Conference: one Right-wing, one middle-of-the-road, and one Left-wing.

The next function of the Conference is to elect the National Executive Committee. In addition to acting as the keeper of the party's conscience, the NEC runs the party between the annual meetings of the Conference. To prevent the 5½ million trade-union-affiliated members from overriding the less than a million individual members and choosing their own men for the N.E.C., the latter is divided into four groups. (1) Twelve members of the Committee are nominated by the trade unions and are voted on by them only. (2) Seven members are nominated and elected by just the constituency parties. (3) The third group consists of five women only. Since they are not elected solely by the women (as one might expect) but by the whole Conference, they must, clearly, secure the backing of the trade unions. (4) The fourth group consists of only one member, who is elected by the Socialist and the Co-operative Societies represented at the Conference. To these 25 members are added the Leader of the Parliamentary Party and the Deputy Leader,

who are *ex officio* members, and the Treasurer, who is elected by the whole Conference, for a total of 28 in all. With the Parliamentary Labour Party, the formal Labour Party structure is complete.

How is policy decided in the Labour Party, and who is most influential in formulating it? We shall discuss this under three headings: (1) the role of the Conference *vis-à-vis* the Parliamentary Labour Party, (2) the role inside the party of the constituency parties and of the trade unions; and (3) the Parliamentary Labour Party itself.

THE CONFERENCE AND THE PARLIAMENTARY LABOUR PARTY. The Conference and the Parliamentary Party are supposedly independent of one another, yet both are responsible for establishing the policy of the party. Before 1952, the Parliamentary Party dominated the National Executive Committee because (1) many of the leaders of the Parliamentary Party belonged to the Committee, and (2) the Committee was able to rely on the vote of the largest trade-unions. In addition, since the Labour Party was in power, from 1945 to 1951 the leaders of the Parliamentary Party who formed the Cabinet enjoyed a high prestige. This is broadly the present situation now that Labour is back in power. But in 1951-52 the constituency parties represented in the Conference revolted against the leadership of the Parliamentary Party and elected to the National Executive Committee a large number of Leftist M.P.'s, the so-called "Bevanites," named after the late Aneurin Bevan, the fiery Welshman who strove to infuse the party with its old radical zeal. Later there was a shift to the Left in the largest of the trade unions, the Transport and General Workers Union, which disposes of one-sixth of the votes in the Conference. This further weakened the hold of the leaders of the Parliamentary Party in the Executive Committee and the Conference.

In 1960, a serious cleavage sundered the

party when, as described, the Conference rejected the platform's resolution on defense and, instead, passed one calling for "a complete rejection of any defense policy based on the threat of the use of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons."

Hugh Gaitskell, the Leader of the Party, refused to change his own standpoint, and stated that the Parliamentary Party was not constitutionally obliged to do so either. When Parliament reconvened, the Parliamentary Party re-elected Mr. Gaitskell as its Leader by a 2-to-1 majority, and elected a parliamentary committee of anti-unilateralists, thus also indicating that it intended to go its own way.

Mr. Morgan Phillips, the party's General Secretary, summed up the constitutional question in this way:

1. The Annual Conference does *not* instruct the Parliamentary Party. It can instruct only the National Executive Committee.

2. The Parliamentary Labour Party is unquestionably an autonomous political body, owing ultimate responsibility only to the electorate.

3. The Parliamentary Labour Party cannot maintain its position in the country if it can be demonstrated that it is at any time and in any way subject to dictation from an outside body, which, however representative of the *party*, could not be regarded as representative of the country.

For some months after the Conference, the struggle between the two factions was evened. When the party Conference met again in October, 1961, Mr. Gaitskell's multilateralist policy was carried by a huge majority. Thus, after an embittered period of strife between the Conference and the Parliamentary Party, unity was restored—on the Parliamentary Party's terms—and its view was reaffirmed in the Conference of 1962.

THE CONSTITUENCY LABOUR PARTIES AND THE TRADE UNIONS. The role of the unions in the Labour Party is enormously important in respect to (1) money, (2) votes, (3) the National

Executive Committee, and (4) the sponsorship of candidates.

Financing. The unions contributed £100,000 to the Labour Party's election fund in 1955; £326,000 in 1959; and £598,000 in 1964. Since 1945, they have never contributed less than 80% of the General Election fund. Of the current annual revenue of the party organization (1965 figures), of a £379,000 total, £281,000 comes from the unions and only £42,000 from the constituency parties.

Voting. At the Conference, there are some 5½ million trade-union votes to ¾ million constituency party votes. Furthermore, the "big six" trade unions control two-thirds of that huge trade-union vote, and it is the practice of each trade-union delegation to vote as a single bloc. (In 1960, for example, the Executive Committee of the National Union of Railwaymen decided, by *one* vote, to support the unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons; at the Labour Party Conference in October, the *whole* of the union's 294,000 votes was cast for this resolution.)

The National Executive Committee. As we have seen, the Committee has 12 trade-union members and five women, and a treasurer elected by a majority of the whole Conference. Thus as many as 18 out of the 28 places can be held by people who are either trade unionists or favorable to them.

Sponsoring candidates. Certain trade unions have "panels" of candidates, and when any of these candidates is adopted by a constituency, the trade union is prepared to contribute to that candidate's election expenses and also to make a certain annual contribution to the running of his constituency party. How much they actually give depends on the circumstances and on the individual union. A union may pay up to £350, or half a full-time agent's salary (whichever is the larger), to a borough constituency, and £420 per year, or half the salary of a fulltime agent (whichever is the larger), to a county constituency. These figures must be contrasted with the very small sums a Conservative candidate is permitted to contribute to his constituency association.

In addition, unions pay a sizable proportion of the election expenses for their own candidates when they are adopted: the maximum is 80% and the average sum paid out is £550. This has increased the gulf between the constituent-

cies that adopt ordinary candidates and those that are tempted by the allure of a trade-union candidate or a candidate sponsored by the Co-operative Party (who also will bring money with him). The trade unions tend to adopt candidates for the safer seats. Of their 138 candidates, 120 were elected in 1964, and 132 in 1966. Both are very high proportions. In the 1964 Parliament, 120 out of 317 Labour MP's were union-sponsored, in the 1966 Parliament, 132 out of 363.

Militants in the constituency parties have tried to demonstrate that the constituency parties raise and spend more money than the trade unions contribute. An independent scholar, however, estimated the annual income for the 1960-1964 period thus:³

Trade unions' donations to local parties and to Central Headquarters	£ 797,000
Autonomous Central and Regional income	35,000
Co-operative donation to local parties and Central Headquarters	125,000
Autonomous local Labour Party income	<u>500,000</u>
Total annual income	£ 1,457,000

Thus 55% of the total is provided by the trade unions—representing 56% of the sum the unions raise from their members by the "political levy." Only 34% of the total is raised by the local parties by their subscriptions, lotteries, etc.

The Parliamentary Labour Party

In Opposition, the Parliamentary Labour Party is, in certain important respects, organized in ways widely different from those of the Conservative Party. The Labour Party's traditional passion for equality and for democratic leadership has handicapped the Parliamentary Party. The Leader is annually elected and then is saddled with a group of people (known as the Parliamentary Committee), who may be personally obnoxious to him, by a vote

of the whole Parliamentary Party. The Leader does have the right (and this gives him some patronage) to choose which area of policy he will assign to each man. In office, as at present however, matters are quite different. The "Leader" is the Prime Minister, and as such he "hires and fires" all members of the government, senior and junior.

Both in Opposition and in office, the Parliamentary Party meets as a body once every week, on Thursday afternoons. In principle, what is decided at such meetings is binding on the entire party, under its Standing Orders. Unlike its Conservative counterpart (the "1922 Committee"), Ministers attend this meeting. Since taking office, a Liaison Committee has also been set up, consisting of the elected Chairman of the Parliamentary Party (a backbencher), two other backbenchers as Vice-Chairmen, the Leader of the House of Commons and the Chief Whip (both prominent Ministers, of course), a Labour Peer, and the Secretary to the Parliamentary Party. This Committee arranges meetings of the full party caucus, prepares the agenda, and represents the views of the rank-and-file to the Ministers. Additionally, the party, both in Opposition and in office, has a network of "subject" committees of backbenchers, each electing their own chairman, but (under a revision of the Standing Orders in 1966) notified and approved by the Chief Whip. There are 25 such committees. The trade-union-sponsored members also meet from time to time as a group.

DISCIPLINE The theory of the Parliamentary Labour Party is that it forms its policy democratically, and indeed, in Opposition this is true. The majority selects the Leader, elects the Parliamentary Committee which acts as the "shadow cabinet," and chooses the Chief Whip. Policy is made in the caucus, where the majority decision is binding on the minority. But, obviously, matters are very different in office.

To enforce this majority viewpoint, the party

³Richard Rose, *Influencing Voters* (London: Faber, 1967), pp. 252-255.

has a set of Standing Orders. Among other things, these require that a Member vote along with his party on the floor of the House except in a matter of conscience, when he may abstain. If he disobeys, he must answer to the leadership, and if his explanation is unsatisfactory and he continues to disobey, he may be excluded from the Parliamentary Party. He may also be expelled from the party by its N.E.C. As a result, the National Executive Committee of the extra-parliamentary Party would not endorse his candidature at the next election; and so he would stand to lose his seat.

But the Parliamentary Party has a long history of indiscipline, and the rule has had a checkered career. In the 1945-51 period of Labour rule, the Standing Orders were suspended—the government's majority was so large as to make such tolerance possible. Between 1951 and 1959, however, while in Opposition, the Left-wingers frequently broke ranks, and the rule was invoked against them. Following the 1959 defeat, the Standing Orders were again suspended, only to be reimposed in 1961 and actually used against six Members, who were excluded from the Parliamentary Party (and only re-admitted after some time). The Standing Orders were left in force during the 1964-66 Wilson government, but there was no need to invoke them, as solidarity guaranteed that the backbenchers, with a majority of only four, would not turn out their own government.

They were not re-imposed (up to January, 1968 at least) in the present Parliament, where the government have a majority of 97. Backbench unrest led in late 1966 to a pact by which the backbenchers agreed not to set up any unofficial "study groups," while the Whips for their part agreed to widen the meaning of a "matter of conscience." This latitude, however, was followed by a number of revolts in 1967, culminating in a massive abstention of 61 Members from the government's defense policy. A "doves and hawks" controversy broke out, the loyalists demanding the

restriction of the conscience clause to its former narrow limits, and the "doves," which included the Leader of the House himself, insisting on giving the new rule a fair chance. It was followed by an even worse rebellion in January, 1968 when 25 abstained in a vital confidence vote on the government's economic measures. Here sanctions were finally applied against the rebels. The situation should be contrasted with that of the Conservative Party, which has no Standing Orders, has withdrawn the Whip from a member only once since the First World War, and has had incomparably less trouble with rebels than has the Labour Party.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION. Though the Labour vote is overwhelmingly manual working-class, the candidates they elect are overwhelmingly non-manual class. Only the trade union practice of sponsoring candidates gives the non-manual workers a foothold in the Parliamentary Party. It is possible to classify candidates according to their original or formative occupation, or the one they practiced when elected, and the former is the one used here. This overrates the working-class component: many of working-class origin have taken up some white-collar occupation by the time they are elected.

The Labour members are of four main types. The professions, a category which in this party includes a vastly greater number of teachers and university teachers than it does in the Conservative Party, made up 40% of the Parliamentary Labour Party in 1964, and 43% in 1966. Businessmen—again vastly different from the Conservative contingent, which is largely composed of company directors, of whom there are only *three* in the Parliamentary Labour Party—made up 10% of the latter in 1964, and 9% in 1966. They consist mostly of small shopkeepers, accountants, and executives, rather than directors of large concerns. The next group, the "minor professions," is made up of a miscellany of journalists, organizers, public lecturers, insurance salesmen, and the like: they made up 16%

of the party in 1964, and 17% in 1966. Lastly, those of working-class occupations formed 32% of the party in 1964, dropping back to 30% in 1966. Thus, between 68% and 70% of the party is nonmanual.

Education provides a somewhat better picture of "class" origin when it is remembered that, given the date at which most of the members received their education, "elementary" education and the "elementary+" would tend to denote working-class origin, "secondary" and "secondary+" would denote lower middle-class, and "university," while it would include elements of both of these (the very bright minds), would mostly indicate a middle-class origin. Those receiving only elementary education formed 12% of the party in 1964, and 9% in 1966. Those receiving secondary education formed only 16% of the party in 1964, and 14% in 1966. The members who started out with elementary or secondary education and then went on, either to night school or to teachers' training or similar types of courses formed 26% in 1964, and 21% in 1966. Individuals who had been to a university, however, formed 42% of the 1964 party and 51% of the party in 1966.

The Parliamentary Labour Party likes to boast that it is more socially representative than the Conservatives—and this is obviously true. But for this reason it is much more socially and occupationally heterogeneous. Research on the correlation between social background and political attitudes carried out by the author for the 1955–59 Parliament suggests that this largely accounts for its schisms and convulsions as compared with the greater solidarity of the Conservative Party. In particular there was a tension between the working-class, trade union-sponsored candidates and the remainder, especially the miscellaneous professions on "ideological" issues—such as nuclear arms and the cold war. Similar research on the 1964 Parliament and beyond has been undertaken at Southampton University, and has yielded similar results. A spot check by the author on two issues

TABLE 4-4
*Occupation and Attitude
in the Labour Party, 1967*

Occupational group	Percentage in Labour Party	Percentage abstainers in defense debate	Percentage signing in <i>The Times</i>
Professions	43%	39%	40%
Business	9	15	12
Minor professions	17	20	26
Workers	32	25	22

namely, the defense estimates for 1967, and the war in Vietnam—indicates this.

In February, 1967, 64 Labour M.P.'s abstained from voting with the government at the close of a debate on the defense estimates. In March, 1967, a number of Labour Members signed a statement in *The Times* calling on their government to dissociate itself from the bombing of North Vietnam and to endorse the peace proposals of U Thant, the Secretary General of the U.N. In theory, the signatories should have been from all occupational groups in the party, but as Table 4-4 shows, they were not.

The proportion of professional Members is roughly the same as the proportion they bear to the whole party. The "business" group showed a somewhat higher propensity to act than their numbers in the party would warrant. The minor professions also showed a greater propensity to abstain in the defense debate than their party proportion warrants, and a markedly higher propensity to sign the Vietnam document. The workers, on the other hand, are under-represented among the defense abstainers, and even more markedly underrepresented among the signatories of the Vietnam call.

Problems of the Labour Party

There is really only one problem facing the Labour Party: to be in a position by 1970 where it can win the General Election. The

chances of doing this depend, almost to the exclusion of anything else, on how well Labour handles the economy. Whether the party makes a hash of its foreign policy or succeeds in it is most unlikely to affect the outcome of an election: the ghost of Suez haunted the 1959 election, but it does not appear to have turned a vote. Again, Mr. Wilson may continue to be, as he is now, far more popular than Mr. Heath, and to outrun his own party by the same margin that Mr. Heath runs behind his: but this will not decide the election, either. In 1945 Mr. Churchill was far more popular than his Labour rival, Mr. Attlee, but all the same the Conservatives suffered a most staggering defeat.

As we have already said, Labour made economic revival the center-piece of its program and manifesto, both in 1964 and in 1966. The gross national product was to be raised 25% by 1970, and the proceeds were to provide a substantial increase in social expenditure as well as in increased personal consumption.

So far, however, Labour has failed to honor its election pledges, and it is clear that it will not be able to redeem them by 1970. The Conservatives achieved a growth rate of 25.4% in the years 1959-64; the Labour National Plan envisaged a similar one, of 25%, between 1964-70. Under the Conservatives, personal consumption (in real terms) rose by 23% between 1958-64; the Labour Plan envisaged this running at slightly less, viz at 21%, between 1964-70, the balance going to increases in the social services.

This goal has virtually vanished as a result of the economic crises of 1964-65, and above all as a result of the sterling crisis of mid-1966 and the severe "July Measures" that the government took to meet it. These measures froze wages and prices, and produced unemployment. Meanwhile, production remained static throughout the entire 1964-67 period. By the beginning of 1967 the most optimistic estimates put the probable increase in G.N.P. by 1970 at only 15% instead of the planned 25%, and the more pessimistic put it at only 13%. In

short, the G.N.P. in 1970 was likely to be only about half the planned increase and half what the previous Conservative governments had achieved. Nor was that all. The Plan had fixed certain growth-lines for public expenditure.

If the government continues to spend at these rates, then personal incomes, far from rising by 21% by 1970, are likely to rise by 8% at worst, and only 12% at best: and this is about half what the public had become accustomed to under the Conservatives in the 1958-64 period. In these circumstances the government has faced the cruel choice of priorities between defense expenditure, social-service expenditure, and personal expenditure—and in the choosing, the party has begun to lose both its morale and its cohesion. The following rebellions, ranging over a wide variety show the extent of internal discontent. In January and February, 1967, the trade unions made clear their opposition to a renewal of the government's wage-freeze powers, and this was echoed by the trade union-sponsored M.P.'s in the party. One hundred Labour M.P.'s protested against the government's attitude to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, and on top of this another split opened over the government's suspected intention to try to join the European Common Market. One hundred backbenchers signed a motion protesting against accession, but the next day, 103 signed a pro-E.E.C. motion by way of replay. And, after a debate on the defense estimates, which had shocked the party by their magnitude, no less than 63 Labour Members abstained.

This mounting disunity in the Parliamentary Party led to what is certainly one of the most curious episodes of post-1945 party politics: Prime Minister Wilson's so-called "vicious dogs" speech. In it, Mr. Wilson referred to the various causes of division in the party, pointing out that these cut across one another so that the opposition to the government's policies was self-contradictory and incoherent, and not an "alternative" to the government. He then went on to admonish the backsliders in terms that

caused great offense, as when he said that "Every dog is entitled to one bite" but a different view is taken of a dog which goes on biting all the time. In that case it is likely that its license will not be renewed." But from this Mr. Wilson went on further to advance two claims that, though they are not novel, are most farfetched.

The first claim was that the backbenchers were "elected to support or sustain the Labour Government." Now, the Labour Party is generally favorable to this doctrine because it believes in the concept of the "popular mandate"—that is to say, a General Election gives the winning party a mandate, i.e., the right and the duty to do all the things mentioned in its election Manifesto. So this notion that they are elected to sustain the government is acceptable when it is a matter of redeeming a party pledge on which they were elected. But many of the issues now in dispute, such as defense expenditure, the accession to the E.E.C., and the wage freeze, were not in the Manifesto, or even contradicted it. Thus the Prime Minister was in effect suggesting that the support of his backbenchers ought to be unconditional and unqualified.

This suggestion was given further color by his second doctrine—that in the event of his not receiving support, "Governments have the right to appeal to the country for a fresh mandate with supporters who could be counted upon to support the government." In some quarters this was seen as coming very close to threatening to dissolve Parliament, purge the party of all but those personally pledged to support the Prime Minister, and hold an election. As a practical policy this was ridiculous.

The increased dissidence inside the party over the loss of voting strength in some bye-elections, and defeat in 1967 in the county elections in London—the first time in 33 years—are warning symptoms. But ultimately the party's prospects will, as we have said, turn on its handling of the economy. "If at the next election" (wrote *The Times* on March 10, 1967) "the econ-

omy has begun to grow at a healthier rate, and some of the benefit has been passed on to the public. . . it is most unlikely that the Conservatives will win. But if in 1970 the Labour Party seems to the public to be a government of low growth, high expenditure, and high taxes, then no amount of television expertise is going to prevent a big swing to the Opposition. . . ." The latter appears to be the more likely of the two prospects, and never more so since devaluation in November, 1967 and the control over money, incomes, and salvaging of housing, health, education and other programs that followed it in 1968.

THE DILEMMA OF THE LIBERAL PARTY

Since it has only 12 M.P.'s in the Commons, the Liberal Party might be ignored in a description of the British party system. But in the 1966 election, the party put up 301 candidates—roughly one candidate in every other constituency—and polled 8.6% of the total vote. Now, the effect of increased Liberal candidatures at the next election might well be to draw off more Labour votes than Conservative ones, or vice-versa—and thus affect the major parties' prospects. Conversely, if Liberal candidatures decline, the former Liberal vote, which is by no means negligible in size (it is one-twelfth of the total) may go more to the Conservatives than to Labour, or vice-versa—again affecting their electoral prospects. Thus the future of the Liberal party is of considerable importance.

As we saw in our sketch of the history of the parties, the Liberal Party, an offspring of the former Whig Party, has a tradition as long as that of the Tory-Conservative Party. Throughout the nineteenth century it was the natural alternative to the Conservatives, and government alternated between these two until 1915, when the wartime Coalition was formed. From that date to this, the party has been in decline.

In the nineteenth century, the Liberal Party

was the party of free trade, of individualism, of radical attack on the landed aristocracy. In the later years of the century, it took the nascent working-class movement into a sort of junior partnership, and in its great administration of 1906 became the champion of wide-sweeping social reforms and social-welfare services. In foreign affairs, its attitude was less consistently expansionist than was that of the Conservatives; indeed, its Left wing was militantly anti-colonial. It favored self-government (Home Rule) for the constituent nations of the United Kingdom, notably for Ireland, and it was over Home Rule for Ireland that the Liberal Party split in 1886. In 1912-14, it embarked on a ferocious battle with the Conservatives that might have led to civil war in Ireland.

The Liberal Party has stuck to its principles down to the present, but has adapted them to changed circumstances. It sees the Labour Party as preaching an obsolete doctrine, and thinks Labour is too closely tied to the trade unions to be capable of independence. It sees the Conservatives as a reactionary party, with strong associations with big business.

The Liberal Party favors free trade and is committed to entering the European Common Market. It is hostile to all forms of monopoly or price-fixing; it does not except the restrictive practices and privileged legal position of the trade unions. But it also puts forward a quite distinctive policy of "co-partnership" between capital and labor in industry. It stresses individualism more unrestrainedly than do the Conservatives. In the economic order it opposes nationalization and public control of private enterprises, and in the political order it champions civil liberties. It supports the welfare state, although with reservations about present methods of administering it, and is particularly keen on extending educational opportunities, which it believes are the guarantee of social mobility. It opposes colonialism and supports the colonial independence movements. For instance, it is bitterly opposed to the Smith re-

gime in Rhodesia. On defense, the Liberal Party many years ago took the view that Britain could not and should not compete in the nuclear race with the United States and the U.S.S.R. It recommended that Britain abandon its own H-bombs, rely on American nuclear support or on a common N.A.T.O. deterrent, and concentrate on developing its conventional arms as part of the Western alliance.

Many of the Liberal Party's views have become fashionable. When the Liberals pressed for free trade in 1945, they were considered completely out-of-date. Not so today. The Liberals were the first party to advocate British entry into the European Common Market. The Liberal opposition to the British H-bomb was very unpopular when first announced; today, a number of responsible military thinkers concur with this policy.

The present situation of the party was helped by the new look and impressive reorganization given it when Mr. Joseph Grimond (who has since resigned as its Leader) took over the leadership in 1957. At that time the party had a mere six M.P.'s, and had polled the derisory total of 2.7% of the vote in the 1955 election. Mr. Grimond put his party forward as the "radical alternative" to the Labour Party. He reckoned that a "radical" Liberal Party could oust the Labour Party and put itself at the head of these disaffected but progressive-minded electors. Labour's electoral defeat in 1959 and subsequent internal disputes seemed to confirm this strategy, and in the bye-elections the "new" Liberal candidates began to do remarkably well, cutting into the vote of both the major parties and putting themselves into second place. (In one staggering bye-election at Orpington, which appeared a safe Conservative seat, they won the seat, and hold it today.) Whereas the Gallup Poll put their support among the electorate at only 7½% in January, 1960, in the summer of 1962 it had risen to no less than 24%.

The 1964 election jeopardized the entire strategy. The Liberals had their best election

since the war. They fought 365 constituencies, improved their seats to nine, and above all took 11.2% of the votes cast. It could justly be reckoned that had they contested all seats, their share of the total of votes cast would have been 16.5%. But, far from disintegrating, the Labour Party had won the election by a very small margin. The dilemma was the more acute in that in the new Commons the Liberal Party effectively held the balance of power. If it voted with Labour, the government had a working majority. 326 seats against 304 Conservatives, of whom one was the Speaker and did not vote. If it voted against, the government's majority was so precarious that it would sooner or later have to hold another election, for it would have only 317 seats against the combined Liberal and Conservative 313. As it turned out, the Liberals sometimes voted with the government and sometimes against. To Mr Grimond, a radical, any coalition with the Conservatives was personally distasteful, as well as contradictory to his entire "radical alternative" strategy. The alternatives were either to soldier on alone—but to what purpose?—or to seek some understanding with the Labour Party. The crushing Labour victory in 1966 killed the "radical alternative," and the possibility of a Lib-Lab alliance. The Party had no discernable role

ELECTIONS

The object of political parties is to win elections, and we must now discuss the election procedure in Britain that decides which party will govern the country. The Parliament Act of 1911 limits the life of a Parliament to five years. A Prime Minister, however, for a number of reasons, sometimes calls an election before the time-limit expires. He may seek a mandate from the electorate to make some radical change in the program on which his party was originally elected, perhaps he has just succeeded to the office and wishes to win an election in

his own name; or he may judge that he can improve his party's position in the House of Commons through a new election.

Parliament can only be dissolved by the Queen, and only on the request of the Prime Minister. It is a disputed point whether the Queen has the constitutional right to refuse the request. In practice in this century, no Prime Minister has ever been refused a dissolution.

To vote, in Britain, one must be over 21, be a British subject or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, and have one's name inscribed in the voting Register. Excluded from the franchise are aliens, peers, lunatics (unless they have lucid intervals), felons, and persons convicted of past election offenses. The Register (voting lists) is made up once a year. A form is sent to every house in the nation by the Returning Officer (usually the Town Clerk), and householders must state the eligible persons living at the residence. After the rolls are compiled by the Returning Officer, an announcement appears that the Register is being prepared, and all are invited to check to see if their names are on it.

Elections in Britain are short affairs compared to those in the United States. The first step in the procedure is an announcement by the Prime Minister that on a certain date—usually in about 10 days' time—the Queen will dissolve Parliament. As soon as she has done so, a Royal Proclamation is published, summoning a new Parliament. The elections, by law, must be held within three weeks of the Proclamation. Thus from the time of the Prime Minister's announcement to the election itself, only about four and a half weeks elapse.

Writs are issued to all the constituencies, commanding them to return a representative to Parliament. The very next day, the Local Returning Officer (the Town or County Clerk) must put up an announcement that there is to be an election, and within eight days of the summons to the new Parliament, the nominations of candidates must be complete. Parliamentary candidates require nomination by two voters,

and support by another eight. Also, the candidate must put down a deposit of £150. This provision, dating from the 1918 election, was introduced to discourage freak and frivolous candidates. Candidates get their deposit back if they poll more than one-eighth of the total votes cast; otherwise it goes to the state to help pay the election expenses.

Nine days after the last day for nominations, the polling takes place, from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m., usually on a Thursday. About a week before the poll, the voter will have received a "poll card," which bears the voter's "number" assigned by the Electoral Register. It also tells him where he should vote. Only the names of the candidates appear on the ballot, not the parties they represent, for, in theory, the vote is for the individual, not the party. This is important because it means that much party effort has to be spent during the election to connect the candidate with his party, through posters and signs such as "Berrington—Conservative," "Blondel—Labour," and the parties seem to do this quite effectively. At 9 p.m. the ballot boxes are sealed. The votes are counted at one central point, in the presence of the candidates and party officials. By about midnight, unless an election is very close (as it was in 1964), one usually knows how the election has gone.

Between 1945 and 1966, elections in Britain cost the candidates an average total of £1 million. Party expenditure is limited by law; in 1964 the Conservatives spent an average of 92% of the legal maximum, the Labour Party 87%, the Liberals 66%. There was not a great deal of difference, therefore, between Labour and Conservative expenditures: 5%. In the 1964 election, the total spent was £1,230,000, or an average of £699 per candidate, some £14 more than in 1959. Candidates spent (on the average) 81% of the permitted maximum.

This, it must be repeated, simply accounts for the *candidates'* campaign expenditures. In addition, the arrangements cost the state something: in 1964, £1,850,000. Furthermore, no

legal limit is imposed on pre-election expenditures, and in 1959 and 1964 these reached considerable heights. In 1959, the Conservative Party spent an estimated £468,000 on pre-election advertising, against a mere £103,000 by the Labour Party. Spending was even more lavish in 1963–64, when the Conservative Party spent an estimated £992,000, and this time the Labour Party raised its own spending to £314,000. The steel companies also advertised: the total cost is estimated at £1,896,000. In 1966, with an election coming so soon after the previous one, the amounts spent by the parties were far less.

The Electoral System

Each constituency elects one M.P. (and is thus known as a *single-member constituency*). Voters cast one ballot only. The candidate with the most votes wins, which means that in a field of more than two candidates, the winner might have captured less than half the total vote. This system produces a discrepancy between the number of votes cast for a party in the country and the number of seats it wins in the House of Commons. On strict proportionality in 1966, the Conservatives (who won 253 seats) would have won 266, the Labour Party (which won 363) would have had 302, and the Liberals (who won only 12) would have had 52. "Others" who won 1, would have about 10 seats. And with strict proportionality, *no* parties in *any* of the post-war elections would have had a clear parliamentary majority. It may be argued, however, that if there were a formal proportional representation system, the voters would not vote in the way they do at present.

The British electoral system has two important consequences: it strengthens the predominant two parties against smaller parties, and it keeps the parties united. The weakest of the three main parties could poll up to one-third of the national vote and still run third to the other two parties in *all* the constituencies. Once a

party tends to fall to third place, the electors desert it to vote for one of the two predominant parties, rather than "waste their vote" on a candidate who appears to stand no chance of success. This reduces the weak party's vote still further and drives even more of its supporters to vote for one of the two major parties. In this way, a new party finds it hard to challenge the old established ones, and weak parties become weaker and are eventually "squeezed out."

Only in special circumstances have third parties been able to maintain themselves in Britain. If its vote is heavily concentrated in certain constituencies, it can win seats there. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Irish Nationalist Party had a very small proportion of the total vote, but it was almost entirely concentrated in Ireland, where it was, therefore, able to win most of the seats. (Too, a third party may make electoral arrangements with one of the two major parties. It was thus in 1906, when the newly-founded Labour Party concluded agreements with the Liberals, by which the Liberals supported the Labour candidates in certain constituencies, and Labour did the same for the Liberals in others, so that the anti-Conservative vote would not be split.) But where a weak third party like that of the Liberals stands aloof from the other major parties and its vote is evenly distributed over the whole country, it will have to poll about one-third of the vote to win a sizable number of seats. The Liberal Party won $8\frac{1}{2}\%$ of the vote in the 1966 election, but won only 2% of the seats. Thus, again, the electoral system confirms the advantage held by the two major parties. As a result, neither the Conservatives nor the Labour Party favors proportional representation, which is strongly advocated by the Liberals.

The electoral system also unifies the parties because it imposes a heavy electoral handicap on parties that break up. This can be seen from a simple example. Suppose a constituency has split its vote 60% Labour and 40% Conserva-

roughly equal factions, the result of the next election might well be. European Labour 30%, Non-European Labour 30%, Conservative 40%. Since the Conservative candidate comes at the top of the poll, he would gain the seat from Labour. Parties are deeply conscious of the need to contest the elections as one single body. In the past, the parties that have split—the Conservatives in 1846, the Liberals in 1886, the Liberals in 1922 and 1931, and the Labour Party in 1931—have always lost at the ensuing election.

"Swing"

The lack of proportion between the seats won and the votes cast does not mean that the results of an election are unpredictable. On election night in 1966 an electronic computer was able to say, on the basis of the first hour's results, that the Labour majority would be about 100, indicating that there must be some kind of mathematical relationship between votes cast and seats won in the House of Commons. This brings us to the phenomenon known as "swing."

If in 1959, say, the votes in a constituency had been divided 51% Conservative and 49% Labour, but in 1966 changed to Conservative 52%, Labour 48%, we would say there had been a "swing" of 1%. The result is *as if* 1% of the voters had transferred their allegiance from Labour to Conservative. In a normal constituency (which has between 50,000 and 60,000 voters), and given the normal turnout of about 80% of the electorate, a 1% swing represents about 500 votes, which we subtract from the Labour candidate and add to the Conservative candidate.

Projected onto the national stage, a small-percentage swing will shift a disproportionate number of seats in the House of Commons from one party to the other: roughly, for every 1% swing, about 16 seats will change hands, making twice that difference—i.e., 32—to the

majority. In the 1966 election, for instance, a swing of a mere 0.1% would have increased the Labour lead over the Conservatives from 12 seats to 20; a full 1% swing would have increased it to 58. There was actually a 3.5% swing in Labour's favor, giving it a lead of 110 seats over the Conservatives. But if there had been a swing of only 0.4% against Labour, the Conservatives would have led Labour by four seats in the House; and with a swing of 1% it would have led by 22 seats, and, assuming that the Liberals had retained all their previous seats, this would have given it a tiny but manageable majority. Clearly then, any government is based on a knife-edge of popular support.

The Election Campaign

The parties employ three main techniques to increase their mass support: political gatherings, propaganda campaigns, and (at elections) drives to get out the vote. Such mobilization and propaganda campaigns go on all the time, for the parties must keep alert between elections. All this effort is for one purpose: to get out the vote and see that it votes for the "proper" candidate. To this end, both parties utilize their complete organizations. The constituencies are the front-line groups. Behind them stand regional organizations—the country is divided into regions, each managed by regional party organizers, and each central headquarters has a staff ready to give financial and legal assistance and political advice to the constituency parties. There are never as many professionals on hand as either party would like, although the Conservative Party has more full-time workers than does the Labour Party.

Table 4-5 shows party staffs as they were in 1963. The number of Labour Party election agents increased to 204 in 1966. Evidence from the public-opinion polls shows that in 1964 and 1966 there was no longer very much to choose from between the attention voters received

from the local Labour and Conservative canvassers. This was a marked difference from 1955 and 1959, when the Conservative effort was much the superior.

TABLE 4-5
Party Staffs by Function, 1963

	Conservative (England and Wales only)	Labour (Britain)	Liberal (England and Wales only)
General Headquarters	39	12	5
Agents			
National and Headquarters	9	7	3
Regional	60	38	10
Constituency	520	208	64
Research	25	12	4
Publicity	24	9	3
Totals	677	286	89

Source: Richard Rose, *Politics in England* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964) p. 147.

Voting Behavior

Most voting is habitual. In 1959 a *Daily Telegraph* poll asked: "What did you vote last time?" and "Do you intend to vote the same way again?" It found that 92% of prospective Conservative voters and 91% of prospective Labour voters had voted that same way in the last election. A similar result appears from a reply to the Gallup Poll in 1964. Of those Conservatives who *had* voted in the past, the proportion about to vote Conservative again was 87%, and among the Labour again was 88%. However, 12% of the prospective Conservative voters and 15% of the Labour ones had never before cast a ballot in favor of their prospective party—and the fact is that the way that such "new" voters vote often determines the outcome of an election. For the swing from one party to the other may be caused by former Conservatives voting Labour, and vice-versa; by more voters abstaining from voting in one party

than in the other, and thus giving the *illusion* that voters have switched their allegiance from one party to the other, by voters who could have voted before but did not, and by those who were too young to vote before (Or, by any combination of these.)

In 1959 the swing to the Conservatives could largely be accounted for by many Labour supporters neglecting to vote, while Conservative supporters came to the polls. On the other hand, it looks as if the average 1964 swing (3.5%) does represent a *net* conversion of

former Conservative votes into Labour ones—a greater *real* conversion than in any other election since 1945. The 1966 election showed a marked drop in turnout (It is estimated that the *real* drop in turnout was about 4%.) It appears that the chief abstainers were supporters of the winning party, the Labour Party. For this reason it has been calculated that the apparent swing underestimates the true net swing of Conservatives to Labour, and that some 15 voters in every 200 switched allegiance from the Conservatives to Labour.

V

Government and Parliament

In Britain "the Executive" is *not* a separate organ of the power structure set apart from and over against "the Legislature." Instead, the *top* echelon of the British Executive—that is to say, the part which corresponds to the American President and his Cabinet—is itself a group of parliamentarians, mostly Members of the Commons, who command a solid and permanent majority in that House. A General Election is a contest between two major teams of Labour and Conservative candidates for the purpose of commanding the House of Commons, on the implied condition that when elected, the winners will support and sustain a government, selected by their party Leader from among themselves, for the duration of the Parliament. Fortunately, (for their party, at least) once elected as M.P.'s, this is precisely what the majority do; and because they do, no government so formed ever loses a vote in the Commons, except by some temporary mismanagement (which it usually will, and always can, reverse). For the vote only *registers* policy; policy is *made* elsewhere, *before* the voting takes place: in the Ministries, where the Ministers negotiate arrangements with outside interests, and "Upstairs"—in the Committee rooms of the House of Commons, where they argue with their own party supporters.

Opening a Commons debate on its own procedure, one Leader of the House (the Minister charged by the Prime Minister with the overseeing of Parliamentary business) gave this view of the relationship between Government and Parliament:

Procedurally we still behave as though we were a sovereign body which really shared with the Government in the initiation of legislation, which exercised a real control not only of finance but of the administration of the Departments. But today not only the House of Lords has been shorn of most of its authority. The House of Commons, too, has

surrendered most of its effective powers to the Executive and has become in the main the passive forum in which the struggle is fought out between the modern usurpers of parliamentary power, the great political machines

In this transformation of the parliamentary scene the House of Commons has largely lost the three functions for which its procedures were evolved and to which they are relevant the making of Ministries, initiation of legislation shared with the Cabinet, and the watchdog control of finance and administration

I know that there are some of my honourable friends who dream of a time when the secret negotiations of the Government with outside interests, which precede all modern legislation, and the secret decisions in the Committee Room upstairs, which largely determine party attitudes, will be rendered insignificant because the House of Commons will once again become sovereign and make decisions for itself I think they are crying for the moon.

Today, for example, it must be the electorate, not the Commons, who normally make and unmake Governments It must be the Cabinet that runs the Executive and initiates and controls legislation, and it must be the party machines that manage most of our business, through the usual channels, as well as organizing what was once a congeries of independent backbenchers into two disciplined political parties

For these reasons and more, a discussion of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet must precede the consideration of Parliament

THE CABINET

Composition

Following the result of the General Election, the Queen appoints the Leader of the majority party as her Prime Minister, and he then selects (for her formal approval) the remainder of the Ministers All together, this siz-

able group is known as "the Government" (hereafter, capitalized in our text only when paired off against "the Opposition") or "the Ministry" or even "the Administration." Then a small group, usually numbering from 16 to 23 and including the Prime Minister himself, are appointed by him to an inner and policy-directing body the *Cabinet*—the keystone of the governmental arch.

Most Ministers, both Cabinet and non-Cabinet, head up Departments, and nearly all are assisted by junior Ministers also appointed by the Prime Minister. Most of the Departmental Ministers also appoint "Parliamentary Private Secretaries"—MP's who volunteer to assist them in their parliamentary duties without compensation In addition, the Prime Minister must also appoint a number of party Whips to certain paid posts, which are nominal offices in either the Treasury or in Her Majesty's Household. All these together comprise "the government."

According to the law, a Minister need not be a member of *either* House of Parliament, but in practice the qualification is regarded as indispensable precisely because all Ministers are answerable to Parliament. Therefore when, as does infrequently happen, the Prime Minister selects for a ministerial post a person who is not a parliamentarian, steps are immediately taken either to get him to run (or "stand") for a seat in the House of Commons which is "safe" (i.e., which he is sure to win), or to have him nominated for a peerage with the right to sit as a Member of the House of Lords. But the overwhelming majority of ministerial appointments are already parliamentarians.

The bulk of the appointees sit as MP's in the Commons, but for various reasons (some legal) a number must sit in the House of Lords The number of these "ministerialists"—("those holding office and expected to conform to the Cabinet's policy by voice and vote")—is on the increase, and nowadays is very large.

To the total of 117, in 1966, must be added

¹House of Commons *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 738, No. 117, Cols 479-480

TABLE 5-1
*Growth in Size of British Governments,
1900-1966*

	1900	1910	1920	1950	1960	1966
Cabinet Ministers	9	19	19	18	19	23
Non-Cabinet Ministers	10	7	15	20	20	31
Junior Ministers	15	22	33	35	35	55
Household Offices	16	14	13	8	9	8
Total	60	62	80	81	83	117
Number of M.P.'s in Government	33	43	58	68	65	99
Number of Peers in Government	27	19	22	13	18	18

some 40 unpaid Whips and Parliamentary Private Secretaries (P.P.S.'s): so that the number of M.P.'s who were "ministerialists" was some 140— that is to say, two out of every five of the government Members in the House!

The essential difference between the Cabinet Ministers and those not in the Cabinet lies in the fact that the former have the right (possibly the obligation?) to attend every Cabinet meeting and to receive in full all the memoranda and minutes circulated by the Cabinet Secretariat, while the non-Cabinet Ministers are summoned to attend Cabinet meetings only when business affecting them is being transacted. The Cabinet, as an institution, almost never appears in British constitutional law, being recognized indirectly only in the Ministers of the Crown Act of 1937 (an Act which is concerned principally with the regulation of ministerial salaries).

In forming his Cabinet, his intimate team, the Prime Minister must be guided by four considerations: (1) the Members' personal compatibility with himself and possibly with one another; (2) the need to satisfy the various and often conflicting wings of his party (in Labour Cabinets, for instance, it is always necessary to balance the Trades Unionists against the non-Trades Unionists, and to give at least one post to the Co-operators); (3) the need to have three

or four Cabinet Ministers in the House of Lords to look after government business there; and (4) the special qualifications required by certain specific Departments.

Since 1946, the holders of the following offices have always been members of the Cabinet: Non-Departmental members—the Prime Minister, the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Chancellor, and the Lord Privy Seal; Departmental members—the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of Defense, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the President of the Board of Trade, and the Minister of Labour. These number only 11 and Cabinet membership since 1945 has ranged from 16 to 23. The extra members are included in the Cabinet or not, depending on the importance of an office at a particular period, or the importance of a particular officeholder to the Prime Minister.

Function

Each Minister is individually responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his duties, but the Cabinet is *collectively* responsible to Parliament; it stands or falls as a corporate unity on matters of general policy. Formally, this corporate body is responsible for:

1. The final determination of the policy to be submitted to Parliament.
2. The supreme control of the national Executive in accordance with this policy, as modified by and consented to by Parliament.
3. The continuous coordination and delimitation of the activities of the various Departments.

But, in practice, much of this formal authority is exercised, outside of the plenary meetings of the Cabinet, by the Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned, or by Committees of the Cabinet. To understand how and why this is so, it is first necessary to understand the way the Cabinet is organized.

The Cabinet is the Prime Minister's Cabinet: he summons it, makes up its agenda, and presides over its meetings. Normally there are two meetings a week, each lasting about two hours. What goes on inside them is a secret.

As the supreme authority over policy and the machinery of government, the Cabinet faces three major problems. First, how are 20-odd ambitious and able men, constitutionally equals, each with a Departmental view to press, to reach a collective decision? They must achieve this through discussion, yet how can they do it in the limited time available? Secondly, with the amount of Cabinet work continually multiplying, how can the Members of the Cabinet address themselves to all the issues they must consider? Thirdly, how are all these men, meeting but twice a week for two hour meetings, to maintain consistency between one meeting and another in what they decide?

These three problems have been attacked by three institutions

1. The Cabinet Secretariat, which acts as a collective memory.
2. The Agenda, which sifts out the less important matters
3. The committee system, which weeds out the less crucial matters, too, but also reduces the time needed for the Cabinet's collective discussions

Institutions

THE SECRETARIAT Established under the stress of wartime conditions in 1916, the Secretariat has become increasingly useful as a recording agency. It takes the minutes of all Cabinet discussions and all Cabinet committee meetings and circulates them to the Cabinet members, and sends appropriate daily extracts to the non-Cabinet Ministers. Thus, each member of the government is acquainted with the work of the entire membership, and is notified of any action for which he is responsible. Since all these records are meticulously indexed,

the Secretariat serves as the memory of the Cabinet, and thereby provides for its self-consistency.

THE AGENDA. Much of the Cabinet business, like that of any well-run committee, is based on the advance circulation of papers. Before a Department can put an item on the Agenda, for example, it must first send a draft paper around to all interested Departments, for their comments.

THE COMMITTEES The Cabinet Agenda is relatively formal, for most of the preliminary work will already have been done by committees. The development of a committee system serviced by a Secretariat is one of the most important changes in Cabinet procedure in the last quarter-century. There are two kinds of committees: the temporary *ad hoc* ones that study particular problems, and the standing committees. We know little of these committees, because the Cabinet is a secret body, with no "organization chart." Its members take the Privy Counsellors' oath of secrecy on all official matters. This secrecy is a necessary condition for their collective responsibility for policy, since no rumors, let alone information, must leak out of any differences of opinion.

Consequently, all we know of these committees is derived from the memoirs and analyses of ex-Ministers, such as Lord Morrison's *Government and Parliament* (the most revealing book on the subject), which are inevitably out-of-date, and from incidental disclosures of the work being done by the various committees. It is impossible to name or number the *ad hoc* committees. Between the World Wars there were perhaps as many as 20 at any one time, and between 1945 and 1950, as many as 30, each comprising only three or four Ministers. But if the definition of "Cabinet Committee" is taken to be "all committees of Ministers serviced by the Cabinet Secretariat," then today there are as many as 100, and they ramify out

and down into the various Departments. The Standing Committees known to exist today are the *Future Legislation Committee*, which, as will be seen, decides the priorities for government legislation; the *Legislation Committee*, which steers it through the current Parliamentary session; and the *Defense and External Affairs Committee*, which is chaired by the Prime Minister himself and has the Minister of Defense as its Vice-Chairman. This powerful and widely ramifying committee, with the assistance of the Chiefs of Staff, advises the Minister of Defense and the service Ministers of each of the three branches of the armed services. But in this Cabinet the Prime Minister so overshadows his colleagues that some observers have talked of "Prime-Ministerial" government (or even "Presidential" government) as having superseded "Cabinet Government."

Cabinet and Prime Minister

THE PRE-EMINENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER. Whereas a Minister has only one role, that of being a Minister, the Prime Minister has *four*. To *begin with*: he is the leader and representative of the nation. The General Election has become a gladiatorial combat between two party leaders: the two teams of candidates for whom the electorate cast their votes are like two electoral colleges whose votes are committed in advance to making their leader the Prime Minister. Once in office, the Prime Minister uses the mass media to appeal directly to the nation. Furthermore, the opinion polls nowadays provide a kind of monthly plebiscite on his popularity. *Secondly*: he is a leader of a national party, which means that he disposes of a network of professional politicians at the headquarters, regional, and constituency levels to publicize and disseminate his views, as well as the local activists who come to hear them at party rallies. Additionally, he is (ideally, at any rate) the master strategist and tactician of his party: he chooses the date of the election

and has the decisive voice in the party's Manifesto plans, the tactics of the campaign. *Thirdly*: he is the leader of the Parliamentary Party. This is his power base. Unlike the American President, a British Prime Minister has no fixed tenure guaranteed by the Constitution; instead, his tenure depends on the House of Commons—that is to say, on his party majority there. In principle, if dissatisfied with him, it can even depose him. However, in practice it is fairly well limited because he wields very real and impressive powers over it. He hires and he fires, and, as has been seen, about 100 posts are involved with him, out of a total of 362 seats. And he recommends the faithful for honors and awards. As to party policy, even when he is not its architect (though often he is), in the last resort he is the manager and conciliator of the often restive factions in the rank and file. In like manner he is the ultimate judge as to whether a recalcitrant Member shall be denied membership in the Parliamentary party—a decision which would probably cause the rebel to lose his seat at the next General Election. *Fourthly*: he makes and breaks a Cabinet: as we have said, he hires and fires its members.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET PROCEDURES. One aspect of the prodigious power that the Prime Minister can wield over his hand-picked Cabinet was dramatically illustrated in July, 1962, when Mr. Macmillan removed seven of his colleagues from the Cabinet—a third of its numbers—in one swoop. He had hired them, and he fired them. (Indeed, the Cabinet is so much the Prime Minister's Cabinet that if he resigns, all Ministers must also resign.)

As the Chairman of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister convenes it and settles its agenda, not only deciding what is to be included but more importantly what is to be left out. He also arranges the order of business, an important matter since the twice-weekly meeting lasts only two hours. He calls on Ministers to speak, de-

cides at what point discussion shall cease, sums up the sense of the meeting (no formal votes are taken in Cabinet), and defines the decision for inclusion in the Minutes. Most of the matters are formal reports from the various committees and sub-committees which he has established in order to have the interested Ministers reach preliminary agreement. The Prime Minister nominates the members of these committees and presides over the key ones.

For a long time, Prime Ministers have exercised direct control over foreign affairs. All Prime Ministers from 1937 (when Neville Chamberlain was Prime Minister) to the present day have tended to overshadow their Foreign Secretaries, representing the country in summit conferences and receiving important foreign heads of state.

Nor is this all. The Cabinet Secretariat, which services the Cabinet meetings and those of its committees, and which prepares the Agenda for the Prime Minister to approve, is the Prime Minister's *own* Secretariat. The Prime Minister, through the Cabinet Secretariat, therefore knows—or can know—all that is going on in all the committees at any point of time, and intervenes if he wants to. This aside, he is constantly engaged in person-to-person discussion with any Minister who wishes to have a matter put on the Agenda, or who finds himself in some perplexity.

The Cabinet, we may sum up, is the supreme leader and coordinator of the entire government machine. But today this body itself is coordinated, lead, and personified by the Prime Minister, partly through the multiplicity of the political roles he nowadays assumes, and partly through the mechanism of the Cabinet Secretariat, which gives him a synoptic view of the entire field of developing departmental policies.

Cabinet and Commons

The Cabinet, the powerhouse of the entire British constitutional system, derives its

unique authority from the fact that its members combine in themselves three kinds of status. Like the American Cabinet, the British Cabinet constitutes the executive branch of the government because its members are Ministers—that is, the heads of government Departments. But, unlike the American Cabinet, it is also the steering committee of the Legislature; virtually all its members are M.P.'s. Finally—again, unlike the American Cabinet—it is a committee of the majority party, since it is composed for the most part of the trusted and tried party chiefs. The Executive is thus a committee of the Legislature and acts by and with its consent, it gains such consent precisely because it consists of the leaders of the party that controls the House of Commons. Thus the peculiarly dominating role of the Cabinet is an outcome of its party's solidarity. As long as the Cabinet and its party hang together, they will never hang separately.

Unlike the American Cabinet, the British Cabinet is no mere aggregation of Ministers. It is a corporate unity. Each Minister is personally responsible to the Commons for the day-by-day administration of his duties, and it is the Minister who stands up in the House of Commons to explain, justify, and answer awkward questions about the way he has carried out these duties. In practice, of course, nearly all the things done in his name are performed by civil servants, but he, not they, must take the responsibility for acts of omission or commission carried out in his name. If he fails to give a convincing explanation, M.P.'s may demand his resignation. Most commonly, the Cabinet regards an attack on a Minister as directed against itself, and expects its party to support it. But occasionally Ministers *are* forced to resign—when *their* fault is so grave that even their own backbenchers feel too uneasy to support them. In 1954, for instance, a Conservative Minister of Agriculture, Sir Thomas Dugdale, was compelled to resign because he had failed to control the activities of some of his civil servants.

But although each Minister is personally responsible to Parliament for the good conduct of his Department, on matters of *general policy* all members of the Cabinet (and indeed of the whole ministerial group, i.e., "the government") take equal responsibility and stand or fall together. Every member of the Cabinet is deemed to have acquiesced in the policy of his colleagues. If he disagrees with his colleagues, his proper course is to resign. He is then entitled, by convention, to make a speech to Parliament, explaining his reasons for resignation. Lord Salisbury, a most influential Conservative peer, resigned from Mr. Macmillan's first Cabinet because he disagreed with its policy of independence for Cyprus. In 1958, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his two junior Ministers — i.e., the whole Treasury team — resigned simultaneously because they thought their colleagues' economic policy was too mild.

The Cabinet and the Cabinet alone, then, is answerable to Parliament, and beyond it to the country for all acts of policy during its term of office. How does it maintain its position in the House of Commons? It does so only as it retains the support of a united party. How then does it retain this support? Most of the common explanations are misleading. (1) It is said that the Cabinet can expel rebel M.P.'s from the Parliamentary Party. This could be effective if the rebels were few in number. Movements of backbench protest numbering 40 or more M.P.'s — such as are not uncommon — could not be disciplined in this way without breaking the party up. In any case, rebel M.P.'s are not frequently disciplined. (2) It is argued that since the Prime Minister can get the Queen to dissolve Parliament and plunge his party into a General Election, this makes his backbenchers more compliant, since they do not care to face more election campaigns than are necessary. But for a Prime Minister to seek a General Election at a time when his party was divided would be to court disaster, for, as we have seen,

the electoral system works heavily against a disunited party.

In practice the Cabinet controls its supporters for four main reasons:

1. The government as a whole (including the junior Ministers) includes almost all of the party leadership. Its senior members are particularly influential party men. And, additionally, it forms a high proportion of the total government seats in the Commons.

2. A fair proportion of the backbenchers strive manfully to become Ministers, even junior ones; they do not wantonly incur the displeasure of the Prime Minister.

3. There is constant consultation between the government and its supporters, and in the normal way both make concessions to one another. The Conservatives practice such consultation more than the Labour Party, however, and, as has been seen, in early 1967 the Labour Ministers seriously lost touch with their backbenchers.

4. On many things a majority of the backbenchers are content to let Ministers run things their own way; for in the British political system, the Cabinet and its party supporters are elected simultaneously on the same platform and believe in the same principles. The party's successes at the next election are entirely bound up with the successes of its Cabinet.

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

Parliament consists of the Crown and the House of Lords, as well as of the House of Commons, but the first two components can be set aside for the present for these reasons: First, while it is true that all legislation must receive the assent of the Sovereign, the last time she vetoed a bill was in 1706, and it is generally agreed that this particular prerogative is obsolete. Secondly, as far as the House of Lords is concerned, this Chamber can only impose a month's delay on money bills sent up to it from the Commons, can merely delay for the period of one year other kinds of bills sent to it from the lower House, and is unlikely to use this

power for reasons discussed later. Its primary function today is to revise the details of bills from the House of Commons.

Composition, Basic Organization, and Primary Function

At present this House consists of 630 elected Members of Parliament—the familiar M.P.'s. Some citizens are disqualified from sitting as Members: they include clergy of certain denominations (*viz.* of the Church of England, the Church of Scotland, and the Church of Ireland, and priests of the Roman Catholic Church), minors, lunatics, bankrupts, and felons. Peers also are excluded but the Peerage Act 1963 permits a peer to renounce his peerage and sit, if duly elected, as an M.P. (The Earl of Home, a peer and member of the House of Lords, renounced his peerage on election to the Leadership of the Conservative Party and accession to the Prime Ministership in 1963, was elected as M.P., and entered the Commons as Sir Alec Douglas-Home.) Once duly elected and sworn in, the Member remains a Member for the term of the Parliament, though he can be expelled by the House itself, as occurred in 1947 and again in 1954. An M.P.'s membership cannot be revoked by any outside body, not even his constituency. The independence of the M.P. from outside pressures is protected by the hallowed "privileges" of the Member, including freedom from arrest in civil actions (save bankruptcy), and freedom from proceedings or from harassment (described by the elastic term, "molestation") for speeches and activities carried out in Parliament in the course of his duties. M.P.'s are paid an annual salary of £3,250. After tax deduction this is only a little more than twice the average wage in Britain.

The *primary function* of the House is to sustain a government, its secondary function is to criticize it. These two functions are reflected in its shape and its party organization. The Cham-

ber is a rectangular room with long, padded benches (not chairs or seats) on three of its sides, and the Speaker's throne at the "top" end. On the benches to the Speaker's right sit the majority party, the front benches occupied by the Ministers. The Opposition party or parties sit on his left, with the Leader of the Opposition (i.e., of the largest of the Opposition parties) and his "shadow cabinet" taking the front benches, eyeball to eyeball with the Ministers. (The Prime Minister draws a salary of £14,000 of which £4,000 is tax-free, the Leader of the Opposition draws a salary also—£5,750 per annum—for discharging his particular functions.)

The Speaker is elected by the M.P.'s from among their number at the beginning of the new session of Parliament and is customarily re-elected thereafter until he expresses a wish to resign. Both sides make every effort to agree on a candidate, though this is not always successful, but once a Speaker is elected he sheds all party ties and must preside with complete impartiality in his judgments, in accordance with the precedents of the "law and custom of Parliament." He never votes except to break a tie, in which case he must vote for the existing situation. His rulings may be challenged—but only by a formal motion put to the House, not from the floor; and such motions are very rare.

Standing Orders, which can be modified from time to time by the government's majority power, allocate the great bulk of the time of the House to government business, and relatively little to the backbenchers, or "Private Members," as they are known. "Private Members' time" includes the opportunities for introducing bills and motions for debate. The remainder subdivides broadly into the time when the government "has the floor" (i.e., for its legislation, and administrative Orders), and the time put at the disposal of the Opposition front bench for criticizing the Government. The Standing Orders allow of various types of closure, but most

of the closure arrangements are made, amicably, by the Chief Whips of either side. This is known as "*the usual channels*." If the Opposition feel cheated, they can obstruct; if the Government feel thwarted they can enforce a closure by their majority. Such upsets do occur, but are relatively rare: Government control and Opposition opportunity for debate are mutually accepted objectives. The following table, compiled in 1959, shows the broad allocation of time spent in the House.

TABLE 5-2
Allocation of Time Spent by House Members

	Pre-war		Post-war	
	Days	Percentage	Days	Percentage
Private members	25	18%	29	18%
Opposition	34	23	41	26
Government	69	46	75	48
Remainder	21	13	13	8
Total	149		158	

How Important Is the House of Commons?

The relative powerlessness of the House of Commons as against the government, a feature noted for many years past, has become even more striking under the Labour governments of Mr. Wilson (1964–). As a party of social change, the Labour Party today is more concerned with getting legislation through the House than with procedural niceties designed precisely in order to slow down the rate of legislation and subject it to criticism.

The power of the House is undercut by several factors. (1) It is not a law-initiating assembly. Backbenchers do indeed have opportunities to introduce legislation (known as "Private Members' Bills"), but they are limited. Their bills do not usually deal with important matters, must not involve public taxation or expenditure, and, in any case, could be debated

and enacted only if the government were favorable, or at least neutral. The government itself initiates all the major legislation, controls the time-table, and receives exactly the appropriations it demands. (2) The parties vote on predetermined lines, with almost no cross-voting, and, although occasionally there are abstentions, these almost never occur on a dangerous scale. If a government forces a vote of confidence, it is certain to get a majority vote. (3) Governments have tended to make all issues matters of confidence—i.e., they will resign on a defeat. Yet the outward show of a Cabinet triumphing all along the line and never being overturned by a hostile vote of the Commons is deceptive. The mechanics of control are much more subtle. Cabinets are not overturned because they take steps to meet the mood of the House, which means taking into account first their own backbenchers, and secondly the Opposition.

The Role of the Opposition

All constitutional governments must somehow reconcile the rights of opposing interests with the necessity for the government to continue functioning. Some systems—the American system is one—seek to achieve this by dividing authority among a number of constitutionally equal and independent bodies. The decision-makers are thus checked and balanced by *outside* organs. In contrast, the ultimately supreme power in the British system, the House of Commons, contains an *internal* check and balance, in the form of the Opposition Party.

The notion of a neat pyramid by which the Cabinet commands the Commons, the Commons the Parliament, and the Parliament the nation, is inadequate and misleading. It omits one of the major characteristics of the system: the integral status of the Opposition. The parliamentary Opposition has five characteristics and four functions. Its *characteristics* are:

1. It is *organized* It presents a united challenge to the Government on all issues it chooses to contest. We have already noted its organization—its leadership, its nervous system (the Whips), its intelligence system (the backbenchers' committees).

2. It is *permanent* It does not band and disband but is a permanent feature.

3. It is *representative* It is the leader of a group of dedicated party-followers throughout the country, with whom it is organically connected.

4. It is the *alternative* If the Government falls, the Opposition succeeds it. If the Government is beaten in an election, the Opposition takes over. This possibility forces the Opposition to be more moderate in what it condemns and what it promises.

5. It is a *participant* It helps the Government shape the program of the House and participates in the decisions made in each session.

The functions of the Opposition are

1. To participate in the deliberations of the House of Commons

2. To oppose objectionable policies by its voice and vote

3. To compel the Government, by all acceptable methods, to modify its policy

4. To create by its voice and vote a public revulsion against the Government and public sympathy for itself, as the pre-condition for winning the next election (Since, as we have already seen, a relatively small swing of votes in any election can mean the difference between victory and defeat, this is not as difficult as it sounds.)

5. To pose an alternative program (Perhaps this is the most important of all the Opposition's functions. The mere fact that the Opposition makes promises toward, say, the old-age pensioners or the farmers, or advocates a particular view about the draft or the European Economic Community, forces the Government party to counter or outbid such promises. Students who compare the Manifestos of the two main parties will find a surprisingly large measure of agreement. The reason is that both parties are out to attract the votes of relatively uncommitted groups. A long time ago Benjamin Disraeli, the future Conservative Prime Minister, talked of the Conservatives as "catching the Whigs bathing and running off with their clothes." He also characterized the conservatism of Sir Robert Peel as being "Tory men and

Whig Measures." Both the major parties play this game of borrowing their opponent's most popular measures and adapting them to their own use. In the early 1950's, when R. A. Butler was the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, the public could detect so little difference between his policies and those of his Labour predecessor, Hugh Gaitskell, that it coined the name "Mr. Butskell." A striking convergence today is the Labour Party, which opposed the Conservative effort to join Europe when it was out of office, but is now making an effort to get in.)

The fact remains that the Opposition cannot expect to defeat the Government in a floor vote and turn it out of office. The last time that an adverse vote overthrew a government which had a nominal majority in the House was in 1895. No Opposition would count on repeating that nowadays. The most it can hope for is to shame so many of the Government's supporters into abstention that the Government's stand is morally condemned in the eyes of the nation, and it may well have to wait till the next election to reap the fruits.

In crisis conditions, however, such massive abstention might produce the resignation of the government. The last time this happened was in 1940, when Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's handling of the war had already provoked serious criticism from both sides of the House. When Hitler seized Norway and defeated the woefully equipped and badly handled British forces at the port of Narvik, unrest boiled over. At the close of a two-day debate, the House voted, giving Chamberlain a majority of 81. Its full majority should have been over double that figure, but some 60 Conservatives abstained and over 30 voted against their government. Mr. Chamberlain thereupon resigned, and the King called on Winston Churchill to form a new Cabinet—which became the wartime Coalition Cabinet.

Such a dramatic success for the Opposition could scarcely be expected in peacetime, for the Opposition can expect to do only three things. First, it can (and often does) wring amendments

to legislation from the Government; and on rare occasions these are substantial in number and importance. For instance, the Conservative Opposition fought the Finance Bill of 1965 for a total of 211 hours, introduced 680 amendments, and had the bill materially changed in certain important particulars. But successes on this scale are rare and can be attributed to the existence of a strong public opinion or outside pressures that induce the Government to yield.

Next, the Opposition can expose the weaknesses or injustices of Government policies, and sometimes get them modified or even cancelled. In early 1967 for instance, the Secretary for Education announced that tuition fees for overseas students studying in British Universities were to be raised from £50 to £250. This aroused a storm of protest from the universities and was taken up by the Opposition, who pressed it to a debate. At the end, no less than 35 Labour M.P.'s abstained; and later, administrative action was taken to modify the policy.

Finally, the attacks of the Opposition can create a mood among the electorate. Its speeches bring many tears, but never turn a vote—though it *can* capture voters *outside* the House of Commons. It is to the electorate that its criticism is directed. For though the Cabinet has power, the power is contingent: it faces a dedicated enemy which is armed with procedural privileges and commands an organized national following. And all the Government says and does is staked on the hazard of the few votes—three or four in every hundred—that can turn it out.

The Role of the Government's Backbenchers

We have already seen that both parliamentary parties organize themselves into committees. The influence of these on Ministers is hard to measure because they hold private meetings, and often great care is taken to see

that their proceedings do not leak. But the pressures they can generate are well documented. Professor H. H. Wilson's *Pressure Group*, for instance, tells how, in 1951–53, a small group of Conservative backbench advocates of commercial television were able to win substantial support in the Parliamentary Party, and finally to thrust their plans upon an initially hostile Cabinet.

Although Labour governments are more resistant to backbench pressures, in 1946, when Mr. Attlee was Prime Minister, the combination of 72 Labour M.P.'s voting against the government, with a similar number of abstentions, led the government to cut conscription from 18 months to 12. And in 1966, Mr. Wilson sensed that any deal with Rhodesia which appeared to be a sellout would arouse widespread resistance, and adjusted his policy accordingly. And it is widely believed that his withdrawal of British approval of American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was due to the widespread feeling among his supporters. But even backbench influence is qualified. In the first place, as we have seen, the number of ministerialists is quite large compared with the number of backbenchers, and the appetite for office of the backbenchers also dampens their rebel ardor. Again, to rebel too far and too seriously might risk the overturn of the Cabinet itself and destroy the party as a force, not only in the House but in the election as well, and most backbenchers are sufficiently partisan to feel that their own Government could not possibly be worse than the Opposition, in any circumstances.

Finally, the backbenchers may be short-circuited by outside groups on legislation. As we pointed out when discussing pressure groups, the proposals brought to the House increasingly represent complicated compromises and package deals made between Ministers and the outside interests. Even if the backbenchers had the information with which to base an attack on such deals, they could not alter any sub-

stantial part without damaging or perhaps destroying the government's policy.

The Legislative Cycle

Whereas the U. S. Congress enacts between 500 and 1,000 bills into law every session, the British Parliament enacts only about 100. About 40 are "Private Acts" which do not affect the general population or classes of the general population, and can be put aside until later. Of the remaining "Public Acts," averaging about 60 or 70 per session, about one-tenth are Private Members' Acts. These, which usually concern minor matters, and are prohibited by the Orders of the House from imposing any charge on the public revenue (for this always demands a government resolution), are made on the initiative of the backbenchers, and very often on behalf of outside interests which supply drafting assistance. But 90% of the Public General Acts of Parliament, which averaged 49 Acts per session between 1959-63, consist of government bills, put forward by Ministers. This is another and very striking indicator of the supreme characteristic of the British governmental system—the fusion of Executive and Legislature. The legislative cycle cannot be considered as starting on the floor of the House of Commons, or House of Lords, but way back in the offices of a Ministry. And the same holds true, as will be seen, of financial legislation.

In legislating, the government is inspired by four considerations, either separately or in some combination: (1) the promises made to the electorate in its Manifesto, (2) the desire of the civil servants to introduce or amend legislation, arising out of the performance of their duties, (3) the wishes of outside interest-groups, and (4) sudden emergency. For instance, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia, in 1965, demanded immediate legislation, and such was put to the Parliament, and enacted.

A bill will originate inside a Department, as a result of policy discussions between the Minister and his senior civil servants. Once it is clear that the policy will require legislation, a memorandum is prepared and sent to the Cabinet Secretariat, which in turn circulates it to all interested Ministers, and always to the Treasury. Since this is routine, it is in the originating Department's own interest to have cleared policy with these other Ministries and the Treasury beforehand, and this is always done. Thereupon, the general policy is discussed by a Cabinet committee, and then at the Cabinet. In the normal course of events—i.e., barring some sudden emergency requiring legislation—this bill preparation by Departments has become routinized, thanks to the Cabinet Secretariat.

A Parliamentary session usually begins in October or November, and six weeks after it opens the Cabinet Office asks all the Departments to send in lists of the bills they are likely to require in the next session (in 12 months' time), with estimates of how long and controversial they are likely to be, and a forecast of the date at which the Department would be ready to give instructions to the counsel who draft the bills—assuming they had permission to go ahead. For this is the crux, parliamentary time is far too limited for the number of bills that departments would like to bring forward. Therefore, once the Cabinet Office has all its information, its next step is to forward this to one of the Cabinet's Standing Committees, the *Future Legislation Committee*, which will always include the government's Leader of the House of Commons and of the House of Lords, and the Chief Whip.

After the Christmas recess, the Future Legislation Committee examines the list and draws up a tentative short list of bills for discussion with the sponsoring Ministers. It meets with them, and finally establishes a provisional list for the session to come, putting the bills in or-

der of priority. This list is put to, and finalized by, the Cabinet. Once a proposed bill has a place on such a list, the Department may ask for the help of the Office of Parliamentary Counsel to draft the bill.

The moment the new session of Parliament opens, the care of this bill passes from the Future Legislation Committee to the Legislation Committee, whose meetings are attended by the Lord Chancellor, the Leaders of the two Houses, the Law Officers, the Chief Whip, and any of the Ministers involved with the bill. This committee (which prepares the Queen's Speech, a list of Legislative proposals) meets weekly to look in detail at any draft bills submitted. Often these bills are amended, not once but many times, before they are approved. Not until the Legislation Committee gives the word may the Minister present the bill to Parliament.

Technically, a bill may be initiated in either the House of Lords or the House of Commons (the Cabinet's Legislation Committee decides which); in practice, only about one in five bills are introduced in the House of Lords, the rest in the Commons. At any rate, a bill must receive three readings in the initiating House before going on to the other, and for a bill to be passed, both Houses must approve an identical text of it. It then goes forward to receive the formality of the Royal Assent. But, it must be repeated, in the case of bills certified by the Speaker of the House of Commons to be money bills, the approval of the House of Lords is not required.

Two points must be realized in order to understand the nature of the parliamentary discussion of a bill. First, in sharp contrast to the practice in the U.S.A., the bill receives its floor vote *before* going on to a committee stage. Second, the role and operation of these committees is far different from those in the U.S.A. and in France.

The first step for a bill in the Commons is taken when the bill is about to receive a First Reading. This is usually just a formality, for

only the title of the bill is read by the Clerk of the House, from a printed sheet called a "dummy bill," which is then laid on the desk of the House. Publication follows soon after. Usually some two or three weeks elapse between the First Reading and the Second Reading, allowing time for the Opposition to decide on its line of attack, and for outside interests to make their views known.

The Second Reading ordinarily lasts a day or two (an unusually long three days will be allocated for very important bills like the Transport Bill of 1946-47), and it is at this time that the general principles of the bill are debated between the Government Ministers who are in charge of the bill and the Opposition "shadow ministers" who are keeping tabs on, or "marking," them. The Ministers open the debate; then the backbenchers follow, often speaking to a nearly empty House. As the evening wears on, the Ministers reappear and the frontbenchers on both sides re-enter the debate.

Next comes the Committee stage—*after* the floor vote. The Government may take this stage either on the floor of the House, in the Committee of the Whole House, which is simply the membership of the House debating in the Chamber under relaxed rules of debate; or it may take the bill in one of the standing committees ("upstairs"). Matters of signal or constitutional importance alone are taken on the floor of the House. The rest go to the Standing Committees.

Standing Committees

All but one of these committees, of which at present six are operating, are symbolized by the letters of the alphabet—A, B, C, etc. That one is called the Scottish Committee because it contains all the Scottish Members and deals with all Scottish business; it is the only standing committee that is in any sense specialized. The others each consist of from 20 to 50 Members, drawn proportionately from the

parties in the House, and empaneled by the Speaker, assisted by his Committee of Selection, from names submitted by the party Whips. These committees meet in rooms which are small replicas of the House itself. The opposing Members range themselves on each side, with the Chairman presiding on a cross-bench at the top. The party Whips are always present on each side of the Committee.

These committees play an entirely different part from that played by the committees of the United States Congress or, indeed, by the committees in the various legislatures of continental Europe. First, they are unspecialized: they are allocated bills as soon as they are free to consider them. Secondly, they never conduct hearings from outside witnesses, nor from civil servants; they do nothing but discuss the bill in front of them according to strict committee procedures. Thirdly, their proceedings are printed in an official record which is placed on sale. Fourthly, it is not their function to report to the House their views about the policy of the bills, nor is there any way in which they can suppress bills or hold them up indefinitely. The House of Commons, in its Second Reading of a bill, is the body that pronounces on whether its policy is good or bad, not the committee. Likewise, the Cabinet decides whether to hold back or expedite a bill, not the committee. The function of the standing committee is to take the bill after the House of Commons has approved its policy in a Second Reading, and to work through it in detail. The committee considers the bill word-by-word and line-by-line, considering new clauses and amendments as it does so.

These standing committees act in the same way as the Committee of the Whole House does when it is taking the committee stage of a bill. They are established simply to save time. While a Committee of the Whole House is considering merely the one bill before it, six standing committees can be considering six bills.

The task of the appointed committee is to examine the bill very carefully and to consider amendments. Now is the supremely opportune time for outside interest to influence the bill. Working through their friends on the committee, they often greatly change legislation through the amendments they submit that are accepted.

When a bill comes out of committee, it enters the Report stage. The bill "as amended in committee" is circulated to all Members, and then debated in the House. If additional clauses are found to be necessary, they are added, and further amendments can also be considered, at that time. These are not the same amendments that were discussed in committee and rejected, but "new" amendments. It is the Speaker who has the power to decide which amendments are substantially "new" and allow them.

One other important feature of the Report stage must be noted. During the committee stage, the Minister may tell a Member (either one of his own backbenchers or an Opposition Member) that although he cannot promise to accept the Member's amendment, he will consider it. The Report stage gives the Minister the opportunity to bring forward amendments he wanted time to consider during the committee stage.

When the Report stage is over, the bill goes forward for its Third (and final) Reading, which is, once more, a general debate, this time on the final version of the bill. Third Readings do not last more than a day. If a majority of the Members vote for the bill, it has passed the House of Commons. But it is still not a law, for it must then be voted on by the House of Lords. If approved by the Lords, the Royal assent is then given and the bill has become a law.

Although few bills come out of the House of Commons just as they went in, by-and-large the government's general policy is upheld. A bill is often altered in one or two important particulars, and usually greatly changed in its less important details. And sometimes (but very rarely)

a bill meets such a hostile reception that it is dropped altogether.

Private Bills

When private individuals or corporations seek particular powers and benefits not granted by the ordinary law of the land, bills passed to embody such powers and benefits are known as "private bills." Ordinarily introduced by local authorities and other statutory bodies, such as public corporations, private bills rarely meet any opposition, since objections are usually warded off by compromises before the petition is framed. If, however, the bill is opposed, it runs a double hazard: it may have to stand up to a grueling examination in specially constituted committees, each consisting of four M.P.'s; and, even if approved by the committee, it may face a debate on the floor of the House of Commons or the House of Lords.

Subordinate Legislation

Yet another type of legislation is known as "delegated" or "subordinate" legislation. This legislation is made by a public (or, much more rarely, a private) body under the authority of an Act of Parliament, which is called the "parent" Act. There is an enormous amount of this kind of legislation. In 1952, for instance, the public Acts of Parliament numbered 64, but the number of "Instruments"—i.e., the delegated legislation made under Acts of Parliament—totaled 2,312. There are five reasons for the growth of delegated legislation: the pressure on parliamentary time; the technical nature of many Acts; the likelihood of unforeseen contingencies arising during the administration of a complicated Act; the need for legislative flexibility; and the occasional development of emergency conditions that require speedy action. The need for delegated legislation is generally conceded today,

but the adequacy of control over it is more widely disputed.

Since Instruments are so numerous and technical, for every one that a Member detects as objectionable, scores probably escape his notice. Consequently, in 1944 the House created the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments, usually known as the Scrutiny Committee (consisting of 11 Members, with an Opposition Member as its Chairman), to bring to the attention of the House any statutory Instrument it thinks should be reviewed by Parliament.

The committee may not consider or report on the merits or the policy of any of the Instruments. Its duty is to draw the attention of the House to whether it imposes a tax, excludes an appeal to a court, or purports without authority of the parent Act to have retroactive effect; or whether there has been unjustifiable delay in its publication or "laying before" Parliament; or, more generally still, whether its language should be clarified, or whether it seems to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by the parent Act. Between 1944 and 1952, the committee examined 6,900 Instruments and reported only 93 of these to the House.

Controlling the Government

Once the government makes up its mind on major policy matters, it is not likely to be influenced to change it. (And further, the government *always* gets its vote). It is only on matters of sub-policy and administrative detail that the government may be induced to alter its thinking. This sort of alteration can be accomplished in one of two ways: either by trying to withhold money, or by direct challenge. It is carried out either through regular channels (general procedures) or with the aid of certain specialized sub-committees. It will help the reader to understand how all this happens if he will bear in mind the following diagram:

The House of Commons and Its Control over Administration

By General Procedures

By Sub-Committees

Via Finance

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| 1 Budgetary
the Finance Bill
(‘Ways and
Means’) | 1 The Public
Accounts
Committee |
| 2 The Estimates
and Appropriations
(‘Supply’)—i.e., the
26 ‘Supply Days’
Debates | 2 The Select Committee
on Estimates |

Via Direct Challenge

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 Questions | 1 The Select Committee
on Nationalized
Industry |
| 2 Adjournment
motions | 2 The Select
Committees on
Agriculture, and on Science
and Technology |
| 3 Queen’s Speech
debates and
the like | |
| 4 Censure motions | |

Financial Scrutiny

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES According to the Parliament Act of 1911, in matters of finance the House of Commons is supreme. A bill that the Speaker of the House of Commons certifies to be a money bill cannot be amended by the Lords, nor does it need to receive the assent of the Lords to become law. If the House of Lords refuses assent, the bill is merely delayed a month.

A motion to expend public revenue can come only from a Minister of the Crown. This rule was established in Standing Order 63, one of the oldest of the Standing Orders, dating from the reign of Queen Anne. The Opposition, therefore, cannot suggest *increases* in expenditure. In order to combat the Government, it is forced to move for reductions—even if it favors increases, this is its paradoxical way

of drawing attention to the inadequacy of the grant. There are two financial Committees of the Whole House. One, the Committee of Supply, appropriates money to the various services that need it, the other, the Committee of Ways and Means, raises money.

THE TAXATION CYCLE A Budget is introduced every year early in April, which is the beginning of the financial year. The House then, on certain days from April through July, goes into the Committee of Ways and Means and discusses what are known as “budget resolutions.” When all the resolutions have been debated, they are collected together into a bill which, when passed, is known as the Finance Act. It embodies the government’s taxation program for the year.

“SUPPLY.” Parliament must also “supply” the government with money—that is, grant it the right to spend for certain approved purposes. The Treasury collects and revises the estimates presented to it by the different Departments, and these are introduced in the Commons before April. (It might be noted here that “estimates” is a word which, like “bill,” “resolution,” and various others, often is capitalized in its more formal usages.) The House then discusses these estimates over the next four months, after which, in July, they are incorporated in the Appropriation Bill. This bill, when passed as the Appropriation Act, permits the various Departments to spend on the purposes detailed in the estimates, and on *nothing else*.

Two points must be noticed. First, the House has no effective control over the “timing” of discussion on the estimates. The 26 days scheduled for the discussion of these—the “Supply Days”—must be taken advantage of when they fall, no matter how inconvenient their arrival to the House as a whole. Furthermore, the choice of which estimates are to be debated lies with the Opposition—which, taking full advantage

of its prerogatives, and then some, does not use the occasion to probe the details of the estimates, but for a general debate on the broad policy of the Department whose estimate is up for discussion. Thus the supposed "control" of the House over Government expenditure is lost in a labyrinth of meandering policy debates initiated by the Opposition. And, on the last day, all the estimates that have not been debated are simply put to the vote *without* discussion!

On the other hand, the House exercises minute control over the spending of all money granted, to make sure that it has been spent *only as Parliament has authorized, and in no other way* (save in very exceptional and justifiable cases). In the process, it investigates and checks details of maladministration. It does this by specialized machinery: through its officer (the Comptroller and Auditor General) and its Select Committee (the Public Accounts Committee). The Comptroller and Auditor General audits the accounts of every Department and presents a report to the Public Accounts Committee, which draws attention to: divergencies between what Parliament authorized and what the Department actually spent its money on; cases of unwise or wasteful administration of the sums granted; and other irregularities. The committee summons the accounting officers of the Departments to its hearings to justify any departures mentioned in the report. Chaired by an Opposition Member, it consists of 15 M.P.'s, and is exceedingly influential.

The Commons' Control over Finance

We have seen that although the Commons can partly affect the modes of taxation, it has no control over expenditures. It relies on the Treasury and the Cabinet for the formulation of the estimates, and has neither the time nor the machinery to control them in detail. As long ago as 1912, the Commons set up a Select Committee on Estimates. This committee and

the Public Accounts Committee can, at best, examine the detail after the estimates have been voted and the money is spent. This provides a second specialized piece of machinery to investigate and criticize maladministration. But although this committee (of 43 M.P.'s subdivided into sub-committees) is becoming increasingly influential, the government is still getting exactly the sums it asks for and for the purposes it has approved. Furthermore, both the government and this committee know in advance that the government gets its way. It is therefore impossible for any Department to rely on its friends in Parliament to get its estimate altered or improved.

Three important results follow. First, all Departments are strictly subordinated to the Cabinet's general financial plan. Secondly, the Budget is a coherent document representing the financial aspect of the government's policy. Thirdly, lobbyist pressures are kept in firm check.

Scrutiny and Control of General Administration

It will be seen that although the House devotes much attention to the finance of government, it is no longer so much concerned with finance as such as with the uses to which the Government puts finances: that is to say, either with the high policy of the Government (insofar as this is expressed through the appropriations which it seeks) or the details of administrative machinery. And it will be noted, also, that it devotes its attention to these two classes of matter in two different ways: the challenge on high policy is made through the 26 days of *general debate* on topics initiated by the Opposition, which were originally supposed to scrutinize the Government's detailed appropriations; while the control over administrative detail is exercised through two *specialized committees*, the Public Accounts

Committee and the Select Committee on Estimates.

As we shall now see, these two broad methods of challenging the Government's general or detailed administration also apply outside the financial field.

SELECT COMMITTEES TO CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL. In 1956 a Select Committee on Nationalized Industries was set up, with powers to send for "Persons, papers, and records." It investigated and reported to the House on the Hydro-Electric Board, the National Coal Board, the airlines, the railroads, and the gas and the electricity supply industries. The committee has behaved very independently in its relations with the government of the day, in fact, its reports have often criticized the Ministers responsible for the nationalized industries. It is the practice for the boards concerned to make public replies to committee strictures, and the committee has not hesitated to retort to those it has regarded as unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the information elicited has served as ammunition for critical M.P.'s in general debate, thus generating even more pressure. Of course the committee has no way of forcing the government to act, but, on the whole, governments have proved responsive.

The effectiveness of this committee so reinforced the impression made by the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee that a Select Committee on Procedure recommended the establishment of additional committees, each supervising the administration of a sphere of government policy. Accordingly, in January, 1967, the House set up, experimentally, for that session, two new Select Committees: one a subject committee on science and technology, and the other the first committee to study a government Department, the *Department of Agriculture*. These committees also have the power to send for persons

(including Ministers), papers, and records, their meetings are public; and they publish a verbatim account of their proceedings.

Parliamentary Questions

The parliamentary question addressed to a Minister (to elicit information or to register criticism), and the daily Question Time, are distinctive and vital features of the parliamentary system in Britain. Every Member has the right to ask questions of a Minister. He may, however, "star" (qualify or mark for special attention, as with an asterisk) his (written) question, by way of asking for an oral answer. He must give at least two days' notice for such an answer, and he may not request more than two such questions for any one day. The chief reason for demanding an oral answer is that it entitles the Member, and other Members, too, to ask supplementary questions, and these are used to entrap the Minister into damaging admissions.

Question Time runs from 2.45 p.m. to 3.30 p.m. every day except Friday (but the Prime Minister can be questioned only on Tuesdays and Thursdays). The turn of each Ministry comes up at intervals of about 10 days, but, owing to the popularity of Question Time, the number of questions and particularly of supplementary questions has enormously grown. Consequently, a Member's question may not be reached on the day the Minister is down to answer. In that case it is postponed until the Ministry's next turn on the rota (roster)—and so, for an important Ministry it may be a month before the M.P. gets an answer to his question. It is up to the Clerks to decide which Minister is constitutionally responsible for an answer, and they will, if necessary, transfer the question from the Minister queried by a Member to the constitutionally appropriate one. (It should be noted that not all questions are admissible, for there are 29 conditions to be met for admissibility,

such as: the purpose must be to gain information or press for action, and not just an excuse to make a speech; the Government must, in some way, be responsible for the matter questioned; questions to which answers have been refused cannot be repeated.)

The questions are numbered and printed on the Order Paper. At Question Time the Member rises and, addressing the Speaker, says "No. 63, Sir"—upon which he resumes his seat while the Minister rises and reads the reply. (He has been known to read the wrong reply, with side-splitting results.) On answering, the Minister may expect a veritable drumfire of supplementary questions. Where the issue is controversial, the process turns into a cross-examination of the Minister by all the House. And sometimes the question or answer is veritable dynamite.

Question Time is important because it enables the Opposition to probe weak points in the Government's handling of affairs, because it permits this immediately, and because this probing occurs by cross-examination in the presence of the House (which is always crowded for Question Time). For instance, in February, 1967, a daily newspaper had stated that outgoing and incoming cables were being scrutinized by the security services. The Prime Minister, who made a statement on this matter, alleged that the story was sensationalized, and that the practice was standard—and that, in any case, the newspaper had defied a "D Notice" (a request that a story be suppressed in the interests of national security). A chain of questions followed, on that day and successive days, until it appeared that the issues were by no means as clear as the Premier had at first suggested: and in the end he had to concede an impartial inquiry into the whole matter, and the principles it raised.

The questions always range over an enormously wide area. In one afternoon, for instance, the Minister of Labour can be asked to provide answers to queries on a list of topics

ranging from "actions being taken to offset redundancy in the motor car industry in Scotland," and "racial discrimination in employment practiced by foreign firms," to a pointed personal query as to why a civil servant employed by the statistics department of the Ministry allegedly threatened the director of a company with fines of £50 and £200.

As soon as a question is received in a Minister's Department, it is given priority over all other business. Many Departments have a special parliamentary branch, part of whose business is to take responsibility for getting the question answered. A single sheet of text is prepared for the Minister, embodying the answer, background data, and suggested answers to possible supplementaries. A well-briefed Minister often can defend himself even if he has a bad case, though it is much more likely that his weak position will be exposed. The House may not always discover the truth, but it infallibly recognizes a cheat.

Adjournment Motions

An adjournment motion enables a Member to start a debate unrelated to the motion itself. Adjournment motions can take place at the close of a day's business, and also when the House disbands for a vacation or holiday. Members who are dissatisfied with a Minister's reply to their questions can seek to raise the matter again "on the adjournment." If successful, they can force the Minister into an additional half-hour debate on the issue. Although no vote is taken on such debates, they can be a useful check on ministerial action. For instance, a Conservative M.P. once raised at Question Time a complaint from a constituent who charged that the local police had beaten his son. Failing to get a satisfactory reply, the M.P. raised the matter on the adjournment. His case raised such wide sympathy from both sides of the House that the government had to institute a public inquiry.

The "Urgency" Adjournment Motion

For business that brooks no delay, Standing Orders provide for an "urgency" adjournment motion, under which a debate can take place at 7.00 p.m. that very night, usually amid great excitement. Confidence in the government is often at stake, and since the Whips on both sides have to take crash action, by telephone, telegram, and runners, to collect their scattered Members, the occasion is generally one of high drama. The most recent debate under this procedure arose from the decision of a U. N. mission to quit Aden, after a brief and fruitless five-day sojourn there, instead of completing its task of consulting all shades of political opinion. To a restless and indignant House the Foreign Secretary stated that he had dispatched a Resident Minister to Aden—but, under questioning, gave no clear indication of what that Minister's duties were to be. Thereupon, an Opposition "shadow minister" moved the "urgency motion," and the Foreign Secretary had to do his best to reassure the House that very evening. But such occasions are rare because the issue has to be one of "immediate, urgent, and public" importance, and Speakers interpret each of these three modifying words very conservatively. Indeed, in the last 20 years, only 16 debates had taken place under this procedure up to time of writing.

Queen's Speech Debates

Every session of Parliament is opened by the Speech from the Throne, which is either read by the Queen in person or by her *Commissioneer*, in a ceremony of antique grandeur and dignity. But the speech has actually been drafted by the Cabinet, and it sets out the government's legislative program for the session. Six days of debate follow, with the Opposition usually mounting a sustained attack on the

Government that ranges over foreign affairs, defense, colonial affairs, the state of the economy, and other matters of pressing interest to the Opposition.

Votes of Censure

The Opposition, which is always given time for debate on the Queen's Address and on the estimates, invariably can persuade the Government to "give" it days to debate certain urgent topics. The Government, being miserly of its time since it has a program of its own to get through, is of course reluctant to turn the floor over to the Opposition. But the Opposition always has a potent weapon in reserve: it can call for a discussion of a motion expressing lack of confidence in the Government—a "vote of censure," as it is called. Strictly an emergency move, the "vote" must be used with discretion; but by convention the Government never fails to accede to a demand from the Leader of the Opposition for a vote of confidence. For this is a convention based on the fact that the Leaders of the Opposition are responsible Members who form a potential alternative government—a position of power and trust that not only warrants but guarantees the legitimacy of such an interruption of the normal course of business. And for their part, the Government ordinarily has everything to gain by confidently meeting such a direct challenge to its authority at the earliest possible moment.

Is the House of Commons a Legislature?

For some time, considerable concern has been voiced about the "decline" of the Commons in books with titles like "The Passing of Parliament" and "Is Parliament in Decline?"; in the informed criticisms of the members of the "Study of Parliament" group (mostly academics), and now, with the advent of the Labour government, by Labour backbenchers.

Newcomers to the House, mostly young and full of crusading zeal, these backbenchers have found themselves deprived of the opportunity to initiate reforms, and with much less influence on the Government than they had anticipated. The House, for its part, has set up a Select Committee on Procedure, to examine what can be done to renovate itself.

Some critics still hope to restore to the House a greater initiative in the making of law. They would like to see bills referred to select committees with powers to send for "persons, papers, and records," and with the capacity to amend the draft bills sent to them—something along the lines of the American or continental legislative committees of their various legislatures. The present government has made clear that it will not undertake such reforms. Instead, it seems to agree with the more conservative—or perhaps despairing—critics, whose program is limited to putting more information at the disposal of the House, and giving it far greater opportunities and stronger machinery for reviewing and criticizing the activities of the Executive. The two "specialist" committees (on Agriculture, and on Science and Technology) are the first fruits of this thinking.

The assumption behind this line of thought is precisely that the dominance of the government over Parliament is here to stay: that the House of Commons is an ancillary. The following excerpts from the Study of Parliament Group's evidence to the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Procedure, published in 1965, expresses this assumption.

"... Parliamentary scrutiny of the Executive is fundamental to the whole question of parliamentary reform. *For though it is the business of the Government to govern, it is also their business to give a running account of their stewardship to the House of Commons which was elected to support them and to submit their action or inaction in any particular instance to the judgment of that House.* . . ."²

²*Fourth Report of the Select Committee on Procedure, Session 1964-65, HC303 (1965), p. 135.*

THE HOUSE OF LORDS

The House of Lords is a survival from the very earliest days of the English monarchy, when power lay in the King in his Great Council. That body was the lineal ancestor of the House of Lords, for the House of Commons was a subsequent outgrowth from it. The enduring consequences of these facts are that (1) until 1911, the House of Lords' powers were co-equal with those of the Commons, and (2) to this day it is still overwhelmingly composed of the hereditary aristocracy.

Powers

We must clear our minds of the fact that the highest court of the United Kingdom is also called the House of Lords. In theory this court and the current House of Lords are indeed identical; in practice no *lay* peers ever sit with the court, and no appeal may be held by that court unless three qualified legal personages are present. Such personages are the nine Lords of Appeal and the Lord Chancellor; should an insufficient number of such persons be available, then any other of the duly qualified peers may be invited to sit. For all practical purposes, then, the House of Lords, as the highest court in the kingdom, is a separate body from the House of Lords, as a political body and Upper House of Parliament.

The powers of the House of Lords, as the Upper House, are to initiate legislation and to revise and if necessary to delay bills sent up to it by the House of Commons—money bills excepted. By the Parliament Act of 1911, as amended by the Parliament Act of 1949, any other bill (except a private bill) which is passed by the Commons in two successive sessions within a period of one year can become law *without* the assent of the Lords.

INITIATION OF BILLS. As we have seen, about one-quarter of the government bills in the 1959-63 period were initiated in the (House of) Lords, thus relieving pressure on the Lower House.

REVISION. With much more time at its disposal than the (House of) Commons, and containing a nucleus of highly qualified lawyers, professional men, and business executives, the Lords is a valuable revising Chamber. The author, analyzing the Labour Government's Transport Bill of 1947 in detail, found that the Lords discussed 450 amendments and passed 210 of these, 177 were substantive amendments, of which 80 were introduced by the Government itself. Fifty-three amendments of the 177 were designed to meet points raised by the Opposition in the Commons, and 91 were introduced by the Conservative Opposition in the House of Lords itself. There was no doubt that without the help of the Lords, the bill would either have been a very muddled affair, or alternatively, that the Commons would have had to spend a great deal more time in discussing and amending it. The Lords has helped clarify the details of the present government's complicated Companies Bill and Land Commission Bill in a similar workmanlike manner. Nor does the House of Lords revise only Labour legislation for instance, it made important qualifications to the Conservative Government's Television Bill in 1953.

DELAY. Although the Lords' functions of initiation and revision rouse no controversy, their delaying powers do, because delay, which is supposed to be a barrier against hasty legislation, can also be used as a barrier to hold up well-thought-out legislation. During the Labour governments of 1945-51, the Lords passed nearly all Labour measures. However, it did hold up for two years the Parliament Bill of 1947, which cut down its own delaying powers from two years to one (though this was only to

be expected), and rejected a clause in a bill which provided for the abolition of capital punishment. But most importantly—and for this the Labour Party have never forgiven it—in the Labour Government's last year of its first term office, in 1949, the Lords used its threat of delay to make the government promise that the nationalization of steel, provided for by an Act of Parliament, should not commence until after the General Election. The government was returned with too flimsy a majority to carry through effective nationalization of the industry, and when the Conservatives came back to power in 1951 they denationalized it.

This provides the clue to the pledge, contained in the Labour Manifesto of 1966, to introduce legislation "*to safeguard measures approved by the House of Commons from frustration or delay in the House of Lords*" For, to the Labour Party, it appeared possible (or even likely) that the House of Lords would use its delay powers in the fifth year of the Parliament's life, and thus effectively reduce the period of Labour legislation from the five-year legal cycle of the Parliament to only four years. And this appeared intolerable to the Labour Party for two reasons: first, the social composition of the House of Lords, and secondly, its political composition.

Social and Political Composition

At present the House of Lords has a membership of nearly 1,000. Of these, 739 are hereditary peers who have succeeded to their title, and another 130 are peers of first creation. There are 17 Law Lords and former Law Lords, who sit for life only as do 26 Bishops. In addition, ever since the Life Peerage Act of 1958 was passed by a Conservative government, there are now as many as 121 Life Peers. It should not be thought that the hereditary peers are ancient aristocrats who came over with William the Conqueror. Table 5-3 shows that a very high proportion are recent creations from the ranks of industry, the administration, and the

TABLE 5-3

Background of Peers Created Between 1916 and 1956

	M.P.'s	Labour Party workers	Commerce and industry	Military, etc.	Other public servants	Lawyers, etc., (except Lords)	Others	Total
1911-1919	32	—	14	9	2	—	3	60
1920-1929	46	—	26	1	5	6	3	87
1929-1931*	9	2	—	1	1	2	4	19
1932-1939	37	2	23	3	8	—	7	80
1940-1944	18	2	3	4	3	5	2	37
1945-1951*	24	10	—	16	—	—	10	60
1951-1956	27	—	4	—	2	2	2	37
	193	16	70	34	21	15	31	380

Source: P. A. Bromhead, *The House of Lords and Contemporary Politics, 1911-1957* (London: Hillary House, 1958).

*Periods of Labour rule.

professions. On the other hand, it can fairly be asked: Whom do the Peers represent other than themselves? And that being so, by what authority do they presume to hold up the legislation of an *elected* and representative House of Commons? Many outside the ranks of the Labour Party would take this line.

THE CROWN

The social and symbolic importance of the Queen has already been discussed. What is her political role?

Every act of government is carried out in the Queen's name, although the Queen's personal discretion is very limited, indeed. In law, she has the right to dismiss her Ministers at her own discretion; but this right was last exercised in 1834, and even then with the acquiescence of the Prime Minister. Again, she has the legal right to veto a bill passed by both Houses of Parliament; but the last time this was exercised was when Queen Anne vetoed the Scotch Militia Bill in 1707. Again, the Queen convenes and dissolves Parliament. May she, at her personal discretion, withhold her consent to a dis-

solution of Parliament when this is asked for by her Prime Minister? For more than a century, no Sovereign has rejected such advice to dissolve (though examples have occurred in other countries of the Commonwealth). Whether the Queen can refuse today is still a contested question.

Those personal prerogatives of the Crown which the Sovereign still exercises at her own discretion today are two. In the first place, she has the right to "be consulted," the right to encourage, and the right to warn her Ministers. She has the right to see all Cabinet papers and to receive the Cabinet Agenda in advance; to receive copies of all the important Foreign Office telegrams; and receive the reports of the Cabinet's Defense Committee and its important sub-committees. In constant touch with what is happening, she becomes increasingly well informed as her reign lengthens. This may well make her influential; but this influence is advisory only. If her Cabinet insists, she must give way.

Secondly and finally, in certain circumstances the Sovereign may have a discretion as to the choice of Prime Minister—but only if a party has no clear majority and/or no recognized leader.

VI

The Executive

We have seen how the Cabinet stands at the intersection of "Party, Parliament, and Civil Service." Having discussed the Cabinet's relation ship with Party and with Parliament, we now move on to its tie-in with Civil Service. And this is a case of "last but not least," because in Britain the senior ranks of the Civil Service play a cardinal role in shaping government policies.

We should mention, however, before going on, that besides the Civil Service there are two other types of administrative organs responsible for executing the policies set by the Cabinet and Parliament, and that thus play some part in determining government policies: the public corporations (such as the B.B.C. and the nationalized industries) and the elected councils that constitute the local governments of the country. Neither of these is regarded as part of the "Executive," although they are certainly administrative agencies. But the spinal column of the whole administrative system is undoubtedly the Departments of the central government which are manned by the Civil Service, and so we shall devote most of our time to them.

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE

The so-called "Executive" in Britain consists of the important government Departments, with their associated boards and other powerful public agencies. At the head of each Department is a political appointee, the Minister, who is assisted by a varying number of junior Ministers (also political appointees). Apart from fleeting appearances before select Committees of the Commons, the civil servants in each Department are answerable to Parliament only through their Minister—who, for his part, is answerable to Parliament for the actions of his

civil servants. It is this relationship that produces "the individual responsibility of Ministers for their Departments" which we have already discussed.

The Minister, the political head of the Department, is temporary; he is an amateur; the source of his strength is the popular mandate; and his view is highly colored by immediate political needs. The Civil Service, on the other hand, is a skilled, permanent, and dispassionate (since it is not elected) body of public servants that keeps its eye on the future, since it will be left with the consequences of a Minister's policies long after he has departed. As the duties of government have increased, much work that used to be done by Ministers and Parliament has been delegated to the Civil Service. Today, Acts of Parliament do not usually aim at doing more than laying down the essential principles of the law, leaving the details to be filled in by Statutory Rules, Orders, and Regulations—which are drawn up by the Civil Service, with the knowledge of the Minister, who has the final say. These regulations vastly exceed the Acts of Parliament both in number and in bulk. Many Acts now establish special arrangements for adjudicating breaches of these Statutory Rules and Orders through administrative tribunals, and in many cases the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts is excluded.

In addition to these two relatively new func-


tions of the Civil Service, its ancient one of giving assistance and advice to the Minister has enormously expanded. The work of a Department is so complex today that on all but the most vital or politically controversial subjects the Minister is bound to lean heavily on his Civil Servants to execute his policy.

Structure

The central Executive has three main characteristics: (1) it is organized into a number of Departments and their dependent boards and agencies; (2) it is more highly integrated than in, say, the United States; and (3) the senior ranks of the Civil Service that make up these Departments are highly influential in the shaping of policy. The organization of a typical government Department is shown in Fig. 6-1.

In striking contrast to the typical American governmental Department, in Britain an entire Department is the responsibility of a single civil servant, the Permanent Secretary (except in the Treasury, which now has two Permanent Secretaries). Although the Permanent Secretary concentrates on particular aspects of the Department, he is charged with overseeing all the operations of the Department and is assisted in this by one or more Deputy Secretaries. Under this central direction come the Under Secretaries, each in charge of a Section, and, below

FIGURE 6-1 *Organization of a typical British Government Department.*



them, the Assistant Secretaries who head up the lower-echelon divisions of the Department. Within these divisions, smaller units are administered by Principals and Assistant Principals.

The lower-echelon divisions correspond roughly to the "bureaus" in an American Department. Two very important differences from American practice must be noted here. First, the ranks between the equivalents of "bureau chief" and the political head of the Department are in Britain filled by permanent career men who have spent a lifetime in the service. In the United States, the equivalent ranks are usually filled by political appointees who may be fairly rapidly and regularly replaced. The chief advice given to the incoming political head of a British Department thus comes from the tried and trusted top civil servant of the Department, not from the party appointees who are brought in together with him. Nor do British incoming Ministers follow the French practice of bringing with them their own "cabinet" of advisers.

Further, the fact that the higher ranks consist of career men who have usually spent many years in that particular Department helps to make the Department a real unity instead of a collection of separate bureaus. All controversies between the different divisions of the Department gradually work their way to the top, where they can receive a final decision from the Permanent Secretary if necessary.

Attached to most of the Departments are several boards or commissions for which the departmental Minister takes parliamentary responsibility, but which have structures of their own. Against the 24 Departments that existed in 1967, there were about 100 boards or commissions of this kind.

Coordination

How are the competing policies of so many Departments and agencies brought together into a coherent whole? The institution

of the Cabinet is one answer. Since it consists of the heads of Departments, any disputes can be cleared at its level through the committees, the Cabinet Secretariat, and the Cabinet Agenda (as already described). And we have already seen, for instance, how a Department must consult all other interested Departments, especially the Treasury and the Law Officers, before bringing the draft of a bill to the Cabinet.

In practice, of course, only the most serious of departmental collisions are brought up to the Cabinet. Below the Cabinet level, the Treasury establishes many of the administrative procedures and minor policies common to all the Departments, and there is also a network of consultation and cooperation among Departments that buffers any very serious collisions between them.

THE TREASURY. The pre-eminence of the British Treasury, which is often called "the Department of Departments," is recognized by all other Departments. As its name suggests, the Treasury is concerned (as is the United States Treasury) with all the financial transactions of government; but it does much more besides. It is charged with the responsibility for economic policy—and this gives it a degree of control over what the Departments concerned with industry and commerce are doing. And it is responsible for negotiating all pay, recruitment, promotion, and training policies in the Civil Service. Finally, it is responsible for the estimates of the various Departments. This control of the staffing and the finances of the other Departments gives it a unique insight into their outlook and into the policies they are pursuing and wish to pursue.

The Treasury certainly never tells Departments what their policy must be. A Department's policy, as we know, is in the hands of its Ministers, who must answer for it in the Cabinet and in the House of Commons. But the Treasury can and does influence to some degree the policies of the other Departments. It has the

right to say "No" to a Department's estimates. The Minister of the Department may fight the decision up to the Cabinet, but at least the result will be clearly understood by all and not cloaked in secrecy, or subject to breaking out suddenly in full view. However, although the Treasury can say "No," it cannot and does not seek to tell other Departments how they ought to spend their money. Actually, the great bulk of spending today follows automatically from some previous policy decision (e.g., a decision to raise the school-leaving age to 16), and all that the Treasury can do is to process the estimates accordingly.

In the course of the Treasury's "review" of Departments' spending and staffing, it is in the unique position of knowing in what direction their policies are moving. It is, therefore, able to detect divergencies from the government's policies at an early stage, and can point these out to the Departments themselves, or, if the issues are too serious for the Departments to settle, to the Ministers in charge. Further, in getting the Departments to work together, it stands in a very strong position. It is bound to be represented on every important interdepartmental committee. And it has the right and the duty to make trouble over the financing and staffing of all other Departments.

Interdepartmental Consultation

Most governmental disputes and frictions occur in the actual carrying out of government policy—i.e., at the departmental level rather than at the Treasury, or, still more rarely, at the Cabinet level—because the principal interest of one Department tends to be a secondary interest of other Departments. For instance, housing conditions are a principal interest of the Ministry of Housing, but a secondary interest of the Ministry of Health. Nevertheless, the Departments try to hammer out a coherent policy between themselves as far as possible. They succeed largely because of the

habit of mind of the highest class of the Civil Service, the Administrative Class (which we shall discuss more fully later). This class, which consists of no more than 3,500 civil servants, now is drawn from a wider social class than ever before, though it still derives much of its strength from the fee-paying "public" schools, and comes preponderantly from Oxford and Cambridge. This common educational background is reinforced by the nature of recruitment, which is by a general, not a technical, examination, thus heavily emphasizing the humanities, especially classics and history. The slow turnover of civil servants brings in recruits in such small doses that they become absorbed into the traditions of the Civil Service. Many if not most of the members of the Administrative Class belong to the same half-dozen men's clubs in and around Whitehall, and thus regularly meet one another informally. The long-term effect of this informal collaboration—telephoning one's opposite number, chatting at lunch, "dropping in to see" a colleague in his office—is very far-reaching.

But formal methods of collaboration are also essential, of course—and the most common and most influential of these is the interdepartmental committee or conference. In fact, the whole Administrative Class is continuously involved in transient interdepartmental committees that arise in the course of executing policy. Many are not established by any regular process but are created on the initiative of a particular civil servant with a specific problem to solve.

If a Department already has a policy it will, of course, try to stick to it. But many interdepartmental committees are convened at an earlier stage, when the Departments have not so much policies as *views*. The committee will consist of representatives of the Departments, trained in committee work and anxious to find a solution. In the end, somehow, a policy is arrived at which, if important enough, will be considered by a top-level official committee, by a committee of Ministers, or even by the Cabi-

net where the matter is most grave. But most of the matters discussed will never go that far. Thus, policy—some might prefer to call it sub-policy—is being made all the time. Within limits set by the governing party and the Ministers, the interdepartmental committees make the bulk of governmental policy, and it is in these committees that the presence of the Treasury representative is at its most influential.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS

There are at present about 830,000 full time nonindustrial civil servants in Britain. (Industrial civil servants are such persons as postal engineers and Admiralty dockyard workers.) Following are the main characteristics of the nonindustrial Civil Service.

(1) Excepting only the few "temporaries" brought in from outside by the Labour Government, on contract, it is entirely made up of "career" personnel. Once a civil servant has passed his probationary period, he holds a permanent appointment and will not be discharged except in the very rare cases of personal misbehavior or dishonesty. Resignations are infrequent and the turnover is extremely small.

(2) It is recruited by open competitive examination (or, in the appropriate cases, open competitive interview). Examinations for other than technical, scientific, and professional staff test for general aptitude and not special skills; they are similar to the examinations administered to students when they leave school, or university examinations, according to the class of civil servant involved.

(3) For purposes of pay, working conditions, and promotion, the Civil Service is treated (by the Treasury, which is responsible for these matters) as one service. Apart from the professional, scientific, and technical classes that are found in several Departments, and specialized classes found in a few Departments whose numbers are increasing (they totalled over 132,000

in 1966), the Civil Service is divided into three main classes. The Clerical Class (about 135,000 in number), located at the bottom of the ladder, carries out general clerical duties. The middle-rung Executive Class (about 80,000) is concerned with the details of governmental operations, and contains most of the highly trained semiprofessional staff, such as auditors. The top-rung Administrative Class (about 3,500) will be discussed shortly.

(4) The nonindustrial Civil Service is politically neutral. Neither appointment nor dismissal takes place for political reasons. Although the senior civil servants may not take part in any partisan activities, the lower ranks are freer, some (providing their Departments approve) even become candidates for election.

(5) The Service is almost totally free from corruption, and in the senior ranks it is completely so.

About 40% of vacancies in the Administrative Class are recruited from the Executive Class by special examinations. The rest come from the outside, from among young men and women between 21 and 28 years of age.

The work and outlook of the Administrative Class are all geared to the prime fact that the Minister is the head of his Department and that the Minister takes responsibility before Parliament for everything the civil servant does or does not do. The only contact between Legislature and civil servants is through a Minister. The Minister is the civil servant's chief, and the civil servant must serve him, not merely with political neutrality, but with loyalty and enthusiasm. His first task, therefore, is to keep his Minister out of trouble with Parliament and, more widely, with public opinion. Consequently, all decisions in the Department are made in the knowledge that the Minister may be called on to defend them in Parliament, either at Question Time or in the course of a debate.

For his part, the Minister, who often changes more than once in the lifetime of a single Cabinet, inevitably turns to his senior civil serv-

ants, the officials from the rank of Permanent Secretary down to the Assistant Secretaries, for advice and help in running the Department and developing its policies. The Minister brings, or should bring, to his Department his own special political skills; his knowledge of party and Cabinet policy, his keen scent for what will be popular and what the public will not stand for, a sense of urgency, and his own conception of what should be the Department's policy. The senior civil servant in turn impresses on the Minister what may be called "the departmental view." Most Departments, out of their own past relationships with their clients and their own internal workings, have evolved a collective view of their own responsibilities and have developed certain rules of thumb to guide them.

The Administrative Class and particularly the higher Civil Service are not passive agents carrying out the policies set by Parliament and Cabinet. They are an integral part of the policy-making process, and, although Parliament and the Cabinet necessarily have the last word the civil servants usually have the first one, and often the two are the same.

The responsibility of a civil servant of the Administrative Class is:

1. To oversee the day-by-day work of his particular branch of the Department.
2. To put forward his own views for advancement of the Department's policy.
3. To help prepare legislation.
4. To brief his Minister for discussions in the House and in committee.
5. To prepare parliamentary answers for his Minister and to supply him with material for speeches, committees, and the like.

THE PUBLIC CORPORATION

In Britain, the government has long participated in the economic activities of the nation. This intervention into the economy did not begin with the Labour government of

1945-51, for the Conservatives, by 1939, had set up six government corporations while they were in power: the Central Electricity Board, which nationalized the generation of electric power in 1926; the British Broadcasting Corp., in 1927; the Electricity Board of Northern Ireland, in 1931; the London Passenger Transport Board, which operates the entire Metropolitan Transport system, in 1933; the Northern Ireland Road Transport Board, in 1935; and the British Overseas Airways Corp., in 1939. All of these were run by government-appointed boards, and subject to little or no parliamentary control.

The Labour Party at the time was much influenced by these models, notably by the London Passenger Transport Board, the brainchild of Herbert (later Lord) Morrison. As early as the mid-1930's, the party had decided to nationalize key industries into public corporations when it had the opportunity to form a government. Elected to power in 1945, the Labour Party proceeded to nationalize the Bank of England (1946), the coal mines (1946), civil aviation (1946), inland transport (1947), electricity supply and distribution (1947), and gas supply and distribution (1948), as well as iron and steel (1949). The latter were subsequently denationalized in 1952.

The Labour Party, when returned to power in 1964, resumed its program of nationalization. Iron and steel were once more taken into public ownership in 1967. In 1967 an Industrial Reorganization Corp., to stimulate streamlining and mergers in private industry, was set up with £150 million capital. A Land Commission was created to buy and hold stocks of land for public building purposes. In addition, the aircraft industry is to be reorganized on a basis of public share-participation.

The public corporation has five characteristics:

1. Parliament may not inquire into its day-by-day management. Ministers are empowered to give general directions to the corporations on

matters affecting the national interest, they appoint the directors of the corporation, they control the corporation's investment plans, and they can set specific goals for each individual industry. In addition, most of the corporations are required to report on their activities annually to Parliament, and the report is subject to debate. To the extent that a Minister establishes the policies for a corporation, he is answerable to Parliament for what these policies are. But he need not answer questions on the details of a corporation's operations. This system caused considerable dissatisfaction among both parties in the House of Commons, which in 1957 established a Select Committee on the Nationalized Industries to provide it with more information. The experiment proved highly successful.

2. The personnel of the public corporations are not civil servants, and so neither the Treasury, the Civil Service Commission, nor even Parliament can regulate their remuneration or conditions of service.

3. Their funds are not derived from public taxation. Either the corporations raise most of their own money on the market, or the Treasury raises it for them.

4. The directors and the chairman of a corporation are appointed by the appropriate Minister for a fixed term, thus they do not enjoy the permanent status of a civil servant.

Electricity supply and distribution may serve as an example of the way a nationalized industry works. The generation of electricity was nationalized as long ago as 1927, by a Conservative government. The principal reason was the technical desirability of providing one national "grid" to supply the whole nation. Distribution was nationalized in 1947, with the government taking over the private and municipal concerns. Today, the control of the industry vests in two central bodies, the Electricity Council and the Electricity Generating Board. The Council is the central body of the whole industry.

Consisting of a number of directors appointed by the Minister of Fuel and Power, together with the chairmen of 12 Area Boards, the Council is responsible for general policy and, more specifically, for capital financing and research. The Electricity Generating Board,

consisting of a chairman and other directors, also appointed by the Minister, has the technical duty of generating the electricity and supplying it to the Area Boards, which distribute and sell the electricity. Each Area Board is composed of a chairman, a deputy chairman, and a number of part-time directors, all appointed by the Minister. In each area, Area Consultative Councils represent the interests of consumers. Each Council consists of from 20 to 30 members, about half of whom are appointed by the Minister from lists nominated by the local authorities. The Minister's responsibilities in all this are to appoint the directors, to approve the capital development plans of each Area Board and of the research program, and to approve the boards' borrowing arrangements. *He also has the power to issue general directions in the general interest where he thinks it necessary.* Under the 1957 Electricity Act, each Area board, and not just the industry as a whole, must pay its own way over a period of time. The industry has been prosperous, up to and including the fiscal year 1964-65, its surpluses amounted to over £374 million.

THE SOCIAL SERVICES

Any setback to economic growth will seriously affect the social services. This extensive system is administered either by a number of different Ministries, or by local authorities in partnership with the Ministries, and it is reckoned that it costs some £6,500 million per annum to run. Some £2 billion is paid out as social security payments, and about £1 billion represents the cost of the National Health Service.

The "welfare state" was not invented by the Labour Party, but they systematized it. A limited form of National Health Service existed before the war, as well as state unemployment and sickness payments, and old-age pensions. But the Labour Party, when it took office in

1945, acted on two documents: a "white paper" entitled *A National Health Service*, and the *Beveridge Report* of 1942. The latter, an exhaustive survey of the administration of the social services carried out under the chairmanship of the distinguished sociologist Lord Beveridge, became the basis of the Labour Party's policy. They reflected the problems of the pre-war period, with its heavy unemployment. It rested on two main principles: that benefits should be sufficient for subsistence without any other resources, and that there should be a single flat rate of benefit for everyone and for every case of cessation of earnings—whether from sickness, unemployment, or old age.

Both of these principles are under attack. First, "subsistence" at £4 week is too low a standard. Yet to increase all old-age pensions to a tolerable level would cost far too much. And so the "flat rate" principle comes under attack also, since it might be better to discriminate, giving more to some and less to others.

The National Health Service

The National Health Service provides free medical advice, drugs, and treatment for every person resident in the United Kingdom; it also provides free hospital care and treatment by specialists; and it carries on a wide range of miscellaneous activities, called the "personal health services"—child clinics, the ambulance service, and the midwife and health visitor service, to mention just a few. These personal health services are the responsibility of the local authorities, under the supervision of the Ministry of Health; but the hospitals, under the National Health Service Act of 1946, are a national responsibility. They are grouped together under 15 Regional Hospital Boards, which are composed of doctors, local government authorities, and members of the general public, all appointed by the Minister of Health. Finally, the General Practitioner Service is left in the hands of the medical and allied profes-

sions themselves, under the control of the Minister of Health. They work from their own premises. The administration is in the hands of 138 Medical Executive Councils, each consisting of doctors, dentists, and pharmacists, all appointed by the Minister.

From the patient's point of view, the system could hardly be simpler. He chooses the general practitioner he wants, and has his name put on that doctor's list. (He can change if he wants to.) From then on, he and his family go to that doctor, who treats them or summons the other services—ambulance, health visitor, specialist, midwife, hospital—as and when he decides they are required. Many criticisms may be leveled at the National Health Service, as at any administrative agency, but the charge, often made in the United States, that the patient is regimented, is totally without basis.

PROBLEMS OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE. In the first place, family doctors are dissatisfied. They complain that they are not enough in number in Britain. Further, many have emigrated, and so, as population has increased the workload for those who have remained has grown. In 1965 a crisis arose between the British Medical Assn. and the Minister over pay and conditions. The doctors threatened to resign in a body from the N.H.S. In the end the Minister gave way, and an entirely new contract between family doctors and the state is under negotiation. Meanwhile, the old-fashioned concept of family doctoring is changing, since doctors are being encouraged, financially and administratively, to congregate rather than practice entrepreneurship.

In addition to doctors' complaints about pay and conditions, the organization of the service has long given rise to problems. It has proved difficult to relate the local authority services for maternity and child welfare to the hospital service, and there is a similar lack of relationship between the hospitals and the family doctor. For although the hospitals form part of lo-

cal society, they are run by the nominees of the Minister. It is argued that if they were handed back to enlarged elected regional councils, their interrelationship with the local authority's part of the health services could be greatly improved. On the whole, however, doctors do not like this suggestion, they dislike being controlled by local councilors.

Meanwhile, a more radical school of critics attacks the entire philosophy of the National Health Service. It argues that as long as this has to be financed by general taxation, too little money will be spent upon health. It has been stated, perhaps on doubtful evidence, that *perhaps as much as half the population is prepared to accept a scheme based upon private health-insurance schemes, with massive government subsidization of the participants. It is unlikely that such a scheme would be adopted.* For all its shortcomings, the NHS is very popular and highly prized, as public opinion polls show.

Social Security

Some £2 billion per annum is spent on social security in Britain just over £1 billion of this was paid out in old-age pensions, £200 million went in sickness benefits, £143 million in family allowances, £108 million in widows' benefits, £45 million in unemployment benefits, and £31 million in maternity benefits. In addition, £264 million was spent on paying additional sums in special cases.

Where does all this money come from? Practically the whole of it comes from the pockets of the employer and the employee. All employed and self-employed persons over the age of 16 must contribute to a national insurance fund. The payments vary according to one's age, and the employer must contribute an amount equal to that of his employee. Wives are insured with their husbands unless they work themselves and choose to be insured separately. This system of compulsory insurance entitles the insured and his family to benefits

for sickness and consequent loss of earnings, and for unemployment or industrial injury. Wives receive a maternity grant upon the birth of a child, and a widow a payment upon the death of her husband. If both husband and wife survive, he to the age of 65 and she to the age of 60, they receive an old-age pension. A death grant is also payable on the death of any adult or child. But many persons for one reason or other have not paid their full insurance, or are in such poverty that the insurance benefits are not enough to maintain them and their families; some persons are not covered by the insurance provisions, others are made destitute by some calamity like fire or flood. In such cases the citizen is assisted by a special branch within the Ministry of Social Security, responsible for relieving extraordinary distress and for supplementing the benefits due under the insurance scheme where this is necessary. Such supplementation varies not only with the need, but also with the means of the applicant.

On top of the scheme as described, there has been grafted the beginnings of a graduated system. In 1961 the Conservatives introduced a graduated set of contributions, to provide for benefits related to one's earnings. Those earning less than £9 per week do not need to contribute, nor do those whose job carries a pension with it, provided steps are taken by the firm to "contract out." The contributor who does come into the scheme pays a percentage of his earnings (over and above what he is paying for the flat rate scheme) and in return, when he retires, is entitled to receive an addition to his flat-rate pension, suitably adjusted to his earnings at retirement. The Labour Party is pledged to extend this arrangement to the entire range of social security benefits, but so far has merely made a limited start since 1966 the first six months of widowhood, sickness, and unemployment are paid out at this new graduated rate.

Grave difficulties arise in the administration of the social security system owing to its flat-

rate and subsistence basis. The system takes little account of large families which have small incomes, where the husband is in regular but ill-paid work. It is here that a significant area of child poverty has been exposed. Some have argued for wage supplementation according to the size of family; others for juggling with the present child allowances so as (in effect) to take the money from the bachelor and pay it out to the married man—or, alternatively, to take it from the better-off married man to give to the poorly-paid one. Since all these are for a variety of reasons objectionable, it is necessary to consider increasing payments to the poorest families after a test of their means. The Conservatives find no difficulty at all in suggesting something of this kind; but it sticks in the throats of the Labour Party.

The old-age pension also arouses controversy. The alternative to raising the pension rate all-round is, once more, that selectivity based on a test of means which is anathema to the Labour party. Yet one shilling (12¢) on the pension requires £20 million in national taxation. The Conservative solution is to make

greater use of private occupational pension schemes to finance old age. Nearly two-thirds of the employed population are *already* in such schemes, and four-fifths of the entire labor force work for firms which offer such schemes. The Conservatives urge that these schemes should be generally extended to cover the whole labor force, so that they would be able to draw a pension from the firm *on top of* the flat-rate old-age pension, which would continue as it is now.

As long as the national income was likely to increase by 25% by 1970, it was possible to ignore all possibilities other than an all-round increase. But since the increase is going to be little more than half that "planned," it is clear that there will not be enough money to service the intended increases in the social services. In that case, it is very likely that the government will be forced into making some payments on a basis of personal means, instead of by a general flat-rate increase. Thus the Beveridge principles of subsistence and the flat rate, already eroded by the beginnings of the graduated-pension scheme, are likely to be much more seriously under attack in the near future.

VII

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

A Power Pyramid?

In formal terms, public policy is made by a collective council of Ministers in which the decisive voice (assuming he has one) is the Prime Minister's. The power of the elected House of Commons to modify this policy is on the decline, the House of Lords' is marginal, and that of the Sovereign is negligible. In short, the British system is one of government by the Executive branch, tempered by periodical elections. But at a behavioral level this description is quite misleading. It conveys the impression that the government (including the bureaucracy) stand above and away from the life of the nation, freely imposing their policies on it, that secure in its parliamentary majority, it is restrained only at the end of the parliamentary term by a desire to win the next election. But in practice the government is under constant popular constraint, and its freedom of action is limited.

Democratic Constraints

No governments are entirely free to act. A British government is limited, to begin with, by what the administrative machine can manage. It has been a constant source of complaint since at least 1962, for instance, that there have been too few economists in the public service to make economic planning effective. Again, before the present government's intentions to tax land values and set up a sort of "land bank" (a holding of land by the government for the use of public authorities) could be carried out, it was necessary to establish an entirely new Ministry. The government's latitude is confined, again, by the impact of unforeseen

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emergencies. The entire domestic program will be permanently distorted by the sterling crisis of 1966-67. Of course in the field of foreign relations, the powers with which it deals, such as the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., or the N.A.T.O. powers of Europe, often prove entirely intractable. But in addition to constraints like these a British government is subjected to democratic ones reflecting public opinion.

The first of these is the influence of its parliamentary majority. Certainly, where a government regards a parliamentary vote as vital to its survival, it can always rely on a majority. But the Parliamentary Party is not an artifact of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. It shares distinctively national values, such as sentiments relating to the Commonwealth and it takes sides, as the general public does, on such disputed matters as industrial relations, economic incentives, taxation levels, and so forth. In addition, it is in constant communion with the public on issues of the day.

Members are highly responsive to local anxieties such as unemployment, bad housing, child poverty, and the like. A Member is expected to intercede with civil servants and Ministers on behalf of individuals and groups in his constituency. He is sensitive to his daily mailbag, and is expected to run weekly or monthly clinics (called "surgeries") for his constituents, wherein he can give them advice and help. Consequently, the Parliamentary Party can and does become highly disturbed over such unpleasant matters as unemployment and the wage freeze, and Ministers, who have to live and work in constant touch with their parliamentary supporters, are inevitably influenced by these expressions of the public's concern. If they are not, they can find a revolt on their hands, such as occurred in the last year of the Conservative Party's rule (1964) over a bill to limit resale price maintenance. This bill appeared to damage the interests of the small shopkeepers, a highly influential political group, and under their pressure the Conserva-

tive Cabinet faced the most serious floor revolt that it had met with since taking office in 1951. Though it overrode this revolt in the end, it was not an experience it would willingly court for a second time.

Governments do in fact bear in mind the anxieties of their backbenchers and do what they can to meet these: and indeed, since the backbenchers are a sensitive antenna of the government, in touch with grass-roots opinion, they find it in their interest to do so. If this appears to contradict what had earlier been said about the limited role which the backbench of the majority party can play in influencing their government, let the reader imagine that Parliament were suspended for a year and the Cabinet given power to govern by decree: there can be no doubt that it would act more dictatorially, and with far less concern for public opinion, than it does under the present arrangements.

Secondly, the government is extremely sensitive to unpopularity, and this is why the Opposition is significant. For under the British electoral system the unpopularity of one party is the popularity of the other. The system operates like those little weather-house gadgets whereon one figure, often called "Dry," pops into a doorway while the other, in this case called "Wet," pops out. Governments (and their parliamentary supporters, who fear to lose their seats) watch their unpopularity and the popularity of the Opposition, as measured in public-opinion polls, bye-elections, and local elections, with the morbid attention of a hypochondriac who keeps taking his own temperature. If the Government has sinned by omission, it acts to prevent the Opposition from out-promising it. In the last years, for instance, much public concern has been expressed over child poverty—the plight of low-income families with large numbers of children. When the Government failed to legislate for these in its 1967 Budget, the Opposition stepped in with a vote of censure. As a result the Government was quick to hint that the matter was "under review." On the

other hand, where the Government's unpopularity is caused by its act of *commission* (as has been the case with the freezing of wages), it begins to modify its policy

Obviously, a government is more sensitive to unpopularity at the end of its parliamentary term than at the beginning. But this does not mean that it is unconstrained at the beginning of its term. Throughout its entire period in office it is subject to the administrative or political need to defer to organized group pressures. The importance of this cannot be overemphasized as has already been said, the interest-groups form, as it were, a second circuit of public representation. If parties and elections represent the public at large, the interest groups represent particular and limited publics. Sometimes their pressures reinforce party pressures in the Commons. At other times, the House is presented by the government with the package deals it has negotiated with these groups, and is called on to endorse them—which it does, willy-nilly, since it has neither the time, the information, nor the appropriate procedure to unravel the tangled compromises and begin again. The annual Farm Price Review, the recently negotiated contract of service for doctors in the National Health Service, and the ill-fated National "Plan" of 1965 provide examples.

Thirdly, however, these groups sometimes act as "veto" groups, slowing down or actually halting a government's policy. Nowhere is this clearer than in the so-called "Prices and Incomes Policy"—the attempt to find a policy to relate increases in prices, profits, and other forms of incomes, to increases in national productivity. In 1962 the Conservatives established a National Incomes Commission, but their policy broke down because the trade unions refused to come before it to present evidence. Further efforts in 1963 and 1964 also broke down, owing to the intransigence of the T.U.C. With the advent of the Labour government in October, 1964, the unions changed their tune

and agreed to exercise restraint over wage claims, while for its part the government established the Prices and Incomes Board, giving it the duty of reporting on all changes in these and declaring whether or how far they were consistent with the health of the economy. It was assumed that public opinion would be enough to make employers and employees comply. But by the middle of 1965 this arrangement proved useless, so the government introduced a bill to force employees and employers to give the Prices and Incomes Board advance notification of their intentions. A number of the unions opposed this, and their foremost representative in the cabinet, Mr. Frank Cousins (of the mammoth Transport and General Workers Union) resigned on the issue.

The bill was dropped at the election of March, 1966. When reintroduced, it was overtaken by the sterling crisis of July—in response to which the government went much further and tacked a fourth part to the bill. This move gave the government the power to veto any price or wage rises of which it disapproved, and decreed a freeze on wages for the next six months, followed by a six-month period of "severe restraint." It was with the utmost difficulty that the government was able to get the T.U.C. to accept this and the issue came to a head in 1967 when the government sought to make these veto powers permanent. (It seems at first to have envisaged some sort of tripartite arrangement, whereby trade unions and employers sat together with the government, which, as the third party, would proclaim the "national dividend" for the year, to which the unions and employers would get their members to conform.) Neither side would have anything to do with this idea—and in fact the trade unions went so far as to insist on terminating the government's "Part Four" power to veto settlements arrived at by collective bargaining.

In the end, the government had to climb down. It abandoned these powers, merely reaffirming its right to refer price rises and wage

settlements to the Prices and Incomes Board, and to hold these up until the Board had reported. But as it also permitted such wage settlements to be back-paid once the Prices and Incomes Board had reported, all that it ensured was a seven-months' delay in paying out a wage agreement.

These interest groups constitute a great "sub-system" in British political life, and it is remarkably stable. When in 1966 the author was revising a book on the interest groups 10 years after its previous publication, the most striking feature of the exercise was that, with minor exceptions, the same groups played out the same roles and pursued the same policies, by similar techniques and on similar occasions. The "government" (i.e., the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the Civil Service) is so involved with this political sub-system, partly by the machinery of inquiries and of the 600 or so advisory committees that serve the various Ministries, and partly by the established tradition of mutual consultation and negotiation, that, irrespective of its party complexion, it finds its discretion trammelled and confined, and its operations slowed down.

Stability—or Immobilism?

Why then the surface *appearance* of massive strength and wide discretion on the part of the government? First, because of the mistake of equating the passage of legislation with effective power over the nation. In the Labour Party Conference of 1965, Mr. Wilson boasted that, despite its majority of only four seats in the Commons, his government had passed more bills than its Conservative predecessors, and would have carried out almost all its pledges within two years. But the object of these pledges was to increase the gross national product and to improve the welfare services. Undeniably the government had not either at that time, nor up to the time of this writing.

Legislation is pointless if the powers conferred are irrelevant to the aims sought—or if,

supposing that they are relevant, they prove ineffectual. Whatever the future economic results of the nationalization of the steel industry or the establishment of a Land Commission to acquire land for public authorities' building programs, neither of them are of the slightest immediate relevance. And fiscal measures such as the Selective Employment Tax and the Capital Gains Tax, which are immediately relevant to the country's economic plight and the Labour Government's desire to equalize incomes, have been counterproductive. The Selective Employment Tax imposes a levy on each employee engaged in a service industry, and distributes a bonus to each employee engaged in a manufacturing industry. The intention was to cause a drift of employment out of service trades and into manufacture. At the moment of writing, however, the tax has had an exactly contrary effect, while the Capital Gains Tax, a "measure of social justice," which was intended to raise some £80 million per annum, realized only £4½ million in its first year.

In the second place, a great deal of legislation and administration is of no concern to the general public; it affects only special, interested publics, and in these cases the government has far more freedom to maneuver. In matters like the annual Farm Price Review (matters of this kind form the great numerical majority of government bills and regulations), the arrangements are settled by a rather small number of Ministers, civil servants, and interest groups; Parliament plays a marginal role, and the general public almost none at all.

But where opinion is genuinely *public* and where it expresses itself, it is arguable that British governments, far from commanding it, surrender to it. The vexed issue of Commonwealth immigration—(a euphemism in Britain for *colored* Commonwealth immigration) provides a sad example of this. When the Conservative Party introduced a bill in 1961 to refuse entry to Commonwealth immigrants who could not support themselves and did not possess a labor permit (exception made for students and

visitors), the Labour Opposition opposed it *bitterly and pledged themselves to repeal it*. This commitment grew cloudier as the 1964 election approached, and in their election Manifesto they merely promised that they would *restrict entry until or unless they could negotiate a satisfactory agreement with the Commonwealth countries*. The election showed that the policy of restriction was popular. It was dramatically illustrated by the defeat of Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker by a "restrictionist" in the Midlands town of Smethwick, and even more dramatically in January, 1965, when Mr. Walker, standing for a usually safe Labour seat in the London area, was once again defeated. It may have been coincidental that a few days later the government announced that it was tightening up the Act to prevent evasions. But six months later, in August, 1965, the government went much further even than the Conservatives, under whose administration some 20,000 immigrants had entered each year: it announced its intention to restrict the number henceforth to only 8,500.

An even more striking example is provided by economic policy. Ever since 1947, every time a government *has intervened to restrain credit and incomes in order to relieve the strain on the balance of payments*, it has become profoundly unpopular, and faced the alternative of pursuing inflationary policies or courting electoral defeat: and it has always preferred the former.

At least one of the Labour Ministers (Mr. Benn, Minister of Technology) once nourished the expectation that the government could stand over and above group pressures, in precisely the way the British government is so often claimed to do. Commenting on the influence of pressure groups, he wrote: "The remedy lies in strengthening those elements that derive their power from the nation as a whole. If the State machine—including Parliament and the Civil Service—can really acquire an impetus of its own . . . then there is hope." Governments are too involved with interest

groups and public opinion to acquire any such "impetus of their own." On the contrary, a British government is part of the entire social system, embodying its values, prejudices, aspirations, and interests. It is this remarkably close identification of the two, and the way in which government and people are involved with one another, that makes the system (as opposed to individual governments) so stable and durable. But this characteristic has the defects of its qualities. Where public sentiment or prejudice is widely involved, governments find it hard to make headway, and in such cases stability has its counterpart in immobilism. One example of this is to be found in economic policy. Another is in foreign affairs, where widespread notions of great power status, sentiments relating to the Commonwealth, and the noted insularity of the British people all have led governments to undertake far more commitments than the country can adequately support.

THE ECONOMY

The economy plays a central role in *linking domestic politics with foreign affairs*. Domestically, British politics revolve about inequalities, and elections are fought on the issues of increasing the national income, and redistributing it. But the strength of the economy also decides the number of troops overseas, the extent to which Britain can assist the Commonwealth economically (an important factor in its cohesion), and her relationship to the six Common Market powers.

The central features of the economy have been its mediocre growth rate and its instability—the latter arising largely from Britain's position as a vast importer and world banker, a position which exaggerates any balance-of-payments problem and has led to the (previously discussed) "stop-go" cycles. It is important to note, however, that the economic problem is *not* that the economy fails to satisfy rising expectations. Indeed, had it been less

successful in this respect, action to improve it might have come much sooner. It is hard to convince the nation that it is badly off because during a recent period of just 15 years (1951-64), the living standard rose more than in the whole previous half-century. The problem is that this performance, though it satisfies at home, is poor compared with that of Britain's competitors abroad.

One excuse, often alleged, is that such countries have been able to increase their manufacturing labor force in a way Britain has not, by drawing surplus agricultural labor from the land. But even if adjustment is made for this (as laid out in the O.E.C.D. booklet, *Economic Growth, 1960-70: A Mid-Decade Review of Prospects*), Britain has lagged far behind. Between 1960-65 (years of exceptionally high growth-rate in Britain) the annual percentage increase in output per employed person ran: Japan 7.2%, France 4%, Italy 3.8%, Germany 3.7%, Belgium 3.5%, Netherlands 3.2%, U.S.A. 2.9%, and Britain only 2.5%. At the same time Britain is losing her share of world trade: in 1958 her share of world exports was 18%; in 1966 it was only 13%.

And not only is her growth rate slow. It is also unstable. In the following table on the "stop-go" cycle, it is measured by the "coefficient of variation." This represents a country's variation of performance around its average rate of growth, divided by that rate of growth itself.

The Labour Party made the mediocrity of Britain's growth-rate performance, and of Conservative "stop-go" policies, the central features of its 1964 election campaign; and loudly boasted of the curative powers of its own program involving a new Department of Economic Affairs, a National Economic Plan, and a prices-and-incomes policy. The Plan was published in 1965, setting an annual growth rate of 3.8%; and the Labour Manifesto of March, 1966, categorically stated: "In the next five years, living standards for the individual and the whole community will rise by 25%." The ster-

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Sweden	3.9	0.5
United Kingdom	2.8	0.6

Source: A. Maddison, "How Fast Can Britain Grow?", *Lloyd's Bank Review*.

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It has already been pointed out that this failure to meet electoral commitments may have a serious result on the Labour Party's fortunes in coming elections, but on the future of the economy it is more difficult to see ahead. Currently it is being managed by short-term tactics, but there is no discernable strategy. Since July, 1966, the Labour government has followed step-for-step what its Conservative predecessors had to do when faced by a severe balance-of-payments crisis: restrict credit, create unemployment, and freeze wages; and it has been similarly rewarded by halting the balance-of-payments deficit and strengthening the pound sterling. But, as Labour Ministers themselves point out, this is only a pre-condition of economic advance; it does not guarantee it.

Five strategies, separately or together, are

being canvassed. The first, the Labour "mixture as before"—that is to say, a new National Plan—seems most unlikely. The consensus among economists and businessmen is that the 1965 exercise achieved nothing, and was in any case based on a fallacy, that by indicating the expanding possibilities of the market to businessmen, they would act as though these possibilities were facts, and react accordingly. This, the so-called "predictive planning," has been described as a sort of "virtuous confidence trick." It is in the nature of any confidence trick, however, virtuous or not, that it is unlikely to succeed twice running; much less so if it has failed the first time. And, unlike the situation in 1960, when the Federation of British Industries called for some measures of governmental planning over the next five years, a similar conference has now set its face against any such exercise.


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its own value on the world market. As we have already pointed out, this course of action has not only severe diplomatic and financial disadvantages, but commercial ones, also. It could only assist the economy, if at all, provided prices and wages were held down in Britain. If they rose, then the cost of British goods on the world market would rise also, and the object of the devaluation would be negated. Yet, as will be seen, the holding down of prices and wages is so electorally unpopular that it would be difficult for a government to carry it out for any length of time.

A third possible strategy is the gearing of price and wage rises to increases in the national product—the "prices and incomes" policy. It has already been shown how an attempt to put this on a voluntary basis failed between 1964 and 1966, and had to be followed by a wage freeze. And that in turn proved so unpopular that Labour lost one parliamentary seat, and suffered a landslide defeat in the local elections of 1967. Also, both the T.U.C. and C.B.I. rejected a continuation of compulsory wage- and price fixing. The government therefore had to abandon this policy in its hard form, and, in his budget speech, the Chancellor himself confessed that although the G.N.P. would not rise by more than 3% in the coming year, he expected wages to rise by 6%.

A fourth strategy is that of severe competition accompanied by less direct taxation, so that (it is argued) firms will be forced to improve their economic performance, while the greater opportunities for keeping their profits will induce them to make such efforts. This, roughly speaking, is the Conservative line or argument, and it links with another Conservative policy adhesion to the European Common Market—which will, it is contended, supply a larger market for the British products, but also a greater competitive challenge. The Labour Party, itself now committed to adhesion to the E.E.C., sets the economic advantages at only 50-50: there is no doubt that Britain's balance-

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
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of-payments problem would be worsened by the agricultural provisions of the Common Market and by costlier food from outside Europe, and these disadvantages would offset, to a degree that is not exactly computable, any advantages to the sale of British manufactures.

The fifth strategy is that associated with the name of the now Emeritus Prof. of Economics of the University of London, F. W. Paish, who has consistently argued that the economy can run efficiently only if it is worked slightly below capacity—i.e., with some plants idle, and with an unemployment rate of from 2%–2.5%, instead of with the overfull employment which the country has enjoyed, apart from the years of “stop,” since the end of World War II. This was the policy adopted by the 1967 budget, which assumed that unemployment would continue at its then-present rate of 2.1% for the rest of the year. The question was how long the government could maintain this posture, which was so extremely unpopular. It is here, as with the prices-and-incomes policy, and to some extent with the Common Market policy, that the government’s economic strategy is seen to be bound up with the representative and democratic constraints upon its freedom of action. After more than 30 years of power, the Labour Party has lost control of London to the Conservatives; and the *Times* commented on this in a now-famous leading article, entitled “*Paish, Yes; London, No.*” It showed that on each and every occasion when a government, irrespective of party complexion, tried to check inflation by imposing a “stop” on the economy, it suffered a major electoral reverse nine months later; whereupon it began to abandon its policy of restraint—and so initiated another “stop-go” cycle. Nor, it pointed out, had this process ceased with the advent of the Labour Government in October, 1964. On the contrary.

The ‘Paish’ policy has not been under way more than six months when circumstances dictated a different line. Incidentally, no better proof than this could be found of what was said

earlier, as to how little a Cabinet is the real master of events. For, in the midst of severe unemployment and deflation, with the government losing a number of bye elections by crushing margins, still another ‘raid’ on sterling developed. All over the world dealers sold pounds and bought other currencies, and the Bank of England’s reserves began to drain away. Despite all the disadvantages in November 1967 the Cabinet decided to devalue the pound, and this was marked down from 2.80 to the dollar to 2.40—making the English and the American “pennies” equivalent in value. This move will certainly boost Britain’s export opportunities, for it makes her goods that much cheaper in foreign markets. But this advantage would be wiped out if British wages and other costs rose. Hence the government immediately imposed further restrictions on home domestic purchasing power: public expenditure cuts, increased taxation efforts to restrain wages and salaries. Together with devaluation, these measures could re-vitalize the economy, and this in turn would restore the government’s popularity. But in the short term, the government was likely to prove even more unpopular than ever.

BRITAIN AND THE WORLD

Habitation to playing a world role; feelings of kinship with the peoples of such countries as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada; the hangover of the pre-war imperial tradition as represented in the new concept of the “multiracial Commonwealth”: all these have played a prominent part in the shaping of Britain’s external relations since the end of the war. They have sustained governments which flattered these sentiments, while governments, as part and parcel of the British nation, have fostered these attitudes in their turn. Though the reasons are more complex than just the mutual interplay of opinion between rulers and ruled, this does go a long way toward ex-

against the U.S.S.R.; to possess an independent nuclear deterrent; and to maintain garrisons across the globe.

The first of these follows logically from the desire to keep war from her own shores. Western Europe, to repeat, is Britain's front line.

The second made some sense immediately after the war, ran into problems in the fifties, and is difficult if not impossible to sustain today. The initial decisions, taken in 1946-48, really continued war time trends. The U.S.A. had unilaterally broken off the wartime collaboration in nuclear weaponry that had enabled her to build the atomic bomb. But British research was still continuing vigorously, and to continue it did not at that time impose any serious strain on her scientific knowledge or industrial capacity. And the V-bombers, her strike force, could act as carriers.

Britain exploded her atomic bomb in 1952, and her hydrogen bomb in 1957, and the White Paper on Defense of that year envisaged the new weapon as the chief mode of restraining Russian attack on Western Europe. But at that very point the policy was rapidly undermined. Britain relied on aircraft; but when the Russians launched Sputnik in 1957 they made an aircraft delivery system obsolete. Britain therefore decided to build a Blue Streak rocket: but just as this reached its advanced stage in 1959, the Russians made their moonshot. Now, Blue Streak could only be fired from fixed sites, and the pinpoint accuracy of Soviet rocketry suggested that these would be useless with Russian missiles zeroed in on to them. So Blue Streak was abandoned and Britain ordered the projected Skybolt missile from the U.S.A. This weapon, fitted to a plane, could be carried for some distance before being released—thus giving it a greatly extended range. But with this, the British deterrent ceased to be entirely independent—since it depended on a component from the U.S.A.

Then in 1962 the U.S.A. decided not to develop Skybolt after all, and in return offered

Polaris to Britain, which promptly began to build a fleet of four nuclear submarines to take these missiles; and with this the nuclear deterrent became even more reliant on American technology. Despite his acrid criticism of the Polaris fleet while in Opposition, Mr. Wilson showed no hesitation in continuing to build it when he came to office. But advanced technology is eroding its credibility. Soviet anti-missile systems make Polaris increasingly unreliable. The substitute is the American advanced missile Poseidon. But these and the cost of converting the nuclear fleet to take them can only be had at a prohibitive price. Advanced technology has priced Britain out of the market as long as she goes it alone.

The third role—that of world policeman—also made sense in the aftermath of the war. Some of the new Commonwealth states (India, for instance) adopted a stance of neutrality; but others, like Pakistan and Malaya, did not, and arrangements were made to help defend them. Still others, like the sheikhdoms of South Arabia and the Persian Gulf, already had defense treaties with Britain which had to be honored. The result was a string of bases encircling the globe, and garrisons in the Mediterranean, South Arabia, Malaya, and Singapore.

The more the Empire shrank, the greater the difficulty of defending these bases became since, geographically, one "covered" another. Furthermore, the expense of doing so mounted. For these (and other) reasons, in 1947 Britain welcomed the Truman Doctrine proclaiming the intention of the U.S.A. to defend unilaterally Greece and Turkey, and in 1949 raised no serious objections when Australia and New Zealand entered a pact with the U.S.A. which also did not include Britain. Indeed, by the late 1960's, when the "Empire" was little more than a string of islands, the chain of bases was being maintained—and even supplemented in the Indian Ocean—less as a moral commitment to the Commonwealth than as part of a deliberate design to continue to play a world role. (This

policy was actively encouraged by the U.S.A., which otherwise saw itself relegated to bearing the full cost and responsibility alone.)

What with the cost of playing the role of world watchdog today, the present government's decision to withdraw from Aden in 1967 and from Singapore by the 1970's has found no favor with the U.S. administration. In Britain, however, the move is considered part of the increasing tendency, among all parties, to favor Britain's getting out of its traditional "East of Suez" role. But the issue had not yet been decided by late 1967, the only obvious fact in the matter was that the European commitment, the independent nuclear role, and the worldwide string of bases were too costly. A choice had to be made. It was forced by devaluation, and Britain is now committed to abandon the Gulf, and Singapore by 1971.

Foreign Policy

As late as 1967, when Britain made her first attempt to come to terms with the nascent Common Market by proposing an Industrial Free Trade Area (which the French scuttled), British official doctrine was couched in terms of the so-called "three circles." Britain, it was alleged, had a special relationship with the U.S.A., another with Europe (realized through N.A.T.O. and W.E.U.), and still another with the Commonwealth. But by 1967 the "special relationship" with the U.S.A. had turned into dependency—militarily, economically, and diplomatically. The temporary and unlooked-for alliance of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. at the U.N. against Britain's Suez enterprise in 1956 revealed this dependence in a singularly crude form. And, in 1962, Britain stood helpless while the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. confronted each other over Cuba.

By 1967 the relationship with the Commonwealth had also turned sour. The original, pre-war Commonwealth had consisted of four "European"-type nations (which in the U.S.A.

might be called "W.A.S.P."—White Anglo-Saxon Protestant—the exceptions being the French Canadians of Canada, who were not Protestants, and the Maori of New Zealand, who were not white.) When the Asian and then the African states blossomed into independence, sentiments underwent a change. To the Left this new Commonwealth was more inspiring than the old, it represented ideals come true. The new states were independent, not dependencies, their union in the Commonwealth was voluntary, not forced, and the entire body represented multiracial cooperation. In the Commonwealth the Left saw a microcosm of what Tennyson had once sung as "the brotherhood of man, the federation of the world," and they looked to Britain to give diplomatic and economic assistance to these young states. The Right, for their part, saw in the Commonwealth an association of free but unequal partners in which Britain, as the oldest, strongest, and wealthiest nation, would always take the lead.

Both Left and Right were disappointed. The Right was the first to be disillusioned. The Conservative decision in 1961 to turn away from the Commonwealth and to Europe represented the first stage of this process, but even then the pro-Commonwealth sentiment in the party and the country was so great that the British negotiators were charged with the task of securing special arrangements for the Commonwealth as well as for Britain, and these ranged from such matters as associate status for African member-states to the exports of kangaroo meat from Australia. It must be remembered that the Commonwealth exports freely into Britain. Should Britain enter the Common Market, Commonwealth countries would have to jump the hurdle of the Common Market's tariff walls, while inside these walls Italy or France would be able to export their goods freely into Britain. So, accession to the Common Market not only denies the Commonwealth its existing preferences, it reverses them in favor of the European countries. Common-

policy was actively encouraged by the U.S.A., which otherwise saw itself relegated to bearing the full cost and responsibility alone)

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wealth sentiment in 1961 was far too strong to permit the British negotiators to make the best deal for themselves, and to let the Commonwealth fend for itself.

The necessity of negotiating special arrangements for the Commonwealth was one of the major factors leading to the breakdown of negotiations. It confirmed to the Conservative leadership that the Commonwealth was now a handicap to British foreign policy, and contributed to the much more marked aversion to it that is now widespread throughout the party. But the Labour Party chose to resist the negotiations in 1962 on the grounds, among other things, that the Commonwealth was being abandoned; and from then on it propounded the policy of building the Commonwealth, economically and politically, as an alternative policy to a European association. The Manifesto of 1964 contains a long list of pledges designed to bring such a policy into effect. Yet in the 1966 election Manifesto, all but the most tenuous had been deleted, and by 1967 Prime Minister Wilson brought his party to support the policy of adhesion to the Common Market.

A number of factors have contributed to this disillusion with the Commonwealth now widespread and among all parties. Unlike, say, Canada or Australia or New Zealand, most of the new Commonwealth countries have rapidly abandoned British political and legal traditions, and some have turned themselves into squalid tyrannies. And the political unity of the Commonwealth has proved illusory. For instance, an *Indian* delegate, V. K. Krishna-Menon, led the Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N. against Britain's Suez policy. Both Pakistan and India abused Britain for not taking their side when they went to war with one another in 1965. (And that war was settled, not by Britain, but—of all countries—by the Soviet Union, at the Tashkent meeting of early 1966!) Nor did Commonwealth immigration (touched on earlier) endear the "multiracial Commonwealth" to the population of the islands. Instead, it demonstrated

that although multiracialism undoubtedly could and did operate at the professional and ministerial levels, it did not do so at the popular one.

Another disillusioning factor has been the intransigence of the African states. This came to a head after the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. To keep the Commonwealth together (which meant, in fact, to prevent the African states from walking out), Prime Minister Wilson had to agree on imposing mandatory sanctions on the Rhodesian economy. It became clear to him then, if it had not done so before, that the Commonwealth did not give Britain a greater power to speak in world affairs; instead, as in this particular case, it established a sort of court or tribunal at which Britain was forced to justify her policy, and even modify it, but which brought no bloc support for Britain at the U.N. in return. Left-wing sentiment has usually claimed this as a point in the Commonwealth's favor: it makes Britain more receptive, so they say, to the demands of African and Asian states than she otherwise would be. They are quite right in making this inference, but it can hardly be expected that such a state of affairs would commend itself to a British Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary.

And finally, turning to the material plane, the Commonwealth has disappointed expectations. The proportion of British trade to the Commonwealth is in decline; the commitments to providing aid and loan capital have risen. As dependency on the U.S.A. has increased and the potentialities of the Commonwealth waned, those two "circles" of British overseas commitment have begun to lose their attractiveness.

By contrast, the third "circle"—the European connection—has attained greater importance. Opinion is divided as to the economic pros and cons of accession to the Common Market; even Mr. Wilson thinks it is six of one and half a dozen of the other. But strategically and politically it appears that since Britain has now lost her freedom of diplomatic maneuver,

more is to be gained as a partner in an extremely powerful confederacy of European nations, with an inevitably strong influence upon its policy, than by staying out.

When Prime Minister Wilson announced his May decision to seek accession, the outcome would not be decided by Britain's will to join, but the readiness of France to allow her admission. Opposition still came from a handful of Conservatives and a larger number of Labour Members, the first still true to their vision of a strong, independent Britain, leading a world Commonwealth, and the latter distrustful of the "capitalist" powers of the Continent, and committed to their multiracial ideal. But the great majority of M.P.'s, and the majority of public opinion, supported the policy. After two decades of endeavoring to be at once an Atlantic power, a Commonwealth power, and a European power, the moment of choice had arrived and it was on the last alternative that the decision fell.

The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister embarked on a tour of the European capitals to ascertain whether an application to accede would be welcome. No doubt was expressed in five of the six capitals visited, some doubt was however expressed by President de Gaulle who had vetoed the application made by the Conservatives, in 1963. It remains a mystery as to

what prompted the British Ministers to believe that the President would not repeat that performance since in the eyes of many outside observers, French national interests were not likely to be better served by British accession in 1967 than by no accession in 1963. From this point of view nothing had changed. Nevertheless the British government decide to submit their application to join. First somewhat obscurely, but then—in November 1967 very clearly and positively—the French President repeated his earlier performance. Despite the protests of his Common Market partners, he declined to allow negotiations on the British submission to proceed.

Had the negotiations succeeded an entirely new role would have opened for Britain, and the future of Europe, of world international relations, and of Britain itself would all have been significantly different. As it is, matters will simply drag on in the indeterminate situation of before: the economy will not suffer unduly, and Britain will remain an economic and military power of some importance. Not for some time will she be more significantly at a disadvantage than before, and the most likely outcome will be the renewal of the effort to accede at a more propitious moment. But here again, is another proof of how little a Cabinet is the master of events.

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Chapter VI


The classic work on the Cabinet is Sir Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government* (Cambridge, 1959). An indispensable text is H. Morrison, *Government and Parliament* (Oxford, 1960), which gives an inside view by a former Leader of the House of Commons. Reference should certainly be made to the new history of the Cabinet, J. P. Mackintosh's *The British Cabinet* (Stevens, 1962), which is the source of the controversial "Prime Ministerial" thesis which is carried to typically brilliant but extravagant lengths by R. H. S. Crossman in his *Introduction to Bagebot's English Constitution* (Fontana edn., 1963).

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FRANCE

Roy C. Macridis



I

Introduction

France is a relatively small country—smaller than Texas. *It has approximately 50 million inhabitants.* Despite certain backward sectors in her economy, France is a highly industrialized and prosperous nation. The average Frenchman enjoys an individual income that ranks him seventh in wealth in the world. Progress made since World War II in the production of energy, chemicals, aeronautics, aluminum, and automobiles place France in the same industrial rank with England and West Germany, second only to the United States and the Soviet Union.

Located in the western part of Europe on the Atlantic Ocean and, to the south, on the Mediterranean Sea, France has been both a continental and a maritime power. Until World War II, she had the second largest colonial Empire, stretching into the heart of Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. More than 100 million people lived under the French flag, and the great majority still remain linked to France by economic and cultural ties.

France has long been considered the crucible of what we loosely call "Western civilization." Her name carries a special, even if not always the same, message to every educated person in the world. She is the "oldest daughter" of the Catholic Church, and her missionaries and religious orders worked to restore the unity of the Church against the Reformation and later helped to diffuse the teaching of the Church. It is the land where Monarchy became associated with national greatness, but also the land of the Revolution of 1789, in which all privileges were swept aside in the name of popular sovereignty, freedom, and equality. Napoleon spread the doctrine of the Revolution and established his dominion over the greater part of Europe. It is a land of people who have constantly experimented with ideas, who take nothing for granted, especially in politics. No other nation has radiated its influence for so

long a period and so profoundly affected the world's thoughts and ways of life.

It is precisely the richness and the diversity of the French past that accounts for one of the most characteristic features of the French political system—instability. Without any ethnic minorities to speak of (only after the turn of the century and more particularly since World War I has there been an appreciable immigration of Italian, Spanish, and Polish workers and more recently of Algerians); without any significant religious minorities (there are less than 1 million Protestants); and with a strong feeling of national unity forged by a thousand years of national existence, the French have been unable to come to terms with any political regime.

Since the Revolution of 1789 that overthrew the Monarchy (the *Ancien Régime*) and proclaimed a Republic, France has had 16 different constitutions that have created many forms of government. The Revolution led to a Constitutional Monarchy (1789–91), which became a Republic (1792–95), which in turn gave place to the Directorate and the Consulate (1799), with Napoleon as the First Consul. In 1804 France was transformed into an "Empire," and Napoleon became the "Emperor," governing by proclamations and executive orders. In 1814 the Empire was brought down by an alliance of most of the major countries of Europe, and the Bourbon kings were restored. But they gave way after the Revolution of 1830 to the "July Monarchy," the Orleanist branch of the Bourbon dynasty that ruled until 1848. The Revolution of 1848 again discarded the Monarchy in favor of a new Republic (the Second) based on universal male suffrage and a presidential system containing checks and balances between the legislature and the presidency. The President, Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III), abolished the Republic in 1851, to introduce the "Second Empire," in which he governed, as his uncle had done, by executive proclamations, although he did seek popular support through plebiscites.

The defeat of Napoleon III in the Franco-

Prussian War (1870) spawned another crisis, and a new republican constitution (the Third Republic) was introduced in 1875. It was destined to have the longest life in French political history. It weathered many crises, including World War I, which ravaged the economy and decimated France's population, but collapsed when France was overrun by the Nazi armies at the beginning of World War II (1940). The unoccupied part of France, and later the whole of the country, was then ruled by the co-called "Vichy Régime" (1940–1944), in which all powers were concentrated in one man, Marshal Pétain, who was granted broad authority by the constitutional convention that met on July 10, 1940, in the wake of the French defeat. After the Liberation, France returned to a republican form of government—the Fourth Republic—whose Constitution was approved by the people in a special referendum on October 21, 1946. It lasted for only 12 years and was radically overhauled in the summer of 1958. On September 28, 1958, the French voted overwhelmingly in favor of a new republican constitution—the Fifth Republic—in which substantial powers are invested in the President.

This turnover of political regimes is not an historical accident. To understand these fluctuations, we must keep in mind that whenever compromise between conflicting groups is not possible, the dominant one will impose its views, often by force. Thus political changes frequently reflect, as Aristotle pointed out, profound shifts in the balance of power between various social forces. The Revolution of 1789 struck a heavy blow at the landed aristocracy and the Monarchy. It also affected adversely the rights of the higher clergy and thus the overall position of the Catholic Church. From then on, throughout the whole of the nineteenth century, the nobility and the Church looked for revenge at every opportunity. They worked and sometimes conspired against all Republics. The restoration of a Monarchy in 1814 meant their return to power and influence. They were op-

TABLE 1-1

The Instability of the French Political System

<i>Republics</i>	<i>Monarchy</i>	<i>Bonapartism</i>
	<i>The Ancien Régime</i> (to 1789) (ended by revolution)	
The First Republic (1792–1799) (ended by military coup)	Constitutional Monarchy (1789–1791)	Napoleonic dictatorship (1799–1814) (ended by military defeat)
The Second Republic (1848–1851) (ended by military coup)	The Bourbon Restoration (1814–1830) (ended by revolution)	The Second Empire: Napoleon III (1851–1870) (ended by military defeat and revolution)
The Third Republic (1870–1940) (ended by military defeat)	The Orleanist "July Monarchy" (1830–1848) (ended by revolution)	
The Fourth Republic (1946–1958) (ended by military uprising)		The Vichy Régime: Marshall Pétain (1940–1944) (ended by military defeat of the Axis powers)
The Fifth Republic (1958–)		The Fifth Republic (1958–)

A different and better-known form of instability has been Cabinet instability—the high turnover rate of the Cabinets under both the Third and Fourth Republics. When France seemed to have become reconciled, even if reluctantly, to the republican regime and had adopted a parliamentary system, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet were unable to stay in office for long. Under the Third Republic (1870–1940), there were more than 100 Cabinets. Under the Fourth Republic (1946–58), there were 20 Cabinets and 17 Prime Ministers. Thus, while in England the life of the Cabinet, which is in charge of the most important activities of government, averaged about four years, that of the French Cabinet has been seven to eight months. This instability illustrates that within the framework of republican institutions the French have been unable to provide themselves with stable and positive leadership. French society under the Third and Fourth Republics seemed to be caught inextricably in the

contradictions of conflicting groups, and parties and could not resolve them. In the end, they reached a standstill—*immobilisme*, as some French commentators put it.

Constitutional and Cabinet instability are only two aspects of the same pervasive phenomenon of the French political culture: the search for authority, and the deep distrust for it. The constitutional history shows recurrent patterns or cycles in which a constitutional arrangement consecrating authority and executive leadership alternates with assembly or direct popular government. For instance, during the Revolution of 1789, France moved from absolute monarchy through to a phase of a limited monarchy, to a parliamentary republic which gave place in turn to an authoritarian system led by Napoleon. This arrangement lasted through to the Monarchy (1814) which again became a limited monarchy (1830–48) to give place to a Republic. But within a short time the pendulum swung to the second Bonapartist Empire, and that was

itself followed by another Republic. From then on the cyclical pattern became limited to alternation between the Republic and a Bonapartist solution (Third Republic—Vichy—Fourth Republic—De Gaulle's Presidential Fifth Republic).

Cabinet instability, and in general the history of parliamentary institution, exhibit something of the same cyclical pattern of an alternation between strong leadership and Assembly government. Strong Prime Ministers attempted to impose, sometimes successfully, their leadership over a divided and defensive Parliament. Their efforts often coincided with the confrontation and the solution of serious external or domestic problems: the clerical question, the reorganization of the Army, national defense, social and economic reforms, decolonization. But the Assembly invariably found a way to reassert its supremacy by overthrowing them at the very time when their success and popularity gave cause for satisfaction and opened the way for them to assume party leadership. Even within the parliamentary system the quest for authority and leadership alternated between executive leadership and parliamentary supremacy.

The argument was put forth in the last years of the Fourth Republic that cabinet instability, providing for rapid alternations of Cabinet and Prime Ministers, was in itself a way to provide for quick decision on specific problems. *Ad hoc* majorities among otherwise competing parties and factions would support a Cabinet and a Prime Minister to cope with a particular problem, only to disintegrate after it had provided

a solution for it. Thus for some policy questions a flexible and extremely rapid mechanism for reconciling cabinet and parliamentary government with the need of decision-making was provided.

France is now going through a phase of strong executive leadership. De Gaulle, his Constitution, his government, and his leadership have dominated in the last decade the French political scene. It would be relatively easy to concentrate exclusively on the present Gaullist polity, to analyze its mainspring, and discuss the Gaullist Constitution—the Fifth Republic—as if it embodied a lasting arrangement. It would be equally easy to consider the Gaullist polity a transient and personal phenomenon and assume that with de Gaulle's inevitable disappearance from the scene, the pendulum will again swing to Assembly government and that the old parties, institutions, and practices will return. Neither proposition is correct. The Gaullist polity embodies a number of traits that are likely to last, but it includes also many that are likely to disappear. How shall we tell what is lasting and what is transient? How can we assess at this stage what will be the political system five years hence? We cannot. The best we can do is outline some of the old forces and evaluate the character and significance of their transformation—if any—under the impact of the Gaullist system. At this stage, institutional arrangements appear to be fluid, and our task will be to discern and discuss what *may* be lasting, and discard what is purely personal and transient.

II

The Foundations of French Politics

The set of memories that people have; the way they pattern their various personal relations; the ideas and values they hold about a number of things (such as work, poverty, cooperation, conflict); the roles they play and the manner in which they view them; all constitute what we call "culture." The term in its specifically political sense, however, must be confined to a much narrower definition. It refers only to those individual and collective practices, attitudes, and beliefs that relate to such human phenomena as the state, authority, participation, obedience, rebelliousness, and the like. We shall attempt here to give a brief account of the political culture that exists in present-day France.

THE FRENCH POLITICAL CULTURE

The most generalized trait of the French political culture is its ambivalence—but even more, the antinomy between authority and freedom that exists within it. In every Frenchman there is a quest for authority and unity, and yet an attachment to individual liberty that induces him to resist authority. Thus authority is both valued as a symbol and instrument of national unity, and feared as a vehicle of power that may oppress or enslave the individual.

Since authority is embodied in the state, the French have consistently quarrelled about the nature, form and organization of the state. The state as a symbol of French greatness and national unity has been an object of veneration and sacrifice—but it has also evoked strong opposition and hostility. The French who died for the Emperor built barricades against him, and the French of today who trooped behind de Gaulle when he liberated France, and who have gone to the voting booths to heed his appeals,

are the very same who might well march from the *Bastille* to the *Place de la Concorde* to oppose his type of personal rule.

What has been lacking in French tradition is an organic linkage, between the individual on the one hand and the state on the other, to reconcile and temper the opposition between the two. This, and not the proverbial and highly distorted accounts of French individualism, is the real reason for the lack of political activity in France as a process of cooperation, bargaining, and compromise. No institutions have developed to bridge the gulf between the individual and the state and make the first a full-fledged participant and the second an instrument for the realization of the demands and interests of the citizens. Voluntary associations, political parties, trade unions, and, in general, intermediary associations that allow for participation and provide for compromise, have been weak.

It is hard to account for this. Perhaps the reason lies in the legacy of the *Ancien Régime* with its strong centralized authority, nourished by the Bonapartist regimes of the nineteenth century and sustained by a strong, well-organized and centralized Civil Service. The Revolution and the Republican regimes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not change the structure of centralized government but provided for ways and means to control and limit it. The average citizen continues to expect initiative and action from the state (i.e., the Civil Service) while denying it the right to intervene in the reserved domain—generously interpreted—of individual liberties and individual property rights. Thus parliamentary and representative institutions were considered, and still are, primarily as fences or restraints against the state, as the embodiment of the national will against the administration.

Throughout the nineteenth century, political parties remained weak and diffuse organizations that represented class, parochial, or ideological interests against the state, rather than becoming

vehicles of compromise and action. Participation in political life, except for balloting, remained at a very low ebb.

This situation accounts for another trait. While political participation and sustained political activity remained at a very low level, it alternated with manifestation of extreme and often violent activity. The lack of voluntary associations and well-organized political parties or interest-groups to provide for a permanent dialogue between the individual through such organizations and the state left no other form of political expression open except the streets and the barricades. As a result, most French men and women shared, and continue to have, a low opinion of political activity, considering it by-and-large ineffective—whether it be carried out by representatives or through demonstrations and violence that by their very nature are bound to be ephemeral and unproductive.

The distinction between the authority and the individual and the perennial distrust of the first by the second is also related to the sharp distinction between Paris, the seat of the government, and the rest of France. In the first, the centralized administration made decisions that affected all. Through the Ministry of the Interior, the *Préfet* and the Mayor, Paris made itself known to all and imposed the burdens, and at times provided the benefits, that affected all. But there was no well-structured and institutionalized way for the citizen to act upon the administration. The individual in the provinces, after erecting parliamentary institutions to defend himself against Paris, did not create any permanent institutions to influence the government and participate continuously in the decisions made. To repeat, there was no continuing dialogue between the citizen and the central authority. The citizen had set up (as it were) dikes and dams and fences around authority, but he shunned the establishment of permanent maintenance and communication lines to help make them the means of realizing his demands.

One other trait must now be mentioned. It

relates to the educational system. This system presented (and still does) all social, political, and economic problems as if they were amenable to rational solution. It emphasized logical explanation and clear-headed understanding. Everything became a matter of black and white, leaving out the vast gray area of experimentation, compromise, and uncertainty which in fact is the guts of democratic politics. The school, by stressing the uniqueness of individual effort and understanding, inculcated a pattern according to which rational discourse and the mastery of subject matter in terms of logic exhausted its essence. The essence of education was to demonstrate Descartes' famous aphorism; it was to seek the meaning and the vindication of life in thought.

We shall come to understand better these and other traits of the French by discussing their ideological, historical, and socio-economic contextual details in greater depth.

THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FRENCH POLITICS

The history of a nation, Aldous Huxley once remarked, is very much like the history of a family. It keeps alive traditions and symbols that give its members a sense of unity and continuity and provides a vocabulary with which they can communicate clearly and rapidly. The Declaration of Independence, the Boston Tea Party, Lincoln's refusal to consider that the Union might be destroyed, the Western frontier, Pearl Harbor—these are all rich with meaning for Americans. They symbolize common efforts and evoke common memories.

But every country does not have a national memory that serves to unify its citizens. For some nations, the past is a source of discord that divides rather than unites. Traditions and symbols are differently shared by different groups. To evoke the past is to raise clouds that cast shadows across the present and the future.

New differences are added to old ones, piling up obstacles to reconciliation and common action. This has been the case with France; understanding this is the key to understanding its political system. But the job is just as difficult as comprehending the personal and sometimes very subtle quarrels that divide a family.

France became a national state under the Monarchy. It was one of the first countries in Europe to overcome the various regional and personal loyalties of feudalism and develop a sense of national unity, which was enhanced by the growth of a strong central political organization. France rose to its peak of power during the reigns of Louis XIII and Louis XIV in the seventeenth century, under the direction of the great Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, who presided over the King's Councils. By the time the long reign of Louis XIV came to an end in 1715, foreign enemies—particularly Spain and Austria—had been neutralized, a strong Army had been mobilized, a network of highways had been constructed, the nobility and religious minorities—especially the Huguenots—had been brought under control, and even more important to the future of the nation, a well-organized and efficient central administrative service had been established.

The subsequent overthrow of the Monarchy by the Revolution of 1789 did not affect one of the vital pillars of national unity—the administrative departments, which continued to collect taxes, provide services, raise armies, and quell dissidence throughout the nation. The Revolution, and later Napoleon, in fact improved the centralized administration that had been built up during the *Ancien Régime*, and the Republic inherited and made full use of it. The conception and institutions of an administrative state remained side-by-side with the republican regimes, ushered in by the Revolution of 1789.

The Republican tradition of the Revolution of 1789 stressed the claims of the citizens for representation in the government. The state, it was proclaimed, was a creature of the people,

vested with no powers other than those delegated to it. The sovereignty of the people resided in the elected representative assemblies. All orders and privileges were abolished, equality and individualism were emphasized. This democratic conception, stemming from Rousseau's idea of the general will, clashed with all the privileged orders of the *Ancien Régime*—particularly the nobility and the clergy—and with the tradition of the administrative state. The contradiction was never resolved. The proponents of the Republic used the power of the state and its central bureaucracy to crush the privileged orders, while Napoleon used it to buttress the rule of equality and to advance his military designs. The Republican theory of popular representation and sovereignty of the people conflicted with the idea of a one-man government and a centralized administration that had been developed under the Monarchy and perfected by Napoleon.

During the nineteenth century, many new forces came to divide the community. Representative institutions never took root, and the people often resorted to civil disobedience and revolution. In 1830, in 1848, and again in 1870 the people of Paris, joined sometimes by those of the provinces, overthrew the government and sought to establish a new Republican regime. The privileged orders, on the other hand—the Church, the nobility, and very often the Army and the administration—advocated the return of the Monarchy or the restoration of Bonapartism.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, these divisions were further intensified. The first President of the Third Republic, Marshal Mac Mahon, was suspected of trying to institute a constitutional monarchy, and, indeed, there is evidence that he worked for the restoration of a king. But the Republic survived. Within two decades, republican leaders launched a direct attack against the Catholic schools and religious orders. Many of the schools were closed, the orders were disbanded, their property confiscated. The conflict between the Church and the

Republic flared anew, and the old wounds of the Revolution of 1789 were reopened.

After the repression of the workers' government—the Paris Commune—in 1870 the workers formed militant trade unions that advocated the overthrow of capitalism, thus frightening the middle class, who began to waver in their attachment to the Republic. Having persecuted the clergy, disappointed the conservatives by failing to restore a king and establish a Constitutional Monarchy, lost the loyalty of many in the middle class, and alienated the workers, the Republic began to weaken.

The wave of nationalism accompanying World War I (1914–18) brought a temporary unity, but after the final victory, which was attained at tremendous cost, the differences broke into the open even more sharply than before. The Church claimed subsidies for its schools, the workers demanded social reforms and many joined the newly formed Communist Party, the farmers asked for increased protection and price supports; the proponents of the administrative tradition wished to curtail the powers of the representative assembly, while many conservatives and, later, "Fascists" urged the overthrow of the Republic in favor of a totalitarian regime. Caught in these contradictory interests, the representative assemblies were unable to make policy decisions, and the Civil Service performed only the routine functions of government. A weak state and a divided nation were unable to withstand the German attack in 1940.

Defeat in World War II brought about the expected reaction against the Third Republic in the form of the Vichy government, in which all powers were concentrated in the hands of Marshal Pétain, who governed with the support of the Army, the Civil Service, and conservative Catholics. But their rule was short-lived. After the Liberation, the Fourth Republic, very similar to the Third, returned the republican forces to power. But the divisions continued.

A serious rift developed between the advo-

cates of a strong state and the proponents of the representative tradition. The former did not reject the Republic but wished to greatly increase the power of the executive, the President or the Prime Minister—to give him, for instance, the right to dissolve the representative assembly and call for elections, to prepare the budget, and to control the agenda of the legislative assemblies. The defenders of representative government remained steadfastly in favor of legislative supremacy and wanted to keep the President and Prime Minister and his Cabinet subservient to the legislature. The quarrel about constitutional reform was in a subtle sense the old quarrel of the two political traditions—the monarchists and Bonapartists against the republicans.¹

The historical foundations of the French political system are thus built upon historical layers that underline divisions. National unity is undermined by the existence of many conflicting conceptions of government and authority. Catholics still remember the years of repression under the Third Republic; some of the workers retain a revolutionary posture, even though they have long had the right to vote and to organize; and there are still some right-wing extremists who bide their time to scuttle the Republic at the slightest provocation. History has dealt France a series of blows that have become part of the living memory that divides the French and impedes the creation of an integrated political community and a smoothly functioning government.

THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FRENCH POLITICS

To the extent that historical events live in the minds of a people, they are more than "history"—they become ideas that fashion be-

liefs and shape conduct. And ideas, as a French writer has said, "are politics." Ideas that impregnate groups and motivate them to action are political ideologies. They are both the lenses through which people look at their society and the world at large and a set of beliefs that makes them act in one way or another. There have been numerous political ideologies in France, and many of them trace their origin back to the French Revolution, to the regime of Napoleon Bonaparte, and to the restoration of the Bourbon kings, when, in the words of the poet, France hovered "between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born. . . ."

One French author, writing in 1932, identified six "ideological families" in France: traditionalism, liberalism, Christian democracy, industrialism, socialism, and radicalism. To these we can add two more: Communism, which has emerged as a distinct ideology, and "Gaullism," which has revived the old Bonapartist symbolisms.

Traditionalism, it must be said, is more a state of mind than a coherent political philosophy. It accepts and respects the status quo and is, in general, adverse to anything but very gradual change. It is characterized by a marked respect for the past, more specifically, for the traditions of the Monarchy and the Church, and also for the privileged groups and the instruments of order in the society—the Army, the Civil Service, the propertied groups. *Liberalism* favors limitations upon the state, advocates a *laissez-faire* economy, individual rights and political freedoms, and remains attached to parliamentary democracy. *Radicalism* claims to be the proper heir of the Revolution. It retains a deep faith in government by the people and their representatives and is suspicious of all vested interests. Like liberalism, it distrusts the state and all its instrumentalities, notably the Civil Service and the executive, is anticlerical, and invariably supports the supremacy of the legislature. *Christian democracy* accepts the separation between Church and state (although it

¹For a fuller discussion, see Macridis and Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic: Quest for Unity*, Part II (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1960).

favors public subsidies to Catholic schools), but encourages the active participation of lay Catholics and priests in solving concrete social and economic problems. It urges social welfare programs, economic controls, and the equitable distribution of income.

Industrialism takes its cue from the early nineteenth-century utopian writer, the Comte de St. Simon, and extols the application of rational techniques to questions of economic production and distribution. It defers to the expert and the administrator and often favors authoritarian solutions. Its contemporary variant is often referred to as "technocracy"—the government by the expert and the technicians. *Socialism* has traditionally advocated the control of the means of production by the state, but has espoused the Republic and its representative institutions, while *Communism* continues to pronounce its intent to overthrow the government and forcefully expropriate private property.

Finally, *Gaullism* is not basically different from Bonapartism. It is the belief that one man can break through the contradictions of the political system and bypass the political parties and the various representative groups, and establish direct contact through referendums and plebiscites with the people. Based on loyalty to one individual, it rejects the properly constituted Republican organs in favor of personal rule by a strong leader—namely, Charles de Gaulle. Since the end of World War II, de Gaulle has claimed, very much as Napoleon I and Napoleon III did before him, to incarnate the nation in his person. As we shall see, the institutions of the Fifth Republic are dominated by this element of personal fealty to one man.

The Left and the Right

A commonly accepted way to look at the ideological families in France is to divide them into two large groups, the Left and the Right. The Left, which has traditionally in-

cluded the radical ideology, has been joined by the Socialists, Communists, and, on a number of issues, by Christian democrats. The Right, on the other hand, consists of the traditionalists, the advocates of "industrialism"—the technocrats—many of the "liberals" who advocate economic freedoms, the Gaullists, the outright authoritarians, and a few monarchists.

"Left" and "Right" have had changing political connotations throughout French history. The location of the line between them depends on the criteria used to distinguish them, whether it be the attitude to the Church, to private property, to business or the privileged groups, to the Republic or constitutional reforms, to foreign policy, to atomic rearmament, etc. The line of division, in fact, has become so blurred that many argue that the distinction between Left and Right is only a historical residue and does not correspond to reality.

The multiplicity of ideologies has had a profound effect on the French political system. In the first place, political ideologies are (or at least have been until recently) *intensely held* by the citizens. They are taken very seriously and are more than mere political slogans. This intensity often has made the *ideological differences irreconcilable*. People tend to agree more readily on conflicts over material interests than on clashes between deeply felt principles. Those who think that the *cure* is an enemy will never willingly agree to allow their tax money to be used to support parochial schools, while, on the other hand, a compromise can usually be reached between those who believe in a 2% sales tax and those who oppose any sales tax.

The multiple and contradictory ideologies of France naturally result in a *weak state*. The government is immobilized by the divisions that split the nation, and the various factions work to perpetuate an ineffectual government, for each group fears that opposing forces will prevail if the state is allowed strong control over the country. This paralysis of government in turn produces a *negative opinion* toward the state

and the government. The French characteristically refer to the government as "they"—something alien, remote, and perhaps hostile. Their attitude is apolitical not because they do not care or think strongly about politics but because, being so much at odds with each other, they finish by rejecting politics as an activity that can solve national problems through common effort.

The end result of this condition is an extreme form of individualism. Having denied to the nation the means of effective action and having splintered into many irreconcilable divisions, the French finally come to reject collective programs and to rely only on individual action. In the words of Voltaire in *Candide*, they demand to be left alone to cultivate their own gardens! The ideological foundation of the French system, then, like the historical tradition, is a fragmented one that provides an uncertain base for the erection of a responsible and effective government.

THE HERITAGE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Nothing illustrates better the historical and ideological content of the French political culture than the legacy of the French Revolution. Political ideas, tactics, and style trace their origins to it. Political families—to say nothing of the basic distinction between Left and Right—still associate with that monumental political upheaval which, in a period of less than 10 years, moved the country from a Monarchy ruled virtually by divine right, to a Republican Monarchy, to a Republic, to a government by one party controlled in effect by a small directorate (under Robespierre) known as the Committee of Public Safety, to a collegial dictatorship—the Directorate—and finally, to a Consulate and an Empire with the young Napoleon at its head. Within a decade at least four

major constitutions were drafted. Constitutional development throughout most of the nineteenth century was often a re-enactment of what had occurred in that fateful decade. Further, the intensity of the struggle, the deadly dedication with which different political ideas were supported, and the universality of the aspirations of the various protagonists and their ideologies, influenced the political style of the generations to come.

The Revolution bequeathed the spirit of total commitment and total solutions. With the shaky compromise between the King and the Republican forces broken after 1792, what ensued was a free-for-all conflict to the bitter end. No compromises were to be tolerated, no leniency was to be expected. Every participant, every leader propounded his view for truth and victory with the foreknowledge that failure meant death. Politics was the art of heroes and death the supreme vindication of one's beliefs! By the same token, an appeal to violence to defend political beliefs and to promote political ideas became not a necessity or a tactical expedient but a value in itself. The result was the injection of styles and attitudes that brooked no compromise. As they spread among the citizens they divided villagers, townsmen, and families against each other, and split the nation asunder.

To the King's absolute rule, the Revolution countered with the notion of absolute popular sovereignty—supreme, inalienable, pure, and always right. The old maxim, "The King can do no wrong," was replaced by the new one, "The people are always right." This, again, inculcated a distrust for any and all officeholders and governments, a deep uneasiness with all forms of "personal government," and a tendency to equate democracy with legislative supremacy. The threat that the people are ready to rise has been a repeated theme ever since 1789. As late as 1956, Pierre Poujade, a right-wing radical, promised to set up an Assembly of *Estats Gen-*

eral, and the French Colonels in Algeria established Committees of Public Safety during their uprising against the Republic in May, 1958!

Yet, while the Revolution had injected these divisions, it sought desperately to preserve the national unity of France. Never before and perhaps never since has the idea of the French nationality been so exalted. In the name of freedom and equality the French nation was portrayed as a cohesive and unified force embracing all citizens. Hence the contradiction between authority as the embodiment of the nation, and the Republic as the expression of individual freedom and equality.

While constitutions and leaders toppled as fast as the guillotine could function, Law was revered as a general and abstract principle expressing the sovereign will of the nation. Legality rather than law-abidingness became the rule, and one law after another was feverishly passed through the legislature with the belief that they would settle all issues and fashion morality for all. The result has been that the French, somewhat like the Americans, will legislate at length to cope with all problems, and will be the first to disregard the laws made. Concern with the letter of the law is associated with disregard for its substance.

The question of who incarnates national sovereignty has bedeviled French political thought and action since the Revolution. Who speaks for France? Sometimes the legislature, sometimes the Army, sometimes one man has claimed to do it. National sovereignty, an abstract entity has been claimed on behalf of the people by divergent and conflicting political forces. De Gaulle, like Napoleon, has claimed to incarnate it—first when he defied the state, then as its head! In the name of one and the same France, different political regimes have been proposed and espoused by different groups. The greater the disagreements, the greater the quest for unity and stability. The

Revolution combined, in the form of ethical imperatives, contradictory political attitudes—the notions of violence and legality, unity and individualism, authority and freedom.

THE REPUBLICAN SYNTHESIS AND THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that a synthesis appeared to have been reached among the various ideological families. The Third Republic, established formally in 1875, provided a broad formula of agreement—a common denominator. The authority of the state was carefully circumscribed. the President of the Republic became a figurehead, while the Cabinet and the Prime Minister were deprived of many of the prerogatives they enjoy in England. They could not control the business of the legislature, they could not dissolve and call for elections, and they remained constantly at the mercy of the shifting majorities in the legislature. The provincial and rural interests found protection in the Second Chamber, the Senate, which gradually became equal to the Lower House in its power to control and overthrow the Cabinet and to pass or reject the budget. The political parties remained, until the turn of the century, electoral alliances of provincial bosses and notables. Essentially, this was a Republic in the hands of a divided bourgeoisie that equated good government with the least government. The only cohesive force remained the Civil Service, whose tasks and efforts gradually became limited to caretaking activities. No dynamic leadership and no initiative was expected of it.

This was a "stalemated Republic." As long as extremist movements did not develop from the Left or the Right—as they occasionally did—it was remarkably stable. National unity and the existing social arrangements were overwhelmingly accepted, while political authority re-

mained suspect. The people voted but did not participate; the parties designated candidates but never developed programs on the basis of which they could receive a mandate for action; interest groups were on the defensive, unable or unwilling to promote participation and generate political action; the countryside remained remote from the center.

It was after the turn of the century, especially after World War I, that this Republican synthesis began to be undermined. The need for social legislation and state controls, the urgent demand for modernization, the growing burdens imposed upon the system by its relations with its colonies and the outside world, and above all the international conflicts that broke out anew, even before the ink on the Versailles Treaty was dry—and the renewed menace of Germany—called for decision and firm execution. Even more so, sharp conflicts at home between the Left-wing forces, led by the Socialists and the more uncompromising Communists, and some of the conservatives and extremists, could no longer be easily compromised within the system. The Republican synthesis began to definitely break down.

Yet when the French were ready to refashion their institutions after World War II, the past continued to cast a long shadow. A combination of the old parties and the Communists prepared a constitutional document that in its

broad lines copied that of the Third Republic. The electorate endorsed it, even if by a slim majority. The old practices reasserted themselves. We shall describe them briefly, simply because their tenacity indicates how deeply they are embedded in the French political culture. A decade of Gaullism is not enough to efface deeply-rooted practices and institutional arrangements unless other factors, totally extraneous to de Gaulle, have entered the system to bring about its transformation.

The Governmental Machinery of the Fourth Republic

The Constitution of October, 1946, that ushered in the Fourth Republic was sharply criticized throughout its short life, even by those who helped create it. Known as "the system," the governmental machinery of the Fourth Republic was portrayed as being dominated by lobbies, incapable of making needed decisions, and unresponsive to its leaders, who, by-and-large, were not commanding figures. The Constitution vested supreme power in Parliament—notably in the lower house, the National Assembly. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet governed as long as they had majority support in the National Assembly. The President of the Republic was elected by Parliament and, like the British Monarch, was only the titular head

FIGURE 2-1 *From de Gaulle to de Gaulle. Note the cabinet instability during the 12 years of the Fourth Republic.*




TABLE 2-1
Legislative Election Results in the Fourth Republic and in 1958

	1946	1951	1956	1958
Communists and Progressives	5,489,288	5,057,305	5,514,403	3,882,204
Socialists	3,431,954	2,744,842	3,247,431	3,167,354
Radical Socialists and allied groups	2,831,834	1,887,583	2,834,265	2,695,287
MRP	5,058,307	2,369,778	2,366,321	2,378,788
Gaullists, RPF, 1951, Social Republicans, 1956, UNR, 1958		4,125,492	842,351	3,605,958
Independents and Moderates	2,565,526	2,656,995	3,257,782	4,092,600
Poujadists			2,483,813	669,518
Extreme Right			260,749	
Other parties	63,976	87,346	98,600	
Votes cast	19,203,070	19,129,064	21,298,934	20,489,709
Number of registered voters	25,052,233	24,530,523	26,774,899	27,236,491


of state. Prime Ministers came and went with disturbing frequency as the majorities shifted back and forth in the Assembly. The 12 years of the Fourth Republic saw 20 Cabinets form and dissolve, an average of one every seven months (Fig. 2-1).

MULTIPARTISM

In our discussion of Great Britain we have seen an example of a two party system in which the parties are disciplined and support the government on the basis of pledges formulated at election time. In France the party sys-

tem has been—at least until very recently—vastly different. There have been eight or 10 parties, most of them without discipline, leadership, or platforms. This multiparty system was projected upon the legislature when a number of parliamentary groups, more-or-less corresponding to the political parties, formed weak and ephemeral coalitions behind a government which therefore was short lived. The multiparty system led to a fragmented Assembly which in turn accounted for Cabinet instability (see Fig. 2-2 and Fig. 2-3).

Compounding the multiparty system has been the fact that most of the parties have been internally divided. After national elections, the




elected representatives of a party often formed small groups and thereafter acted independently of the party under whose label they ran. Under the Fourth Republic, any 14 deputies could organize one of these "parliamentary groups" in the National Assembly, and it was not uncommon for 15 or more of these groups to exist at one time. When individual parliamentarians "seceded" to form a minuscule group with a new name, they often elected a president and were granted representation in the various parliamentary committees and given a voice in organizing the business of the legislature.

Fragmentation results from weak party discipline. It is easy to point out the factors that account for this. First, it was very difficult for the Prime Minister or the President under the Third and Fourth Republics to dissolve the legislature and call for elections. A representative, once elected, was secure in his seat, no matter how he voted and acted, for the length of the legislative term. He could oppose the Cabinet with virtual impunity, even when the Prime Minister happened to be from his own party—a practice, as we know, that is rare in

Great Britain. Secondly, many of the French deputies became, like many United States Senators, strongly entrenched in their local constituency: they remained as mayors of important or strategically located cities and towns, and frequently as spokesmen for the lobbies prominent in their constituency. Thirdly, with the exception of the parties of the Left, particularly the Communists and the Socialists, the parties were, loose affiliations of notables, political bosses, and leaders. The party organization, in other words, reflected and encouraged a lack of discipline. The nomination of a candidate was mostly a local matter; the control of funds was highly decentralized so that the candidate, once elected, owed little to the party, and the central organization could not penalize him for his actions. Finally, the underlying social and historical factors we have already discussed—the multiplicity of ideologies, and their incompatibility—not only accounted for multipartism but also for the internal fragmentation of parties and for their lack of discipline and central organization. The conflicts about subsidies to parochial schools, the division be-

FIGURE 2-2 *Major parties and parliamentary groups in the Second Legislature, Fourth Republic (1951–1956)–"The Hexagonal Assembly."*




tween the proponents of a welfare state and of economic individualism, the perennial problem of constitutional and electoral reform, and the quarrels over the many pressing issues of the day—such as foreign policy, European integration, colonial disengagement, and Algeria—merged with uncompromising ideological attitudes to splinter the parties. Virtually every issue that confronted the Fourth Republic was fought within the parties, not between them.

The multiparty system made it difficult, under the Fourth Republic, for national political leaders to emerge. When by chance, as occasionally happened under the Third and Fourth Republics, a man of great quality attempted to speak directly to the nation about pressing problems and to suggest solutions, the various party leaders united against him to thwart his efforts. No leadership was allowed to develop, or centralized party machinery to grow, that would enforce discipline and initiate collective action. Lack of leadership thus has been both the result and the cause of undisciplined political parties.

Because of their multiplicity and internal

divisions, the parties in France have not performed two vital functions that parties in other countries ordinarily provide. First, they have not been able to debate and clarify issues for the public. Members of the same party (excepting the Communists and possibly the Socialists) have often advocated different things in different parts of the country, and in their party congresses their differences have not been resolved. Secondly, the parties could not, under the Fourth Republic, provide for a stable government that was committed to certain policy objectives. Unlike elections in Britain and the United States, an election in France did not and still does not determine the national government. The electorate votes for the members of the Lower House of the Legislature—the Chamber of Deputies under the Third Republic and the National Assembly under the Fourth and Fifth—which in turn endorses a Prime Minister and supports his Cabinet. It has been impossible, until very recently, to tell which combinations among parliamentary groups could provide temporary support for a Prime Minister, and which new combinations would bring about

FIGURE 2-3 Parties and parliamentary groups in the last legislature of the Fourth Republic (1956–1958)



his downfall, and subsequently that of his successors.

The structure of the parties under the Fourth Republic was responsible for another unfortunate development: the widening gap that grew up between the people and the government. To survive, the government had to rely on the support of a coalition of groups that was called the "government majority." But since this coalition was the creature of the party leaders in Parliament and was never itself approved by the electorate, the public became increasingly alienated from a system that did not give it an opportunity to select its government and hold it accountable. As we shall see, the reform of October 28, 1962, allows the people to participate directly in the selection of their national leader, the President.

Electoral Trends and Shifts

The Fourth Republic was not only characterized by multipartism but also by large electoral shifts—usually of 15–20% of the vote—in every national election. In 1946 a *new* political party, the M.R.P., won over 5 million votes, the first important shift (see Table 2–1). In 1951 another new political party, the R.P.F. (Gaullists), won over 4 million votes, many of which came directly from the M.R.P., a second radical shift. A third switch occurred in 1956; the R.P.F. collapsed but a number of its votes were captured by a new formation, the Poujadists, who received almost 2½ million votes. In another changeover in the same election, almost 2 million votes went to a new electoral alliance, the Republican Front, formed between the Radicals and the Socialists. A fifth shift took place, as we shall soon see, in 1958, in favor of the U.N.R.—the new Gaullist Party. Elections were thus characterized by a "floating vote" that moved from one formation to another, or occasionally supported a new party or movement. These shifts did not, of course, all

come from the same voters, though in each election they were roughly of the same size.

Was this floating vote a protest vote? Or simply a personal vote for de Gaulle, Poujade, or some other leader? Was it directed against parliamentary immobility, or perhaps even against the Republic? Did it grow out of the profound social and economic changes sweeping France, particularly economic modernization? These are difficult questions to answer. But the conclusion was inescapable: new forces were troubling the political life of France throughout the period of the Fourth Republic. And, as we shall see, they are still operative in the Fifth Republic.

Cabinet Instability

Cabinet instability throughout the Fourth Republic was fundamentally the result of multipartism. But the Cabinets' difficulties were aggravated by the fact that the Prime Minister could not dissolve the National Assembly unless two consecutive Cabinet crises had occurred within a period of 18 months. A Cabinet "crisis" was constitutionally defined as the overthrow of the Cabinet by an *absolute majority* on certain solemn occasions—when the Prime Minister asked for a vote of confidence, as the British Prime Minister can do, or when the Assembly voted a motion of censure. Cabinets suffered defeat after defeat by *relative majorities* and were forced to withdraw without being allowed to retaliate by dissolving and calling for a new election. Only once were the conditions for dissolution fulfilled and the right exercised—in December, 1955.

Other procedural devices further subordinated the Cabinet to the Assembly. The legislative committees in the National Assembly were miniature Parliaments with sweeping prerogatives similar to those of congressional committees in the United States (whose powers, however, in the American system are offset by a

stable and powerful Presidency) They could pigeonhole bills, amend them at will, or rewrite them. It was their version of a bill (not that of the government) that came on the floor for debate. The agenda of the National Assembly was prepared by the presidents of the various parliamentary groups, not by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. These powerful parliamentarians established the legislative calendar by sidetracking important governmental measures with which they disagreed. Wrangles over the "order of business" became sharp political conflicts, and the Cabinet was reduced to appealing to the National Assembly to restore some of its own items on the agenda. Often it had to risk a vote of confidence on this purely procedural question.

When a budget was submitted to the National Assembly by the government, it was often overhauled by the legislature and particularly by the Committee of Finance. During financial debates, amendments could be introduced from the floor which, contrary to the prevailing practice in England and other parliamentary systems, provided for diminution of credits or increased expenditures. Only in the last years of the Fourth Republic were certain procedural safeguards introduced providing for expenditure ceilings beyond which no amendments could be entertained. Continuous parliamentary debate constantly endangered the position of the Cabinet, which frequently had to resort to a vote of confidence on even minor issues. A Cabinet's margin of support usually underwent a progressive decrease until it either had to resign or fall on a question of confidence—such was the history of every Cabinet in the Fourth Republic.

Cabinet Crises

Since there was no majority party at any time during the Fourth Republic, all Cabinets were coalition Cabinets, composed of the

leaders of many parliamentary groups and parties. Divisions in the Assembly were so sharp that forming a Cabinet was like trying to sign a treaty among warring nations, and, indeed, the formation of the Cabinet became known as the "contract of the majority." When a Cabinet fell, the President of the Republic asked a political leader to scan the political horizon (*tour d'horizon* or *tour de piste*) to determine the willingness of the various political leaders to participate in a new Cabinet and the conditions under which they would join it. If his report were encouraging, he would probably be asked to form a Cabinet. He would then appear before the National Assembly to deliver his "investiture speech," which would spell out what he proposed to do and quite frequently, in order to placate certain groups, what he proposed not to do. If he were "invested"—that is, if he received majority approval—he would become the Prime Minister, presiding over a coalition Cabinet. If he failed to receive the approval of a majority, the whole process would have to be repeated.

In a prolonged crisis, the President of the Republic would call a solemn gathering of all former Prime Ministers and all the presidents of the various parliamentary groups. At this "round table" conference, the leaders would seek to reach enough agreement to form a Cabinet. If the crises lengthened, these meetings would be held more frequently until some consensus was established and a new Cabinet created. Within a matter of months, if not weeks, after the formation of a Cabinet, small parliamentary groups would usually detach themselves from the government majority. It was estimated that the defection of 40 or so members of the National Assembly was ordinarily sufficient to bring down the Cabinets of the Fourth Republic. Since a small group of parliamentarians constituted a powerful veto bloc, they were able—because the life of the government depended on them—to exact concessions from the

Cabinet and impose conditions far disproportionate to their numerical strength.

Cabinet instability, however, had certain positive aspects in a system where party and ideological divisions were so deeply embedded. First, it provided access to positions of political power for many ambitious politicians, thus moderating the intensity of the conflict between parties. A political leader had but to wait his turn for a high post. Among the some 600 deputies, over 150 were known as *ministrables*, persons who were likely to be picked as Cabinet members. During the Fourth Republic, about 200 members of the National Assembly held ministerial posts at least once. The Cabinet "crises" allowed many men peacefully to come and go in the Cabinet without necessitating an appreciable change in policy. Occasionally, however, a crisis did spawn a genuine shift in policy. This was notably the case when Joseph Laniel's Cabinet fell in 1954 and Pierre Mendès-France was invested after he pledged to seek an immediate end to the Indochinese war. Even though the war was soon terminated, his Cabinet was unable to retain its majority and collapsed within a short time.

The Search for a Majority

The French political system under the Fourth Republic was, in a word, paralyzed. The numerous parties prevented any one of them from gaining a majority, and the legislature so hobbled the executive branch that leadership was virtually impossible. Out of the 627 seats in the National Assembly during the Fourth Republic, the Communist strength averaged 125 deputies. From 1947 until roughly 1954, they were in a permanent state of opposition. They voted against all governments, and, with the exception of some tactical votes, against most policy measures. After 1954, they began to urge the formation of alliances and to vote for the endorsement of Prime Ministers; no Prime Minister and Cabinet, however, were

willing to govern if they had to count on Communist support. Hence the *true* number of deputies from which a majority had to be found to counter the Communist vote ranged from 425 to a maximum of 500.

If all the non-Communist parties had been in agreement, the Communist strength could easily have been neutralized. But they were not. The parties of the Center and the Right cooperated to form the so-called "Third Force," which lasted from May, 1947, to the middle of 1952. But internal disagreements on price controls, social-welfare legislation, increased governmental investments, economic modernization, wage increases, subsidies to Catholic schools, the war in Indochina, colonial policy, and many other issues, were sharp. The Third Force disintegrated every time these questions came up.

When the Third Force came to an end in 1952, these disagreements flared up, further paralyzing the Center parties. The Communist strength was reduced to about 100 deputies, but the Gaullists, against whose electoral comeback the Third Force had been fashioned, emerged to the Right with almost 120 members. Since the combined Gaullist-Communist group totaled at least 220 deputies, as long as the two voted together against all Cabinets, the Assembly was literally ungovernable, faced as it was with a classic case of a "negative majority"—a majority *against* but never *for*. No stable majority could be formed from among the some 370 deputies of the other parliamentary groups to counter the combined Communist-Gaullist opposition.

The Search for Strong Personal Leadership

Since the parties were so stalemated on so many vital issues, the Assembly began to search for strong political leaders to solve particular problems. In 1952, Antoine Pinay, a popular parliamentary leader of the Independ-

ents, was invested as Prime Minister with authority to launch a new economic policy. In 1954, another popular Radical leader, Pierre Mendès-France, was approved as Prime Minister on his pledge to end the war in Indochina in a month's time, to undertake extensive economic and social reforms, and to cope with the independence movements in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. When fighting in Indochina did cease within the month, Mendès-France received an overwhelming vote of confidence from all the parties. But when he began to initiate economic reforms, he found his majority dwindling, and when he promised "internal sovereignty" to Tunisia, his former supporters, including members of his own party, but also the Communists and the Gaullists, joined forces to bring him down—another case of a "negative majority."

In December, 1955, the National Assembly was dissolved, and the ensuing elections, on January 2, 1956, ushered in the third, and what proved to be the last, legislature of the Fourth Republic. As Fig. 2-3 shows, this was again a case of an unmanageable legislature—unable to provide continuing support to any cabinet

ALGERIA AND THE LAST CRISIS

It was the Algerian war that caused the last crisis and brought an end to the Fourth Republic. Algeria was conquered by France in 1830 and administered as a French Department—as a part of France. There were until 1962 roughly 1 million Europeans (all of whom were French citizens) in Algeria, and some 9 million Algerian Moslems. The Europeans, often called *colons*, had much higher incomes than did the Moslems, and dominated them politically and economically. After World War II, many Algerian leaders demanded political emancipation and full political and economic integration with Metropolitan France. This was rejected. Only after 1952 did they begin to de-

mand independence, and, in 1954, small rebel bands began to harass French detachments and commit acts of terrorism. The threat of losing Algeria, considered by Frenchmen to be an integral part of their country, provoked strong reaction in France. Troops were dispatched across the Mediterranean, and by 1957 more than 400,000 soldiers were combating the rebellion.

All Right and Center groups, and even the Socialists, demanded the maintenance of French sovereignty in Algeria. Some were in favor of military solutions, while others argued for negotiations. From all over the nation, the clamor for a strong government that would put an end to the vacillations of the Republic increased. The Army itself became deeply involved. Many officers began to participate directly in politics and sought to impose its will on the government, and went so far as to refuse to obey some of the instructions issued in Paris. As the cleavage in the political system became deeper and more widespread, the government became more helpless, and the public more prone to accept the return of the hero of the war years—General de Gaulle.

Supported by powerful patriotic and Right-wing organizations, the Army and the *colons* refused to obey the last government of the Fourth Republic, formed by Prime Minister Pierre Pflimlin on May 13, 1958. They called for a government of "public safety." Army units in Algeria and elsewhere were alerted and prepared for a show of strength against Metropolitan France, involving, if necessary, a military invasion. The Gaullist groups, fearing a military coup, called for the return of General de Gaulle, who emerged from his long silence to declare his readiness to assume the government of the Republic. Pflimlin's Cabinet resigned two weeks after it was formed. On June 1, the National Assembly endorsed General de Gaulle and his Cabinet and the next day amended the Constitution to empower de Gaulle to draft a new one. A military coup had

through which action can take place and decisions can be made

But the Fourth Republic failed where all previous regimes had failed: it failed to develop political institutions that were legitimized and acceptable. While consensus on social

and economic questions was growing, political consensus—the development of an acceptable procedure for the solution of problems—had not taken shape. France remained deadlocked on the vital issue of politics. What kind of constitution? What kind of government?

been narrowly averted. De Gaulle was granted full powers to govern and to prepare a new Constitution. The breakdown of parliamentary government, the military stalemate in Algeria, the rebellious attitude of the Army, the economic difficulties at home—all eventually led the French to return to the tradition of Bonapartism, the personal leadership of one man to solve their problems.

THE DEMAND FOR REFORM

Throughout the whole period of the Fourth Republic, the demand for reform was pervasive. First, there was a strong and persistent dissatisfaction with the parliamentary institutions—not with representative government as such. As early as 1947, when asked the question "Do you believe that things would be better or worse if there were no Parliament?" only 33% felt that they would be worse, 21% better, 27% the same, and 17% did not answer. By 1955 nobody seemed satisfied with Parliament. More than two-thirds were either "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied." Characteristically enough, dissatisfaction was due to the following reasons: (a) governments changed too often (95%); (b) there were too many parties (88%); (c) the parliamentary practices were bad (75%). The rate of Cabinet turnover was a particular source of dissatisfaction, and the demand for stable and continuing executive power persistent. As early as 1945, 50% of the people favored the election of the President of the Republic by direct popular vote. But there was an equally growing desire for greater participation in national politics. In 1945, 66% of the people favored a referendum on constitutional issues.² Many had begun to equate a stable government with executive leadership. In 1946, almost half the people wanted to see the President of the Republic play a more important role instead of

limiting himself only to honorific functions—and their number has grown steadily since the return of General de Gaulle to power. While the parties have continued to be viewed as necessary for democratic government, both their numbers and their ideological commitments came under criticism. They were blamed for the frequent governmental crises, and the average Frenchman began to view the parliamentary game as something that concerned a small group of politicians and had nothing to do with his interests and demands. They seemed to be reconciled to a Parliament with fewer powers.

There were other straws in the wind. First, many of the economic and interest groups became better organized on a national basis, and seemed more willing to undertake cooperation with other groups and with the state. Secondly, economic modernization initiated by a group of intellectuals and technicians in the form of economic planning began to inculcate new demands and a new awareness that politics could satisfy them. Thirdly, the legacy of the Resistance—the assurance that cooperation and participation could accomplish a lot—was much in evidence among a number of young political and professional leaders. The Resistance had bridged the distance between different classes and groups of the social hierarchy—it had a leveling impact that made a dialogue among individuals and groups easier. And finally, the world was changing fast, and the challenge of American wealth and of the German revival could not but affect directly the pride and incentive of the French elites.

The issue of new political institutions was constantly in the air, with many favoring better organized political parties and executive leadership. There was a new attitude toward the state, a greater demand for participation, a dissatisfaction with parliamentary institutions, a demand for greater stability and continuity. For the first time, perhaps, the French were willing to consider a political system in pragmatic terms as an instrument embodying procedures

²By 1962 a majority continued to approve referendums and popular elections of the President.

was going through a period of disinvestment. The destruction of World War II estimated at approximately \$50 billion, was an additional blow. With her industrial equipment destroyed or dilapidated and her transportation network paralyzed, the French economy was in a state of collapse at the end of the war.

What were the major factors behind France's long economic stagnation? First, the slow growth rate of population, second, a backward agriculture, third, the protectionist policies of the state; and finally, business attitudes.

POPULATION In 1800, France had a larger population than any other country in Europe or the Americas, with the exception of Russia. The Napoleonic armies were recruited and supported from among 26 million French citizens. England at the time had only 11 million people, the United States $5\frac{1}{2}$ million, and Germany, including Austria, about 23 million. France maintained her population advantage until around 1860, when she numbered 38 million inhabitants. After that, the population level remained virtually static, despite a sharp decline in the mortality rate (Table 3-1). In 1940, for instance, her population was almost

exactly 40 million, while the United States numbered close to 150 million, Great Britain 50 million, and Germany (but without Austria) 65 million. Between 1930 and 1940, the French population actually declined. Some of the Italian and Spanish immigrants returned to their homes, and there was an excess of deaths over births. The two World Wars took their heaviest toll from among the young and most economically productive, leaving a disproportionate number of older people, which contributed to the economic stagnation.

AGRICULTURE AND THE STATE A quick review of France's agriculture between 1870 and 1940 reveals that she had a high percentage (35-40%) of farmers, that the productivity of French farmers was low, and that the many small marginal farms were divided and subdivided into minute parcels that were unsuitable for mechanization and new techniques. Until 1940, France used only a small amount of chemical fertilizers, and the number of tractors on the farms was insignificant.

Unfortunately, the unproductive farms were encouraged by the tariff policies of the state. Agricultural interests, and also manufacturing groups, formed powerful lobbies that demanded and got high protectionist tariffs, special subsidies, and guaranteed price supports, all of which sheltered French business and agriculture from foreign competition. The state was thus helping to perpetuate the antiquated economic system.

BUSINESS ATTITUDES Industrialists and businessmen in France did not show in many cases the initiative and willingness to take risks that we generally associate with a capitalist system. Many business affairs were family enterprises. Managers tended to keep production geared to a limited demand instead of seeking new markets, and profits were often "saved" instead of being reinvested in the business.

The system of distribution was particularly

TABLE 3-1
*Growth of French Population
in the Twentieth Century*

Year	Population (in millions)
1900	38.9
1913	39.8
1929	42.0
1949	41.4
1962	47.0
1967	50.0
1970*	51.0 ^b (est.)
1978*	55.2 (est.)

*Projected

^bEstimated rate of growth between 1960 and 1970 approximately 250,000 per year. The greater increase between 1962 and 1967 is due to the influx of the French from Algeria.

III

ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS¹

Until a few years ago, the dominant characteristic of the French economy was relative underdevelopment. While industrialization rapidly advanced in the last hundred years in England, Germany, Japan, the United States, and, more recently, in the Soviet Union, France's economy grew at a relatively slower pace. In some decades it did not grow at all. Yet France began with a marked advantage over *all* the other countries. During the Napoleonic era and on through till the middle of the nineteenth century, France was one of the more developed nations of the world. From then on, however, despite her wealth of resources (though lack of coal and energy was an important deficit) and skilled labor, her economy declined in comparison with almost all the countries of Western Europe. Her national income between 1870 and 1940 rose by about 80%, while that of Germany increased five times and that of Great Britain three and a half times. After a rise in economic production and investment between 1924-31, net investment declined in the thirties to a point below zero—that is, France was living on her capital, using her factories and equipment without replacing them in full. She

¹In preparing the various tables and estimates of the French economy, a certain degree of simplification was unavoidable. The following sources were used: *United Nations Economic Survey for Europe* (1965); *Tableaux de l'Économie Française*, 1958, 1960, 1963, and 1966; *Mouvement Économique en France de 1944 à 1957*; and *L'Espace Économique Français* (1955). The three last publications were prepared under the auspices of the official *Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques*. Also the *Année Politique*, 1965 and 1966; *Le Budget de 1965* and *Le Budget de 1966* (Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances); and the *Reports on France* of the O.E.C.D. (Organization of European Cooperation and Development). I have also used the excellent publications of the Information Services of the French Embassy.

TABLE 3-2

Industrial Production in the Twentieth Century (Annual Averages)

	1892-1902	1909-1913	1925-1929	1934-1938	1948-1952	1955-1959	1965-1966
Steel (millions of tons)	15	46	97	62	91	152	190
Aluminum (thousands of tons)	10	135	291	508	746	2175	3400
Automobiles (in thousands)	2	45	254	227	286	1,283	1,602
Tractors	—	—	—	1,750	17,290	77,940	89,500
Iron (millions of tons)	54	220	50	33	31	600	595
Bauxite (thousands of tons)	59	309	666	649	767	1,746	2,652
Merchant Marine (thousands of tons)	1,597	2,319	3,303	2,881	2,710	4,461	4,878
Electricity (billions of KW per hour)	—	—	156	208	406	700+	1012

tions greatly increased the scope of state ownership, which already had included rail transportation and the production and sale of cigarettes and matches. A sizable part of the economic activity of France thus came under state direction. Massive subsidies, both for state-controlled activities and for private enterprises, were necessary after the war.

Contrary to popular opinion about the French not paying their taxes, taxation—both direct and indirect—reached high levels in the post-war period. The total tax receipts in France in the sixties, for instance, amounted to about 18% of the gross national product—considerably higher than in the United States. And they have continued to increase. It is true that indirect taxation accounts for more than half the total, but this is because there are still many small entrepreneurs and independent workers, for whom tax collection is more difficult and evasion easier, rather than because the French are more reluctant than the citizens of other countries to pay their taxes.

An extensive program of social legislation has been adopted. It includes old-age insurance,

accident and unemployment compensation, maternity benefits, medical care (a very large part of the patient's expenses for medical treatment, hospitalization, and drugs comes from the national insurance fund), and family allowances that provide supplementary income to families with two children or more.

By 1956-57, the impact of the expanded economic activity became clearly discernible. France's economy (except in housing) was growing at a rate that compared favorably with that of Germany in the years of 1952-56. The decline in the total volume of coal production was fully compensated for by the increased use of gas and electricity. By 1958, agricultural production was 30-35% higher than in 1949. Chemical fertilizers were finally beginning to be widely used, and the annual production of tractors increased rapidly. The pre-war national income almost doubled and the population began to grow. France today, therefore, is quite similar to other industrialized nations. Of her labor force of over 19 million people, about 22% work in agriculture, 40% in industry, and 38% in so-called "tertiary employment," as

faulty, although there were some large chain stores. The economy was encumbered with too many small merchants and shopkeepers who eked out livings through limited volumes of trade. As a result, costs remained high because efficient techniques of distribution were not developed. Retail prices were disproportionately high when compared to wholesale prices, and the small profits extracted by the numerous middlemen who handled the products unduly inflated the price to the consumer. Although a relatively unproductive segment in the economy, the middlemen were organized into strong pressure groups who demanded and received protection, and, to top it off, the sturdy virtues of the storekeepers were extolled as much as the diligence and stamina of the farmers.

The Beginning of Economic Modernization

The task facing the country immediately after the Liberation in 1944, when industrial production was not even 40% of the level in 1938, was twofold: to replace the industrial equipment that had been damaged or destroyed in the war and to eliminate the weak elements in the economy. This was the objective of the first "Monnet Plan" for 1947–50 (but actually extended to 1952), named after Jean Monnet, who was its architect in economic planning and modernization.

This plan, known as the "plan for modernization and equipment," had the following goals:

1. To assure a rapid rise in the living conditions of the population, and particularly an improvement in their diet
2. To modernize and re-equip the basic industries—coal mining, electric power, iron, cement, farm machinery, and transportation
3. To bring agricultural methods and machinery up-to-date
4. To devote the maximum resources possible to reconstruction, keeping in mind the needs of the basic industries, and to modernize the construction-material trades, the building trades, and public works

5. To modernize and develop the export industries to assure equilibrium in the balance of payments by 1950

These targets were set for the year 1950: the production of 65 million tons of coal; the generation of 25 billion kilowatt hours of electricity; the production of about 12 million tons of steel; the production of 50,000 tractors. Many of these targets were not achieved by 1950, partly because they were too ambitious, partly because the plan often lacked vigorous administration, and partly because of social unrest and strikes. But a beginning had been made. Three more "plans" ensued, and their cumulative impact began to be felt by 1955–56.² Despite the weaknesses of the Fourth Republic and the vacillations of the various governments, business and public investment in the economy soared, and the rate of growth began to accelerate.

Several key economic activities were nationalized immediately after the Liberation. Not only the political leaders of the Left, but also General de Gaulle believed that public ownership of certain industries was superior to private enterprise. Nationalization had been advocated by many resistance groups and endorsed by the National Council of the Resistance. In many speeches General de Gaulle had implied the need for state control and planning. Sometimes nationalization was urged as a punitive measure against companies that had collaborated with the Germans, sometimes as a necessary step to curb the monopolies, sometimes as an indispensable instrument for intelligent state planning, and almost always as a way to ensure social justice and improve the living conditions of the poor, particularly of the workers.

In 1946, electricity, gas, and some automobile plants, notably the Renault Automobile Co., were nationalized, and the Bank of France and Air France, the most important airline, came under state direction. These nationaliza-

²For more detail on political implications, see Chapter I.

the "static" regions, bringing them welcome prosperity.³

The increasing number of radio and television sets and the increasingly widespread ownership of automobiles, scooters, and motorcycles have brought the farms closer to the towns and broken through the old parochial barriers of the village that were so well described in books such as Laurence Wyllie's *Village in the Vaucluse* a few years ago. Although there are rural Departments in which individual income remains abominably low and in which life is not much different from what it was at the end of the nineteenth century, the number of people living under pre-industrial conditions is becoming progressively smaller. The poorer sections of France are certainly no worse off than the rural areas of Mississippi or the depressed mining areas of West Virginia and of South Wales in England, or the ghettos of our cities where millions of Americans live.


Two long-range trends should help boost France's economy tremendously: the increase in population and the European Common Market. The progressive elimination of the tariffs between France and West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland—it is expected that they should be reduced to nearly zero before 1969—will greatly stimulate the flow of goods, labor, and capital among the participating countries. At the same time, the common external tariff for the Common Market Countries will provide protection for French agricultural products. Thus all sectors of the French economy, including agriculture, will be forced to step up modernization in order to meet the competition and the demands of her rising population and her European partners. What is the impact of modernization? How will it affect the political attitudes and actions of the average Frenchman? To these crucial questions we shall return at the end of our discussion.

³For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter VII

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The political analyst ordinarily classifies individual citizens of a country into groups with similar interests or backgrounds. These social groups—workers, farmers, intellectuals, businessmen, the Church, the Army, and so on—vie with each other for positions of political influence. In many countries, these groups are relatively homogeneous blocs that tend to operate as a unit. Not so in France, where these groups are splintered internally along political

FIGURE 3-2 The present structure of the French population including net immigration and servicemen stationed abroad






FIGURE 3-1 Breakdown of the actively employed population, by sector.

merchants, teachers, members of the professions, in services, etc.

Both the agricultural and the industrial sectors, however, exhibit certain peculiarities. The concentration of industry is not yet as marked as it is in Great Britain, West Germany, or the United States. The great majority of the industrial firms employ between five and 50 workers. There are 1¼ million self-employed (*patrons*) in industry and commerce. But again, the larger part of production is in the hands of corporations and firms that employ thousands of workers. In commerce, however, the predominance of individual units continues to be high, and the number of persons employed in agriculture is inordinately large—about 20%—compared to that in Great Britain, where about 5% of the work force is on farms, and in the United

States, where the figure is 7%. The agricultural population, however, is decreasing and so is the number of small marginal farms. The process of urbanization has been slower in France than elsewhere. There are only six cities in France with over a quarter of a million people. About 30% continue to live in small hamlets of less than 2,000 population. The Paris urban agglomeration alone, however, accounts for about 8½ million—18% of the French population.

The distribution of income is somewhat uneven. The wages of the industrial workers have usually lagged behind the income of other groups, partly because of inflation but also because of their inability to unite in a common front against employers. Now that tax favors and social benefits, particularly family allowances, add, in effect, about 50% to the average worker's wages, the standard of living of the working class today compares favorably with that of workers in Great Britain and West Germany. Pockets of underdevelopment persist in France. Housing construction fell far behind that in England and West Germany, and only in the last three years has France been able to build as many as 1,400,000 units a year.

Not all of the various regions of the country share equally in her wealth. France traditionally divided into two areas: a "static" region, composed of some 64 Departments, accounting for less than the national average in economic production, and a "dynamic" region (26 Departments, mostly in the Paris region, the North, along the Mediterranean coast, and around the cities of Lyon, Grenoble, and Bordeaux), in which production was above the average. But even this has been changing. The areas of the Southwest are being modernized rapidly, thanks to the discovery of natural gas, and the areas of the Southeast and South are benefiting from the construction of dams and the production of electric energy. Some industries—oil refineries, aircraft and aluminum factories, and atomic energy plants—have been shifting to

were in 1950. Monthly salaries range from \$140 a month for unskilled workers to \$230 for ordinary qualified workers. Social benefits account for an additional 40-50%, and sometimes more, of the average wage. The worker's opportunity for education is limited. Few go beyond what corresponds to the first grades of junior high school, and, as a result, their social mobility is restricted. Less than 10% of the students in universities come from working-class families.

More important than the economic conditions of the workers in characterizing them as a social group are their ideology and political attitudes. About two-thirds of the workers vote Communist or Socialist, one out of five of the industrial workers believes, in a romantic sort of way, that "revolution" rather than reform will better his condition. In the parts where the workers live together in the same residential sections—as in the Paris area, in the North, and in other industrialized centers—there is a sharp division between the workers and other groups—the middle class, members of professions, and even the lower middle class. Differences in manners, dress, entertainment, education, income, housing, summer camps, and vacations have separated the workers from these other classes until very recently.

The workers' trade unions are divided into a number of organizations. the C.G.T. (General Confederation of Labor), which is controlled by the Communist Party; the Force—Ouvrière (C.G.T.-F.O.), which seceded from the C.G.T. in 1947 and is associated with the Socialists; and the C.F.T.C. (French Confederation of Christian Trade Unions). There are, in addition, a number of "independent" trade unions. The C.G.T. has about 1,500,000 members, the F.O. fewer than 500,000, and the C.F.T.C. not more than 600,000. In 1964 it split into two sections. The large one abandoned its "Christian" label to become the Confederation of Democratic Labor (C.F.D.T.)—while a small group maintained its Catholic denomination. This total represents a

considerable drop in trade-union membership since the Liberation. The unions have become weakened through political division, and workers seem unable to pursue a united front to improve their conditions.

In the last 15 years, the lot of the workers has improved, and this has tended to mitigate their revolutionary spirit. Real wages have risen, there is full employment, specialized industries have grown up that attract workers with ability and give them the chance to attend technical schools and improve their earnings rapidly (a specialized worker may earn more than three times the wages of a semi-skilled one), opportunities for promotion have increased. Internal mobility within a class or sometimes even mobility between status groups is on the rise. Better wages and living conditions have started to eliminate the sharp difference of dress, habits, and manners. Those workers with higher wages can move to better housing facilities and can buy a scooter or even a small car.

But many of the French workers remain attached to old habits and ideas. Real wages for many of them, perhaps as many as one-quarter, are not much higher than during the best years of economic prosperity in the 1920's—20% receive less than \$1,000 a year. The feeling of exploitation and separateness persists. Workers continue to consider themselves inferior and dream of a revolution that will square accounts with history. This attitude, spearheaded by a strong Communist Party, makes the workers an unstable element in French society and a constant danger to a democratic society.

The Farmers

There are some 3½ million "farmers" in France (individual owners, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and agricultural workers), and they constitute approximately 18% of those gainfully employed. A little less than 1 million

and ideological lines. The workers are divided into many political attitudes; so are the Catholics, the intellectuals, the farmers, and the veterans. *The failure of the French to create a political system that is an instrument of compromise perpetuates, and even tends to exacerbate the deep divisions that sunder these social groups into quarreling factions.*

One striking phenomenon of the French social structure, as Professor John E. Sawyer has pointed out in a very illuminating essay, is the existence of overlapping social orders. The first is the *traditional order*, mostly in rural areas, characterized by an attachment to the status quo and to the authority of the Church and the old nobility—more recently the landowners. The second is the *liberal order*, represented by the middle class—merchants, artisans, small entrepreneurs—which is essentially egalitarian and individualistic; and the third is the *industrial order*, which borrows some of the elements of liberalism—individualism, equality, mobility—but emphasizes mass production, social discipline, and social organization.

In France, the traditional and liberal orders clashed all through the nineteenth century, largely in the struggle between the nobility, the Army, and the Church, on one hand, and the Republic, on the other. Just when these two "orders" were learning to live side-by-side, during the best years of the Third Republic, between 1905 and 1914, the impact of industrialization was being strongly felt in some regions of France. The "traditional order" survives in some rural areas and among conservative Catholic groups. The "liberal order" is still very much alive among the merchants, artisans, lawyers, shopkeepers, and small entrepreneurs, while the "industrial order," until recently restricted largely to Paris and the North, is gaining ground.

The French attachment to individualism, the stubborn survival of small firms and family-controlled enterprises, the characteristic enthusiasm for smallness, for a sense of balance,

and for craftsmanship reflect the heritage of the liberal nineteenth-century tradition and have tended to slow down industrialization. The workers themselves have been influenced by the liberal tradition in both their ideological and economic thinking. Many factories continue to employ only a few workers, making it difficult for them to organize. The workers, exhibiting the individualistic traits associated with the middle class and even the peasants, often reject the discipline and organization required by industrialization. Romantic ideas favoring the destruction of industrial capitalism through the general strike and revolution permeate their ranks. But the industrial order has also been deeply influenced by the liberal order. Industrial managers frequently shied away from modernization and mass production in order to stay small and secure and avoid risks. It was not until the end of World War II that what we have called the "industrial order" began to assert itself among civil servants, some managerial and business groups, and the intellectuals.

SOCIAL CLASSES

The Workers

Out of some 19,700,000 gainfully employed persons in France, 7 million are considered to be workers. Although it is difficult to generalize about such a large group of people, they do have certain common traits that put them in an identifiable socio-economic category. In the first place, the worker is relatively poor, and his standard of living improved little even in the years of prosperity. As of 1950, for instance, the real wage of the industrial worker remained somewhat below the 1938 figure.

It is only in the last decade that there has been a noticeable improvement. For unskilled labor the hourly wage is 60¢ and a semiskilled laborer makes 85¢ an hour, representing about the double of what the corresponding wages

less than one-fourth in Vendée and one-third in Haute-Savoie. The Gaullists and the Centrists together were below 50% in Côtes du Nord and Creuse, gained over half in Gers, and reached 65% in Haute-Savoie and almost 70% in Vendée.

The political orientation of a farm region largely depends on its types of agriculture, on its level of income, its historical experience, and the intensity of religious practices. Wherever landholdings are small and the Church weak, the general political orientation is to the Left, ranging from radicalism to Communism. In areas where there are small landholdings and where religious practices are prevalent, the farmers usually vote conservative and sometimes for the liberal Catholics. Where farms range from medium to large in size, the crucial determining factor is religion. In the areas where religious practices are strong, the farmers tend to vote conservative or moderate, where religious practices are weak, they vote for the Center or the Left.

Catholicism is thus, generally speaking, a conservative force in French politics. But the fact that a farmer owns property, particularly in some of the Southern and Southeastern regions, does not guarantee that he will not adopt radical ideas. In fact, in one Department like Creuse, where private ownership is both widespread and widely parceled, the Communist Party is particularly strong.

The Middle Class

The "middle class" instigated the Revolution of 1789 against the nobility and the Crown. Its economic power had increased greatly in the eighteenth century, and it was anxious to augment its political power by establishing a representative government. After the Revolution, it was generally the champion of the Republic against the nobility, the Church, and the Army. Thanks to it, the doc-

trine of the separation of Church and state became well established, the Army came under the control of the state, the representative institutions became supreme, and vested interests have been subordinated to the legislature.

The term "middle class," however, covers many heterogeneous elements. Do we define it according to occupation, income, or status? One French political scientist uses these three basic criteria for categorizing French citizens as members of the middle class. (a) the nature of their jobs, (b) their way of life and the manner in which they spend their income, and (c) the common situation with reference to their income tax. On the basis of these criteria, the French middle class consists of the following groups among the salaried are engineers, office personnel, the bulk of the civil servants, judges, teachers, professors, and noncommissioned officers (*sous-officiers*) in the armed services, among the nonsalaried are members of the professions, small merchants, small businessmen, small entrepreneurs, and artisans. They are roughly estimated to total 8½ million people, or approximately 37% of those gainfully employed. This large figure is what many authors have in mind when they refer to France as a "bourgeois"—middle-class—country, a land of small entrepreneurs, independent artisans, small family enterprises, and small shops where the nineteenth-century values of individualism and quality, moderation and balance, reign.

From the natural affinities that exist within the middle class, you might guess that the group would exhibit a unified and constant attitude in matters of politics. But this is hardly the case in France, where the middle class has often changed its political orientation and is today split into many different viewpoints.

HISTORICAL SHIFTS. Until about the end of the nineteenth century, the middle class was generally anticlerical and pro-Republican. Since the turn of the century, however, the middle

are agricultural workers, who earn less than \$95 a month. The rest own their land or lease it. Small farms held by individual owners continue to be prevalent (Table 3-3).

More than half a million farmers own such small holdings that they are unable to utilize modern techniques for increasing their productivity. As a result, the productivity of French farmers remained until very recently low compared to that of American, British, and Danish farmers. The authors of the Monnet Plan complained immediately after the Liberation that a French farmer produced only enough to feed three persons, while an American farmer could feed 16, a British farmer seven, and a Danish farmer nine.

Foreign observers have described French farmers as a homogeneous group, characterized by their courage against adversity, their moderate political outlook, their sacrifices and patriotism, their labor and wisdom. French authors also have extolled the rural virtues of stoicism and courage, patience and moderation. These impressions were accurate to a great extent for the nineteenth century and the time before World War I. The farmers provided two of the nation's most precious commodities, in addition to their agricultural produce: their sons for

the Army, and their savings. But the devastation of World War I brought to the fore the farmers' sense of individualism and their suspicion of the state. This spirit, coupled with the increasingly antiquated machinery and procedures used on the farm, and the constant fragmentation of the land, has resulted in open defiance in a number of regions against agents of the central government.

"Ideologies" that have had the most appeal for the farmers are *radicalism* and *Catholicism*. The elements of radicalism—individualism and anti-state philosophy—are rooted in the thinking of many farmers. Catholicism, on the other hand, accounts for much of the conservative attitude of farmers. But after World War II, the farmers and their organizations adopted views all across the political spectrum, which increased the political instability of the country. For instance, if we take for purposes of illustration five Departments of France with the greatest percentage of farmers—Creuse (85% of the population), Côtes du Nord (81.5%), Gers (80%), Vendée (80%), and Haute-Savoie (80%)—we find that in the election of 1967, the Communists and the Federation together received over 50% in Côtes du Nord and Creuse, dropped slightly below half in Gers, to receive

TABLE 3-3
Number and Acreage of Farms by Size

Size of farm	Number of farms	Farmland (in acres)	Percentage Distribution	
			Number of farms	Land in farms
Under 25 acres ^a	1,265,070	12,979,850	55.8%	16.4%
25 to 49 acres	532,400	18,614,167	23.5	23.4
50 to 124 acres	375,200	27,582,984	16.5	34.7
125 to 249 acres	74,900	12,271,454	3.3	15.5
250 to 499 acres	16,700	5,425,849	0.7	6.8
500 acres and over	3,500	2,562,131	0.2	3.2
Total	2,267,770	79,436,435 ^b	100.0%	100.0%

is militantly atheistic. In some areas, even burial is a civil affair. A close correlation exists between conservatism and attachment to the Church, and between Communism and Socialism and hostility to the Church. The Right, generally speaking, is religious, the Left is overtly anticlerical and very often atheistic.

The degree of religious participation in the various parts of France is largely the result of historical factors. There is both *more* and *less* religious practice in the rural areas. For instance, in the regions of the Northwest (Brittany and Normandy), about 80% of the population are devout Catholics, while in some 30 Departments of Central and Southern France, the figure drops to about 20% (Fig. 3-3). In the towns, generally only about half the population is religious, and in urban centers like Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse, and Grenoble, the number is even less. In some of the suburban centers of the larger towns, areas dense with working-class settlements, religious practices are almost nonexistent. In the Paris working-class districts, not more than 2% of the people "practice."


History has produced strange things on the religious map of France. The American Catholic tourist who decides to drive from, say, Luçon to Bayeux in Normandy will find that to his left the churches are usually well-kept, regular services are held, and priests are readily available, for some 85% of the people to his left "practice." Only a few miles away to his right, however, the situation is exactly the reverse. Only about 20% of the people practice, and priests are difficult to find. Often the tourist will discover a rivulet that divides a village in two, with one part intensely Catholic and the other intensely anticlerical and nonreligious!

The correlation between social groups and religion is fairly precise, but, as with any generalization, there are exceptions. Many farmers, especially in the Northwest and

Northeast, the upper middle class, the bigger landowners, and part of the middle class itself have a high proportion of practicing believers. The workers, many of the farmers of the South, teachers, intellectuals, and some of the lower middle class show a low percentage of practice.

ORGANIZATION. The Catholic Church in France is technically separated from the state. Until recently, this separation has also applied to education. The Church receives no subsidies, and its schools—grammar schools, nurseries, and technical and high schools—are strictly

FIGURE 3-3 *Religious practice in France* (Adapted from François Goguel, *Géographie des Elections Françaises, de 1870 à 1951* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1952) with the kind permission of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques and the Librairie Armand Colin.)



class has slowly turned back to the Church and toward a more conservative political attitude. Their distrust of the state, very much like the emphasis on states' rights in the United States, often led them to block social and economic reforms, while the advocacy of socialism by the emerging working class put them increasingly on the defensive. One segment of the middle class, the so-called Radicals, continue to pay lip service to anticlericalism and reform, but they are not very strong about them in practice and end up oscillating between the Left and the Right.

The lower middle class, the artisans and shopkeepers, retained their attachment to the Republic until the end of World War II. Since 1945, the "small man" has begun to rise against the income tax and the financial burdens imposed upon him by the state. Conscious that the tide of history is sweeping France toward greater industrialization and is eroding his very existence (the chain stores are driving out the small shopkeeper, the big factories are eliminating the artisan, mechanized farms are squeezing out the small independent farmer, etc.), the "small men" have attempted to arrest this development. Through powerful lobbies, they pressured Parliament for increasing protection and subsidies. In the 1950's, they began to repudiate the Republican parliamentary system they had supported for so long and to join extreme Right-wing nationalist groups.

DIVERSITY AND FRAGMENTATION. In the last 25 years, the middle class has become divided in its political views among all political parties. Regional, historical, religious, and economic factors account for this wide dispersion of political orientation. In a number of instances, middle-class groups have even supported the Communists. It has been estimated, for instance, that as many as 750,000 to 1 million of the Communist Party votes have come from the middle class. The bulk of middle-class

votes, however, goes to the Center groups and the Gaullists, and a small percentage to the Socialists. All political parties in turn make a concerted effort to appeal to the various segments of the middle class and to organize them into a number of professional front associations.

The diversity in political outlook divides and weakens the middle class. Further, the majority is not particularly active or interested in politics and is susceptible to the unifying appeal of a "strong" man; it has succumbed at different times to Bonapartism. Generally, the middle class has supported the Republic as the best instrument for accommodating its interests, but in time of crisis it has swung to the Right. During the Second Empire (1852-70), with Marshal Pétain in 1940, and, finally, with General de Gaulle, the middle class has opted for what amounts to a one-man government. It has not displayed in the realm of politics the moderation and tolerance that Aristotle and later John Stuart Mill associated with it.

The Church

France is a predominantly Catholic nation. There are only a little more than a million Protestants and Jews and three to four hundred thousand resident Algerian Moslems in France. Yet of the 48 million Catholics, not more than about 25%, a maximum of around 12 million, can be classed as practicing believers. The great majority are "indifferent"; they observe only the basic sacraments prescribed by the Church—baptism, communion, marriage, and extreme unction—and perhaps conform outwardly to some of the most important religious ceremonies and rites. A minority, about 6 million, is anticlerical and agnostic. Many densely populated urban centers are virtually "de-Christianized"—without churches, priests, or practicing Catholics. Much of the urban population, especially in the working-class districts,

predominantly royalist. The young officers received their "high school" training in exclusive Jesuit schools where they faced rigorous examinations and then were sent to the few select military schools, later to be assigned to regimental or divisional commands or to the various staff organizations in Paris. Family, social, religious, and school ties made them a well knit group, whose autonomy was assured by the frequent appointment of a General as Minister of War. Time after time, the Army imposed virtually a veto on the regularly constituted governmental authorities. When the Third Republic was introduced, Army officers attempted on two occasions to subvert it in favor of the Monarchy. It was the Dreyfus Affair in 1894—a landmark in the political history of France—that broke the political autonomy of the Army and changed its social composition.

The real issue in the Dreyfus Affair (1894–1906) was whether the Army could continue to be a state within a state, immune from political scrutiny and able to impose its own will upon the civil government. The Army court-martialed Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish Captain, for treason, and, when challenged that the documents used to convict Dreyfus had actually been forged by another officer of the General Staff, the Army claimed that any interference with its own jurisdiction and rules would destroy its morale and ultimately undermine the unity of the nation. A wave of nationalism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Republicanism swept across the country when Émile Zola and others charged that Dreyfus was innocent and demanded a new trial for him. After some 10 years of unremitting social and political strife, the Republican forces won, civil control over the Army was asserted, and the hold of the Church and the aristocracy on the Army was broken.

The end of the Dreyfus Affair virtually coincided with the establishment of separation of Church and state in France and the dissolution of a number of religious congregations and the

confiscation of their property. These developments marked, in a real sense, the culmination of the Revolution of 1789: they weakened the ultraconservative elements of the Church, virtually wiped out the influence of the aristocracy, and paved the way for the democratic reorganization of the Army under the supremacy of the Republican government.

From the turn of the century until 1940, the bulk of the Army officers adopted an attitude of political neutrality. It was referred to as the "*grande muette*," the "great deaf and dumb." It did not interfere in politics. However, few high-ranking officers were genuinely Republican. The Army was not attuned to the world of politics, to the need for give and take, negotiation and compromise, and it thus tended to stand aloof from the arena of political bargaining.

The defeat of the French armies in World War II shook the Army to its foundations. It weakened its loyalty to the state, shattered its internal discipline and cohesiveness, and radically changed its social composition; it also led the Army to search for a scapegoat to blame for the disaster. When the Armistice was signed between the French and the Germans in 1940, the Republic was set aside and one man, Marshal Pétain, established an authoritarian system. He was supported by the bulk of the Army. Following the Army's tradition of political neutrality, virtually all the officers commanding colonial garrisons obeyed Pétain. In Senegal, Madagascar, Morocco, and Algeria, discipline held. But one General, de Gaulle, did not obey. With a small group of followers, he decided to reject the legitimacy of Marshal Pétain's government and continue the war. De Gaulle's rebelliousness was not a unique phenomenon, but it was remarkable that he was able to win over more and more officers and colonial garrisons and eventually to march into liberated France as the country's legitimate representative and spokesman. The logic of the situation carried dangerous seeds for the future.

"private."⁴ Only the diplomas given by the public schools and universities are recognized. Matters of religious dogma and practical administration are decided by a loose organization headed by the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops. The country is divided into dioceses that correspond to the Departments, and these in turn are subdivided into parishes. A total of some 40,000 priests and about 100,000 auxiliaries belonging to various religious orders perform the services and administer the many activities of the Church—charity, education, relief, hospitals, and so forth. The state intervenes only when a bishop is nominated by the Pope, for it must approve the choice for the appointment to be valid.

What is the political orientation of the practicing Catholics? As with other groups we have examined, there is great diversity in the political behavior of Catholics. Some follow the Church's dogma and believe the state to be subordinate to the Church. Many remain extremely conservative. In the thirties, this group was represented by a militant anti-Republican organization, the National Federation of Catholics. On the other end of the spectrum, the "progressive" Catholics are actively concerned with social and economic reform and are more interested in social action than in proselytizing and maintaining the dogma. This group, since the Liberation, has been moving toward the Left and has been responsible for establishing new reformist Catholic groups, parties, and trade unions. Between the Left and the Right are the majority of believers, who generally vote for the Center parties.

In the last decades, many Catholic youth organizations composed of lay believers have been particularly active in social, economic, and political matters. The most significant among them have been the J.A.C. (*Jeunesse Agricole Catholique*—Catholic Agricultural Youth), the

J.O.C. (*Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique*—Catholic Workers Youth), and the J.E.C. (*Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne*—Christian Student Youth). They have to spread a new progressive philosophy among the workers and farmers. Often looked upon with suspicion by the Catholic hierarchy and frequently in sharp disagreement with other parareligious organizations of the Church, these groups have been quite successful in organizing Catholic workers, farmers, and students, and in bringing about progressive reforms. They have not been able to reduce appreciably Communist influence, but they have succeeded in reaching those who might otherwise have succumbed to it.

In 1944, Catholic Action organizations spurred the creation of a large liberal Catholic party, the Republican Popular Movement (M.R.P.); in the fifties, they successfully rebuilt the Christian trade union, the French Confederation of Christian Workers (C.F.T.C.). Today they are trying to penetrate the countryside, by sparking a desire for reform among the farmers and villagers, by encouraging economic and technical reforms that are so much needed in French agriculture, and by supporting enlightened candidates at the local level for the offices of mayor, municipal councilor, and, more recently, senators and deputies. They are also beginning to actively enter politics in an effort to restructure the political parties—especially those of the Left.

The Army

As in England and in all other European countries, the French Army, except in the brief periods during the Revolution, the reign of Napoleon and since World War II, has been composed of officers of aristocratic and upper middle-class background. After the Bourbon Restoration of 1814, the officer corps became almost a caste—hierarchically organized, anti-Republican, and, until the turn of the century,

⁴Except for Alsace-Lorraine, where the Church and Catholic schools have been subsidized since 1918.

Dreyfus case and the victory of World War I, it was assimilated into the Republic. It adopted a neutral stand in politics, but not for long. In the late thirties, it began to question the weak and vacillating policies of the Republic, and in 1940 most of the officers supported the authoritarian system that emerged from the Armistice. General de Gaulle's call emboldened many officers to set their own goals ahead of those of the legally constituted government. All pretense to neutrality was abandoned. At the same time, the Army's social character had changed. The Army began to recruit its officers extensively from the middle class and the lower middle class. Slowly the insecurities and anxieties of this class crept into the ranks, especially into the officer corps. Algeria spurred the officers, fired by years of isolation and defeat, to become the spokesmen of a new nationalism, and a political regime that would support them. Hoping de Gaulle would do this, they backed him in May, 1958. But even their allegiance to de Gaulle and the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was conditional, and it took almost a decade and two uprisings before they acquiesced to the authority of the state.

Intellectuals

Intellectuals are people who work with ideas and manipulate symbols and words. Broadly speaking, we can include in this category teachers, lawyers, doctors, higher civil servants, writers, artists, editors, radio commentators, newspaper columnists. If we apply this very general definition of the term, there are about 1 million intellectuals in France, but, for purposes of political analysis, we need a more limited, a more functional definition of intellectual. Here, then, we will consider an intellectual to be a person of some education and sophistication who, by using various media of communication, consciously attempts to influence the course of events.

To understand the intellectual's role in pol-

itics, we must go back again to the Dreyfus Affair. The trial of Captain Dreyfus not only brought sharp conflict over the fate of the officer, but generated more profound discussions about the nature of justice, the power of the state, and the rights of the individual. Émile Zola's famous article, "I Accuse," in which he levied a bitter attack against the Army and its officers for framing a fellow officer in the name of the rights of the state, crystallized the deeper issues in the case and awakened in the intellectuals a desire to enter the arena of political dispute. Intellectuals thus became "engaged" in politics, but, like the other groups we have examined, they have been fragmented into many ideological camps that support Catholics, anticlericals, nationalists, Republicans, Communists, militarists, antimilitarists, etc. They began to reflect the divisions of the society.

Instead of objectively analyzing and clarifying issues, therefore, the intellectuals became protagonists of political causes. The Jesuit schools produced, until the end of the nineteenth century, intellectuals for the Army and the bureaucracy, while the Teachers' Schools (*Écoles Normales*) graduated teachers and intellectuals deeply committed to a lay republic, to the separation of Church and state, and often to Socialism. The "League of the French Fatherland" (*Ligue de la Patrie Française*) consisted of conservative, nationalist pro-Army intellectuals, while the "League of the Rights of Man" (*Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*) included those who were attached to the Republic, to individual rights, and to the separation of Church and state. Numerous groups in the thirties took an overtly pro-royalist and authoritarian stance. The sympathy of some university professors with Communism provoked, in turn, many conservative intellectuals to favor peace with Germany and later to support Pétain's authoritarian regime. After the Liberation, a sharp debate erupted between those who were sympathetic to the Soviet Union and the cause of Socialism and those who opposed the totalitarian means

If one General could do it, why not another? The dissidence split the ranks of the Army. Some officers had sided with de Gaulle, others with Pétain. "Pétainists" and "Gaullists" became expressions conveying two political tendencies and two orientations in the Army. Even if the passage of time could temper the hostility between the two blocs, mutual suspicion was inevitable. The hierarchy and discipline of the Army was therefore rudely shaken.

Defeat makes any army unpopular. It took a long time, for instance, for the German Army to recover from the debacle of World War I, and it has not quite yet recovered from defeat in the Second World War. Disgraced, useless, and frustrated, the defeated soldiers, and especially the officers, realize that they are something of a pariah in a country that only shortly before had heaped glory and distinction upon them. With the French officer corps, the situation was even more discouraging. The collapse of 1940 was followed by a series of colonial wars in which the French Army continuously had to withdraw. The war in Indochina that lasted from 1946 to 1954 took a heavy toll among the officers, while few at home seemed to care what was going on halfway around the globe. In 1956 France pulled out of Morocco and Tunisia; in 1954 the Algerian rebellion erupted and raged intermittently for almost eight years.

Years of defeat and neglect embittered the French Army, and the officers no longer had wealth or social position to help siphon off their frustration. The French Army in the 1950's contained only a few hundred wealthy officers, compared to some 30,000 in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The twentieth-century officers were mostly from the lower middle class, and many rose from the ranks. Their parents were frequently military officers or civil servants, members of the professions, small landowners. The officers shared the anxieties and fears of the lower middle class, who were frightened of a world that was changing

too rapidly and of a future that carried unknown threats to their security. They thus considered that status and prestige were inordinately important, but found themselves ignored, underpaid, and criticized for losing battles the country itself did not seem to want to win. The officers found their scapegoat in the Republic, which they believed had badly let them, and France, down. They formed dissident organizations and sought allies among Right-wing, anti-Republican forces in an attempt to impose their view on the Fourth Republic. The Army thus re-entered politics in a rebellious mood.

Algeria was the breaking point. Some half a million recruits and their officers were confronted with a far-from-orthodox war. It was a battle involving ambushes, street fighting, and terrorist attacks. The rebels had the support of the overwhelming Moslem majority, who surrounded the French settlers and the Army at every turn. There could be no retreat. Yet victory in the traditional military sense was impossible, since the enemy consisted of elusive bands of guerrillas. In an attempt to "win," the Army embarked on a broad-scale campaign that ranged far beyond just firing weapons. They utilized censorship, propaganda, coercion, and torture. They were given the power to censor newspapers, to control the schools, to administer new schools for the Moslems, to set up "resettlement camps" in which Algerians were screened and indoctrinated, and to move hundreds of thousands of Algerians into barracks and new villages where they could be closely watched. But back in Paris, political leaders criticized the war and urged negotiations with the rebels. The Army was prevented from "solving" the problem in its customary way—by victory. More and more Army leaders came to see that the only way out was to assume political control and eliminate the Republic.

Thus the Army had come full circle since the Dreyfus Affair. Before 1890, it could, in effect, veto actions of the government, but after the

the Soviets imposed to accomplish their goal of Socialism. The old question of whether the end justifies the means split the intellectuals into bitterly opposed pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet camps.

The intellectuals speak through organizations that constitute important pressure-groups, but they speak with so many different voices that they tend to cancel one another out. By often exaggerating and distorting their arguments, the intellectuals end up by aggravating the differences that divide the community. The lively discussions of ideas that continuously take place in France are one of the glories of French culture. But they put a great strain on the nation's political system, and, by mounting ideas as weapons in political battles, make the compromises necessary for effective political action even more difficult to achieve.

INTEREST GROUPS

Economic, social, intellectual, and religious interests are solidly organized in France. For every conceivable interest-group, there seems to be an association or a spokesman. If we look at the Paris telephone directory under "association" or "union" or "syndicat," we shall quickly realize that there is no possible interest that does not have an office or organization in France. What is more, for each single interest there are *many* different associations. We cannot hope to discuss all the interest-groups in France, but we will try to examine their general characteristics and study the mode of action of the more important ones.

Types of Interest-Groups

At the risk of oversimplification, the interest groups can be divided into two broad categories. First are the *representative groups*, organizations that speak for the most important activities and interests at a national level. Their

voice is that of a great number of members and often a large number of affiliated groups and subgroups. Most important among them are: the C.N.P.F., *Conseil National du Patronat Français* (The National Council of French Employers), which represents a great assortment of business enterprises and roughly corresponds to our National Association of Manufacturers and Chambers of Commerce combined; the C.N.P.M.E., *Conseil National des Petits et Moyens Entreprises* (The National Council of Small and Medium-Sized Business), which is affiliated with the National Council of Employers, and represents a vast number of smaller-sized enterprises; the F.N.S.E.A., *Fédération Nationale des Syndicats des Exploitants Agricoles* (The National Federation of Farmers), speaking for farmers; the three major trade union organizations—C.G.T., F.O., and C.G.T.D.; the F.E.N., *Fédération de l'Éducation Nationale* (Federation of National Education), an "independent" union representing most of the grade-school, high-school, college, and technical-school teachers, and the U.N.E.F., *Union Nationale des Étudiants de France* (National Student Union), representing university students. All these affiliations are nationally organized. They have branches all over France. Their members usually, but not always, agree on a particular means of action, so that their leaders can speak on any given issue with considerable authority and weight.

Second, there are organizations that have a *distinctly economic and corporative character*. Some of them act independently, although most belong to the organizations mentioned under the first category. Some have such a mass membership that their effectiveness is primarily "electoral"—that is, they urge their members to vote for or against a particular party or a candidate. Here is just a partial listing of this type of group: high-school teachers; Catholic families who receive subsidies for the education of their children in Catholic schools; the organizations that belong to the so-called "highway

lobby"—motel owners, gas-station owners, car producers, truck and moving companies, gas producers, oil companies, etc., tavern and bistro owners backed by the powerful alcohol lobby; some 2 million "private distillers" who each produce up to 2½ gallons of alcohol every year free of tax, veterans, with their various organizations, war widows, invalids, etc. Other groups occupy critical areas in the country's economy whose temporary suspension may paralyze a good part of the nation mailmen, electrical workers, railroad employees, miners, dockworkers

MEANS OF ACTION In general, French lobbies are quite similar in their methods of action to American lobbies. They give financial support to candidates, they place their spokesmen in the legislature and in the Civil Service; they have their own journals and hand out news releases in an attempt to sway public opinion to their point of view, they often exact pledges from the candidates they support and sponsor "study committees" in the legislature to promote their own interests

French lobbies are also directly active in the legislative process. Through their spokesmen, they introduce bills and see to it that the proper amendments are inserted in pending legislation or that prejudicial amendments are blocked. Their influence even spills over into the executive branch. When a bill is passed, the interested lobby tries to prevent the release of any executive order that might be prejudicial to their interest or, conversely, attempts to see that the proper executive orders will be issued. To do this, spokesmen are often planted in certain crucial administrative services—the Ministries of Public Works, Agriculture, Veterans, Finance, and Industrial Production. With the growing participation of the state in economic matters, lobbying at the ministerial level has greatly increased. Every interest attempts to "colonize" the government in a number of ways, by influencing administrators, by offering

them important jobs in their own organizations, by presenting them with facts and figures that appear to be convincing.

In conclusion, one characteristic of French pressure-groups should be mentioned, a characteristic that both gives the lobbies strength and that denies them the ultimate effectiveness enjoyed by pressure groups in other countries. The French pressure-groups have easily been able to secure favors in the form of legislation, tax benefits, subsidies, tariff protection, insurance against risk, price supports, and the like because of two reasons (1) the governments have been too unstable to be able to say "no" to anyone, and (2) real governmental power has been diffused among many agencies: parliamentary committees (just as powerful as our congressional committees), parliamentary party groups, some 12 to 15 of them, the Civil Service, which was already in part colonized and receptive to pressure-group influence, the Minister, whose tenure was always precarious, the Cabinet and Prime Minister, whose political life averaged about seven months. In such a system, pressure groups, through backstairs maneuvering, could exploit every advantage opened up by party disagreements, or the contradictions arising from coalition cabinets. But this situation was bound to work in the long run against the interest groups. Since all pressure-groups managed to defend themselves and extract concessions from the state, it was impossible for any of them to produce radical changes of policy. The various groups could thus check each other.

The greatest weakness of the lobbies lay, however, in their political fragmentation. The splits among the important groups, like the workers and farmers, were so deep that they could not act in unison. In Great Britain, lobbies are effective because they are able to adopt a common action in favor of specific policies. In France, on the other hand, the interest groups are so divided that they often fail to generate a common strategy and action.

The Articulation of Interest

Each of the major social groups we have discussed is represented by several associations.

LABOR INTEREST-GROUPS. The working class is represented by at least five organizations. The General Confederation of Labor (C.G.T.), the largest of all, includes craft unions and industrial unions—i.e., those with members from an entire industry: steel workers, construction workers, automobile workers, etc. Its directive medium is the National Confederal Committee, which is elected by the delegates to the annual National Congress. The leaders are Communists and have been since World War II, and they often use the union for political purposes. They have called strikes to protest the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Defense Community, and the continuation of the wars in Indochina and Algeria, and they generally pursue the political objectives of the Communist Party.

The C.F.D.T.—the French Confederation of Democratic Labor—is organized very much like the C.G.T. Half its members are salaried workers, and it is committed to social reform and to increasing the standard of living and wages of the workers. It has collaborated quite closely with the C.G.T. on economic issues but it is usually unwilling to strike for political purposes. Despite its present name, the bulk of its forces continue to come from the C.F.T.C.—the French Confederation of Christian Workers, an old liberal Catholic movement.

The C.G.T.-F.O., General Confederation of Labor-Force Ouvrière split off and separated from the C.G.T. in 1947 when its predominantly Socialist membership would not accept the pro-Soviet political directives of the Communist-controlled C.G.T. They seceded to form their own group, primarily composed of

low-ranking civil servants and workers in nationalized industries. It, too, says its goals are "apolitical," but in practice it has followed the policies of the Socialist Party.

There is a small anarchist union, the C.N.T. (National Confederation of Labor), which consists of unions not affiliated with any of the three larger unions. Nonaffiliated unions serve the needs of other employees. The National Federation of Education, for instance, has a membership of more than a quarter of a million grade-school, high-school, technical-school, and university teachers. Although claiming to be apolitical, it has consistently taken political positions on a number of issues. The Socialists and Communists have vied for its control, and the resolutions of the members often reflect sharp political divisions.

FARM INTEREST-GROUPS. About 700,000 farmers belong to the National Federation of Farmers. Nationwide in scope, it includes farmers who deal in such products as wheat, wine, beets, milk, and poultry. Although the avowed purpose of the organization is to "represent and defend on the national plane the interests of the agricultural profession in the economic, social, moral, and legislative domain," the Federation represents only a small percentage of farmers and is generally dominated by the wealthier ones, notably the beet growers, the so-called alcohol lobby, the dairy interests, and meat producers. In the last few years a dynamic small group of agricultural experts, technicians, and intellectuals has organized the "National Council of Young Farmers"—concerned with the development of cooperation and understanding. They have gradually infiltrated the National Federation and have contributed in the improvement of agriculture and the betterment of the standard of living of the small farms. The Federation of Farmers today, like many other interest-groups, is actively participating, in cooperation with the administration, in the over-all reorientation of French agriculture.

Almost all the political parties have tried to woo the farmers by setting up their own farm organization or by demonstrating favorable actions within the National Federation of Farmers. The Socialists established the General Confederation of Agriculture, which was quite powerful right after the Liberation, the Communists ran the General Confederation of Farm Workers, which is influential in central France and in the Southwest, where the farms are parceled into small private holdings, the Catholics and the M.R.P. work through various agricultural Catholic Action groups, particularly the Catholic youth farm organizations, the Right-wing has a number of farm associations, and the Radical Socialist Party has become the spokesman for middle-income farmers in a number of areas. Thus extreme diversity and fragmentation have been the rule with farm organizations, which is clearly reflected by the voting behavior of farmers.

When political-action and pressure-group methods have failed to achieve the farmers' goals, they have borrowed the tactics of the working class and staged demonstrations and strikes, complete with roadblocks and acts of violence. This form of direct action has, of course, precedents that go back to the farmers' uprisings under the *Ancien Régime*, especially in the South, but even as recently as the thirties, farmers were organized into a rural fascist militia known as the "Green Shirts." The postwar infiltration into farm groups of both the extreme Left (the Communists) and the extreme Right (the Poujadists) intensified the farmers' rebelliousness.

The political unrest of the farmers has been exacerbated by economic developments. Since the end of World War II, modernization has increased farm productivity to such an extent that prices of agricultural products have sagged. Although the costs of goods that the farmer buys have dropped, the decrease has not been enough to prevent a decline in farm income and a consequent exodus from the farm to the city.

Every year about 40,000 people move from agricultural areas to the larger towns. The farmers have demanded and received increased aid in the form of subsidies, tax exemptions, and price supports. Help of a sort has also come from those who preach that the farmer is the backbone of the nation's moral character. In 1959, for instance, the Minister of Industrial Production and former Professor of Economics, J. M. Jeanneney, wrote that agriculture has a "civilizing mission" and that the stability of a people derives from a sufficient number of farmers.⁵

But the process of modernization cannot be easily arrested. In most mature societies, people are moving off the farms into towns, from agriculture into industry, leaving in their wake severe dislocations in the life of the countryside, especially in France, where intense resentments and political divisions already existed. Efforts to ameliorate the French farmer's condition, to teach him new techniques, to provide him with fertilizers and tractors, to develop cooperatives, and to show him what and how to plant, have been undertaken by the state and a number of voluntary associations. The farmers' situation is on the upswing.

MIDDLE-CLASS INTEREST-GROUPS As we have seen, the middle class is badly divided politically. However, one large organization, the National Council of Small and Middle-Sized Business, claims to include some 3,000 associations representing a total of 800,000 firms, the great majority of members being shopkeepers and merchants. Dedicated to preserving the interests of the "small" and "medium-sized" firm and store, it has spokesmen in the legislature who influence legislation on tariffs, subsidies, prices, taxation, and means of modernizing the distribution of goods. The Council gives financial support to political candidates and has occasionally run its own men in

⁵*Forces et Faiblesses de l'Economie Française* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1957), p. 65.

national elections. But the "unity" of the small and middle-sized businessmen is a myth. Their loyalties are divided among all political parties. The Communists, for instance, have set up a number of "front" organizations in commerce and industry—among grocers, artisans, holders of liquor licenses, and small businessmen—and pose as the protector of the "small man" against the big corporations.

THE ARMY AND VETERANS. Like any other professional organization, the Army has a number of associations closely tied to it. The officers, noncommissioned officers, and graduates of the different military schools all have their own organizations. In addition, France's veterans are organized into several groups that concentrate largely on obtaining pensions and other economic privileges for their members. These veterans' associations are affiliated with various political organizations. The National Union of Veterans supports the moderate political groups of the Center; the Republican Association of Veterans is linked with the Communists, the National Federation of Republican Veterans with the Radicals, the Federation of Worker and Peasant Veterans with the Socialists. There are also specialized veterans' groups: veterans of the Algerian war and the Indochinese war and veterans of specific military branches and divisions.

An effort to unite all these associations into one apolitical organization that would speak on behalf of the veterans' common economic interests and thus become an effective pressure-group resulted in the formation right after World War II of the French Union of the Associations of Veterans and War Victims. It was a powerful organization, probably representing more than 5 million members. However, disagreement over the colonial policy of the government and the war in Algeria led to the inevitable fragmentation of the group. By 1956, a special committee was established to support the continuation of the war in Algeria and to

assure that France would never allow independence for Algeria. By attracting very nationalistic and often extremely antirepublican support, this committee caused the estrangement of more liberal members of the Union and the formation of rival factions.

INTEREST-GROUPS OF INTELLECTUALS. The only genuine professional association among what we may call the "intellectuals" is the Confederation of Intellectual Workers of France. A very loose organization of some 400,000 members representing about 80 associations, it includes painters, writers, members of professions, and many others. Although it professes to represent the material interests of the intellectuals, this claim of unity around economic themes is illusory. The intellectuals, as we have seen, are divided into all the political families of the nation, and are deeply "engaged" in the political issues of the day.

Among the political organizations of the intellectuals, the League of the Rights of Man has been one of the most powerful. Founded at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, it grew in the thirties to a membership of over 200,000. Since then it has been on the decline, but continues to represent the forces of the Left and champions such causes as individual and political freedom and freedom of the press, and opposes all forms of authoritarianism. It considers itself the guardian of the rights secured by the French Revolution and is a staunch believer in the separation of Church and state. Its support comes from all the elements of the Left, including civil servants, teachers, university professors, and, at times, even the liberal Catholics.

Students should perhaps also be listed under the category of "intellectuals." They are specifically concerned with advancing their own status and well-being, in the form of scholarships, living quarters, loans, and the like, but, as is the case with all the groups we have discussed, it is impossible for students to maintain an apolitical posture. Their organization, the

U.N.E.F. (National Student Union), has branches at all the universities in France and includes in its membership around half the total number of registered university students—about 100,000. It is a very active lobby, constantly sending letters to deputies and parliamentary leaders, either supporting or criticizing government projects.

BUSINESS INTEREST-GROUPS. Probably the most solidly organized professional group in France is that of the businessmen: industrialists, corporation managers, bankers, and merchants. Their strongest organization is the C.N.P.F., *Conseil National du Patronat Français* (National Council of French Employers). Founded after World War I, it includes, according to its own statement, almost a million firms, which employ about 6 million wage-earners and salaried personnel. Besides individual firms, it also includes other business associations, of which the National Council of Small and Middle-Sized Businessmen is one, together with organizations representing particular industries, such as chemicals, steel, and shipbuilding.

The functions of the C.N.P.F. are: (a) to establish a liaison between industry and commerce; (b) to represent business firms before the public authorities, (c) to undertake studies

for the purpose of improving the economic and social conditions of the country; and (d) to provide information for its members. The Council thus speaks on behalf of many powerful interests. Its "representative" character and its huge size render it somewhat inflexible and immobile, and its highly diversified membership makes it difficult to arrive at a common attitude on particular issues. On the other hand, the Council is more effective than most other interest groups. It is prudent in its lobbying tactics, for fear of antagonizing the many groups that are traditionally hostile to business. Most of its pressures are exercised secretly, through a network of personal contacts, particularly between the "businessmen" and the legislators and administrators. Whenever it takes a position on specific policies that are of direct interest to the business world, on, say, the Common Market, plant and equipment modernization, or fiscal policies, it does so more discreetly than the other interest-groups. By successfully avoiding direct identification with political causes, the Council has been able to maintain its cohesiveness and prevent the splintering that has plagued other groups. Consequently, it has been strong enough to resist attack and to block policies that are prejudicial to the interests of its members.

IV

THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC OPINION¹

Parties and Opinion

The structure of public opinion is showing marked similarities with that of other industrialized democratic societies. Interest in politics, measured in terms of the standard criteria—listening to political commentaries on radio and TV, reading about political topics in newspapers, discussing politics with friends, neighbors, and associates—is relatively low. About 8% are “much interested” and 29% “a little,” while 28% claim “very little” interest, and more than a third—35%—none at all. Information at times is abysmally low. Between 1949 and 1960, more than 40% of the French did not know what N.A.T.O. was, and did not know that the United States was a member. By the end of January, 1967, five weeks before the legislative election, 30% did not know when elections were to take place, and 61% could not give the name of a single candidate running in his district. Among those who mentioned a name, 66% did not know the political party to which he belonged. About 40% did not know the groups that were included in the four major political formations that had entered the electoral campaign. A very small number engage in political activity, again measured on the basis of standard criteria: party membership, attendance at meetings, regular letter-writing, distributing of leaflets, organized talks and meetings, helping bring out the vote. Political activists—what the French call “*militants*”—are only a tiny fraction of the electorate. Even at the peak of political activity, right after the Libera-

¹In writing a part of this chapter I have drawn heavily from Deutsch, Lindon, and Weill, *Les Familles Politiques en France* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1966). I hereby acknowledge my debt.

tion, not more than 2 million were regular party members. Today, out of some 28 million electors, not more than 1 million are regular party members. Out of them, not more than 100,000 are *activists*. Yet the voting has been among the highest when compared with European nations, Great Britain, and the United States. Since 1958, there have been four referendums, three legislative elections, and one Presidential election. Only once did voting drop below 30% of the registered voters. In the Presidential election of 1965, it was as high as 84%, and in the legislative election of 1967, over 80%.

Interest and activity correspond to certain standard variables. Men are more interested and more active than women. While 48% of men are "much" or "a little" interested, the corresponding figure for women is 26%. Seventy-four percent of the women are either "very little" interested or "not at all." Age does not seem to be an important variable, though there is a tendency for those between 30 and 55 to show relatively greater interest than the younger or older groups. Farmers show the least interest and corresponding political activity. Only 6% are "very much" and 21% "a little" interested; the small merchants and shopkeepers come next, only 4% are "much" and 21% "a little" interested. The managerial and professional groups show a relatively high interest, with 20% indicating "much" interest and 42% "a little", the salaried groups—civil servants, clerical staff, high-school teachers, etc.—indicate greater interest: 13% are "much" interested, and 33% "a little." Workers are almost as low in their interest as the farmers: 4% declare to be "much" interested and 32% "a little," while the "retired" indicate an appreciable interest—10% "much" and 29% "a little."

The size of the community and the level of education also are significant determinants of interest. Those living in small communities (2,500 inhabitants and under) are the least in-

terested—"very little" or "not at all" accounting for 70%. But interest generally progresses as the size of the community increases, reaching as much as 50% for the towns of about 50,000 (it declines again in the larger urban centers, except for Paris, where 50% are "much" or a "little" interested. Interest also correlates in the same manner with education. Those with grade-school education are the least interested—69%—but 38% to 52% of the holders of high or technical-school and gymnasium degrees are "much" or "a little" interested. Among those with university education, interest is astonishingly high, with 32% indicating "much" interest and 35% "a little."

How do the citizens view the various ideological families in France, and how do they relate with political parties? Where shall we place and how shall we analyze the attitudes and voting patterns of the very large group that is totally disinterested in politics? We shall turn to these questions in the following section.

Opinion and Ideology

In the last decade, but perhaps ever since the Liberation, there has been increasing (though by no means conclusive) evidence that the sharpness and intensity of ideological positions and the corresponding identification of the average citizen with ideological families has been on the decline. Frenchmen are more (but by no means definitely) reconciled today with the need for a strong and effective state, and are more likely to identify problems and issues as amenable to solution through cooperative political effort, rather than to place them into an ideological continuum that would produce division. As we noted, there has been a disenchantment with the present political parties that continue to mirror ideological conflicts of the past, and a growing demand for larger national parties to channel interest. A strong and stable government supported by such a party or parties is generally desired, and stability and

effectiveness are beginning to be valued as such. The parties themselves, despite their attachment to ideological themes, are beginning to be oriented towards *ad hoc* compromises and concrete issues. Even the old conflict between church and state seems to have disappeared, though it flares up occasionally, and the state subsidies to Catholic schools, responsible today for the education of about one out of seven children, is taken for granted by all except the Communists and some militant Socialists. Free enterprise has been considerably qualified by nationalization, state subsidies, state indirect controls, and an overall flexible economic planning. Though planning continues to have significant ideological anti-capitalist overtones, the old quarrels between "capitalism" and "socialism" as alternate ways of life have been virtually set aside.

Still, residual categories remain, and one of them is the traditional distinction between Left and Right. The electorate situates itself in the Left-Right spectrum, but appears to be quite confused as to what the terms mean. The Left-Right continuum can be broken down into six groupings: Extreme Left, Moderate Left, Center, Moderate Right, Extreme Right, and Apolitical. (A very sizable portion of those belonging to the Center express such a total disaffection with politics, and exhibit such a profound lack of interest and information, that they may be called downright apolitical, and so constitute a distinct group.)

Extreme Left 16%	Moderate Left 19%	Center 9%	Moderate Right 17%	Extreme Right 7%
		Apoliti- cal 32%		

The apolitical constitute the largest group—yet they vote! They come from among those that

have the least education, live in smallest towns, and belong to marginal and threatened occupational groups: farmers, artisans, unskilled workers, shopkeepers, veterans, and older people living on pensions. They have no strong attachment to political parties, and hardly ever identify with any political ideology. They have been responsible for the floating vote that swings from one to another party. They account to a large extent for the emergence of a new party (the M.R.P.) after the Liberation; the resurgence of Gaullism in 1951; the strong showing of the Right-wing Poujadists in 1956; and the massive votes for de Gaulle and the Independents in 1958. (They deserted de Gaulle on the first ballot of the Presidential election, only to return on the second.) Finally, the voting strength of the Communist Party comes from a fraction of this group. They vote Communist either out of resentment against the system because they take seriously the Communists' promise to act for the "little man"; or because of downright ignorance and alienation that make them susceptible to the Communist slogans.

While it is relatively easy to identify the "apoliticals," it is extremely hard to identify clearly in the Left-Right spectrum, to which the rest of the electorate belongs, their attitudes on various issues. There is not a single issue on which a minimum of 75% of the persons who claimed to belong to the Left, or 75% of those who claimed to belong to the Right, give respectively the same opinion. On the four issues that appear the most critical—the attitude towards the power of the state, the existence of the parochial (Catholic) schools, nationalization of the large private industries, and the construction of Socialism—the answers were as given in Tables 4-1 through 4-4.

It appears that only the attitude towards the "power" of the state continues to have some residual ideological significance and to discriminate between those who claim to belong to the Left from those claiming attachment to the Right. But even this may simply be an expres-

TABLE 4-1
Attitude Toward the Power of the State

	Extreme Left	Moderate Left	Moderate Right	Extreme Right
Must maintain power of the state	19%	30%	54%	62%
Power must be lessened	73	58	30	26
No opinion	8	12	16	12

TABLE 4-2
Aid to Parochial Schools Should Be Abolished

	Extreme Left	Moderate Left	Moderate Right	Extreme Right
Agree	63%	31%	8%	12%
Disagree	33	54	82	82
No opinion	4	15	10	6

TABLE 4-3
Large Private Industries Should Be Nationalized

	Extreme Left	Moderate Left	Moderate Right	Extreme Right
Agree	58%	34%	25%	29%
Disagree	22	42	50	47
No opinion	20	24	25	24

TABLE 4-4
It Is Necessary to Construct Socialism

	Extreme Left	Moderate Left	Moderate Right	Extreme Right
Agree	84%	69%	38%	32%
Disagree	6	11	21	31
No opinion	10	20	41	37

sion of hostility toward the personal power of General de Gaulle.

On the basis of these critical questions, only political orientations that are vague and inconclusive can be discerned. But there is a certain correspondence between "Left," "Center," or "Right," to which a person claims to belong, and the party with which he identifies. The Extreme Left identifies largely with the Communist Party and the Federation, and rejects the Democratic Center, Gaullists, and the Independent Republicans. The Moderate Left identifies with the Federation (Socialists and Radicals), and to a much smaller degree with the Communists. But there is a certain sympathy and tolerance for both the Democratic Center and the Gaullists. The Center overwhelmingly identifies itself with the Democratic Center and the Gaullists, and rejects the Communists and the Federation, in that order. The Moderate Right favors overwhelmingly the Gaullists, and to a lesser extent the Democratic Center and the Independent Republicans. Their rejection of the Communists is overwhelming, and that of the Federation very strong. The Extreme Right identifies, but not strongly, with the Gaullists; they are tolerated, but not with great sympathy. It rejects the Communists and the Federation, but not as overwhelmingly as the Moderate Center or the Center does. Finally, the Apoliticals show, as expected, a very low level of involvement and identification with any party.

Thus, while it is hard to find a tangible correlation between ideological issues or even policy issues on the one hand, and the Left-Right spectrum on the other, there is a residual correlation between them and political parties. It is only the Apoliticals that in great numbers appear to be detached until the day of voting, eschewing stable political affiliations. As we noted, they are a source of instability that renders difficult the effort of the political parties to create national organizations and discipline. It is perhaps no longer the ideological conflicts

that jeopardize the development of a homogeneous and effective political system in France, although they should not yet be discarded. It is, rather, the existence of a very large fraction of unorganized and disinterested voters, extremely prone to accept or reject Presidential government, attracted in turn by personal and authoritarian solutions, heeding indiscriminately all appeals that are most likely to satisfy their immediate grievances.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The most pervasive trait of the republican regimes has been, as we indicated, multipartism. However, since the inception of the Fifth Republic there has been an opposite trend. Some parties have literally disappeared or have become skeletons of their former selves; others are in the process of combining under a single name and are preparing to amalgamate their organizations into one. The result has been that in the legislative election of 1967, virtually only four major party formations confronted each other—an unprecedented phenomenon in the political history of France. A number of factors account for this trend. First, the Gaullist Party has managed to swallow (but not yet digest) many of the Conservative and Center groups, thus beginning to create what many French Conservatives have dreamed of for a long time: a formation like the British Conservative Party. Some Center groups found that the only way to resist the Gaullists was to unite, and today the Democratic Center is a formation that comprises some four or five different political parties or groups. The Gaullist strength has forced also the Left both to unite and to cooperate. Two of the oldest parties—the Socialists and the Radicals—have formed a Federation, *The Federation of the Socialist and Democratic Left*. A number of new men, mostly among the intellectuals, formed a small political group known as *The Convention of Republican*

Institutions, and they too joined the Federation. Finally, the Communists to the Left remain strong and independent, but are cooperating with the Federation.

Electoral considerations, primarily stemming from the upsurge of Gaullist strength in the election of 1962, forced many groups together. But there were institutional reasons as well. The direct election of the President by universal suffrage, and the requirement that only two candidates confront each other on the second ballot, was an important factor. Presidential elections gave also to the parties a new taste for leadership. New men appeared to challenge de Gaulle and lead the opposition. This meant organization and discipline. De Gaulle could impose discipline upon his supporters, but also curb the opposition in the National Assembly by the ever-present threat of dissolution, a power that the new Constitution gave him. New rules in the National Assembly helped develop unity. A party now needs 30 deputies to form a parliamentary group in the National Assembly; splinter groups are forced to cooperate, and many learn how to do it. The new electoral law stipulates that a candidate who fails to receive 10% of the registered voters in his district has to withdraw from the second balloting or lose his deposit of \$200 unless he receives at least 5% of the votes. This discourages frivolous candidates and reduces automatically their number. Other factors have accentuated the trend toward party simplification. The multipart system had led to an alienation of the public from the parties. The latter had to combine and show strength if they were to gain credibility. Finally, ideological differences among the parties appeared to be not as strong as the vocabulary used suggested.

Whether there is a permanent trend away from multipartism to a three- or four-party system with party leadership and discipline remains to be seen. On the one hand, it is likely that the Gaullist Party may continue, thus forcing the other groups to coalesce, and that the

political parties within the Federation will definitely amalgamate. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the disappearance of de Gaulle may bring about the disintegration of the Gaullist party into a number of formations, and if so, make discipline and unity for the Center and for the Left less compelling. In discussing, therefore, the party configuration, we pay equal attention to the individual parties and to the broader and more integrative formations that have developed. We shall give a general account of the parties by using, for the sake of convenience, the traditional spectrum of French party configuration: Left, Center, and Right. Three formations belong to the Left, which we shall discuss first. They share attitudes and policies traditionally identified with it. They are the Communist Party, the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (consisting of two old parties—the Socialists and the Radicals) a new group, the Convention of the Republican Institutions—and the P.S.U. (Unified Socialist Party)—which, despite its name, is only a splinter Socialist group.

THE LEFT

The Communist Party

One of the most remarkable phenomena in the political history of France has been the strength of the Communist Party, especially since the end of World War II. The country that has been portrayed as a haven of individualism has had, as its largest party, a totalitarian and authoritarian one. Since the Liberation, with the exception of the legislative elections of 1958 and 1962, more than 5 million French men and women (22% or more of the electorate) have voted Communist.

HISTORY. The French Communist Party was founded in 1920, when almost three-fourths of the delegates to the Socialist Congress of Tours split off from the Socialists and followed

the Bolshevik leadership from Moscow. The new party joined the Third International, accepted Soviet leadership, endorsed the revolutionary philosophy of Lenin, and openly advocated the overthrow of French capitalism. It organized the *Confederation General des Travailleurs Unitaire* (C.G.T.U.) in an appeal for broad working-class support. Its membership, however, did not exceed 100,000, its voters did not number more than 1 million, and its parliamentary representation was small (10 to 26 members).

The party gradually increased its popularity and strength by cooperating with the Socialists and the democratic parties of the Center in a "popular front,"—a broad political alliance directed against the Right-wing forces. In the election of 1936, the Communists formed an electoral alliance with the Socialists and Radicals. They received a million and a half votes, and their representation in the legislature jumped to 72 deputies, a sixfold increase. A Socialist government was formed with the participation of the Radicals and the support of the Communist Party, which soft-pedaled its revolutionary posture in order to cooperate with the democratic parties.

When the Nazi-Soviet military pact was signed in 1939, the French Communist Party did an about-face overnight. It declared that the war against Nazi Germany was unnecessary, reasserted its support of Russia (the fatherland of revolutionary Socialism), and called for a world revolution of workers to take the place of the "imperialist" war against the Axis. The government could not accept this reversal of policy, outlawed the Communist Party, and imprisoned many of its leaders. Stunned by the Soviet pact with Hitler, many Communists dropped out of the party, and its membership fell off sharply. The shock of 1939 lasted only until the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. For the French Communists, the war then became a holy war against Fascism. They joined the underground to harass the occupying

Germans, organized guerrillas in many areas, collaborated with all anti-Nazi groups, and generally were the most effective leaders of the wartime Resistance movement. During the Occupation their membership grew, and their efforts earned them the respect and the support of the people. Capitalizing on their strength, the Communists captured control of the trade unions from the Socialists. By 1945 they emerged as the strongest party of post-war France. They supported General de Gaulle and, in line with the spirit of the resistance, cooperated with him from 1944 to 1945, and Communist leaders participated in the Cabinet.

As soon as the Cold War opened a rift between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Communists took the Soviet side. They refused to collaborate with any French government, led the workers into long and crippling strikes against American aid, the Marshall Plan, and N.A.T.O., and intensified their attacks in Parliament against every Cabinet, thus contributing to Cabinet instability.

Between 1947 and 1954—the height of the Cold War—the Communists remained in virtual isolation, both within the National Assembly and in the various elections. It was not until then that their efforts to cooperate with other “Republican” parties began to bear fruit. They, however, remained virtually alone in their opposition to de Gaulle’s return to power, and they were the only party to oppose the new Constitution that the Gaullists introduced. They have been its only consistent critics ever since.

The Gaullist electoral victories and the changing attitude of the Soviet Union brought about a reconsideration of the Socialist position *vis-à-vis* the Communists, but also a more cooperative attitude on the part of the Communists. In the legislative election of 1962, electoral agreements with the Communists were made in a number of Departments, and the “dialogue” between the two parties has since led to a search for a common program and a common

basis for cooperation against the Gaullist majority. By 1965—almost 30 years since the Popular Front had successfully, even if temporarily, brought Communists, Socialists, and Radicals together—the same alliance was about to be formed.

Under the Fifth Republic, despite electoral setbacks, the Communists found themselves in a good tactical position. They had led the opposition to de Gaulle’s return and, together with some splinter formations and individual leaders, had taken a firm stand against its Constitution. It was with a note of optimism, therefore, that the party held its Fifteenth Congress in Ivry, late in June, 1959. Maurice Thorez presented the report of the party:

Since our Fourteenth Congress [in 1956] we have witnessed the destruction of the democratic institutions and the establishment of personal power. Our party has been the principal force to resist the reaction. . . . The Communist Party predicted the Fascist danger, but the leaders of the Socialist Party continued to divide the working class.

The new leader of the Party, Waldeck Rochet, speaking at the Eighteenth Party Congress held in January, 1967, reiterated Thorez’ fears but pointed with satisfaction to the cooperation with the Socialists. The Communist Party was ready to proceed with the dialogue with the Socialists; it committed itself to a peaceful (and not revolutionary) passage from capitalism to socialism, and endorsed fully the notion of a plurality of parties and rejected the single-party system of some of the Communist states. However, it remained faithful to the basic Marxist notion that socialism cannot be realized without the struggle of classes, and without the full mobilization of the working class and its allies. He asked that the Socialists abandon their collaboration with the bourgeoisie and join forces with the Communists. He repeated the criticisms against the nature of the Gaullists’ system: it was a personal Bonapartist system that should be reformed, and it represented the in-

terests of the monopolies and the capitalists that should be done away with.

ORGANIZATION. The French Communist Party resembles that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is like a pyramid, in which the base represents the rank-and-file members, and the apex the leaders. The image of a pyramid also conveys the principle on which the party is founded. "democratic centralism." By democratic centralism, the Communists mean that the superior organs of the party make the decisions, after discussions among all the members, but that once a course of action is set by the majority, it is binding upon the minority. There can be no dissension, no "tendencies," within the Communist Party, even in France. Open opposition usually brings swift reprisals and frequently expulsion from the party.

The lowest echelon of the Communist Party is the *cell*, which consists of 15–20 party members, including a secretary. There are three types of cells: *factory cells*, composed of members working in the same plant, *rural cells*, composed of farmers from the same farm or village, and *local cells*, composed of people living in the same neighborhood. In 1966, 35% of the cells were factory cells, 18% were rural cells, and the remaining 47% were local cells, indicating that the party was not doing as well as it desired in the factories, and was losing on the farms.

Above the cells are the *sections*, consisting of the elected delegates of the cells. They, too, have a secretariat or a governing committee—a *bureau*. Like the cells, they are primarily agencies of information, propaganda, and action. The *federation* is composed of delegates chosen by the sections. There is one federation for each French Department. They are ultimately responsible for the party's activities and electioneering tactics at the departmental level. Their bureaus and secretariats are in the hands of loyal party members who are often on their way to higher positions. The cells, sections, and

federations are under the control of the national organs—the National Congress, the Central Committee, the Politbureau, and the Secretariat—the last headed by the Secretary General who is the leader of the Party.

The *National Congress* is composed of delegates from the membership at large. It meets once every three years—a rule that has not always been respected—and passes on all resolutions and policy reports submitted by the party leaders. Although, in theory, debates are free and open, the members rarely question the proposals that come from above. The slate of candidates submitted by the leaders is invariably elected. The Congress elects the *Central Committee*, a body composed of 74 members and 22 substitutes, with mostly deliberative functions, which in turn elects a small group of 17 members to the *Politbureau*, which selects the Secretariat, consisting of five persons headed by the Secretary General. The Politbureau and the Secretary General are the true powers of the party. They decide what the party will do in Parliament, among the workers, in the trade unions, during elections, and in connection with whatever other issues come up. For a long period of time this body was under the domination of Maurice Thorez and two or three of his staunchest supporters. It was not until his death in 1964 that the tight leadership control he had imposed began to open up, with new men coming in and many of the old guard being gradually thinned out.

STRENGTH While the French Communist organization can be viewed as a pyramid in which control flows from top to bottom, the "strength" of the party is better studied in terms of a series of concentric circles (Fig. 4-1). The very center is the leadership, while the wider circles represent diminishing degrees of support. The first two circles are the *cadres* and *militants*, a hard core of organizers and believers, the outer circles are, respectively: members, voters, and sympathizers.




FIGURE 4-1 *The web of the French Communist Party.*

Members and militants. In the last 20 years, the membership of the party has fluctuated considerably. From the early thirties, when there were not more than 50,000 members, the membership rose in the years of the Popular Front (1936–38) to over 300,000. After the decline following the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the party enjoyed a phenomenal growth during the Nazi Occupation. In 1946–47, membership exceeded 1 million, the highest point it has ever reached. Since then, it has been sinking. In 1966, the figure given officially by the party was 425,800, but there is good reason to believe that it was less than that. Sixty percent of the members are workers, 18% are farmers, 7% are salaried employees, 9% are intellectuals, and 6% belong to other groups.

The distinction between members and militants is largely based on the degree of commitment to the party. Whereas members simply pay their dues and perhaps participate in party meetings, militants actively work for the party, and often aspire to rise through the party hierarchy. Of the present membership, not more than 7% are militants. The militants who have

jobs as administrators, secretaries, members of the bureaus, editors of Communist newspapers, and leaders of trade unions are called *cadres*. Forming a small core of not more than 10,000 men and women, they are the nervous-system of the party.

The party membership continues to show the preponderance of men (about 75%) despite the efforts to attract women. However, the party remains remarkably young: about half are below 40, 10% are less than 25, and one-third are between 26 and 40. Forty percent are between 41 and 60, and only 17% are above 61. But what is equally remarkable (if we are to believe the official figures) is the high rate of renewal in the party—that is to say, the rate at which new members have come into the party over a given period of time. Only some 13% of the present members joined before World War II, and 22% during or immediately after the War. Almost one-fourth joined the party in the years between 1948 and 1958, and an astonishingly high 42% between 1959 and 1966. Thus the party does not consist of well-disciplined and well-trained old Marxists but of persons who apparently for one reason or another come and go. The rate of turnover in membership is around 50%—which means that one of two Communists quits the party say every five years, to be replaced by a newcomer. Almost half of the present members joined during the Gaullist decade—a fact that refutes those who claim that Communism in France is an “old,” “outdated” ideology and movement.

Voters and sympathizers. Far many more Frenchmen vote Communist than carry party membership cards. Almost one out of four French voters has cast his ballot for the Communists. But less than one out of 10 of them is a party member. These Frenchmen vote Communist for a number of reasons: they dislike the government; they dislike the Republic; they think the Communist Party will defend their economic interests; they are opposed to

The second role of the party is to provide an outlet for the expression of protest on the part of French voters. The party's program has become broad enough to encompass many different and, seemingly, some inconsistent views. It is both a revolutionary and a reformist party in the eyes of the voters. It advocates economic modernization but also supports many of the marginal groups that impede it; it is for the socialization of basic industries but favors the retention of individual private property. It is the party of the "Revolution" in terms that satisfy both the past (the Revolution of 1789) and the future (the Communist Revolution). It encourages the national goal of emphasizing the greatness and the civilizing mission of France, and, at the same time, it advances the international ideology of Communism. It is proletarian but also the staunchest supporter of the small farmer in the South; it is against the curé but usually stands ready to cooperate with Liberal Catholics. With an uncanny perception of the basic predispositions of the French voters, it has used effective themes and slogans to attract them to the party. This accounts for both the wide support it receives among so many socioeconomic groups (a fact that continues to baffle all observers) and for the strength it commands in regions that are so different—in both industrialized and rural France.

Today the program of the Communist Party reflects a shrewd combination of political tactics and ideological goals: first, to bring down the Gaullist regime; second, to establish a "real democracy"; and third, to build Socialism. A "real democracy" can stem only from the combination of the party that reflects the working-class interests (the Communists) and their "allies"—Socialists, Radicals, and other Left-wing groups, including many of the liberal Catholic forces. In such a combination of forces the Communists hope to play the dominant role and move to the realization of their third objective: the establishment of their own political power for the purpose of building Socialism.

Thus, nothing as yet indicates persuasively that the French Communists are searching new horizons either in domestic or international affairs. They have continued to align themselves on the Soviet foreign policy on each and every issue—and to seek the same support and alliances on the domestic front. They have rejected the Gaullist Constitution, continue to favor parliamentary supremacy, and oppose the Presidential election by universal suffrage. Their most significant tactical shift has been to seek closer cooperation and ties with the other parties of the Left, notably the Socialists and the Radicals. It is precisely this effort, together with the decreasing danger of the Soviet Union, that has changed the image of the party in the eyes of the French. Though the party has not explicitly abandoned the theory of the dictatorship of the working class or that of the class struggle, it has qualified its stand enough to evoke no longer a real threat to the Republic. Today a majority of the French would not object to seeing the leaders of the party participate in a Cabinet.

The Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left

No other party has managed to emulate the discipline, the organization, and the stability of the voting strength shown by the Communists. The non-Communist Left found itself facing three choices: to form a "labor party" that included as many groups as possible, and become a center of gravity that might attract Communist voters; to cooperate closely with the Communists at the risk of coming slowly under their domination; or to remain fragmented. Until about 1964 it appeared that it might be unable to combine its forces. Three political parties, two of which had a long history and memory—the *Socialists* and the *Radical-Socialists*—continued as separate and often warring entities, while in 1958 a militant splinter—the Unified Socialist Party—seceded from

The onset of World War II and France's defeat found the Socialists divided. Eighty of their deputies voted to invest Marshal Petain with absolute powers in 1940, and during the Occupation they were unable to match the leadership provided by the Communists, who succeeded in wresting control of the Socialists' last bastion of strength, the General Confederation of Labor.

Immediately after the Liberation, the Socialists cooperated with the Communists and the Center. The Communists, however, soon moved into the opposition, and the Socialists then became the pivot of centrist coalitions. A Socialist Prime Minister governed from January, 1956, until June, 1957, gave way to the Radicals and ultimately to the return of General de Gaulle to power. De Gaulle's return found the party in a difficult position: demoralized by the tactics of its leader, Guy Mollet, who supported de Gaulle while providing "constructive opposition" to his Cabinet in the National Assembly. A number of its members and federations were beginning to look to the Unified Socialist Party—a dissident Socialist Party group—and to entertain thoughts of cooperating even with the Communists.

The Socialists began to oppose de Gaulle. They objected to his economic and social policies at home, alleging that national wealth was not being equitably divided and that the working class was being discriminated against; they opposed his personal government and disputed on a number of points the interpretation he was giving to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic; they took strong exception to the practice of referendums that overshadowed Parliament and reinforced personal government; they promised to abrogate the legislation giving subsidies to the Catholic schools, and pledged to work for a genuine European unity. They gradually accepted closer cooperation with both Centrist groups and the Communists in an effort to undermine the position of the President and his majority in Parliament. Together with

all the other parties, they voted against the reform of the Constitution allowing for the direct election of the President by popular vote, and it was only thanks to the support—sometimes of the Communists and sometimes of some Centrists—that they were able to maintain their strength in the National Assembly while seeing their popular vote decline.

Organization. Like the Communists, the Socialists purport to be a "mass party," and emphasize internal discipline, both for members of the party and its parliamentarians. This discipline, however, is tempered by a tolerance for "tendencies" which often makes it impossible for the leaders to enforce party discipline. As a result, the Socialist Party has been prey to sharp division and dissensions.

The basic unit of the party is the *section*, a group of party members from a given city, town, or village. In each Department there is a *federation*, composed of sections, with a secretary who is its spokesman and executive. The federations control the departmental finances and make decisions about political action not only in local matters but often in national elections. They enjoy considerable autonomy, especially with regard to electoral tactics.

The supreme organ of the party is the *National Congress*, composed of delegates chosen by the party federations. It meets regularly once a year, and more frequently in extraordinary congresses. Delegates are selected by proportional representation, so that the various "tendencies" within the party are represented. Each delegate has a "mandate-vote" representing from 10 to 50 members.

The Congress elects a *Directing Committee* of 45 members (though the number has varied), which must include a maximum of 20 parliamentarians and 25 members drawn from the cadres or leaders who are not members of Parliament. The Directing Committee elects a *Bureau* composed of 10 members: the General Secretary, the Assistant General Secretary, the

Treasurer, and seven others. A body comparable to the National Executive of the British Labour Party, it makes all the interim decisions on policy, propaganda, parliamentary tactics, discipline, and sanctions. Every three months there is a meeting of the *National Council* of the Socialist Party, a miniature congress that consists of the secretaries of the departmental federations. It makes decisions between congresses on policy and parliamentary tactics, and takes disciplinary measures.

Strength. As with the Communists, the "strength" of the Socialists must be studied with reference to voters and members. Since the end of World War II the Socialists have lost over half their voters (see Table 4-5). Their strength has dropped from about 22% of the electorate to less than 10%.

TABLE 4-5
The Decline of Socialists

Election year	Number of voters	Number of parliamentary seats
1945	4,561,000	134
1946	4,187,000	115
1946	3,431,000	90
1951	2,744,842	77
1956	2,240,000	56
1958	3,176,000	40
1962	2,319,000	65

Many of the strongholds of the Socialists have been lost to the Communists. The socio-economic character of Socialist support has also undergone a considerable transformation. The working-class vote has diminished, but there has been a gain among the salaried groups: members of the lower middle class, civil servants, school teachers, and pensioners. It has been estimated that among the Socialist voters, 25% are civil servants (particularly school teachers), a little over 30% are workers, 11% are salaried, and the rest come from lower middle-

class groups: artisans, merchants, pensioners, shopkeepers, and others. Support for the party is becoming increasingly diversified to include many of the socio-economic groups. But the Socialist electorate have the least education: 66% have had only what amounts to grade school. They are also in the lowest income bracket: only a quarter earn more than \$250 a month. And they are becoming a party of older people: two-thirds of those who vote are 45 years of age or over, and the average age of their parliamentarians has been the highest in the National Assembly.

The membership of the party has decreased sharply since World War II. In 1946, it boasted 354,000 members. In 1952 the figure was down to 90,000, and it is smaller today. Not only has the recruitment of new members virtually come to a standstill, but the party seems to be losing members every year. The aging of the party's voters is duplicated in the aging of its members: more than 70% are above the age of 45. Furthermore, seniority rules give preference for party administrative positions to those with long service, and discourage the young from joining.

Program. The party continues to use Marxist vocabulary and slogans, yet both its internal composition and its policy pronouncements have revealed it to be a moderately progressive party dedicated to social legislation and welfare measures. It has been opposed, but with considerable qualifications, to colonial war, and has shown a great readiness to modify its program to participate in a coalition cabinet.

The Presidential election by popular direct vote—to which the party was opposed—found the Socialists caught in internal rivalries and contradictions. It was a non-Socialist, Mitterrand, who assumed the leadership of the non-Communist Left and slowly brought the Socialists into a cooperative framework of the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left. The Socialists ran in the 1967 election as Federation candidates. For the first time in this

century, they do not form a parliamentary group as such. But even in defeat, and despite the depletion of their strength, the Socialists jealously guard their independence within the Federation, and resist all effort to allow it to become a genuine party with its own independent organization, structure, and leadership.

THE RADICAL SOCIALISTS AND "ALLIED" CENTER FORMATIONS. The Radical Socialist Party (*Republican Radical and Radical Socialist Party—Parti Républicain Radical et Radical Socialiste* to be exact) has been a party without a program, an organization, leadership, and without any membership to speak of. Yet this "party," under different labels and thanks to many shifting alliances, played a controlling role in the formation and life of virtually all the governments under the Third and Fourth Republics. It participated in Right-wing electoral alliances only to abandon them and move to the Left, but more frequently it managed to do exactly the reverse. Its internal instability both reflected and caused the instability of the Cabinet and the divisions of the Republic. It has had its own Left (closely anchored to the Socialists and even to the Communists), its own Center, and its own Right (which has often been affiliated with extreme Right-wing groups).

History. As a political formation, the Radical Socialists date from 1901, the year the party was officially founded. But its heritage goes much further back, perhaps to the years of the French Revolution. Its roots have grown out of the traditions of anticlericalism, individualism, economic liberalism, and Republicanism. In 1869 it advocated public education, separation between Church and state, democratization of the military service, and modification of the tax structure in favor of a progressive income-tax. This was a program that had great appeal to the lower middle class, farmers, artisans, store-

keepers, teachers, and above all the professional men of the small towns—the lawyers, public notaries, doctors, engineers. It expressed the interests of groups that were still striving to dislodge the Church, the Army, and the remnants of the aristocracy from political power.

To win elections, the Radicals soon found that they needed some sort of organization, and Radical committees were established in most Departments. Since they were allowed considerable autonomy, diversity among the local formations developed. Until 1910 and perhaps through World War I, the party was no more than a powerful electoral organization. In 1906, it gained an unprecedented (for any political party before) victory: 260 Radical deputies were returned to Parliament. But with the end of World War I, the party became increasingly divided when confronted with the economic and social problems that the Industrial Revolution was belatedly thrusting upon the country. The agitation of the workers and the gains of the Socialists and the Communists both attracted and repelled many of its members and voters dividing the party between Left and Right. The hearts of the Radicals, it has been said, remain always with the Left, but their pocketbooks tightly sewn to the Right. With most of the demands for economic and individual liberties and the separation between Church and state realized by the end of World War I, their ideology and electoral program was becoming exhausted.

In 1940, most of the Radicals turned their backs on the Republic. As a result, the Liberation found them very seriously weakened, and they continued to decline sharply in the last decade.

Strength. The strength of the Radical Socialist Party has been primarily electoral—it should be gauged in terms of the votes it receives and the number of its representatives that are elected. According to even the most op-

timistic accounts, its membership has never exceeded 200,000. Today it is doubtful if there are more than 10,000 members.

Since the Liberation, the party's voting strength has ranged from 2 million to a little over 2½ million. Where do these votes come from? The party had strong support from some specific regions. The town of Lyon, the Department of Vaucluse, and the Southwest part of France have sent a great number of Radical deputies to Parliament. The party's main strength began to come from the small towns and the rural sections. The "urban radicalism" of the nineteenth century is being replaced by a "rural radicalism," largely supported by small-town doctors and lawyers, artisans, and some teachers and civil servants. The supporters of the party come, therefore, mostly from the groups and classes that were in the ascendancy in the nineteenth century but that have definitely declined after 1930.

It is no wonder, then, that the party has gone through a period of severe conflicts in the last 10 years that may end in its permanent disintegration. A minority of its members, led by the young and dynamic Pierre Mendès-France, argued in the 1950's for a renovated radicalism, for a strong and disciplined party dedicated to economic expansion and welfare, with a program that would appeal to many groups: white-collar workers, engineers, civil servants, intellectuals, and workers. Others, however, contended that the strength of the party lay in its "pluralism" (another name for its internal divisions). According to them, the party was not a mass party with a program and discipline, but a government party that thrived on electoral alliances, deals, and coalitions which gave it a power disproportionate to its actual numerical strength.

Internal divisions and personal rivalries, a total lack of a program in the name of pluralism (which actually meant freedom to play the electoral and parliamentary game), and the re-

surgence of Gaullist power, virtually wiped out the party. Since 1956 it has split and resplit into many minuscule groups, and its members have formed alliances which have proved to be more profitable than their allegiance to the party.

With the waning of the significance of anticlericalism and the general acceptance of economic planning and state social and economic controls, the Radicals found themselves not only without men, but also without ideas. Some moved to the Gaullist camp, others reluctantly to the Left, while yet a third group found itself anchored in dead Center. A group of leaders have joined the Federation, as one of its constituent parties, and it is in the name of this federation that they are represented in Parliament, about 25 strong. Those who remained in the Center have become part of the Democratic Center, together with other Centrists, moderates, and even "Catholic" groups, while the rest find themselves within the Gaullist majority. The Radical Party is virtually dead, and its dying agony is perhaps the most eloquent proof that French politics may have entered a new stage. The individualism, the loose parties based upon district and local influence and contacts, the politician as a purveyor of service and graft, and the consummate parliamentary game based upon the rotation of ministerial jobs, may well have come to an end, together with the economic liberalism, the sectionalism, and the anticlericalism on which the Radicals flourished.

THE CONVENTION OF REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS. A notable development during the Fifth Republic was the flowering of "political clubs" composed of students, intellectuals, and leaders of student and professional organizations for the purpose of debating the future of the country. The clubs attempted to do what the parties appeared to be totally unable to do: think critically of policies and insti-

tutions and take a stand against the Gaullists. At least six such clubs in Lyon, Grenoble, Marseille, Paris, and Tours took steps to bring them all together into a meeting.

The Convention des Institutions Républicaines was established in 1964, in an effort to bring the non-Communist Left together against de Gaulle. It was explicitly dedicated to economic and social planning, to a democratic government (which meant opposition to the personal government of General de Gaulle), and to European unity—all in all, to what was considered to be the only constructive way to build French resources in Europe and to create a strong bloc to offset American influence, if not outright domination. Not more than 8,000—at most 10,000—made up the various clubs that sent delegates and observers to the first Congress. But they were all influential young men, and not only attracted attention, but began to exercise influence upon the political parties of the Left. They offered to act as a catalyst in the constant dialogue among the Radicals, the Socialists, the P.S.U., and even the Liberal Catholics and the Communists, in order to set the foundations from which a coherent opposition to de Gaulle would emerge and a coherent democratic force would develop. They played an important role in the designation of but *one* candidate of the Left in the Presidential election—even if he were not their first choice and they worked hard to create the Federation. As a recompense for their efforts, they became a part of it, as the third constituent group. Their political strength in terms of number and vote is negligible, but if they are able to assume control of the Federation, and through it, of the Socialist and the Radical Parties, their future may be bright.

The P.S.U. (Socialist Unified Party)

Nothing exemplifies better the tenacity of ideology and the continuing tendency toward fragmentation than this small splinter group

that separated from the Socialist Party in 1958 to oppose the Gaullist Constitution. It has fewer than 8,000 members. It has refused steadfastly to join with either the Communist Party to the Left, or the Federation to its Right, while continuing to favor a regrouping of all the parties of the Left on the basis of a common, well-defined program dedicated to Socialism and planning and “revival” of democratic institutions. Its titular head is Pierre Mendès-France, who has only grudgingly reconciled himself without ever becoming committed to the present Constitution. Only one P.S.U. deputy adorned the National Assembly between 1958 and 1967, and the party has never gotten more than 2.5% of the national vote.

In its last congress, a bare majority refused to affiliate with the Federation, but it is unlikely that the minority will follow. It is more likely, in fact, that the group will split somewhat evenly between two poles of attraction—the Communists and the Federation—while a small group of intellectuals will continue to preach autonomy in the name of ideological purity.

THE CENTER

The Democratic Center

More than 50% of the French, when asked where they belong politically, say to the Center. Yet, though many political parties have claimed a Centrist vocation (especially the Gaullists), no political party has deliberately called itself a Centrist party. Instead, the Center has consisted of splinter formations: Moderates, unaffiliated Independents, Peasants, Republicans, etc. Only in the years immediately after the Liberation did one large political party—the liberal catholic M.R.P.—manage to form a coherent political formation, develop a program, and attract more than 25% of the voters. All other groups changed names and leaders, shifted from one political alliance to another—sometimes to the Left, and sometimes to

the Right—in a manner that makes any effort to describe them in detail futile. For instance, the Center between 1945 and 1962 consisted of the following: the M.R.P., the Left Republicans, some of the Moderates and Peasants, dissident Radicals, and "Left-Center" groups. Between them, they commanded as many as 6 million votes and as many as 200 deputies, only to drop in 1962 to less than 2 million votes and not more than 40 deputies. Since 1962, none of these parties have been able to elect an adequate number of deputies to form a political group in the National Assembly, so that they have had to combine forces, sometimes with the Right-wing groups and sometimes with the Left.

As with the Federation, it was the Presidential election that forced the Center groups to unite behind a single candidate and formation that was explicitly given the name of *Democratic Center*. Jean Lecanuet announced his candidature in October of 1965. His showing in the election made it possible for him to announce the formation of a new party, the Democratic Center, to include a number of splinter groups. Its organization is yet to be clearly established,

and the support it received in the legislative election of 1967 gave little hope of continuity. As long as the Left is represented by a cooperative arrangement between the Communists and the Federation, and the Right is overwhelmingly pre-empted by the Gaullists, the Center becomes tightly compressed and hope for the future is dim. But if the Federation were to break up to the Left, and if the Gaullists were to disintegrate (as the following chart indicates), the hunting to the Left and to the Right might prove extremely rewarding. The promise for the Center, in other words, lies in the disintegration of the Left and Right, and the revival of multipartism.

The only party that needs to be mentioned here, both because of its historical significance and also because it has played an important role in the formation of the Democratic Center, and may yet have a role to play, is the M.R.P.

THE M.R.P.—MOVEMENT RÉPUBLICAIN POPULAIRE (POPULAR REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT). French Catholicism has both a conservative and a liberal tradition. The M.R.P.

FIGURE 4-2 The "Elastic Center." The revival of the Center vote can take place only at the expense of the Left and Right (Federation and Gaullists) and can be triggered only by serious dissensions within the two.




TABLE 4-6

*The Rise and Fall of the Center
(M.R.P. and other Center Formations)*

Election year	Voters (in millions)	Number of seats
1945	6.9	176
1946	7.7	199
1946	7.8	213
1951	2.6	82
1956	2.3	71
1958	2.4	57
1962	1.6	36

represents the latter—it is inspired by a genuine commitment to human rights, equality, and the welfare state. It does not shrink from advocating economic planning. It urged its members to political action in order to bring about a more just and equitable society. Since the old moderate and conservative political parties appeared to have been irremediably weakened by the fall of France in 1940, many of the intellectual leaders among the progressive Catholics wanted to demonstrate the attachment of Catholics to the Republic and to the nation, and so decided to establish a Movement in 1943 and a Party in 1944. Thus a long-standing dream of one of the oldest spiritual families in France seemed to be moving resolutely toward political realization. After the Liberation, two factors contributed to their success. The first was the immense popularity of General de Gaulle, a devout Catholic with a paternalistic view of government who, as the leader of the Free French Forces, incarnated national unity. The M.R.P. became associated in the minds of the public with de Gaulle, and thus benefited from his great prestige. The second reason was the resurgence of the Communist Party. Much of the middle class and many of the Conservatives were frightened enough to throw their support to the Center—the M.R.P. The youngest party in France became, in one national election, also the strongest party. In 1945, the M.R.P. polled

23.9% of the popular vote, and in June 1946, it polled 28.2%.

Then, however, the M.R.P. ran into stiffened opposition. De Gaulle formed his own political party in 1947, that received wide support from the M.R.P. voters. To the left, the M.R.P. soon clashed with the Socialists over the issue of state subsidies to Catholic schools. It continued to urge European unity while many Center groups dragged their feet, and it stoutly favored continuing the war in Indochina, which for many Socialists and the Communists was a "dirty war." Having lost many voters to de Gaulle and having alienated many Liberal voters with its pro-war and Catholic-school-subsidy stands, the electoral strength of the M.R.P. dropped sharply.

The return of General de Gaulle in 1958, and the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, received the full support of the M.R.P., and with it they entered a period of renewed electoral strength. But it was not to last. The M.R.P. joined the "majority" in the Assembly, and several Ministers were drawn from its ranks. But the Liberal Catholic Youth Formations, the white-collar workers, and the more Liberal rural elements forced the party progressively to oppose de Gaulle's regime.

Gradually, the party began to express its hostility both to the government and to General de Gaulle. There were three reasons for this. First, the party began to be apprehensive about the government's economic and social policies for reasons similar to those advanced by the Socialists. Second, it began to take exception to de Gaulle's personal rule and to the denigration of Parliament. Finally, it came out openly against de Gaulle's foreign policy, both with regard to the development of an independent atomic striking force and, more particularly, with regard to de Gaulle's unwillingness to consider seriously measures of genuine European political integration. On May 16, 1962, all five of the M.R.P. Ministers withdrew from the Cabinet at the express request of the

party, as a protest against de Gaulle's opposition to European integration. A few weeks later, the M.R.P. parliamentary group signed a resolution favoring European political integration, and almost half the group voted to censure the new Prime Minister. Yet the M.R.P. still was reluctant to move into permanent opposition: in their party congress held in June, 1962, they merely promised to vote for or against governmental measures on the merits of the issues involved.

THE RIGHT

Since the end of World War II, few have been the formations that have advocated the outright overthrow of the Republic, and its replacement with an authoritarian regime. The colonial wars, and more particularly the exacerbation of the fighting in Algeria, both before and after the return of General de Gaulle to power, together with social discontent, accounted for two such formations. The first was the so-called Poujadist movement, and the second an extremist anti-Republic movement led by Army groups and supported by some Activist formations.

The Anti-Republican Right

THE "POUJADISTS." In 1954, a curious movement emerged from groups that had been traditionally most loyal to the Republic and to parliamentary government—one made up of shopkeepers, artisans, small farmers, and many small-town political leaders. They became known as Poujadists, after the name of the movement's leader, Pierre Poujade. Beginning as a powerful pressure-bloc called the U.D.C.A. (Union for the Defense of Merchants and Artisans), whose aim was to lighten the tax burden on small businessmen, the movement later became a party, the Union and French Fraternity (U.F.F.). It demanded the complete overhaul of

political institutions, Parliament was to be closed down and the Estates General convoked (last convened in 1789 and composed then of the aristocracy, the clergy, and the bourgeoisie—the three social orders that existed in the *Ancien Régime*), and the leaders of the Fourth Republic tried before a "High Court." By 1955, Poujade was able to organize local and departmental federations throughout France. His slogan was "throw out the rascals" (the "rascals" being the deputies of the National Assembly). In the national elections of January 2, 1956, Poujade nominated candidates in many Departments, refused to ally himself with any other political formations, and called for a massive vote for his movement. He received 2½ million votes, 12.5% of the total, and 52 seats in the National Assembly—some of which were contested and lost.

This phenomenal success was followed by an equally remarkable collapse. No subsequent bye-election ever gave Poujade or his candidates more than 7% of the vote. In most cases, they received less. With the return of de Gaulle in 1958, the Poujadist movement literally disappeared, having enjoyed a spectacular, albeit short-lived, success.

Besides the artisans, shopkeepers, small farmers, and those in the backward Departments plagued by a declining per capita income, Poujade's clever evocation of the "little man"—crushed by taxes, by a big Civil Service, by large industrial corporations, and by parliamentarians corrupted by the pressures of big lobbies—triggered the frustrations embedded in the history of France: distrust of the state, contempt for the politician (a man who does no honest work), disenchantment with Parliament and the Republic, fierce pride in the individual and his rights.

THE ACTIVISTS. As in the last years of the Fourth Republic, some Army officers attempted in the course of the war in Algeria to rise against the Fifth Republic and de

Gaulle. They were supported in Algeria by the majority of the French populace there, and in France proper by small, secret groups that attracted veterans, a few of the remaining disciples of the authoritarian ideology, and some outright Fascists and extremists, into the so-called O.A.S.—the *Organization de l'Armée Secrète*. It indulged in indiscriminate acts of terrorism and assassination in which many innocent victims perished both in Algeria and France. It also conspired to assassinate de Gaulle, and proclaimed its determination to keep Algeria French. Only after January, 1961, did intensive police efforts lead to the arrest of many of its leaders, including two top Generals, and to the dismantling of the organization in France.

Both the organization and its objectives appear to have been laid to rest after the declaration of Algerian independence. Diehard extreme Right-wingers are few today: in the presidential election of 1965, Tixier-Vignancourt, one of their spokesmen, campaigned under the program of European unification, Atlantic alliance, and housing and welfare measures—which hardly appears extremist.

The Republican Right

There are only two formations that we can associate by-and-large with the Republican Right: the Independents and the Gaullists. The first appear to be on the way out, like the Radicals and the M.R.P., while the second are in the process of attempting to become a well-organized political party.

THE INDEPENDENTS. They, like the Radicals, have had virtually no organization and membership, but only alliance among departmental and local political leaders. Like the M.R.P., their fortunes have varied inversely with those of the Gaullists.

The Independents welcomed the Fifth Republic with great complacency. The party did

remarkably well in the elections of 1958—but only because it supported de Gaulle. It gained about a million votes and at least 20 deputies, to bring its strength in the National Assembly to 120. Without mass membership or a coherent program, it exploited the wave of nationalism for its own electoral ends. The Independents became the conservative party in the National Assembly in matters of economic and social reform, and in regard to Algeria. They joined the Gaullists in the Cabinet, and one of their leaders, former Prime Minister Antoine Pinay, became Minister of Finance and was responsible for the formulation of financial and economic policy.

Complacency, however, was transformed into feverish political activity when it became clear that President de Gaulle threatened both the policies and the future electoral chances of the Independents. In the first week of 1960, Antoine Pinay, the Minister of Finance, was unceremoniously dismissed by the President of the Republic. The policy of self-determination for Algeria began to divide the Independents, while the Presidential style of government undermined seriously their role in Parliament. They began to move increasingly into the opposition as more than half their members began to vote against the government on a number of issues.

The more the Independents moved to oppose de Gaulle, the greater their internal divisions. Their opposition to the referendum on the election of the President by direct vote, and later the legislative elections of 1962, provoked a split within the party, with a group calling themselves the Independent Republicans joining hands with the Gaullist majority. The bulk of their voters abandoned them, and their vote went down to less than 1½ million. They hardly managed to survive as a parliamentary group and were forced to join forces with other Centrist formations. Many of them are now participating in the Democratic Center, while others continue to be attracted by the spell of the

Gaullist Party, and few have struck out on their own as unaffiliated. Their disintegration (and very likely their disappearance) carries the same general message that we mentioned with regard to the disintegration of the Radicals. Yet at this stage, their fate, as with that of the M.R.P., may well depend on the future of the Gaullists. The Independent Republicans, while maintaining their autonomy within the Gaullist majority, may become a Trojan horse, to split the Gaullists or to attempt with the support of the Democratic Center a larger Centrist formation.

THE GAULLISTS Since the Revolution, strong political leaders—often Army Generals—have occasionally assumed personal rule. The latest is General de Gaulle, a career officer who in 1940 refused to accept defeat at the hands of the German Army and led a small core of followers to London to proclaim from there his determination to continue the war in the name of France. Since then, de Gaulle's towering personal stature has overshadowed the course of public events, even when he has been in political retirement.

History In 1944, de Gaulle returned to France at the head of a provisional government and a small, well-equipped Army. He favored a strong Presidential government, the overhaul of the nation's stagnant economy, and broad social welfare measures. Within 18 months, on January 20, 1946, he resigned.

De Gaulle saw in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic the same defects that had been inherent in the past: a weak executive, a legislature divided into many groups unable to generate policy, Cabinet instability, lack of leadership. He decided to re-enter politics, this time at the head of a large political movement—the Rally of the French People (R.P.F.)—and outlined his program: a new Constitution embodying strong executive leadership, stern measures against the Communists, whom he called "separatists"; the reassertion of French

independence from both the Soviet Union and the United States, the dissolution of the National Assembly, and new elections. This was the beginning of the "Gaullist" movement. It has since taken many forms, shapes, and names.

By the end of 1947 the R.P.F. reportedly had some 800,000 members, and had won a sweeping victory in the 1947 municipal election. It subsequently gained more than one-third of the seats in the Upper Chamber. The Gaullists, sensing victory, pressed hard for dissolution and elections, but in the legislative elections of 1951, the Center parties, with the support of the Socialists to the Left and the Independents to the Right, managed to stave them off. Nonetheless, the Gaullists won 22% of the vote—second only to the Communists—and elected 117 deputies. But the movement had reached its climax. The parliamentary group of the R.P.F. began to disintegrate, and soon de Gaulle freed his deputies from their pledge to follow him. He himself retired shortly from political activity to write his memoirs. In the election of 1956, the Gaullists were reduced to a handful of deputies—the Social Republicans—who received only 4% of the national vote. But a select group of de Gaulle's followers remained active, biding their time when internal and external difficulties would again give them the opportunity to work for their leader's return.

There was no need to wait long. The deterioration of the war in Algeria, and the inability of the governments of the Fourth Republic to maintain its control over the French Army, gave them the opportunity. De Gaulle returned—first as Prime Minister, and later, after his Constitution was fashioned, as President of the new Fifth Republic. A sweeping movement to re-create the Gaullist Party was set in motion, combining many of the old faithful and a number of new men. In the election of 1958, the Gaullists ran under the label of U.N.R.—the Union of the New Republic. It received less than 20% of the vote—a remarkable showing,

however, in view of the fact that virtually all other parties, excepting the Communists, ran with the express commitment to support also General de Gaulle! They elected 189 deputies, and were joined by a number of other deputies, bringing their total up to 210 and making them the largest parliamentary group. They soon claimed to be the majority party—a claim that was not, however, vindicated until the election of 1962 when they won over 30% of the vote and, with the support of the Independent Republicans and some other deputies, commanded a majority of at least 275 deputies out of a total of 482.

Organization. Whatever the names of the Gaullist Party, and whatever its alliances and reorganizations, its traits have been remarkably the same. First, it is not a party in the proper sense of the term, but a "movement." This means a fluid and changing organization, in support of general objectives rather than specific policy programs. Secondly, it is a personal party attached to the leadership of one man. For instance, the U.N.R. deputies took the following oath of fealty:

Elected Deputy of the U.N.R., I confirm in a solemn manner my adherence to the Union for the New Republic, and to its parliamentary group. Respectful of the mandate which was given to me by the electors, I will abstain during the period of the legislature from participating in or becoming a member of any other group. I take the following engagement: to remain faithful to the objective of the U.N.R.; to support in Parliament and in my electoral district the action of General de Gaulle; to accept the discipline of voting as decided by the majority of the group for all the important questions relating to the life of the nation and of the French community, in order to maintain the cohesion of our group and the general spirit of our movement.

Thirdly, while the party supports de Gaulle and runs in his name, he has maintained a singular aloofness toward it. In 1958 he refused to give it his support, and denied its members the right of using his name—which, needless to say,

they ignored. Although he modified his stand in the elections that followed, asking the people to vote against the opposition and for his supporters, he still remained extremely reluctant to allow the party to become well-organized and disciplined, and to develop a strong leadership that he himself was unwilling to assume. He preferred to have a rather loose organization of supporters that he could use at his discretion, instead of a coherent party that might challenge him. As a result, the party, despite its electoral successes, has not developed a strong organization and membership. Both its annual congresses and its Directing Committee are overshadowed by General de Gaulle and by the implicit and explicit loyalty to his person. Though a number of policies have been outlined and debated within the party, the essence of the Gaullists is General de Gaulle.

Strength. The strength of the party must be measured in terms of its electoral appeal. De Gaulle, in the Presidential elections, received 44% on the first ballot, and 55% on the second. In the referendum on the Constitutional reform of 1962 to provide for the direct election of the President by universal suffrage (to which all the political parties were opposed), de Gaulle received 62%. The Gaullist Party, on the other hand, has never managed to exceed 37.5% in any legislative election since 1958, and has never attained more than 44% on the second ballot. Thus its strength runs well behind de Gaulle's popularity, though it borrows to a large extent from it.

Who are the "Gaullist" voters? A first answer can be given by the fact that their strength corresponds to the weakening of the Center and Independent vote. Thus they have derived most of their strength from the Right and the Center—especially the Catholic vote that went to the M.R.P. This is corroborated by the composition of their electorate. It is a party supported by more women (52%) than men. And it is a party that has failed to appeal to the young

voters only 24% of its voters are under 35, and 12%, the largest percentage of all parties, are 65 years old and over. Thirteen percent are farmers, and an appreciable number (27%) are workers. Employed and managerial groups, executives, industrialists, and merchants largely vote for the Gaullists. A great part of the Gaullists' voters (31%) has an income that is above \$250 a month. It is a fairly well-educated electorate, urban and rather evenly distributed (with some notable exceptions) throughout the country.

THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLICANS Allied to the Gaullists, this group of Independents continues to display considerable vitality. Their leader, Giscard d'Estaing, remains influential. In the past few years he has made consistent efforts to establish contacts with the Center, the leaders of the Independents, and many Moderates, and to organize departmental committees. More pro-European and pro-Atlantic than de Gaulle, he claims to be more progressive in matters of social legislation than the old Independents, and favors economic planning. However, his conservative deflationary policy during the period he was Minister of Finance (1962-1965) has secured him the support of the financial circles. In the election of 1962, the Independent Republicans won over a million votes and elected an adequate number of deputies to form their own parliamentary group, while allied with the Gaullists.

Will the Gaullists, with the support and in collaboration with the Independent Republicans, manage to realize the dream of many

French analysts and political leaders and set up a Conservative Party like the British one? If they survive de Gaulle, and establish a viable organization with discipline and leadership, then they will be duplicating, perhaps more successfully, the efforts of the Federation on the Left.

It is hard to answer this question. As yet, for the reasons we have indicated, the Gaullists have been unable to organize a new party with departmental and local committees. Their membership does not exceed 75,000, and the political activity of their various branches becomes relatively active only in the months preceding an election. A number of potential leaders are rivalling to assume the leadership when de Gaulle withdraws—raising the possibility of splits within the party. This possibility becomes a probability in view of the fact that the party has remained one of political leaders and notables coming from the old formations of the Center and the Right, bound together primarily by electoral consideration and loyalty to one man. The mass of members and the program are lacking. On the other hand, it may be argued that the Gaullists have had time to develop their local and departmental attachments and that they are better prepared to continue even without de Gaulle. Realization that internal splits will deprive them of the status of the majority party that they have held since 1962 is an additional incentive that promotes unity. It is not unlikely that the three or four top leaders may find a way to compromise their differences and unite. Much of the political future of France depends therefore on the ability of the Gaullists to maintain at least a façade of unity.

V

Elections in the Fifth Republic¹

Since General de Gaulle returned to office in 1958, there have been frequent electoral consultations. In addition to municipal elections and to the renewal of one-third of the Senate every three years, there have been four referendums, three legislative elections, and one Presidential election by direct universal vote. On the average there has been a national consultation of one kind or another almost every year. The French electorate has invariably risen to the occasion, showing a marked interest in the voting booth (Fig. 5-1).

A CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND A GAULLIST ASSEMBLY *Constitutional Reform*

The watershed of the Fifth Republic may well appear in retrospect to have been the constitutional reform of 1962 and the Presidential election of December, 1965. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic was approved by 80% of the voters—a majority in which many commentators saw a massive vote for de Gaulle himself. Only the Communists dared oppose it, and they lost heavily. Subsequently, two other referenda, addressed to the questions of Algerian self-determination (1961) and Algerian independence (1962) were both approved overwhelmingly. With Algerian independence

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


FIGURE 3-1 Voter participation since 1945

finally granted on July 3, 1962, many felt that the reasons for de Gaulle's return to power and for the overwhelming confidence that the French continued to give him had ceased to exist. The system seemed likely to return to "normalcy"—which to the leaders of many of the political parties meant the inevitable effacement of General de Gaulle and the ascendancy of Parliament. In other words, they viewed the Gaullist system as a "crisis government" caused by the war in Algeria.

General de Gaulle put an end to these speculations. He proposed to amend the Constitution and provide for the direct election of the President of the Republic by popular vote, and not as had been the case in 1958 when a special electoral body had elected him. What is more, de Gaulle proposed that this amendment to the Constitution would be submitted directly to the people for their approval or rejection, without being debated by two Chambers of the Legislature—the National Assembly and the Senate—as the Constitution provides. For the first time the political parties that were opposed to this procedure and to the substance of this constitutional reform were able to join forces in a motion of censure against de

Gaulle's Cabinet. The motion against the Cabinet was carried by 280 votes. De Gaulle promptly dissolved the National Assembly and proceeded with his plans to hold the referendum to be followed by a legislative election.

Opposition to de Gaulle's proposal came from all sides and parties. Communists and Socialists stood with the Independents and with some of the extreme right-wing deputies. It was a classic case of a negative coalition of forces, for it was unlikely that these parties and groups could unite either to provide an alternative to de Gaulle or to form a harmonious coalition in the legislative elections that were scheduled to follow. The opposition to de Gaulle was massive. In the legislative election of 1958, all the parties that now opposed de Gaulle had received more than 75% of the national vote. They now seemed determined and ready to carry their fight to the people.

De Gaulle had no alternative but to throw his immense popularity onto the scales. He appeared four times on national television to urge a "Yes" vote. He attacked the political factions that were agitating against him and reminded the French of the record of his regime as compared with that of the Fourth Re-

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


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General de Gaulle put an end to these speculations. He proposed to amend the Constitution and provide for the direct election of the President of the Republic by popular vote, and not as had been the case in 1958 when a special electoral body had elected him. What is more, de Gaulle proposed that this amendment to the Constitution would be submitted directly to the people for their approval or rejection, without being debated by two Chambers of the Legislature—the National Assembly and the Senate—as the Constitution provides. For the first time the political parties that were opposed to this procedure and to the substance of this constitutional reform were able to join forces in a motion of censure against de

Gaulle's Cabinet. The motion against the Cabinet was carried by 280 votes. De Gaulle promptly dissolved the National Assembly and proceeded with his plans to hold the referendum to be followed by a legislative election.

Opposition to de Gaulle's proposal came from all sides and parties. Communists and Socialists stood with the Independents and with some of the extreme right-wing deputies. It was a classic case of a negative coalition of forces, for it was unlikely that these parties and groups could unite either to provide an alternative to de Gaulle or to form a harmonious coalition in the legislative elections that were scheduled to follow. The opposition to de Gaulle was massive. In the legislative election of 1958, all the parties that now opposed de Gaulle had received more than 75% of the national vote. They now seemed determined and ready to carry their fight to the people.

De Gaulle had no alternative but to throw his immense popularity onto the scales. He appeared four times on national television to urge a "Yes" vote. He attacked the political factions that were agitating against him and reminded the French of the record of his regime as compared with that of the Fourth Re-

public. He asked for unity and left no doubt that if the majority of "Yes" was "small and uncertain" he would withdraw for good from politics. "For me," he declared, "each 'Yes' vote given to me by each of you . . . will be the direct proof of his or her confidence and encouragement. Believe me, I am in need of this for what I may still do, just as I needed it in the past, for what I have already done. It is therefore your answer which, on October 28, will tell me if I can and if I should pursue my task in the service of France." Thus the referendum on a constitutional question became a plebiscite. The political parties found out that they had to fight against de Gaulle, not against his proposed reform. They were forced into a position of asking the French people by voting "No" to vote de Gaulle out of office. When the Cuban crisis darkened the shadows across a world in conflict, de Gaulle's chances of victory became good, despite the opposition of the political parties.

The Text of the Referendum of October 28, 1962

Do you approve of the bill submitted to the French people by the President of the Republic concerning the election of the President of the Republic by universal suffrage?

Principal Parts of the Text of the Submitted Bill

Article 6: The President of the Republic shall be elected for seven years by direct universal suffrage. *Article 7:* The President of the Republic

shall be elected by an absolute majority of the votes cast. If this is not obtained on the first ballot, there shall be a second ballot on the second Sunday following. Only the two candidates who have received the greatest number of votes on the first ballot shall present themselves, taking into account the possible withdrawal of more favored candidates.

THE RESULTS. Out of 27,500,000 registered voters, 12,808,600 voted "Yes," 8 million "No," and over 6 million abstained. The "Yes" vote represented 61.75% of the votes, but only about 46.5% of the registered voters. In 1958, de Gaulle's Constitution had been endorsed by almost 80% of the voters and 66.5% of the registered voters. The number of "No" voters to the Constitution and to de Gaulle had increased from 20.7% of the voters in 1958 to a little over 38% in 1962. But when we consider the fact that all the political parties with the exception of the Gaullists were against the constitutional amendment, this was an overwhelming personal victory for de Gaulle. Once more—despite the relative drop of the "Yes"—he was able to break through the political parties and reach directly to the voter. *Only in 12 out of the 90 Departments was his reform rejected.* He bit deeply into the electoral bastions of the Communists and the Left, which together accounted for over 45% of the electorate. It put all the political parties into a serious predicament that they were unable to overcome in the legislative elections that followed.

TABLE 5-1
The Four Referendums

Date	Registered voters	Abstentions		Voters	Void
		Number	Percentage		
Sept. 28, 1958	26,603,464	4,006,614	15.06%	22,596,850	303,549
Jan. 8, 1961	27,184,408	6,393,162	23.51	20,791,246	594,699
April 8, 1962	26,991,743	6,589,837	24.41	20,401,906	1,098,238
Oct. 28, 1962	27,579,424	6,273,301	22.75	21,306,123	565,474

The Legislative Election of 1962

Fresh from the victory on the referendum, the President of the Republic proceeded to do what no other President had done since the very beginning of the Third Republic. In a televised address he appealed directly to the people and asked them to vote for his candidates—the Gaullist Party. Victory in the referendum, he asserted, had clearly shown that the old parties no longer represented the nation. If the Parliament "which holds the legislative power and controls the government" is to be dominated again by the "fractions" of yesterday, de Gaulle charged, then it would be unable to govern; the country would once more be confronted with political chaos and paralysis.

"Men and women of France," said de Gaulle, "you sealed the condemnation of the disastrous regime of the political parties on October 28, 1962, and expressed your will to see the new Republic continue its task of progress, development, and reconstruction. But on November 18 and 25 you will choose the deputies. Ah! I hope you will do it in a manner that this second vote will not go against the first. In spite of local habits and particular considerations, I hope you will now confirm by the choice of men the choice of our destiny you made by voting 'yes'."

The electoral contest became once more transformed into a plebiscite, and de Gaulle's immense popularity was again thrown into the balance.

The opposition remained divided. Communists, Socialists, M.R.P., Radicals, and Independents, despite the equivocation of some of them, seemed united in an effort to block the U.N.R. and to return a "republican majority." But, as we have seen, there was no unity among these parties. "Anti-Gaullism," therefore, did not embody any specific program that could be translated into action. This was made abundantly clear in the early efforts to make alliances and to agree on a common candidate to run against the Gaullists. Agreement with the Communists on the first ballot was avoided almost everywhere. But agreements even among the four genuinely republican parties—Socialists, M.R.P., Radicals, and Independents—proved to be equally difficult: they ran against each other as well as against the Communists and the Gaullists. The contrast with the apparent unity of the Gaullists was obvious. An Association for the Support of the Fifth Republic was formed on October 17, 1962, under the direction of the Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs, André Malraux. It managed to split the ranks of the Independents and, to some extent, of the M.R.P. The program of the Gaullists was unambiguous: support of General de Gaulle, the maintenance of the institutions of the Fifth Republic, and the continuation of de Gaulle's policies.

Before we discuss the results of this contest, let us very briefly discuss the electoral system used. It was the system that had been used throughout most of the period of the Third

Valid ballots	Percentage of registered voters		Percentage of actual voters	
	"Yes"	"No"	"Yes"	"No"
22,291,301	17,668,790	4,624,790	66.41%	17.38%
20,196,547	15,200,547	4,999,474	55.91	18.37
19,303,668	17,508,607	1,795,060	64.86	6.65
20,740,649	12,808,196	7,932,453	46.44	28.76
			79.25%	20.74%
			75.26	24.73
			90.70	9.29
			61.75	38.25

Republic. The country was divided into a number of constituencies—482 for France proper and the overseas Departments and territories. Each district, despite some notable discrepancies, represented about 90,000 inhabitants. The candidate who won an absolute majority of the votes won the seat. If no absolute majority for any candidate was forthcoming, then a second ballot was to take place a week later in which a plurality was all that was needed to win. However, between the first and the second ballot, candidates were free to withdraw in favor of a better-placed one—thus allowing for shrewd bargains and alliances among political leaders, parties, and candidates. It is the second ballot that counts. For under a multiparty system such as the French one, few candidates ever manage to get an absolute majority of the voters and

get themselves elected on the first ballot. The decision in almost 85% of the constituencies is made on the second ballot.

THE RESULTS. The first ballot of November 18 demonstrated once more de Gaulle's overwhelming impact on the French political scene: the election was in essence a second referendum. The U.N.R. won an unprecedented 31.9% of the vote, almost doubling its vote throughout the country, and all the other parties, with the notable exception of the Communists, lost. The extreme right-wing groups were virtually eliminated.

Yet, though "old parties," singled out for de Gaulle's scorn, received a serious setback even on the first ballot, the Communists and the P.S.U., together with the Socialists and the Radicals, accounted for 44.44% of the vote. The

TABLE 5-2
Legislative Elections in the Fifth Republic

	November, 1958				November, 1962			
	Registered	27,736,491	Voting	20,994,797	Registered	27,535,019	Voting	18,931,733
	Abstentions	6,241,694 (22.9%)	Null and Void	652,889 (2.3%)	Abstentions	8,603,286 (31.3%)	Null and Void	601,747 (2.1%)
	1st ballot	% of voters	2nd ballot	% of voters	1st ballot	% of voters	2nd ballot	% of voters
Communists	3,888,204	19.0	3,883,418	20.5	3,992,431	21.7	3,833,418	20.5
Extreme Left (Includes P.S.U.)	347,298	2.01	146,046	0.8	449,743	2.4	183,844	1.2
Socialists (S.F.I.O.)	3,176,557	15.5	2,574,606	13.8	2,319,662	12.6	2,304,330	15.2
Radicals and Allied Centrist Formations	2,347,989	11.2	1,511,111	8.1	1,466,625	8.0	686,876	6.5
M.R.P.	2,378,788	11.4	1,941,021	9.1	1,635,452	8.9	806,908	5.3
Independents and Moderates	4,092,958	19.9	3,439,948	18.5	1,742,523	9.6	1,125,988	9.1
Gaullists	3,603,958	17.7	5,249,746	28.1	5,847,403	31.9	6,165,929	40.5
					798,092*	4.4*	241,853*	1.6*
					6,645,495	36.3	6,407,782	42.1
Extreme Right	669,518	3.1	172,361	1.0	159,682	0.9		

*Independent Republicans

Left-wing forces held their own, but the Independents and the M.R.P., together with the extreme rightists, lost 3,500,000 votes. As in previous elections, a new "shift" of votes occurred. Part of them went to the U.N.R., and a smaller part into abstention. The vote for the anti Gaullist parties exceeded appreciably the "No" cast in the referendum of October.

The Communist Party showed remarkable strength in the Paris region—perhaps the most modernized and richest area of France—capturing 31% of the vote, as opposed to 26% in 1958. In the suburbs of Paris, the Communists received over 38% of the vote, as opposed to 32% in 1958—in some cases managing to surpass in absolute and relative terms the strength they had shown in the period of the Fourth Republic. Thus, after France had experienced a

decade of economic modernization and unprecedented prosperity, the Communists not only held their own in the agricultural areas and in many of the provincial towns, but improved considerably their position in the industrialized areas and the Paris region.

As was expected, the U.N.R. transformed the electoral sweep into a sizable gain of seats. It won a total of 229. This figure, when added to about 45 or so Independent Republicans and M.R.P. candidates who were pledged to support General de Gaulle, gave to the Gaullists a stable majority. Never before in the political history of France had one party controlled so many seats. The Communists, second in the popular vote, benefited this time from some of the anti-U.N.R. sentiment, the "popular front" arrangements, and the inability of the other polit-

March, 1967					
Registered		28,291,838			
Voting		22,887,151			
Abstentions		5,404,687 (19.1%)			
Null and Void		494,834 (2.16%)			
1st ballot		% of voters	2nd ballot		% of voters
5,029,808		22.46	3,998,790		21.37
506,592		2.26	1,73,466		0.93
Federation of Democratic and Socialist Left					
4,207,166		18.79	4,505,329		24.08
Democratic Center					
2,864,272		12.79	1,328,777		7.1
Centrists, moderates and Independents					
1,136,191		5.08	702,352		3.73
Fifth Republic (Gaullists and Independent Republicans)					
8,453,512		37.75	7,972,908		42.60
159,429		87	28,437		0.15

TABLE 5-3
Parliamentary Groups¹ – The Trend Toward Simplifications (1958–1968)

Fourth Republic Last Legislature— Last Session (1958)		Fifth Republic First Legislature (1958–1962)		Fifth Republic Second Legislature (1962–1967)	Fifth Republic Third Legislature (1967–)
Communists	143	Jan. 59 10	Oct. 62 10	41	71 (2) of whom one Progressist
"Progressists"	5 (1)				
P.S.U. (Socialist splinter)		1	1	1	4 (affiliated with Socialists)
Socialist (S.F.I.O.)	96 (1)	43 (4)	40 (3)	64	
R.D.A./U.D.S.R. ² (Dem. Afr. Rally Union of Dem. & Soc. Resist.)	18 (3)				⁷ Federation of Democratic and Socialist Left 116 (1)
Radical Socialists	42 (1)	41 (6)	31 (4)	³ Democratic Rally 35 (4)	
Dissident Radicals	14				⁸ Progress and Democracy 38 (3) (Democratic Center)
R.G.R. (Rally of Repub. Left)	12 (4)				
M.R.P. (Pop. Rep. Movement)	81 (4)	49 (15)	51 (6)	⁴ Democratic Center 51 (4)	
Independents	86 (12)	107 (11)	121	32 (3) ⁵ (Independent Republicans allied with Gaullists)	41 (3) (Independent Republicans allied with Gaullists)
Gaullists ⁶	19 (2)	201 (9)	168 (9)	216 (17)	179 (22)
French Union and Fraternity (Poujade)	30				
Nonaffiliated	11	92	33	14	7
Independent from ² overseas territories	7	(Splinter Algerian Formation)			
African Socialist ² Movement	3 (1)				
Total	596	589	480	482	487

* After July 1962, Algeria became independent and all deputies elected there lost their seats.

Note: All figures in parentheses indicate number of affiliated members with parliamentary group in question.

1 Until the new Constitution and the new bylaws of the National Assembly, any 14 deputies could form a parliamentary group. Thereafter, a minimum of 30 were required.

2 After 1959, deputies elected from African possessions of France no longer sat in the Assembly. After July 4, 1962, Algeria became independent, and the deputies elected there were withdrawn. The total number of deputies was 482, and was increased in 1967 to 487–470 from metropolitan France, and 17 from the overseas Departments and territories.

3 & 4 After the election of 1962, most of the R.G.R. and M.R.P., with some Independents, formed the Democratic Center, while some R.G.R., some U.D.S.R., some Independents, and most of the Radicals formed the Democratic Rally.

5 "Gaullists" is a general term we give for the various Gaullist labels—Rally of the French People in 1951, Social Republicans between 1953 and 1958, Union for the New Republic in 1959, Union for the New Republic and Union of Democratic Labor (U.N.R.-U.D.T.) in 1962, and finally, Action Committee for the Fifth Republic-Democratic Union, after 1967.

6 They are the group of Independents who, under the leadership of Giscard d'Estaing, separated from the National Center of Independents, to affiliate and cooperate with the Gaullists while maintaining an autonomous group.

7 The "Federation" (Federation of Democratic and Socialist Left) groups, Socialists, and a number of Radicals from the Democratic Rally. Members of a number of political clubs participate as a separate body called "Convention des Institutions Républicaines." Thus Socialists, the Radical parties, and the Clubs, while maintaining their respective autonomy, have formed a single and parliamentary group.

8 Progress and democracy combines the old M.R.P., together with some Independent, some centrist, and some moderate groups.

ical parties to unite against them as they had done in 1958. The Communist Party returned 31 candidates, bringing its total to 41. The Socialists, thanks to Communist support, became the largest party of the opposition: they won 66 seats. The Radicals showed remarkable staying power, supported both by the Communists and the Socialists in certain districts *against a U.N.R. candidate*, they were also supported in other districts by the U.N.R., the Independents, and often the M.R.P. *against a Communist*. Thus, with only 8.3% of the popular vote and 7% of the vote cast on the second ballot, they managed to return 42 deputies to the National Assembly. The M.R.P., Independents, and Extreme Rightists lost more than 110 seats.

Many observers saw in the election a radical transformation of the French political scene, while others saw in it only a proof of de Gaulle's undiminished popularity. It was not so much the U.N.R. that won, but the Gaullist Party. It was de Gaulle himself who had urged

the voters to vote for the men who had supported him. The U.N.R. victory underscored the personal element of the Gaullist regime, this time even at the electoral party level.

This close relationship can be shown by comparing the returns of the referendum and those of the election.

In 21 Departments, a "Yes" vote on October 28 amounted to over 70% of the votes. In these Departments, which were represented by 100 seats in the National Assembly, not a single Communist was elected. Only one Socialist and one Left-wing Socialist (P.S.U.) squeezed by. The U.N.R. won 70 seats and endorsed nine victorious Independents, for a total of 79 Gaullists. The Departments that returned a massive "Yes" vote and a massive U.N.R. majority generally correspond to the traditional strongholds of French conservatism. The Departments that voted "No" and spurned the U.N.R. in favor of Socialists, Communists, and Radicals are the ones traditionally asso-

TABLE 5-4
Communist Support and the Beginning of a Popular Front

Influence of the Communist Vote				How "Popular Front" Alliances Worked in One Department ^a			
First Ballot		Second Ballot		First Ballot		Second Ballot	
FIRST ELECTORAL DISTRICT							
Dhotel, <i>Gaullist</i>	14,233	Dhotel	21,810	R. Carrié, <i>UNR</i>	11,991	R. Carrié	16,630
Guy Mollet, <i>Leader of Socialists</i>	12,944	GUY MOLLET	24,375	P. Grasset-Morel, <i>Independent</i>	10,044	E POINSELLÉ	18,805
Coquel, <i>Communist</i>	11,362			P. Ville, <i>Communist</i>	9,075		
Pouchrisson, <i>MRP</i>	5,960			E. Poincellé, <i>Radical</i>	6,773		
				Chauliac, <i>Socialist</i>	5,959		
THIRD ELECTORAL DISTRICT							
M. Debre, <i>Leader of UNR</i>	15,588	Debre	20,712	C. Lurie, <i>UNR</i>	12,042	C. Lurie	16,836
Berthouin, <i>Radical</i>	9,579	BERTHOUIIN	23,667	M. Calas, <i>Communist</i>	13,581	JULES MOCH	24,281
Mme. Boutard, <i>Communist</i>	7,576			Jules Moch, <i>Socialist</i>	11,313		
Le Garec (<i>Left wing Socialist or PSU</i>)	2,962			Thiery, <i>Independent</i>	3,026		
Courteguiani, <i>Moderate</i>	1,066						
FOURTH ELECTORAL DISTRICT							
				A. Valbrigue, <i>UNR</i>	13,004	Valbrigue	20,291
				Balmigère, <i>Communist</i>	12,298	BALMIGÈRE	21,747
				Crouzet, <i>Socialist</i>	6,707		
				de Serrege, <i>Independent</i>	2,839		
^a Communists, Socialists, and Radicals supported each other in the Hérault Department and won one seat each.							

^aCommunists, Socialists, and Radicals supported each other in the Hérault Department and won one seat each.

ciated with the Left. Whatever the new meaning of party labels, the voting pattern of the French seems to be deeply rooted in past habits and attitudes.

But of course there was another side to the Gaullist victory. For the first time since 1947, the Communists moved out of their political isolation and cooperated with the Socialists and the Radicals. In many Departments the Radicals, Communists, and Socialists (including the Left-wing Socialists) formed open or tacit "popular front" alliances to support each other on the second ballot. In 30 Departments, these alliances accounted for the victory of at least one "popular front" candidate. When the candidate was a Radical or, particularly, a Socialist, the "popular front" alliance worked better. When the candidate was a Communist, the "anti-Communist" reflexes of the public tended to decrease the size of his vote. Would the lesson of cooperation be learned? Were the Gaullists and the Left to confront each other in the future over the dying body of the Center? Was the political scene to become polarized? The Gaullist victory that produced a majority in the legislature raised some crucial questions about future political alignments.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

The constitutional reform of 1962 providing for the election of the President of the Republic by direct universal suffrage was implemented by ordinances that simplified the electoral process. Now a candidate could be designated simply by securing the signed endorsement of 100 "notables"—members of Parliament or of the Social and the Economic Council, or general departmental councillors and mayors (10 of whom would have to be elected representatives of overseas Departments and territories)—and by making a deposit of \$2,000, to be forfeited if he failed to receive 5% of the votes. All candidates who managed to receive 5% or more of the votes

were now reimbursed for all their overall expenses (other than mailing expenses and those incurred in the printing of circulars and posters—these are normally paid for by the state) by receiving a lump sum of \$20,000. All candidates were also given equal free time on radio and TV: two hours on each. The candidate with an absolute majority of the votes would be proclaimed President of the Republic, but if there was no absolute majority, a second ballot would be taken within two weeks, in which the number of contestants would have to be narrowed to two. (The wording of this provision did not necessarily limit the second ballot to the two *first*-placed candidates; it was conceivable that the top candidate might withdraw. But whatever the first-ballot standing of the candidates, the number permitted to run in the second ballot was cut to only two.)

The Parties and the Candidates

De Gaulle's reluctance to announce his candidacy thwarted all activity on the part of the Gaullist Party—the U.N.R. Yet the mere fact that de Gaulle *might* be a candidate paralyzed the opposition, since it was a foregone conclusion that the President, whose popularity had been consistently high, could not be defeated. A Presidential election, many thought, would be a repeat performance of the Constitution referendum or the election of 1962.

The first concerted effort on the part of the anti-Gaullists was made by the Socialist Mayor of Marseille, Gaston Defferre. He suggested the formation of a large federation consisting of all parties and groups, with the exception of the Communists to the Left and the Gaullists to the Right, with himself as their candidate. The idea of this "grand federation," as it came to be known, was based upon a shrewd tactical calculation. It would force the Communists to go along and vote for its candidate on either the first ballot or (more likely) the second. With the Communist Party accounting for a very minimum of 20% of the

votes, and with all the non-Gaullists providing a minimum of another 40%, there was a prospect of preventing de Gaulle from getting an absolute majority on the first ballot, and defeating him on the second. All that was needed was the cooperation of all the center parties and the Socialists behind a single candidate on the first ballot, and the support of the Communists on the second.

After a year's efforts, Deferre withdrew. The Communists opposed the "grand federation" since it was designed to isolate them at the very time when they were hoping to set up an alliance with the Socialists and the Left. But the Socialists were also restive since the coalition suggested by Deferre would throw them into an intimate alliance with the Center forces. The Radicals were, as usual, divided.

As we have seen, a smaller federation (*La Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste*—The Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left, *F.G.D.S.*), limited mostly to the Socialists and the Radicals, developed instead. It was acceptable to the Communists, and they were willing to support its candidate. But there was no candidate! It was only in September, just three months before the election, that François Mitterrand, a left-wing Radical, a former leader of a minuscule party, and the spokesman of the *Convention of Republican Institutions* (see Chapter IV) announced personally his decision to run. He received the support of the Federation and of the Communists. Mitterrand soon began to represent the "classic" Left, and the support of the Communists gave to his candidature both the character and the substance of a "popular front" alliance.

A number of other candidates appeared on the scene—not all at the last minute. Long before the fall of 1965, Tixier-Vignancourt—an old-time right-winger, the defense lawyer for Marshal Petain, and a fervent opponent of Algerian independence—had announced his decision to run, and had been stumping the country. He attacked de Gaulle for his personal government, and asked for amnesty for all those

serving sentences for their uprisings against de Gaulle and for the acts of violence committed in France by the right-wing activists during the war in Algeria. He appealed to the hard right-wing groups, and particularly to French refugees from Algeria, who had not forgiven de Gaulle for granting Algeria its independence and forcing them out of their homes.

In addition to Tixier-Vignancourt, a relatively unknown senator, Pierre Marcellin, who opposed the personal, Presidential government of de Gaulle and who favored a return to Cabinet government, announced his candidature in April, 1965.

The candidature of Mitterrand left the Center group, and particularly the M.R.P., without their own candidate. They had made a number of efforts to establish a new political formation—the Democratic Center. In October, 1964, one of the major promoters of this movement, Jean Lecanuet, announced his candidature. A young and dynamic speaker, a strong advocate of a United Europe and N.A.T.O., he hoped to attract the support not only of the Center and the Conservative groups, but also of Federation voters from among the Radicals and even the Socialists. If de Gaulle failed to get an absolute majority on the first ballot, and if Mitterrand's showing was weak, he expected to force a contest between himself and the President, in which he hoped to receive the support of the Left and the Center against de Gaulle, thus in effect reconstructing the "Great Federation" idea on the second ballot. The Communists, he thought, would have to vote for him in order to defeat de Gaulle.

In the last moment a fifth candidate was nominated. Marcel Barbu, former member of the *Constituent Assembly* of 1945—virtually unknown. Calling himself "the candidate of transition," he promised to stay in office for only two years, and his major policy commitment was the establishment of a Ministry of the Rights of Men.

The campaign opened on November 19, 16 days before the first ballot. It was the first time

that television brought into the French homes the candidates and "nationalized," so to speak, the Presidential election. The aging President contrasted sharply with the forceful Mitterrand and with the dynamic Lecanuet, whom many began to compare with John F. Kennedy. President de Gaulle in his opening address attacked again the old parties, indicated that the opposition was a heterogeneous one from which no genuine leadership could emerge, and stated haughtily that his defeat would lead to chaos. He identified himself with history and his Fifth Republic with the destiny of France. Thereafter he fell into complete silence and refused to stoop so low as to campaign. He refused to use his allotted radio and TV time. He seemed to consider the forthcoming election as a plebiscite. Only when the opinion polls began to indicate a decline in his strength did he make a second appearance—and that on the eve of the election. He intimated at that time that he might withdraw if the vote was not strongly in his favor.

The themes of the campaign were relatively simple. De Gaulle spoke of the record: the resurgence of France as a great and independent power, the economic and social reforms that had been undertaken, and, above all, the stabil-

ity of the government and the leadership of the executive, thanks to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. Neither of his two main protagonists criticized directly the Fifth Republic, though both argued that de Gaulle had not respected his own Constitution. They deplored personal government, the diminution of the role of Parliament, the use of referendums, and the lack of a genuine dialogue between the government and Parliament. They promised to reform the Constitution accordingly. They also criticized sharply his social and economic policies, arguing in favor of stepping up reforms in education, housing construction, and welfare measures. Lecanuet took a staunchly pro-European position, favoring a supranational European arrangement, and close links with the United States under N.A.T.O. Both were critical of the French atomic force. Of all parties that were active throughout the campaign, the Communists provided, as always in the past, the best organization and financial support. They organized a number of meetings in favor of Mitterrand, both in the provinces and in Paris. Lecanuet counted on his television appeal, and began to make serious inroads into the centrist and conservative electorate. De Gaulle's silence forced the Gaullists to remain inactive.

TABLE 5-5
The Presidential Election of December 5 and 19, 1965

	First Ballot			Second Ballot		
	Totals	Percentage of voters	Percentage of registered voters	Totals	Percentage of voters	Percentage of registered voters
Registered voters	28,913,422	—	—	28,902,704	—	—
Voting	24,502,957	—	—	24,371,647	—	—
Abstentions	4,410,465	—	15.2	4,531,057	—	15.6
Blank and void	248,403	—	0.8	668,213	—	2.3
Valid ballots cast	24,254,554	—	84.0	23,703,434	—	82.1
General de Gaulle	10,828,523	44.6	37.4	13,083,699	55.1	45.2
F. Mitterrand	7,694,003	34.7	26.6	10,619,735	44.8	36.7
J. Lecanuet	3,777,119	15.5	13.0	—	—	—
J. L. Tixier-Vignancour	1,260,208	5.1	4.3	—	—	—
D. Marcilhacy	415,018	1.7	1.4	—	—	—
M. Barbu	279,683	1.1	0.9	—	—	—

The First Ballot

The results (see Table 5-5) surprised most of the commentators—though not the opinion analysts, who had detected in the two weeks preceding the elections a movement away from de Gaulle and in favor of his two major opponents. De Gaulle failed to receive an absolute majority. What surprised even more was the high level of electoral participation. Abstentions were the lowest ever recorded in the history of France: only 15%. Many drew from this the inference that Presidential election by direct universal suffrage appealed to the French, and concluded that Presidential government was becoming widely accepted. The election returns (we shall limit our survey only to the three main candidates) indicated several things, which we shall now discuss briefly.

De Gaulle received an absolute majority in only 13 of the 90 Departments, and came in first with a plurality in 70. Mitterrand managed to win an absolute majority in only two Departments, and a plurality in 18. Lecanuet was third in all Departments, except in five where he came second.

The geographic distribution of votes among the three candidates indicated a return to the traditional voting patterns. General de Gaulle received overwhelming support in the Western and Eastern parts of the country, and in parts of the Center where his strength corresponded with the "yes" in all the preceding referenda. The strength of Mitterrand came from the traditional regions and strongholds of the Left and of the Communists in parts of the center, in the South, and in the Paris region. The only exception was his relative weak showing in the industrialized Departments of Northern France. As for Lecanuet, despite his good showing (15.5% of the voters) he was hopelessly outmatched. His strength came from the more

backward and rural departments that had traditionally voted conservative.

Lecanuet's vote invited speculation on the significance of the foreign-policy questions. It is doubtful that the votes cast for him indicate or reflect the extent of pro-European and pro-Atlantic sentiment. His electoral clientele came from groups that were primarily concerned with domestic and economic problems rather than foreign-policy considerations. This is even more obvious since at least 60% of his votes went to General de Gaulle on the second ballot.

Despite the indication of the stability of voting attitudes, the election illustrated once more the personal appeal de Gaulle has had among the voters. His personal vote, even if far below that of the four preceding referenda, was much higher than the one the Gaullist Party received on the first ballot of the 1962 legislative elections: 44.6% as compared to approximately 37.5%, or about 2 million more votes. Conversely, Mitterrand received considerably below the total number of votes that were cast for the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and the Radical Socialist Party in the legislative elections of the same year: 34.7% as compared to about 44%. Since Lecanuet's vote was somewhat higher than that of the centrist parties in the election, the inescapable conclusion is that de Gaulle continued to appeal to left-wing voters and managed to detach them from their parties when his own person or his own policy were at stake in an election.

The Second Ballot

De Gaulle had no alternative but to run on the second ballot against Mitterrand. Lecanuet had to withdraw. In a statement he made, he asked his followers not to vote for de Gaulle, thus indirectly counseling either abstention or a vote for Mitterrand. The same was the attitude of Marcellin. On the other hand, both Tixier-Vignancourt and Barbu expressly asked their voters to vote for Mitterrand.




FIGURE 5-2 Presidential election—second ballot, December 19, 1965: the vote for Mitterrand in percentages.

Thus between the two ballots the confrontation was limited to the two top candidates. De Gaulle abandoned his previous stance and used the full time allotted to him by law on radio and TV. He campaigned with vigor and unexpected gusto, and his own party and the members of his government campaigned forcefully in his favor also. In the other camp the Communist Party, together with the Socialists and the majority of the Radicals, intensified their efforts in favor of Mitterrand. They were surprised to discover that the most powerful office of the land could be theirs, and for a time, irrespective of conflicting motives, they seemed united. The most critical question was the attitude of the voters of the defeated candidates. If they followed the instructions of their candidates, de

Gaulle would be in a precarious position. Assuming that 40% of Lecanuet's candidates voted for Mitterrand, that one-quarter abstained, that 35% went to de Gaulle, and that Tixier-Vignancourt's voters (5%) continued to express their hostility to de Gaulle by voting for Mitterrand, the margin would be narrowed down to not more than 3% of the electorate—about 750,000 votes.

It turned out, of course, that this did not happen. On the second ballot—for which the abstentions and blank ballots increased by a mere 2%—de Gaulle received 55.1% and Mitterrand 44.8%. This, in essence, meant that at least 60% of the Lecanuet voters went to de Gaulle, about 35% supported Mitterrand, and a small number abstained. Most of the votes cast




FIGURE 5-3 *Presidential election—second ballot: December 19, 1965: the vote for de Gaulle in percentages*

for Barbu and Marclhacy were also transferred to de Gaulle, while the majority of the Extreme Right-wing voters who had voted for Tixier-Vignancourt went to the Communist-supported candidate.

Despite the support given to Mitterrand by the extreme right-wingers and centrists (which was offset by the support given to de Gaulle by Left-wing voters), the basic historical voting patterns that we discussed earlier remained in evidence. For instance, as Professor Goguel shows in his analysis² (from which I have drawn heavily), the vote for Mitterrand was virtually identical to the vote of May 5, 1946, on the first

draft of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic sponsored by the Communists, the Socialists, and the Radicals, but opposed by the M.R.P. and de Gaulle; and remarkably similar in its geographic distribution. In its broad contours, the geographic distribution of Mitterrand's vote also resembles that of the "popular front" of 1936—a combination of Communist, Socialist, and Radical strength. The vote for Mitterrand represented the traditional ideological families of the Left, grouped into a number of easily identifiable geographical areas (see Figs. 5-2 and 5-3).

The system and the popular election of the President had survived the test De Gaulle, at the age of 74, continued in office for a second seven-year term. But the opposition he encoun-

²F. Goguel, "L'élection Présidentielle Française du décembre 1965," *Revue Française de Science Politique* April, 1966

tered was not reassuring for his successor. If de Gaulle had failed to win on the first ballot, it is very likely that, with him out of the picture, a great plurality of candidates on the first ballot, and the ensuing horse-trading among them before the second ballot is narrowed down to two, may well produce insurmountable difficulties. The Presidency may be weakened and the President may again become a creature of compromises and coalitions. But there was a second and perhaps more important problem: the candidates disregarded the political parties. Tixier-Vignancourt had no party; Mitterrand had only a small organization to back him when he announced personally his candidacy; Lecanuet did the same with only a qualified endorsement of his own party; and de Gaulle himself expressly ignored the U.N.R. The parties were not associated with the process of designating candidates; they played only a supporting role. They remained outside of the most central political event: the nomination of the candidates for the Presidency.

However, the beginnings in the transformation of the party system were in evidence. The parties were forced to cooperate after all and the election, even on the first ballot, narrowed the choice to three major candidates—representing the Left, the Center, and de Gaulle. On the second ballot the Center had to split into the only two possible directions available and, despite the influx of some unexpected Right-wing votes, the Left supported a single candidate. The relative closeness of the vote conveyed the lesson of unity and suggested the course of action to follow. To the Right and the Center the haunting realization emerged that the chances of victory, without de Gaulle, would be slim without unity and leadership. It is in this sense that the Presidential election became the watershed of the Fifth Republic. The parties, hesitant and reluctant to abandon their organizations and structure, when confronted with the logic of the Presidential election, became forced to do so.

The election did not settle the future of the

Constitution. Though campaigning for the Presidency, both Lecanuet and Mitterrand introduced many caveats and promised reforms for the greater autonomy and initiative of the Parliament, and a restriction of the powers and the personal leadership of the President.

THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF MARCH 5 AND 12, 1967

As soon as the victory of General de Gaulle had been announced, the preparations for the elections of the National Assembly began in earnest. The electoral system remained fundamentally the same as in 1958 and 1962. The only serious modification provided that all candidates who failed to receive 10% of the registered votes on the first ballot were to be automatically eliminated from the second. The electoral districts represented about 93,000 inhabitants each, but gross discrepancies were allowed to remain: in some districts the population was as high as 175,000, while in others it was not more than 75,000. Each Department continued to be entitled to two deputies, irrespective of its population, so that agricultural areas remained over-represented. To the 482 districts (465 for metropolitan France and 17 for the overseas Departments and territories), five more were added in the Paris region, bringing the grand total to 487. Each candidate was required to deposit \$200, which would be forfeited if he failed to receive 5% of the ballots cast. Campaigning expenses were borne by the state, and the parties were given free time on radio and TV. Three hours in all were allotted for this purpose, divided evenly among the "majority" party—the Gaullists—and all the opposition groups represented in the National Assembly. All other political formations were to be given seven minutes, on condition that they nominate more than 75 candidates.³ The

³On the second ballot the time allowed was 45 minutes for the majority, 45 minutes for the "opposition," and five minutes for other political formations.

campaign was officially declared open three weeks before the polling day.

The Communist Party prepared for the election with two objectives in mind. The first was to demonstrate that it continued to be the most popular party in France—a distinction it had lost since the 1962 election to the Gaullists. The party designated candidates virtually in each and every electoral district (478). Their second and perhaps more important (from a tactical point of view) objective was to cooperate closely with the members of the left-wing forces that were grouped under the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left. There was to be no question of a Communist outright support to a non-Communist candidate on the second ballot, as had happened in some cases in 1962. On December 21, 1966, a formal electoral agreement between the Communists and the Federation was reached. Their candidates would compete freely against each other on the first ballot, but on the second ballot they would undertake to withdraw to support the "better placed" candidate. It was further agreed that immediately after the first ballot, the top leaders of both formations would meet to make reciprocal withdrawals according to this formula, and to examine special cases that might arise calling for exceptions.

The Federation entered the electoral contest in a mood of optimism. It had managed to remain united and make progress since the strong showing of François Mitterrand in the Presidential election. It had managed to withstand many internal conflicts and to resist the attraction to move to the Center and seek alliances there rather than to the Left. It designated candidates in the great majority of electoral districts (418). These candidates were carefully apportioned among the three constituent parties in the order of their strength. Socialists, Radicals, and Convention. Almost all Socialist and Radical members of the National Assembly were designated as candidates—many in safe seats—while the candidates of the Convention often found themselves running in dis-

tricts where the odds against them were heavy.

Between the Communist Party and the Federation stood the small and militant Unified Socialist Party, or P.S.U. It came into prominence again when its titular head, Pierre Mendès-France, decided to run as its candidate in Grenoble. The P.S.U. managed to designate a little over 100 candidates—enough to give it a few minutes on radio and TV. After many hesitations and equivocations, it signed the same agreement that had been made between the Federation and the Communists regarding withdrawals and support on the second ballot.

The Democratic Center found itself in a precarious situation. Shut out to the Left by the agreement of the Federation, the Communists, and the P.S.U., it found the door to the Gaullist camp tightly locked by the dislike of the Gaullist leaders for Lecanuet and by the Independent Republicans, who collaborated with the Gaullists and appealed to the moderate center. *There was little room to maneuver.* The party designated candidates in 371 districts and its leader, Lecanuet, put all his hopes in a strong showing on the first ballot, and in the defection of the Federation voters to his candidate, rather than to a Communist, on the second ballot. There was also the threat of maintaining a Democratic Center candidate on the second ballot, thus forcing a triangular contest with a Communist (or a Federation) candidate and a Gaullist. Such a threat could force the Left and the Gaullists to withdraw and vote in favor of the Centrists—the first to stave off a Gaullist victory and the second to thwart a Communist one!

The Gaullists and the Independent Republicans expected to repeat their 1962 performance. An "Action Committee for the Fifth Republic" was formed to assume the direction of the campaign. It imposed a tight control on the nomination of all Gaullist candidates in *all* of the 487 districts. Designation meant endorsement by the leadership of the Party—in many cases, by the Prime Minister himself. Twenty-five Ministers, many of who had never held or

sought a parliamentary mandate before, were asked to run. Discipline was respected. One serious attempt to form a rival organization under the name of "Dissident Gaullists" failed. A number of smaller groups—the right-wing Republican Alliance and the Rally for European Liberation—managed to put up only 68 candidates, the Dissident Gaullists only 35, and unaffiliated candidates, dispersed throughout the country, accounted for another 195.

The Platforms

The platforms of the political parties presented little that was original. There seemed to be, as we noted earlier, a decline of ideological differences. The parties addressed themselves to many immediate problems and avoided others. The Communists, while paying lip service to their revolutionary verbiage, seemed to be at best a reformist party. Their electoral agreement with the Federation emphasized the points in common with the Socialists and the Radicals: Gaullism should be "eliminated," political liberties protected, a coherent economic and social policy set forth, and world peace and disarmament arranged. They urged massive construction of low-income housing and the improvement of public health, national education, and scientific research; and proposed a vigorous policy of economic expansion, a new comprehensive economic plan, the nationalization of all armaments industries and commercial banks, full employment, higher wages and social security benefits, better old-age pensions, comprehensive legislation for the aged, and the improvement of living conditions on the farm. They opposed the United States bombings in North Vietnam and favored the application of the Geneva Accords; were against the proliferation of atomic weapons; and expressed their "profound opposition" to the French atomic force. The agreement seemed to be so comprehensive as to overshadow the differences. The Federation remained generally pro-European

and continued to be oriented towards the Atlantic alliance. Not so the Communists. The Communists favored a profound reform of the Constitution and the re-establishment of parliamentary supremacy. Not so the Federation. It seemed willing to accept the letter of the Constitution, but considered modifications regarding the power of the President and of Parliament. The Communists favored extensive and profound nationalizations; the Federation remained selective, narrowly reformist, and more pragmatic in its approach. But otherwise there was substantial agreement on policy and goals.

Opposed to the Communists and the Federation, the Gaullists' single overriding theme was the continuation of the work of General de Gaulle: stability at home, independence abroad, and continuation of the economic and social reforms. They defended vigorously their record—decolonization, full employment, prosperity, and stability—and asked the voters to provide a majority to make it possible for General de Gaulle to continue his task.

The Democratic Center proposed some kind of Europeanization of the atomic force, the entry of England into the Common Market, European supranational institutions, and continuing attachment to N.A.T.O. It accepted by-and-large the Constitution, but proposed the establishment of a Supreme Court similar to that of the United States. Beyond this the Center emphasized what the other parties also stressed: better economic planning; rapid construction of low-cost housing; rapid increase of educational facilities; subsidies for regional planning and aid to the farmers.

The Electorate

On March 5, some 28 million registered voters were called upon to cast their ballots. About 15 million were women, and 13.7 million men—a fact that favored the Gaullists, since a greater proportion of women than men

voted for de Gaulle in the Presidential election. This was also the most aged electorate in France (over half were between 40 and 61, 25% were over 61, and about a quarter were between 21 and 40)—again a situation favorable to the Gaullists since a greater proportion of those above 50 voted for de Gaulle in the Presidential election.

Five weeks before the election, the distribution of Left-Center-Gaullist strength ran according to the accompanying chart (Fig 5-4).


How was the importance of the election viewed? First, interest seemed to be high. 27% were "very" interested, 47% "a little," and only 25% expressed total disinterest. Thirty-nine percent viewed the election as an opportunity

to vote for a man in whom they had confidence, and 28% to choose "the political family" that best corresponded to their political ideas. Only 20% considered the election to be a vote for or against de Gaulle. In the weeks preceding the election, the popularity of General de Gaulle remained high, with 62% expressing satisfaction with him as President, and only 30% being "rather" or—"very" dissatisfied.

The Campaign

While a number of issues were aired on radio and TV and in some large meetings, the real electoral battle took place at the level of the electoral district. Each candidate endeavor-

FIGURE 5-4 *The French electorate and their voting preferences (Based on a study of the French Institute of Public Opinion, February 7, 1967, indicating voter preferences at that time. Though it does not correspond exactly to the vote distribution on election day, it is very close and gives a good profile of the supporters of each political formation)*



ored to establish an intimate and direct contact with the voter. In the school halls and small chemistry laboratories, the candidate—accompanied by his “substitute,” the person who would replace him in the National Assembly were he to accept a Cabinet post after being elected a deputy—met small groups ranging from a handful to three or four hundred. The topics most often emphasized were the state of the economy and of the welfare measures taken by the government, and the Constitution and its future.

The economic situation was discussed in detail by both the Gaullists and the opposition parties. It may be summed up as a battle of statistics. The Gaullists claimed progress in every sector. The opposition often conceded it, but claimed it was inadequate and that *relative* to the other Common Market countries, France was falling behind. How many miles of highway? How many clinics? How many schools? How many tons of steel and coal? What was the exact rate in the increase of production? What were the provisions made for summer classes and vacations for children? How many housing units had been constructed? The Gaullists conceded to the Federation and the Communists a certain lag in housing construction and in the development of education facilities, but the reason, they argued, was the rapid growth of population and the correspondingly unprecedented demand for these services. Communist and Federation spokesmen attacked the Gaullists for relying on “free enterprise,” castigated the government for lack of positive economic planning, and urged for measures of control and socialization. The leader of the Federation, François Mitterrand, in one of the few large pre-election gatherings, demanded more schools, more highways, greater benefits for the sick and the unskilled workers, higher old-age pension rates, better-paid vacations, and increased wages. “When Pompidou [the Prime Minister, leader of the Gaullists, and an ex-banker] asks me who is going to pay, I answer: ‘You, Monsieur Pompidou.’”

The second topic was the future of the Constitution. Debate here often became acrimonious and took at least two directions. One involved what might be called the “title of ownership”: to whom did the Constitution of the Fifth Republic belong? While the Communists proudly rejected any share of the title—they were the only ones that campaigned and voted against the Constitution—the Gaullist claimed it all for themselves. It was *their* Constitution and it had given leadership and stability to the country. This was refuted indignantly by the leaders of the Center and the Federation. They too had shared in the preparation of the Constitution and had voted for it. The Fifth Republic belonged to all; executive leadership was desired by all; stability was the result of common efforts. But at this point the debate took off in a different direction. The Federation, the Center, and many others argued that the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was not respected by de Gaulle and his Prime Minister. They demanded that the system return to it; that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet become the effective vehicles of executive leadership under the overall control of the National Assembly. The personal power of the President should be curtailed. Similarly, the prerogatives of the National Assembly to exercise control, to scrutinize the government, and to initiate legislation ought to be broadened.

The debate on the Constitution became exacerbated a few days before the election, when the French electorate was presented with an intriguing hypothesis that provoked, in the best French tradition, the most animated debate: What would happen if the opposition won? Would de Gaulle resign? Would he dissolve and call for a new election? Would he play the role of a moderator and simply ask the leader of the new majority, presumably his erstwhile opponent in the Presidential election, François Mitterrand—to form a Cabinet? Some of the Gaullists argued that the President would have to dissolve, and that in case the opposition won in a new election he would have to resort to the

emergency powers granted him by Article 16, and govern by ordinance. Relentlessly the argument was pursued—back to its starting point. If this were the case, then the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle were synonymous. The Fifth Republic belonged to de Gaulle and the Gaullists, but not to France!

General de Gaulle cast fuel upon the fire. He had opened the electoral campaign in a speech in which he asked for a return of his majority to support the task that history, the Constitution, and the voters had invested him with, and claimed that the "partisan" groups that opposed him were "able to unite only in order to destroy but never to construct." Again, 48 hours before the balloting, he appealed in a nationally televised address in favor of the Gaullist party. Asserting that a great deal had been accomplished, he conceded that there was still a great deal to do. It would be impossible to do it if the "parties" had the numerical strength in the National Assembly to thwart his task. But, "there is every reason to hope if the Fifth Republic majority wins," he concluded. The President had personally injected himself again into the electoral campaign, asking for the re-election of his majority to support him in accomplishing his task.

Few other issues played an important role in the campaign. Foreign policy was certainly not one of them, since, with the exception of the Democratic Center, the differences between Gaullists, the Federation, and the Communists were differences of degree. As the voters prepared to cast their ballot, few underestimated, even if they did not openly debate, the significance of the election. The new Assembly was to last until 1972, for which year a Presidential election was also scheduled. A Gaullist majority could give to the Gaullist institutions a chance to last until then—for a total of 14 years, longer than the Fourth Republic—and an opportunity to the Gaullists to become an organized political force able to survive their President. Defeat would spell internal conflicts among them and put a severe strain upon the

institutions. The election transcended, therefore, the immediate policy issues.

For the 470 seats for metropolitan France, a total of 2,190 candidates entered the competition—about the same number as in the previous election. But despite numerous labels and the number of unaffiliated, the contest involved now four parties, or perhaps three and a half: the Communists, the Federation, the Gaullists, and the Democratic Center.

The Results of the First Ballot

More than 22 million out of some 28 million voted, for a participation of almost 81% of the voters (as opposed to 69% in 1962). The small parties, the nonaffiliated candidates, and those who dissented from their national parties and opposed their leadership were literally wiped out. Even the Democratic Center appeared to have been squeezed between the three large formations and to have suffered irreparable political loss.

Otherwise, hardly any major fluctuation of voting can be detected. As the table on page 226 shows, the Communists improved their strength by a total of 1 million votes, but in view of the higher rate of participation, by only 1%. The combination of the Communist and the PSU vote indicates a strength for both 1962 and 1967 of slightly over 25% of the total. The Federation lost about 1.5% as compared with the votes cast for two of its major constituent bodies (Socialists and Radicals) in 1962. The Gaullists, including the Independent Republicans, improved their strength in absolute figures but remained at approximately 37.5% of the vote. The decline of all other formations is noticeable and corresponds to a trend that had been established in 1962. The Democratic Center (but with only 371 candidates) lost 4% of its vote (from about 17%, that its constituent groups—M.R.P. and Independents—won in 1962, to 13%), and the extreme right-wing formations remained below 1%.

This stability of balloting accounts for what

was widely anticipated. Only 81 candidates—mostly the Gaullists, and eight Communists—received an absolute majority and were elected on the first ballot. In the 31 districts of Paris nobody was elected, though the U.N.R. was ahead in every district.

The vote also showed remarkable stability in its geographic distribution. Gaullists continued to be strong in the East and the West, and in some of the Central regions. The Communists maintained their strength in Paris, and improved it in the Paris region, where the Federation also made progress. Both maintained their traditional strength in the South, the Southeast and the Southwest, and in the industrial Departments of the North. If the reader were to draw a somewhat arbitrary line between the Right (Gaullists) and the Left (Communists, the P.S.U., and the Federation), concede the votes received by the unaffiliated candidates to the Right, and give 40% of the Democratic Center to the Left and 60% to the Right, then the division between Right and Left would be as follows:

Left: about 49% of the vote, with a total of about 10.5 million.

Right: about 51% of the vote, with a total of about 11.5 million.

The Second Ballot

Except in Somaliland, where the election had been postponed, 405 deputies remained to be chosen on the second ballot. Some 600 candidates had been automatically eliminated by the 10% rule, mostly among the Democratic Center, the P.S.U., the extreme right, and the unaffiliated. With the collapse of the splinter groups, the candidates that could technically represent their parties with a fair chance of winning came almost exclusively from the Communists, the Federation, and the Gaullists, and a few from the Democratic Center. The issue therefore narrowed to the follow-

ing: Would the electoral agreement between the Communist Party and the Federation be respected; and if so, would it be followed by the voters? Would the Democratic Center maintain its candidates—not more than about 170 were eligible—against both the Left and the Right, or would it rather throw its support behind the Gaullists on the basis of some last-minute arrangements calling for reciprocity in some selected districts? Whatever the arrangements, would the voters of the Democratic Center follow the instruction of their candidates on how to vote on the second ballot?

Each district had its own tradition and memory, and in each the personality of the candidates was likely to play an important role. Further, the way in which the voters would vote on the second ballot depended on whether there was to be a straight fight between a Communist and a Gaullist, or between a Federation candidate and a Gaullist. While the Communist voters were expected to go all the way for a Federation candidate on the second ballot, the reverse was not likely. It was also taken almost as axiomatic that more than 60% of the Democratic Center vote would go to a Gaullist rather than a Federation candidate, and as much as 80% to a Gaullist rather than a Communist.

The alliance between the Communists and the Federation was effectively implemented. The Federation withdrew its candidates in favor of a Communist whenever the latter had received a higher number of votes, and the Communists reciprocated scrupulously. In fact, they went beyond this. In 15 so-called "special cases" they withdrew in favor of the Federation candidate even when the Communist candidate had come out ahead of the latter. These special cases involved contests in which the candidate to defeat was a Gaullist Minister, where the Federation candidate was an important political leader, or where the Federation candidate had a wider local electoral appeal than the Communist. On the second ballot the Communists, the P.S.U., and the Federation presented one

single candidate against the Gaullists, who maintained their candidate virtually everywhere. Only some 80 Democratic Center candidates actually ran, and a mere 30 from other formations or from among the unaffiliated. In metropolitan France on the second ballot there were fewer than 880 candidates. In 335 districts, electoral competition was limited to a straight fight between two candidates. In 62 there was a "triangular" conflict, and only in one did four candidates compete for election. The Gaullists were pitted in a straight fight almost everywhere: in 125 districts against the Communists, in 144 against the Federation; in 18 against the Democratic Center; in six against the P.S.U., and in eight against the right-wing candidates and unaffiliated. Thus the Democratic Center candidates ran in 18 districts against a candidate of the Left, hoping and often expecting to receive Gaullist support, and in 18 districts against the Gaullists, hoping, without necessarily expecting, Leftist support. The dominant aspect of the election was the contest between the Gaullists and the single candidate of the Left—Communist, Federation, and occasionally P.S.U.

THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND BALLOT. On the second ballot participation was almost as high: there was a drop of only 2%. The parties of the Left showed a remarkable discipline and were largely followed by their voters—more so for the Communists than the Federation. Generally, the single candidate of the Left received a greater number of votes on the second ballot than did all the candidates of the Left put together on the first. The Gaullists continued to show remarkable strength, their total percentage going up from 37% in the first ballot to about 45% on the second. In the eighteen contests that pitted the Democratic Center against the Gaullists, the Left-wing vote went for the Center; in the eighteen that pitted the Center against the Left, the Gaullist voters supported the Center. The electoral strategy of the Demo-

cratic Center, in other words, worked—and helped them gain about 20 seats on the second ballot. The election was very close, 55 seats being decided by less than a thousand-vote margin. The Gaullists barely managed to stave off defeat. They and the Independent Republicans finally finished with 245 seats—a loss of 37 seats. In contrast, the Left improved its position (see Fig. 5-5) greatly. The Communists moved from 41 to 73 seats—a gain of 32, and the Federation from 89 to 116—a gain of 27. The Center lost nine seats, from 38 to 27, but it managed to recruit some of the "unaffiliated" candidates, while the Extreme Right failed to gain a single seat.

What accounted ultimately for the loss of Gaullist seats was the transfer of votes from the first to the second ballot. The Federation and the Communists gained more than expected, and the Gaullists simply did not gain all that was expected. In the first ballot the Democratic Center and various centrists and moderates received some 3.8 million votes. Half of this went back to the centrist candidates that remained on the second ballot—in about 100 districts. The other 1.8 million votes were free on the second ballot to go to a Gaullist, a Federation, or a Communist candidate, or into abstention. Only about 45% went to the Gaullists, another 40% to the candidate of the Left, and the rest into abstention. In the Paris districts, in the 18 cases that pitted a Communist against a Gaullist in a straight fight, 25% of the centrist vote went to a Communist, another 45% to a Gaullist, and the rest into abstention. A part of the Center (and at times the extreme right) vote simply went to the Left—even to vote for a Communist—in order to defeat a Gaullist. Finally the Centrist vote was heavier in favor of the Left when the candidate was a Federation man.

In Table 5-6 below, we give a schematic indication of the pattern of transfers from the first to the second ballot for all the straight fights that pitted Communists against Gaullists and

TABLE 5-6

*Second Ballot: Federation vs. Gaullists (Pattern of Transfers)**

	<i>Fed.</i>	<i>P.C.</i>	<i>P.S.U.</i>	<i>C.D.</i>	<i>V^e</i>	<i>G.D.</i>	<i>Div.</i>
Federation	99	99	85-90	40	0	10	30
Fifth Republic (Gaullists,	0	0	0-5	40	99	70	50
Abstentions and void	1	1	5-10	20	1	30	20

TABLE 5-7

Second Ballot: P.C. vs. Gaullists

	<i>P.C.</i>	<i>P.S.U.</i>	<i>Fed.</i>	<i>C.D.</i>	<i>V^e</i>	<i>G.D.</i>	<i>Div.</i>
Communists	99	80-90	80-85	20	0	1	15
Fifth Republic (Gaullists)	0	5	5-10	45	99	80	50
Abstentions and void	1	15	10-20	35	1	19	35

*Legend: Fed. = Federation; P.C. = Communist Party; P.S.U. = Socialist Unified Party;
C.D. = Democratic Center; V^e = Fifth Republic (Gaullists); G.D. = Dissident Gaullists;
Div. = Various.
(Pattern of transfers shown by reading each column from top to bottom.)

the candidates of the Federation against the Gaullists. They are not more than an approximation, and are given for purposes of illustration. They indicate only the general pattern of transfers.

Equally unanticipated was the massive transfer of the Federation and the P.S.U. votes to a Communist candidate on the second ballot. Sometimes 80%, and even 90% of the Federation voters were transferred to a Communist. The Communist voters rarely faltered. They transferred their votes massively to a Federation candidate, often assuring him of his election. Thus the "popular front" alliance worked—not only at the higher party echelons where the agreements had been made, but even more significantly it was effective among the voters.

The second ballot confirmed the tenacity of the geographical distribution of the vote. In the

Paris region, the Left continued to show strength, while in the city of Paris the Gaullists lost 10 of their 31 seats. (See Figs. 5-6 and 5-7). The Communists and the Federation maintained their position in the Southeast and Southwest, and in general South of the Loire, while showing renewed strength in parts of the Center and Center-East and in the industrial Departments of the Nord and Pas de Calais. The Gaullists made some gains in what was considered to be some of the left-wing strongholds—especially in some Departments of the South and Southwest, but they were unable to make up for their losses in Paris and the industrial Departments of the North and in the Southeast.


The election had produced a remarkable voting concentration in three political families. But each family was easily recognizable in the political map of France, and within each one

old parties could still be identified. The election had given the semblance of unity, but how and when it would overcome the potential sources of disunity remained to be seen. France appeared on the way to becoming a three-party system. But large political formations like the Gaullists or the Federation were only broad


alliances that included different groups and rival leaders.

The new Assembly resembled more that of 1958, though the Gaullists maintained a tenuous majority: 245 out of 487 seats. But with the Gaullist majority the Independent Republicans that formed an autonomous parlia-


FIGURE 5-5 The National Assembly before (top) and after (bottom) the election of March, 1967 (Boldface indicates approximate number of seats gained or lost)




THE LEFT (Communist Party)



NON-COMMUNIST LEFT (Federation and P.S.U.)



THE DEMOCRATIC CENTER



THE GAULLISTS





FIGURE 5-7 Geographic distribution of major political formations—first ballot, March 5, 1967 (in percentages of registered voters) (Adapted from the study of Professor François Goguel, "Les élections législatives du mars, 1967," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, No. 3, June, 1967, pp. 429-467)

PAS-DE-CALAIS—ARRAS (1st ELECTORAL DISTRICT)

Registered voters 64,441

1st Ballot		2nd Ballot	
Voting: 52,819		51,877	
Theeten (Gauli)	17,833	GUY MOLLET	29,618
Guy Mollet (Fed)	16,447	Theeten	22,259
Coquel (P.C.)	13,816		
Debande (Dem. Cen.)	4,723		

ISERE (GRENOBLE—2nd ELECTORAL DISTRICT)

Registered voters 83,896

1st Ballot		2nd Ballot	
Voting: 63,432		63,036	
Vanier (Gauli)	24,108	MENDES FRANCE	34,15
Mendes-France (Fed)	21,519	Vanier	28,879
Giard (P.C.)	13,113		
Langon (All. Rép.)	3,161		
Dugoujon (Non-aff.)	1,359		
De Saint-Jean (Ind.)	172		

The Federation Shows Discipline . . . but

PARIS (10th ELECTORAL DISTRICT)

Registered voters 57,269

1st Ballot		2nd Ballot	
Voting: 45,446		43,095	
Malleville (Gauli)	17,694	CHAMBAZ	22,116
Chambaz (P.C.)	14,399	Malleville	20,979
Leygnac (Fed)	5,180		
Mabille (Dem. Cen.)	5,147		
Jouffa (P.S.U.)	3,026		

PARIS (30th ELECTORAL DISTRICT)

Registered voters 43,546

1st Ballot		2nd Ballot	
Voting: 34,519		32,606	
Mme Troissier (Gauli)	12,952	VERGNAUD	16,748
Mme Vergnaud (P.C.)	10,872	Troissier	15,858
Astier (Fed)	3,936		
Pinoteau (Dem. Cen.)	3,120		
Gozard (P.S.U.)	1,970		
Dides (Right)	1,669		

MAINE-ET-LOIRE (1st ELECTORAL DISTRICT)

Registered voters 49,918

1st Ballot		2nd Ballot	
Voting: 37,046		36,131	
Pisani (Gauli)	12,216	PISANI	14,839
David (Dem. Cen.)	8,577	David	12,787
Sicard (P.C.)	6,263	Sicard	8,505
Loison (Fed)	5,668		
Mme Millor (Dis. G.)	4,322		

CORREZE (3rd ELECTORAL DISTRICT)

Registered voters 44,299

1st Ballot		2nd Ballot	
Voting: 35,716		36,507	
Chirac (Gauli)	15,289	CHIRAC	18,522
Emon (P.C.)	10,567	Emon	17,985
R. Mitterrand (Fed)	8,657		
Kellermann (P.S.U.)	1,203		

The Gaullists Remain Disciplined . . . against Communists

CREUSE (1st ELECTORAL DISTRICT)

Registered voters 52,442

1st Ballot		2nd Ballot	
Voting: 37,746		38,578	
Tourraud (P.C.)	10,734	DE PIERREBOURG	20,118
de Pierrebourg (Dem. Cen.)	9,341	Tourraud	18,460
Ferrand (Fed)	8,933		
Binet (Gauli)	8,738		

LOIRE-ET-CHER

Registered voters 60,167

1st Ballot		2nd Ballot	
Voting: 48,467		46,260	
Sudreau (no party label—former Minister, former Prefect)	17,540	SUDREAU	30,202
Goemaere (Gauli)	14,981	Piquet	16,058
Piquet (P.C.)	11,123		
Foulet (Fed)	4,823		

VI

The Governmental Institutions

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic¹ originated in the enabling act of June 3, 1958, in which the National Assembly provided, by the requisite majority of three-fifths, that "the Constitution will be revised by the government formed on June 1, 1958"—that is, General de Gaulle's government. A small group of Ministers and experts, headed by the Minister of Justice and later Prime Minister, Michel Debré, prepared the new Constitution in two months. A special consultative committee, composed of 39 members (two-thirds elected by Parliament and one-third nominated by General de Gaulle), endorsed the proposed new text after suggesting only minor modifications. Submitted to the people in a referendum held on September 28, 1958, it was ratified by an overwhelming majority of 79.25% of the voters.

Although the new Constitution (Fig. 6-1) was written in a short period of time under the stress and strains of the Algerian war, it institutionalized a number of revisionist ideas that had been uttered by General de Gaulle and many political leaders throughout the period of the Third and Fourth Republics. Without entering into the details of the various schemes and ideas of constitutional reform, we ought to single out two major themes that dominated the thinking of the framers. First, the reconstitution of the authority of the state under the leadership of a strong executive. Second, the establishment of what came to be known as a "rationalized" Parliament—a Parliament with limited political and legislative powers. The new Constitution was to establish a "parliamentary system," but one in which Parliament

¹For a more detailed discussion of the Constitution, see Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown, *The De Gaulle Republic: Quest for Unity* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1960), Chapter X. A portion of that chapter is reproduced here in a modified form with the permission of the publisher.

Legislative

Executive

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

487 members—470 from metropolitan France and 17 from overseas territories and Departments.

Mandate: five years. Elected directly by equal and universal suffrage.

Limited Legislative Powers: Legislates on civil rights, nationality, status and legal competence of persons, penal law and procedure, taxation, electoral system, organization of national defense, administration of local government units, education, employment, unions, social security, and economic programs. Authorizes declaration of war. Can initiate constitutional revision. Can delegate above powers to Cabinet—votes organic laws. Can question Cabinet one day a week. Meets in regular sessions for a total that does not exceed six months. Votes budget submitted by government. If budget is not decided with Senate within 70 days, may be issued by decree. (All other matters fall within rule-making power.)

SENATE

274 members

Mandate: nine years. Renewable by thirds every three years.

Elected indirectly by municipal and general councilors and members of National Assembly. Approximate size of electoral college, 110,000. Majority system, but PR for seven Departments with largest population.

Functions: Full legislative powers jointly with Assembly. Bills must be approved in identical terms by both Houses unless Prime Minister, in case of discord, asks Lower House to vote "definitive" text. Otherwise Senate has full veto powers.

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Elected for 7-year term by direct popular election.

Personal Powers: Nominates Prime Minister; dissolves Assembly; refers bills to Constitutional Council for examination of constitutionality; calls referendum; issues decrees with force of law; nominates three of nine members to Constitutional Council; can send messages to legislature; invokes state of emergency and rule by decree; not responsible to Parliament.

PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET

Prime Minister proposes Cabinet members to President for nomination; "guides policies of nation"; directs actions of government and is responsible for national defense; presides over Cabinet meetings; proposes referendum; has law-initiating power. Prime Minister is responsible before Assembly.

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Elected by professional organizations. Designated by government for five years as specified by "organic law." Composed of representatives of professional groups (approx. 195 members).

Gives "opinion" on bills referred to it by government. "Consulted" on over-all government economic plans.

Judiciary

CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL

Composed of nine justices and all ex-Presidents of Republic. Presidents of Republic, Senate, and Assembly appoint three justices each.

Functions: Supervises Presidential elections and declares returns. Supervises referendums and proclaims results. Examines and decides on contested legislative elections. On request of Prime Minister or Presidents of Republic, Assembly, or Senate examines and decides on constitutionality of pending bills, treaties, and legislative competence of Assembly.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

HIGH COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY

ORDINARY COURTS

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
{CONSEIL D'ÉTAT}

FIGURE 6-1 Major features of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.

was no longer in a position to dominate the executive as it did in the period of the preceding Republics.

Both General de Gaulle and his close associate and later Prime Minister, the aforementioned Michel Debré, expressed clearly in a number of their pronouncements the purpose of the projected constitutional reform. The most important landmark was the speech made by General de Gaulle at Bayeux on June 16, 1946, wherein he outlined the ideas that were to serve as the foundations of the new Constitution.

The rivalry of the parties takes, in our country, a fundamental character, which leaves everything in doubt and which very often wrecks its superior interests. This is an obvious fact that . . . our institutions must take into consideration in order to preserve our respect for laws, the cohesion of governments, the efficiency of the administration and the prestige and authority of the State. The difficulties of the State result in the inevitable alienation of the citizen from his institutions. . . All that is needed then is an occasion for the appearance of the menace of dictatorship.

To avoid this menace, de Gaulle outlined the following institutional arrangements.

1. The Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary must be clearly separated and balanced.

2. Over and above political contingencies there must be a national "mediation" (*arbitrage*).

3. The voting of the laws and the budget belongs to an Assembly elected by direct and universal suffrage.

4. A second Assembly, elected in a different manner, is needed to examine carefully the decisions taken by the first, to suggest amendments and propose bills.

5. The Executive power should not emanate from the Parliament. Otherwise the cohesion and authority of the government would suffer, the balance between the two powers vitiated, and the members of the Executive would be merely agents of the political parties.

6. A President of the Republic (*Chef d'État*), embodying the Executive power above political parties, should be elected by a College, which

includes the Parliament but is much broader than Parliament . . . to direct the work and the policy of the government, promulgate the laws and issue decrees, preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers, serve as mediator above the political contingencies, invite the country to express its sovereign decisions in an election, be the custodian of national independence and the treaties made by France, and appoint a Prime Minister in accord with the political orientation of Parliament and the national interest.²

Michel Debré himself pointed out that the object of constitutional reform was to "reconstruct state power."³ He advocated a rationalized Parliament that involved shorter sessions, a division between legislation and rule-making, the right of the executive to legislate by decree, and reorganization of the legislative and the budgetary procedure in a manner to give the government a controlling position. Certain rules that normally were part of the standing orders of the Parliament were also put into the Constitution: the personal vote of the deputies, the length of time for which the presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate were elected, the preparation of the order of business of the National Assembly, and so on. But why all these detailed provisions? Debré's answer underlined the perennial dilemma of the French body politic. He insisted that all these provisions were necessary because there was no majority in France and because multipartism made effective government impossible.

Ah, if only we had the possibility of seeing tomorrow a constant and clear majority, it would not have been necessary to establish an Upper Chamber whose role it is to support the government against an Assembly which attempts, because it is so divided, to invade its sphere of action. . . There would be no attempt to establish order and stability by cutting the ties that united the parties with the government.⁴

²The text of the Bayeux speech in de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages* (Paris, 1946) pp. 721-727.

³Michel Debré, *La Nouvelle Constitution* (Tours, 1958).

⁴*Ibid.*

Thus the crucial task was to create a strong and stable government to succeed a parliamentary system that could not produce stable majorities.

The new Constitution, however, respects the French republican tradition. The Preamble solemnly affirms the attachment of the French people to the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and to individual and social rights that were affirmed, after France's Liberation, by the Constitution of 1946. Article 1 proclaims that "France is a Republic, indivisible, secular, democratic, and social." It insures the rights of all citizens and respect for all beliefs. Article 2 affirms that "all sovereignty stems from the people." But this sovereignty is not to be exercised solely through the representatives of the people but also through a referendum. Respect for the freedom of the political parties is reiterated in Article 4, where, however, it is stated that the parties "must respect the principles of national sovereignty and democracy"—a provision that many thought was aimed at the powerful Communist Party.

The Constitution establishes the familiar organs of a parliamentary system: a bicameral legislature; a politically irresponsible chief of state; a Cabinet and a Prime Minister in charge of the direction of the policies of the government and responsible to the Lower Chamber; the right of the Lower Chamber to censure and overthrow the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. But, in contrast to the Fourth Republic, it delegates broad powers to the chief of state (the President) and places serious limitations on the legislature. There is a new principle—that of the incompatibility between a parliamentary seat and a Ministerial portfolio, requiring a member of Parliament who becomes a Minister to be replaced by the "substitute" who runs on the same ticket at the legislative election. The Constitution reproduces many time-hallowed provisions of a democratic government—tenure of judges, immunity of parliamentarians from arrest and prosecution without prior permission of the chamber to which they belong, freedom of speech and press, freedom of

association, protection against the arbitrary detention of an individual. Finally, a long section (Section 12) organized the relations between France and former colonies that had become semi-independent Republics. They were all grouped into the "French Community," a loosely federated organization in which important powers were lodged in the hands of the President of the Community who is also the President of the French Republic. This structure was abandoned after 1960 in favor of complete independence for all the former colonies. The only ties that bind them to France are individual treaties and agreements that can be renegotiated or revoked in the future. The real novelty of the Constitution lies, then, in the establishment of a strong executive and a limited Parliament.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

In 1958, the framers wished to give to the President the prestige and prerogatives that would enable him to provide for the continuity of the state, to cement the bonds between France and the former colonies of the French Union, and to supervise the functioning of the Constitution. The President is the "keystone of the arch" of the new Republic—he is both the symbol and the instrument of reinforced executive authority. To accomplish this, the framers modified the manner in which he is elected and strengthened his powers.

The President was at first elected by an electoral college, which, in addition to the members of the Parliament, includes the municipal councillors, the general councillors, and the members of the assemblies and the municipalities of the overseas territories and Republics. It was a restricted electoral college favoring rural municipalities and small towns and discriminating against the large urban centers. As a result it was widely criticized at the time it was introduced by many political leaders and con-

stitutional lawyers who saw in it the perpetuation of the old political forces of the Fourth Republic.

In the middle of September and again early in October, President de Gaulle proposed to modify the manner in which the election of the President was to take place. He suggested that after the end of his own first term (early in 1966), or in the event of his death in office, the President be elected by direct popular vote. In a message to Parliament on October 2, 1962, he put the matter very succinctly: "When my seven years term is completed or if something happens that makes it impossible for me to continue my functions, I am convinced that a popular vote will be necessary in order to give . . . to those who will succeed me the possibility and the duty to assume the supreme task. . . ." On October 28 in a referendum the people endorsed, as we have seen, de Gaulle's proposal. The heart of the Proposal is that the run-off election is limited to two candidates, thus forcing the parties to combine for or against the two and enabling the people to make a clear-cut choice.

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic maintains the political irresponsibility of the President but at the same time gives him personal powers that he can exercise solely at his discretion.

1. The President designates the Prime Minister. Although the President presumably makes the designation with an eye to the relative strengths of the various parties in the National Assembly, it is a personal political act.

2. The President can dissolve the Assembly at any time, on any issue, and for any reason solely at his discretion. There is only one limitation—he cannot dissolve it twice within the same year—and one formality—he must "consult" with the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the two legislative assemblies.

3. When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its territory, or the execution of international engagements are menaced in a grave and immedi-

ate manner and the regular functioning of the public powers is interrupted, the President may take whatever measures are required by the circumstances (Article 16). Again, this is a personal and discretionary act. The President needs only to inform the nation by a message and to "consult" the Constitutional Council. The National Assembly, however, convenes automatically and cannot be dissolved during the emergency period.

4. Finally, the President can bring certain issues before the people in a referendum.

The President of the Republic on the proposal of the government or on joint resolution by the two legislative assemblies may submit to a referendum any bill dealing with the organization of the public powers, the approval of an agreement of the Community or the authorization to ratify a treaty, that without being contrary to the Constitution would affect the functioning of existing institutions [Article 11].

The calling of a referendum is, however, a personal act of the President of the Republic. He may elicit or refuse it depending on the circumstances. Constitutional provisions to the contrary notwithstanding, the President claimed in October, 1962, that this article empowered him to submit directly to the people amendments to the Constitution.

The Constitution also vests explicitly in the President other powers that he can exercise at his discretion. He has the nominating power for all civil and military posts, and, unless it is otherwise provided by an organic law (a law passed by absolute majority of the legislative branches), he signs all decrees and ordinances prepared by the Council of Ministers. He can raise questions of unconstitutionality on a bill or on a law before a new special constitutional court—the Constitutional Council.

The President continues to enjoy the prerogatives that were vested in the office in the past. He presides over the meetings of the Council of Ministers, receives ambassadors, and sends messages to Parliament. He may ask for the re-examination of a bill or some of its arti-

cles, which cannot be refused; he promulgates laws within 15 days after their enactment; he negotiates and ratifies treaties and is kept informed of all negotiations leading to the conclusion of international agreements; and he is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Services and presides over the Committee of National Defense.

Special Presidential Powers

To strengthen his position, President de Gaulle made full use of the special powers provided by the Constitution. Immediately after the uprising of the Algerian settlers in January, 1960, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet asked and received from the French Parliament broad powers to legislate by decree under the signature of President de Gaulle for a period of one year. Thus the executive assumed full legislative powers, on condition that all measures taken in the course of the year were to be submitted for ratification to Parliament by April 1, 1961, and with the proviso that while the exceptional powers were in force Parliament could not be dissolved.

Hardly has this special delegation of legislative powers come to an end when a new and even broader assumption of powers, this time by the President of the Republic alone, came into force, under Article 16 of the Constitution.⁵ Following the military putsch in Algeria

⁵Article 16 provides: "When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are threatened in a grave and immediate manner and when the regular functioning of the constitutional governmental authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures commanded by these circumstances, after official consultation with the Premier, the Presidents of the assemblies and the Constitutional Council.

"He shall inform the nation of those measures in a message.

"These measures must be prompted by the desire to ensure to the constitutional governmental authorities, in the shortest possible time, the means of fulfilling their assigned functions. The Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such measures.

"Parliament shall meet by right."

on April 22, 1961, President de Gaulle declared: "Beginning today I shall take directly . . . the measures that appear to me necessary by the circumstances." A prolonged state of emergency was declared; a number of persons were arrested or held at their homes without court order; many organizations were dissolved and several publications were forbidden. A number of officers who participated or were associated with the military putsch were expelled from the Army, and special military tribunals were formed to try them and their presumed accomplices, whether military or civilian. Finally, the President of the Republic was allowed to remove civil servants and judges in Algeria from office.

The powers of the President came to an end on September 30, 1961, by virtue of a special presidential declaration, but the application of some of the decisions continued until the summer of 1962. Again by virtue of the referendum of April 8, 1962, the President enjoyed, until Algeria emerged as an independent "political organization," full legislative powers to deal with any matter that relates to the Evian accords, the agreements leading to Algerian independence.

In his second term of office that began in January, 1966, he decided, without any consultation with the legislative organs, and perhaps without the full knowledge of his Cabinet, to ask for the withdrawal of the United States forces from France and, in effect, withdrew from N.A.T.O. Again he demanded, through his Prime Minister, in the spring of 1967, for delegation of broad legislative powers to deal with certain economic and social matters—particularly social security—to enable him and his Cabinet to legislate for a period of six months on a subject matter reserved to Parliament. In his various trips abroad, he forcefully advocated his own foreign policy, invariably catching many of his Ministers—and perhaps, when he advocated the "liberation" and "independence" of Quebec in the summer of 1967, even his own Foreign Minister—by surprise.

The President as Mediator (Arbitre)

The Constitution explicitly charges the President to guarantee the functioning of the institutions of the government.

The President of the Republic shall see that the Constitution is respected. He shall ensure, by his arbitration, the regular functioning of the governmental authorities, as well as the continuance of the State

He shall be the guarantor of national independence, of the integrity of the territory, and of respect for Community agreements and treaties [Article 5]

Mediation is a personal act involving the exercise of judgment. As a result, the President is given an implicit veto power on almost every conceivable aspect of policy. Thus the list of Presidential prerogatives is a very impressive one. In matters of war, foreign policy, the preservation of internal peace, and the functioning of governmental institutions, his powers are overriding. He is deeply involved in politics and can no longer be considered as an "irresponsible head of the state" like the British Crown.

Speaking one week after his election, de Gaulle reaffirmed his conception of the office and his own personal role "The national task that I have assumed for the past 18 years is confirmed. Guide of France and chief of the republican state, I exercise supreme power to the full extent allowed and in accord with the new spirit to which I owe it" This view of the office stems directly from French monarchical traditions. De Gaulle is the custodian of a national unity that has been forged through some thousand years of history—a unity that is "real" and therefore assumed by him to be perceived by every French man and woman, despite the vicissitudes and squabbles of the republican regimes. He is "invested" by history and is

responsible to the people only in a vague fashion. He stands above the everyday party conflicts and quarrels, intervening in order to lead and to "arbitrate."

De Gaulle seems to divide the task of government into two not very clearly distinguished categories. The first, *la Politique*, concerns France's position in the world and thus involves matters of defense, foreign policy, and relations with the former colonies. In this area, de Gaulle alone apparently initiates policy and makes decisions.

The second category of responsibility consists of economic and social matters—the means for the realization of overall national objectives. Problems in this area may be delegated at the discretion of the President to "subordinate" organs—the Prime Minister or the Cabinet and Parliament. It is for them to make appropriate decisions, subject, of course, in the case of conflicts among Ministers or between the Cabinet and Parliament, to the President's "arbitration."

On three important occasions, President de Gaulle interpreted the Constitution in a way to limit the power of Parliament, and in each case his decision was accepted. In the first instance, an absolute majority of the deputies (as the Constitution prescribes) demanded the convocation of an extraordinary parliamentary session. It was generally assumed that such a convocation, once the existence of a majority had been ascertained, was automatic. The President, however, claimed that it was only up to him to decide whether it was opportune or not to convene Parliament. In this case, he refused to convene it.

On the second occasion, the constitutional question was more complex. In the summer of 1961, Article 16, empowering the President to take whatever measures he deemed necessary, was in force, which meant that Parliament was also in session and could not be dissolved. Parliament had adjourned for the summer vacation, but remained technically in session. Given the unrest among the farmers because of falling farm prices, the parliamentarians decided to

convene and consider appropriate legislation. Since they were still in session, it was up to the presidents of the two chambers to convene them. Yet President de Gaulle was opposed to this, arguing that the agricultural problems were totally unrelated to the exercise of his powers under Article 16. He could not, in a strict sense, oppose the convening of the Parliament, but he announced that he would not permit Parliament to pass any legislative measures.

In the third instance, as we have seen, de Gaulle decided to submit directly to the people, on October 28, 1962, a bill modifying the constitutional provision for the election of the President of the Republic. The overwhelming opinion of the jurists is that a specific bill to be proposed to the people for a constitutional amendment must be submitted to and voted by the two legislative assemblies.

The President as a "Guide"

Gradually, from a conception of "mediator," de Gaulle has vested the office with broad leadership functions. He is now the "guide." De Gaulle put the new conception of the office in a nutshell when he stated in 1964 that "the President elected by the nation is the source and holder of the power of the state"; the only man to "hold and to delegate the authority of the state." This ultimately means that, according to de Gaulle, the President can concentrate in his hands the powers of the state provided he holds the office by virtue of an election or as long as specific reforms, no matter what their scope, are approved by referendum. The office of the Presidency has become the center of policy-making—not only in foreign affairs, something that is taken for granted, but also in domestic issues. Specialized bureaus and offices virtually "second" the Ministries. Policy alternatives are thrashed out there, and the Minister, or even the Prime Minister, may be totally unaware of what is happening at the

Élysée, the French White House. When de Gaulle took office, he appointed 17 policy advisers, an unprecedented number compared with the very limited number of presidential advisers under the Fourth Republic. Within seven years the number had more than doubled. De Gaulle's staff has the following functions: (a) to maintain close liaison with the Cabinet Ministers and the Civil Service; (b) to prepare drafts embodying policy suggestions; (c) to take over from the Cabinet and a given Ministry the deliberation and the drafting of policy suggestions on matters that come technically under ministerial jurisdiction; (d) to prepare on its own, or more likely at the specific request of the President, policy suggestions based on detailed studies; and (e) finally to provide the President information whenever he so requests. In contrast to the past, the Presidential staff consists primarily of career civil servants appointed on the basis of competence.

The system has become Presidential. The President has emerged as the key policy-making organ, while the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, which are responsible to Parliament and, according to Article 20 of the Constitution, are in charge of determining and directing the policy of the nation, are bypassed. Even the highly contested and contestable notion of "reserved" powers has been abandoned in favor of the thesis that all powers stem from an elected President and can be delegated or not by him.

The constitutional power of the President, under the interpretation given by de Gaulle, is vast. But his political role is just as great. Both in the legislative election of 1962 and 1967, he appealed to the people to vote for his supporters. Without him it is doubtful that the Gaullists could continue to win or, for that matter, be a party. Hence, docility of the Gaullist deputies to de Gaulle and his immediate associates stems directly from the realization that they owe their election directly to him, and that disobedience will be severely punished by the collective threat of dissolution—far more

potent now in France than it has been in England since the turn of the century—or by withdrawal of support in an election as in the last one. In the last analysis, it is political rather than constitutional considerations that count. The overwhelming trait of the Fifth Republic is not the powers the Constitution gives to the President, but his remarkable and generally consistent popularity. As Fig. 6-2 shows, with the exception of 1963 (and the Presidential election of 1965) he never dropped below 50% at any time. In contrast, his two Prime Ministers remained consistently below 40%, only occasionally attaining a slightly higher margin.

Because a sense of unity is one of the first requirements of a strong nation, de Gaulle has been anxious to impart his view of France's historical mission to the people (which was also one of his prime concerns right after the Liberation). He has sought to renew his contact with the people, by frequent tours through the country, in order to create a common national purpose. Thus, General de Gaulle has given to the Fifth Republic a strong personal orientation. He has controlled and shaped French foreign policy, with the aid of his Foreign Minister. He has been solely responsible for all decisions concerning colonial policy, he has been the sole spokesman for the settlement of the war in Algeria. He has been the architect of the new organization for defense and the modernization of the armed forces. The office of the Presidency is no longer a mere symbol, it has become the seat of political power in France.


THE CABINET

In the language of the Constitution, the Cabinet, composed of the Prime Minister and his Ministers, "determines and conducts the policy of the nation" and is "responsible before the Parliament." Special recognition is accorded to the Prime Minister. He "directs" the action of the government and is "responsible"

for national defense. He "assures the execution of the laws and exercises the rule-making power"—but on condition that all decrees and ordinances are signed by the President of the Republic (Articles 20 and 21). He determines the composition of his Cabinet, presides over its meetings, and directs the administrative services. He defends his policy before the Parliament, answers questions addressed to him by the members of Parliament, states the overall program of the government in special declarations, and puts the question of confidence before the Assembly. Thus the Constitution establishes a parliamentary government side-by-side with a strong Presidency.

The functions of the Cabinet have become drastically modified under de Gaulle. To begin with, it is no longer composed of parliamentarians who simply resign their electoral mandate—as the Constitution provides—in order to assume a Cabinet post. Since 1958, more than one-third of the Cabinet members have been civil servants, technicians, professors or intellectuals who have never been in Parliament and who had never any desire to do so. The most significant areas of *la Politique* have been entrusted to technicians who are presumably able to implement the policies of the President of the Republic. Both they and the parliamen-

FIGURE 6-2 The popularity of de Gaulle and his Prime Ministers (Percentage of those who declared themselves satisfied)



tarians who renounce their parliamentary mandate are therefore presumed to be independent of immediate political and electoral considerations, only, however, to become increasingly dependent upon the President, from whom they hold their ministerial position.

With de Gaulle as President, since the inception of the Fifth Republic, there have been only two Prime Ministers over the period of nine years: Michel Debré (1959–62), and Georges Pompidou, since 1962. The Cabinet has shown also a corresponding stability. There have been a number of Cabinet reshufflings, 21 in all, but most of them minor. Only on three occasions have there been important Cabinet reorganizations. The major posts—Foreign Affairs, Army, and Interior—have been in the hands of one Minister over a long period of time. The first has held office ever since the beginning of the new Republic, while the Ministry of the Interior and Army has been headed by the same one Minister for over six years. In contrast, the Ministry of Information and Education and, to a lesser extent that of Finance, have had a higher rate of turnover. The number of what we may call the “ministerial roster”—the *ministrables* of the French Republic—has been relatively small. About 65 persons became Ministers, but only some 15 held key ministerial positions over five years or more. This is a remarkable stability that compares favorably, if not better, with the stability of the British or the American Cabinet.

The political composition of the Cabinet has progressively reflected the strength of the Gaullists in the National Assembly. With the exception of the first Debré Cabinet, that was a coalition one, and the first short-lived Cabinet under Pompidou in the spring of 1962, all others since have been controlled by the Gaullists. The presence of few occasional Independents or Moderates indicates the efforts made by the Gaullists to co-opt new notables. The Ministerial jobs offered to their closest allies, the Independent Republicans, are the only political

debt they have to pay. For the first time, France has a Cabinet and a President that are in tune with a legislative majority. This enhances executive leadership and stability more than all the constitutional provisions put together.

The meetings of the Council of Ministers under President de Gaulle are frequent and prolonged. Reports prepared by the Ministers or their aides are debated, but generally the discussion revolves around the suggestions and directives of the President. In contrast, the Cabinet meetings under the Prime Minister are becoming rare. Instead, several small interministerial committees have been set up to implement the decisions reached in the Council of Ministers by President de Gaulle or at the *Élysée*. The Cabinet has become a mere instrument for the execution of policy and in some matters—especially defense and foreign policy—is, as we have noted, simply bypassed.

THE LEGISLATURE

The Parliament of the Fifth Republic is, as in the past, bicameral, consisting of a National Assembly and a Senate. The Assembly, elected for five years by universal suffrage, is now composed of 487 deputies. The Senate, elected for nine years, is composed of 274 members (255 from Metropolitan France, 12 from the overseas Departments and territories, and seven from the French citizenry living abroad). The Senate is elected indirectly by the municipal councillors, the departmental councillors, and the members of the National Assembly. One-third of its membership is renewed every three years.

The two chambers have equal powers except in three extremely important respects. First, the traditional prerogative of the Lower Chamber to examine the budget first is maintained, and the Senate cannot introduce a motion of censure. Second, the Cabinet is responsible only before the National Assembly. Article 45

specifies that every bill "is examined successively in the two assemblies with a view to the adoption of an identical text." But if there is continuing disagreement on the text of a bill after two readings by each assembly, the Prime Minister can convene a joint conference committee, consisting of an equal number of members of the two Chambers, and ask it to propose a compromise text, which is then submitted by the government for the approval of the two Assemblies. In case of a persistent discord between the two Assemblies, the Prime Minister may ask the National Assembly to rule "definitively." If the government and the Senate are in accord, the senatorial veto is ironclad. The Senate can be overruled only if there is an agreement between the government and the National Assembly, something which has been the rule ever since 1962, as we shall see.

A "Rationalized" Parliament

The new Constitution establishes a "rationalized" Parliament—a Parliament with limited powers.

1. Only two sessions of the two Assemblies are allowed—the first begins October 2 and lasts for 80 days, and the second on April 2, and cannot last more than 90 days—a maximum of five months and 20 days. Extraordinary sessions may take place at the request of the Prime Minister or of a majority of the members of the National Assembly "on a specific agenda." They are convened and closed by a decree of the President of the Republic, who, it appears now, seems also to have the last word on whether to convene an extraordinary session or not, despite the terms of the Constitution.

2. The Parliament can legislate *only on matters defined in the Constitution*. The government can legislate on all other matters by simple decree.

3. The government now fixes the *order of business*.

4. The President of the National Assembly is elected for the whole legislative term, thus avoiding the annual elections that in the past placed him at the mercy of the various parliamentary groups. The Senate elects its President every three years.

5. The Parliament is no longer free to establish its own standing orders. Such orders must be found to be in accord with the Constitution by the Constitutional Council before they become effective.

6. The number of parliamentary committees is reduced (only six are allowed), and their functions are carefully circumscribed.

7. The government bill, not the committees' amendments and counterproposals as under the Fourth Republic, come before the floor.

8. The government has the right to reject all amendments and to demand a single vote on its own text with only those amendments that it accepts—a procedure known as the "blocked" vote.

All these provisions are directed against "Assembly government." By putting rules into the Constitution that are essentially of a procedural character, the framers hoped to limit Parliament to the performance of its proper function of deliberation and to protect the executive from legislative encroachments. Many of the new rules reflect a genuine desire to correct some of the more flagrant abuses of the past and are consistent with the strengthening of the executives in modern democracies. Others, however, are designed to weaken Parliament.

Relations between Parliament and the Government

Four major provisions in the Constitution determine the nature of the relations between Parliament and the government. They concern: (1) the incompatibility between a parliamentary mandate and a Cabinet post; (2) the manner in which the responsibility of the Cabinet before the Parliament comes into play; (3) the distinction between "legislation" and "rule-making"; and (4) the introduction of the "executive budget."

THE RULE OF INCOMPATIBILITY. Article 23 of the Constitution is explicit: "The 'office' of a member of government is incompatible with the exercise of any parliamentary mandate."

Thus, a member of Parliament who joins the Cabinet must resign his seat for the balance of the legislative term. He is replaced in Parliament by his substitute—the *suppléant*—the person whose name appeared together with his on the electoral ballot. Despite the rule of incompatibility, however, Cabinet members are allowed to sit in Parliament and defend their measures. They are not allowed, of course, to vote.

The purpose of the rule was to introduce a genuine separation of powers and to discourage parliamentarians from trying to become Ministers, which was one of the major causes for the high rate of Cabinet turnovers under the Fourth Republic. It was also the intention of the framers to establish a government that would be better able to resist pressures emanating from parliamentary groups and thus be in a position to give its undivided attention to its duties.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CABINET BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE. The responsibility of the Cabinet to the legislature comes into play in a specific and limited manner. After the Prime Minister has been nominated by the President of the Republic, he presents his program before the National Assembly and, through a Minister, before the Senate. If this program is accepted by the Assembly, the Cabinet is "invested"; if defeated, the Prime Minister must submit his resignation to the President of the Republic.

The Parliament can bring down the Cabinet in the following manner: The National Assembly (but not the Senate) has the right to introduce a motion of censure, which must be signed by one-tenth of the members of the National Assembly. The vote on the motion is lost unless it receives an absolute majority of the members composing the National Assembly. In other words, blank ballots and abstentions count for the government. If the motion is carried, the government must resign; if the motion is lost, then its signatories cannot move another one in the course of the same legislative session.

The Prime Minister may also, after consultation with the Cabinet, stake the life of his government on any general issue of policy or on any given legislative bill. Although the Constitution does not use the term, this is equivalent to putting the "question of confidence." A declaration of general policy is presumed to be accepted unless there is a motion of censure voted under the conditions mentioned previously. A specific bill on which the Prime Minister puts the question of confidence becomes law unless a motion of censure is introduced and voted according to the same conditions, but with one difference: the same signatories may introduce a motion of censure as many times as the Prime Minister stakes his government's responsibility. If the motion is carried by an *absolute* majority, the bill does not become law and the government resigns. If, however, the motion of censure is lost, and it is lost when there is no *absolute* majority for it, the bill becomes law and the government stays in office. Thus bills may become laws even if there is no majority for them.

"LAW" AND "RULE-MAKING." The Constitution provides that "law is voted by Parliament." Members of Parliament and of the government can introduce bills and amendments. The scope of Parliament's law-making ability, however, is limited. It is defined in the Constitution (Article 34) to include:

. . . the *regulations* concerning:
civil rights and the fundamental guarantees granted to the citizens for the exercise of their public liberties; . . .

nationality, status and legal capacity of persons, marriage contracts, inheritance and gifts;

determination of crimes and misdemeanors as well as the penalties imposed therefor; criminal procedure; . . .

the basis, the rate and the methods of collecting taxes of all types; the issuance of currency; . . .

the electoral system of the Parliamentary assemblies and the local assemblies, . . .

the nationalization of enterprises and the transfer of the property of enterprises from the public to the private sector, . . .

[and the] fundamental principles of,

the general organization of national defense,

the free administration of local communities, the extent of their jurisdiction and their resources,

education,

property rights, civil and commercial obligations,

legislation pertaining to employment, unions and social security

This enumeration of legislative power cannot be enlarged except by an organic law (a law passed by an absolute majority of the members of both Houses). Article 37 makes this point clear. "All other matters," it states, "than those which are in the domain of law fall within the rule-making sphere." It goes even further. "Legislative texts pertaining to such matters may be modified by decree." Thus, laws made under the Fourth Republic dealing with matters that are declared by the new Constitution to be beyond the powers of the legislature can be modified by simple decree. They are "delegalized."

The Constitution also allows Parliament to delegate law-making power to the executive. "The government may for the execution of its program ask Parliament to authorize it to take by ordinances, within a limited period of time, measures which are normally reserved to the domain of law" (Article 38). Such ordinances come into force as soon as they are promulgated, but they are null and void if a bill for their ratification is not submitted by the government before Parliament within a prescribed time, or if the ratification of the bill is rejected.

THE BUDGET The Constitution consecrates the "executive budget." The budget is submitted by the government to Parliament. Proposals stemming from members of Parliament "are not receivable if their adoption entails either a diminution of public resources or an increase in public expenditures" (Article 47). No bill entailing diminution of resources or additional expenditures is receivable at any time. If "Parliament has not decided within seventy days" after the introduction of the budget, then "the budget bill can be promulgated and put into effect by simple ordinance" (Article 47, par. 2 and 3). Thus the government may be able to bypass Parliament in case the latter has failed to reach an agreement.

THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES. Until the new Constitution, the legislative committees of the legislature resembled those of the committees of the American Congress—they were numerous and powerful. They could decide the fate of virtually any bill by amending it, pigeonholing it, or failing to report it. Only the amended text of a bill could come from the committee to the floor of the legislative assembly. The situation has been drastically altered. Only six committees are allowed: Foreign Affairs, Finance, National Defense, Constitutional Laws, Legislation, and General Administration, Production and Trade, and Cultural, Social, and Family Affairs. Their composition ranges from 60 to 120 members, nominated to represent proportionately the political parties. They receive the bills, examine them, hear the Minister provide for amendments—but the government has the last word on bringing the bills before the floor and on accepting or rejecting the amendments made. Thus legislative work has been expedited and improved in many respects, while the government no longer remains at the mercy of committees that were often inspired by parochial interests, and even more usually by political considerations. The fact that a Gaullist majority exists in

each and every committee further streamlines their work under party discipline.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Relations between the Cabinet and the National Assembly have varied depending upon the strength of the opposition. The first Prime Minister, Michel Debré, after being endorsed by an overwhelming vote of 453 against 56, faced six motions of censure, most of them directed against the policy of the President of the Republic. As his opposition grew to as many as 210 votes out of an absolute majority of 277, he resorted increasingly to the instruments of control that the Constitution made available to him: he used the procedure of the blocked vote; put the question of confidence; refused debates; invoked the limitation of the legislative functions of the Assembly. The continuation of the war in Algeria and the widespread popularity of General de Gaulle made an open revolt against him impossible, especially when the President could retaliate with dissolution. With the settlement of the Algerian crisis in April, 1962, Debré urged the President to dissolve and call for an election at the very height of his popularity, believing that there would be a Gaullist sweep. But disagreements between Debré and de Gaulle apparently crept in with regard to the attribution of their respective functions and roles. The Prime Minister believed that a Cabinet supported by a majority should assume the major responsibilities for policy-making, leaving to the President a discretion limited only to the specific constitutional provisions, some of which were to be exercised only upon the advice of the Prime Minister. With a majority, a French Cabinet system could emerge similar to the British. All that was needed was an election. He also wished to introduce a majority electoral system similar to the British and American one. Such a

system, he believed, would discriminate against the Communists in the election, and provide for a Gaullist majority.

All of Debré's arguments were contrary, as we have seen, to the conception of the Presidency held by de Gaulle. For him, the executive power is the President. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are his subordinate organs, while the Parliament remains a deliberative forum. To accept Debré's suggestions was to undermine the Presidency in favor of a strong Prime Minister and a strong legislative majority. What Debré was asking appeared to de Gaulle to come perilously close to a return of legislative supremacy. And if a Gaullist majority were in fact returned to the National Assembly, what guarantees were there that it would remain behind the President rather than the Prime Minister? Debré had to withdraw.

The new Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, had served General de Gaulle in many capacities in the past. He had been a close personal adviser, had served for a short period on the Constitutional Council, and had been the Director of the Rothschild Bank. He had never sat in Parliament and had never been a political leader. He was the "President's man." Loyal to the conception of strong presidential power, he outlined before the National Assembly a governmental policy dealing almost exclusively with domestic, social, and economic problems and formed a Cabinet that differed little in its political composition and its membership from the preceding one.

The National Assembly expressed its discontent by giving to Pompidou only a very slim endorsement. He received 259 votes against 128, with about 155 members abstaining. Speaking in the National Assembly, the veteran political leader, Paul Reynaud, expressed the sentiments of many deputies and underlined the personal character of the institutions of the Fifth Republic when he confronted Pompidou with the same challenge that a deputy raised against a Prime Minister named by King

Louis-Philippe: "The proof that we do not live under a parliamentary regime is that you are here." Pompidou, Reynaud claimed, was a political unknown; as with Louis-Philippe's Prime Minister, he had only the "King's" confidence!

But the restiveness of the National Assembly and the political parties came to a head in a rather explosive manner when de Gaulle proposed a referendum to modify the manner in which the President of the Republic was to be elected.

On October 5, the National Assembly, in order to express its hostility to the manner in which the General proposed to amend the Constitution, introduced a motion of censure. "The National Assembly. . . Considering that democracy presupposes the respect of law and above all the respect of the supreme law—the Constitution. . . Considering that the Constitution prepared by General de Gaulle and approved by the French people provides formally that a revision must be voted by the Parliament . . ., Considering that by bypassing the vote of the two houses the President of the Republic is violating the Constitution of which he is the guardian; Considering that the President of the Republic cannot act except on the proposal of the government, hereby censures the government . . ." This was a stinging indictment of General de Gaulle's action. The censure motion against the government was the only way open to the National Assembly to express its disapproval of the President of the Republic. All the political parties with the exception of the Gaullists voted in favor of the motion and against the government and de Gaulle—280 deputies, well above the requisite majority.

Acting in accordance with the Constitution, de Gaulle dissolved the National Assembly, and called for elections. The Gaullists won, as we saw, an absolute majority in the second legislature (1962–67). The Prime Minister, in contrast with Debré, accepted to play a subordinate role as long as de Gaulle was President—in fact, assumed that he could not but

play such a role. His main task was to keep his supporters together, and to act on behalf of the President. There could be no possible friction between the two, and no serious likelihood of serious frictions between Pompidou and his Gaullist supporters in the National Assembly. Thus the "fiction" that the regime was both Presidential and parliamentary—as de Gaulle claimed—would be maintained.

A Gaullist Legislature

An overall view of the work of the legislature, especially during the years 1962 to 1967, indicates marked similarities with the practices that developed in England, partly because of the limitations imposed by the Constitution, but to a great extent because of the existence of a disciplined majority. Parliament was "productive," passing more than 400 laws, some of major import: it modified the electoral law, decreed amnesty for a number of political prisoners, ratified the Franco-German Treaty, debated and adopted the Fifth Economic Plan, undertook fiscal reforms, reorganized the Paris region, and established a new administrative organization for regional development. The reforms undertaken were important enough to provoke divisions, but the majority held. In the same period the budget, the perennial graveyard of the government in the past, was voted ministry by ministry, and then as a whole, without occasioning any serious crisis.

If this legislative work appeared to be orderly, it should be kept in mind that most of it was initiated by the government. Only about 20% of the laws originated with individual members. The Prime Minister was able to exert pressure upon his majority. In many instances, the procedure of the blocked or global vote was used, forcing the Assembly to vote—as it invariably did—the definitive text of a bill that was acceptable to the government. This did not mean that amendments were not permitted and often incorporated in a bill. In fact, very few

bills remained without changes. The government often accepted modifications from its own members, and frequently from the opposition. But it always retained the last word and was able to make its decisions stick.

The existence of a majority behind the Prime Minister blunted the weapons of a divided opposition. Only twice in the five years of the second legislature was a motion of censure introduced (whereas it had been introduced nine times before): once on agricultural policy and the second time to oppose General de Gaulle's policies that virtually took France out of N.A.T.O. In both cases it received a number of votes well below the requisite absolute majority. The Prime Minister did not have to resort to the question of confidence—except once, upon presenting his program—a remarkable phenomenon in view of the fact that during the Fourth Republic, the Prime Minister had to put the question of confidence and court defeat on the average 16 times a year.

The opposition was given many opportunities to oppose. There were a number of long and serious debates on policy questions, some leading to a vote but more not doing so. The military reorganization of the country and its reliance upon atomic weapons was thoroughly debated; the policy of withdrawing from N.A.T.O. was the object of a long discussion in the National Assembly; the economic plan and the budget were carefully deliberated upon; foreign-policy questions were a number of times discussed in committee and brought before the floor. Debate was often of high quality, perhaps because the overthrow of the government was rarely the issue. On the other hand, the Question period and the motion of censure proved to be limited instruments of control. The first led frequently to a debate but not a vote, and thus became a way to get information from the government or to air grievances; and the latter proved limited because the chances of success against the Gaullist majority were few. However, it may yet become a far more potent

instrument in an Assembly where the Gaullists and their allies command only a slim majority. The last two motions of censure obtained 237 and 207 votes respectively, eight and 38 votes short of the requisite absolute majority. Further, if the opposition parties are strong, it is easier to introduce censure motions more frequently.

It is true, however, that the formidable powers of the President and the Cabinet, when they are in agreement, are not offset by legislative scrutiny and control that ultimately exist in all parliamentary and even Presidential systems. Bills become laws unless there is an absolute majority against the Cabinet that initiates them. In every case wherein the Prime Minister puts the question of confidence, the legislative competence of Parliament is narrowed and its ability to scrutinize and control the executive is curtailed. The direct election of the President of the Republic by popular vote further enhances the prerogatives of the executive to the detriment of the legislature. The President, elected for a period of seven years, disposes of powers that are in the last analysis qualified only by his own sense of self-restraint. In general, Parliament has been belittled, and it is very likely that it will seek to regain some of its powers in the future.

The Logic of a Parliamentary Majority

Two legislative elections returned a Gaullist majority. In full control of the Committees, with their own Speaker and with a majority showing exemplary discipline, the Assembly provided the required support. But it also showed certain signs of complacency. Absenteeism remained high (sometimes there were not more than 20 deputies attending the debates), a practice that the Fifth Republic was supposed to have put to an end. As in the past, a few individuals, designated by their colleagues, held to keys that operate the voting machines,

The Last Four Motions of Censure

2nd Legislature (1962-67)

Against the agricultural policy of the government

Voted for	209—Absolute Majority	242
Communists		41
Socialists		68
Democratic Rally (Radicals & allies)		39
Democratic Center (M.R.P. and allies)		50
Independent Republicans		6
Nonregistered		5

Against the overall policy of the government, and specifically against its N.A.T.O. policy

Voted for	137
(Only Socialists, Democratic Rally, and Democratic Center)	

3rd Legislature (1967-)

Delegation of legislative powers to the government
(April-June 1967, 3 consecutive motions)

Voted for	(1st motion)—236
	(2nd motion)—236
	(3rd motion)—237
Communists	73
Federation	121
Progressive and Democratic	39
Non registered	4

Against economic, agricultural and social policy of the government (October 11, 1967)

Voted for	207—Absolute Majority	244
Communists and affiliated		73
Federation and affiliated		121
Progress and Democracy (Dem Cen)		10
Non affiliated		3

to vote on behalf of their colleagues. The legislators found it more expedient and profitable to work in their districts and Departments rather than remain in Paris, where they felt impotent.

But the presence of a majority began to produce the proper response for unity and combativeness on the part of the opposition. First, in the wake of the governmental crisis of 1962, all non-Gaullists began to refer to themselves as "the opposition." Efforts were made to form a

"shadow cabinet"—as in Britain—the *contre gouvernement*—consisting primarily of the Left-wing parties, but not the Communists. This in turn produced an effort in the direction of the amalgamation of parliamentary groups into larger formations. From 15 different groups there are now only five. The opposition seems to have come into its own, however, since the election of 1967. Grouped into two larger formations—the Communists and the Federation—with the frequent support of the Democratic Center (the "Progress and Democracy" group), they can wage a war of attrition against the Gaullists and their immediate allies, the Independent Republicans. The slightest equivocation on the part of the latter may open the way to censure of the government, and hence to new legislative elections.

If and when the opposition manages to overthrow the government, then the Gaullist system will enter a crisis far more severe than that of 1962, for the aging President may be unable to throw his weight on the scale of the political forces, as he did then, and may find himself confronted by a new majority unwilling to support *him* and *his* government. It is at this juncture that the real test of the system will come. Will the Gaullist majority follow the logic of democracy? Or will it attempt to use the constitutional powers of the President to thwart it or stifle it? In the former case, the Fifth Republic may well survive its President and architect. Otherwise, it will not.

The Republic Senate

The Senate was conceived as the chamber whose detachment and wisdom would provide for a balance against the National Assembly. While deprived of the right to overthrow the Cabinet, the Senators were given, as we saw, an ironclad veto over legislation if the Prime Minister and the government desired it. When a bill was vetoed by the Senate, it was up to the Prime Minister to call a conference committee

of the two bodies to iron out the differences. (If he does not do so, the bill dies.) It turned out that the Senate—whether displaying wisdom or not—proved to be the most stubborn, if ineffective, opposition to the Gaullist majority. On more than 45 occasions, involving major bills, the Senate refused to go along with the National Assembly. The conference committees failed to reach agreement, and the bill had to be voted two consecutive times by the National Assembly before it became law.

Conflict between the Senate and the majority in the National Assembly made the Gaullists increasingly hostile to this body. The Ministers simply stopped attending the debates of the Senate—as they have the right to—and refused to answer written or oral questions. Many prominent Senators found themselves excluded even from informal contacts with the Ministers and the President. As hostility between the government and the Senate increased, speculation about its reform grew. Many claimed that the Senate is an antiquated body that should be transformed into a representative professional body rather than a political one.

The reasons for the intransigence of the Senate lie in its mode of election. Two hundred and fourteen out of the 274 senators are elected by the departmental and municipal councillors. Cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants received one extra elector for each additional thousand inhabitants. Despite this provision, the small towns and villages continued to play a dominant role. Those with less than 3,000 inhabitants have a majority in the Senatorial electoral college. They represent *only* 33% of the population, but 53% of the Senatorial electors. The larger towns, those with more than 10,000 inhabitants, which represent more than 40% of the population, have only 21.5% of the senatorial electors. Only about 60 in the seven large Departments are elected by proportional representation.

On two occasions (1962 and 1965) since it was first chosen in 1959, the Senate has been

renewed by a third of its membership, so that its composition *ought* to correspond to the composition of the National Assembly. But this is not so: the Senate is almost a replica of what it was when it was first chosen. The electoral college, consisting of notables and local representatives, has shown a great aversity to change. On the other hand, the inability of the Gaullists to capture the local assemblies and the municipalities is a reflection of their weak organization. As the table below shows, they have hardly gained any strength in the Senate at the very time when they succeeded in capturing a majority of the National Assembly.

TABLE 6-1
The Senate

	1959	1963	1966 (274 members)
Communists	13 (1)	13 (1)	14
Socialists	50 (11)	52 (1)	52
Radical groups	67 (1)	49 (1)	50
M.R.P.	27 (7)	28 (6)	38
Gaullists	36 (1)	29 (3)	30
Independents + Moderates + Democrats	86 (5)	84 (2)	81
Nonregistered	7	5	9

The recently held election (September 24 and October 1, 1967) to choose the departmental councillors that constitute the bulk of the senatorial electoral college indicates that the renewal of one third of the Senate in 1968 is not likely to bring any noticeable changes in its composition. The Communists gained votes and increased their representation *slightly*. The Gaullists also improved their positions *slightly* but failed to gain additional strength among the departmental councillors. Of a total of about 1710 departmental councillors, the Left (including the Communists) controls about 850, the Centrist formations about 550, with

the rest—only about 300—in the hands of the Gaullists.

But as long as the Gaullists hold a disciplined majority, they can overcome the Senatorial vote. When their majority disappears, or when it becomes precarious, as it is now, the veto of the Senate may strengthen the opposition in the National Assembly. Then the conflict between the government and the Senate may become a source of instability.

OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANS AND PROCEDURES

The Constitution re-established an Economic and Social Council. Representing the most important professional interests in France, it has consultative and advisory powers to give advice on proposed economic and social legislation, and particularly on measures related to economic planning. If the Senate were to be reformed along the lines indicated, then it could replace, in essence, the Economic and Social Council with limitative consultative functions only.

As under the Fourth Republic, a High Court of Justice, whose members are elected by the National Assembly and the Senate, may try the President of the Republic for high treason and the members of the government for criminal offenses committed in the exercise of their functions. A High Council of the Judiciary, presided over by the President of the Republic, nominates judges to the higher judicial posts, is consulted about pardons by the President, and rules on disciplinary matters involving the judiciary. The same section of the Constitution (Article 66) provides what purports to be a writ of habeas corpus clause: "No one may be arbitrarily detained. The judicial authority, guardian of individual liberty, assures the respect of this principle under conditions provided by law."

A most striking innovation is a Constitu-

tional Council, composed of nine members who serve for a period of nine years. Three are nominated by the President of the Republic, three by the President of the National Assembly, and three by the President of the Senate. They are renewed by a third every three years. In addition, all former Presidents of the Republic are members *ex officio*. A variety of powers has devolved on the Constitutional Council. It supervises the Presidential elections and the referendums and proclaims the results, it judges the validity of all contested legislative elections, thus avoiding bitter and long controversies in the legislative assemblies. It is the ultimate court of appeal on the interpretation of the Constitution on a specified number of matters. All bills, including treaties, may be referred to it, before their promulgation, by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, or one of the presidents of the two assemblies. A declaration of unconstitutionality suspends the promulgation of the bill or the application of the treaty. The Council determines the constitutionality of the standing orders of the National Assembly and the Senate which go before it automatically. It is, finally, the guardian of legislative-executive relations, it decides on all claims made by the government whether the legislature exceeds its legislative competence.

The constitutional review provided by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic differs from the American practice in two important respects. First, it is almost exclusively limited to certain specified categories of cases involving the relationship between the legislature and the executive, and, second, it is brought into play only upon the request of four officers of the Fifth Republic—the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the two presidents of the legislative assemblies. Review applies only to pending bills. A law cannot be attacked for "unconstitutionality" except under the specific and very restrictive terms of Article 37—that is, only when it is claimed by the government that the legislature exceeded its competence in

enacting it. In contrast to the American practice, the Constitutional Council cannot hear cases brought to it by individuals and is not competent to judge matters where individual rights are violated.

The Constitution provides two ways to amend the Constitution. An amendment proposed by the two legislative Assemblies by simple majorities becomes effective only after it is approved in a referendum. A proposal stemming from the President of the Republic and approved by the two Chambers by simple majorities may go, at the President's discretion,

either before the two Chambers, meeting jointly in a Congress (in which case a three-fifths majority is required), or to the people in a referendum. Thus amendments that emanate from the government may either go before the Congress or the people, while a proposal stemming from Parliament must always be submitted to the people in a referendum. As we have seen, President de Gaulle has claimed, by invoking Article 11, that an amendment can also be submitted directly by the President to the people in a referendum—thus bypassing Parliament.

VII

The French Administration

The key to understanding the French administrative tradition is to realize that the political system is unitary, that decision-making is highly centralized, and that the state has an all-encompassing role. No Frenchman fully understands the meaning of the term "federalism." For instance, in a number of opinion polls about European union, the French opt for a federal system but are against supranational institutions. This is as if the people were for the federal government but against giving legislative power to Congress. From the Monarchy through to the Revolution, the four Republics, the two Napoleons, and down to de Gaulle, France has remained "one and indivisible." What is decided applies to all alike in every department and every hamlet, and until recently, to every colony. Many years ago, a Minister of Education dumfounded his visitor by telling him, after looking at his watch, that at that precise hour all the children of the same grade in all the schools of France were having Latin classes and were in the process of conjugating the same verb¹.

There is but one legal authority in France that can make and enforce decisions affecting the comings and goings of every last Frenchman, even down to the exact moment of his wrestling with a particular Latin conjugation. There can be no parallel or independent authorities, no differentiation on the basis of provincial or local situations. This awesome authority is the central government. Its subordinate organs execute its decisions. It can delegate to inferior or local organs, but only under central scrutiny and control. Its authority is all-encompassing: the running of the railroads, the education of the children, radio and TV, the building of highways, the supervision of cultural activities, tourism, the regulation of medical benefits and family allowances, retirement benefits, sports, stadiums and parks, the

collection of taxes, the police, urban redevelopment, the meticulous arrangements for the economic development of the country as a whole, or of diverse regions—all and many more of these matters are decided by the central government.

The French administrative tradition gives to the state a greater role than that of the government in any other democracy. For numerous reasons, some of which we have already mentioned, the French prefer to see an impersonal and higher authority decide many things for them, rather than to be forced to decide themselves on the basis of local committees and voluntary associations, and through general face-to-face relations. After all, decisions "from above," if made without the direct participation of the individuals concerned, are easier to disobey than if they are made by the individuals concerned.

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND: FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO LOCAL MAYORS

Almost all important governmental decisions are made in Paris by the President, the legislature, and the Cabinet, and these decisions are enforced by a network of agents throughout the country. The three principal organs in this network are the Minister of the Interior, the Prefects, and the mayors.

The Ministry of the Interior

The Ministry is responsible for the execution of all the decisions of the central government and for administering departmental and local units throughout the country. Staffed primarily by permanent civil servants—and assisted by a number of civil servants "loaned" to it from the Council of State—the Ministry supervises all national services. It is responsible for the enforcement of the law, for which it has

broad police functions and sweeping powers in time of national emergency.

Prefects

The most important instruments of the Ministry are the Prefects, who are in charge of the Departments of France. They are civil servants responsible for the execution and enforcement of laws and executive orders in each Department, and they have supervisory functions over all the local units within the Department as well. Assisted by elected departmental councils and by a number of sub-Prefects, they are the true spinal cord of the administrative machinery and serve as a highly centralized and disciplined extension of the central government.

Mayors

Below the Prefect and his sub-Prefects are the mayors and the municipal councils. Both are elected. But once elected, the mayor assumes a double role: he represents both the state and his municipality. For certain matters the mayor is the representative of the national authority, and must account for his actions to the Prefect and perform a number of functions required by the national government. In many instances—notably in matters concerning the local budget and local taxation—his decisions have to be endorsed by the Prefect before they come into force. In other instances, the Prefect can command him to perform certain acts and failure to do so may result in his suspension from office for a period of time or, in extreme cases, his dismissal by an executive order of the Minister. Thus local government—more than 36,000 small communes with their municipal councils and mayors—is controlled from Paris. The mayor operates under what French lawyers call the "tutelage" (*tutelle*) of the Prefects and the central authority. Uniformity is the rule.

In the last few years, the Departments—es-

tablished in the years of the Revolution and Napoleon—seem to have shrunk in size and importance, in this day when virtually the whole of France can be traveled by car in a matter of 24 hours and when the telephone and the radio have brought every part of the country so close to Paris. As a result, an effort is being made to establish *super-Prefects*, regional Prefects who have been nominated corresponding to 20 "regions" (see Fig. 7-1), with the Paris region as a separate entity. The Re-

gional Prefect has under his immediate direction all the state services operating within his own region. In the past all these activities came under the direct control of the various Ministries in Paris, with the Prefect being bypassed. This means that in essence he is assured of a wide range of consultations, deliberations, and decisions, under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, for a great number of public matters—construction, public works, education, welfare, etc. As the spokesman for the region,

FIGURE 7-1 *Regional Prefects and regional action*



he will take them all into account in an attempt to coordinate effort and plan better policy. To do so, he is assisted by a number of advisory boards, in which the various regional interests are represented, to inform and advise him. A genuine effort to decentralize, even if it comes from the top, has been made. However, it is not at all certain that it will succeed, since internal regional rivalries and interministerial rivalries are involved. A simpler solution, advocated by many, is to consolidate the Departments into 20 or so regions, and provide for genuine deliberative regional representative assemblies, and delegate them a variety of functions that are still tightly held in Paris.

Another step in the direction of better coordination is the merging of municipalities into one. They are allowed to make agreements for the joint administration of services that can be rendered more efficiently and economically on a joint basis—electricity, water supply, etc. Subsidies are provided to spur rather than control local effort.

The Central Government

In Paris, a stable bureaucracy is at the disposal of the Cabinet. The basic unit, as in England, is the Ministry, which is responsible for the execution, enforcement, and, at times, policy-formulation of matters under its immediate jurisdiction. The Ministries, again as in England, are divided into bureaus, and the French civil servants, like their English counterparts, form a permanent body of administrators, the top members of which are in close contact with the Ministers and, therefore, with policy-making. As with the British Treasury, the Ministry of Finance plays a predominant role, since it prepares the budget, formulates the estimates, collects taxes, and, to a lesser degree, controls expenditures.

Who are the French civil servants? If we include manual workers and teachers of grade schools and high schools, their total comes to

over 1 million persons (Table 7-1). But if we were to add these and also the career military personnel, and those working in the nationalized industries—the railroads, gas, electricity, and other economic activities controlled by the state—the total would be 2.5 million, 12.5% of the working force. The vast majority are engaged in subordinate tasks. Only a small group of about 10,000 persons participate in the formulation and execution of policy. The top echelon are selected on the basis of competitive examinations and, as in Great Britain, the majority come from certain schools: the law schools, the *École National d'Administration*, the *École Polytechnique*, and a few others.

TABLE 7-1 <i>Civil Servants in 1966 (in thousands)</i> <i>—Excluding those in Nationalized Industries</i>	
Ministry	Number
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	11.6
Ministry of Agriculture	18.9
Ministry of National Education	589.8
Ministry of Finance	122.3
Ministry of Interior	81.5
Ministry of Justice	18.3
Post Office and National Savings Banks	272.3
Ministry of Construction	7.2
Ministry of Public Works and Transportation	74.3
Ministry of Social Affairs	20.6
Various	11.0
Total	1,227.8
National Defense (civilians)	148.9
Career Military	297.1
Total	1,673.8

Source: Le Budget de 1966, Ministère de l'Économie et de Finance.

The government has attempted to give all prospective candidates for the Civil Service a common education and provide for entry on the basis of merit. In 1946 a special school, the National School of Administration, was established for this purpose. The school is open to candidates, and not only is it free, but the stu-

dent is paid a stipend by the government for a period of three years as a trainee civil servant. Common training makes rotation from one job to another and from one Ministry to another easier. The prestige of the National School of Administration has to some degree overshadowed the law schools (although most prospective civil servants continue to study law) and the other specialized schools.

The better qualified enter the most important branches of the higher Civil Service: the Diplomatic Corps, the Inspectors of Finance, the Prefectorial body, the Court of Accounts, and the Council of State. The great majority—perhaps as many as 90%—come from the upper middle classes or the middle classes. Many come from families in which the father is a high-level civil servant—indicating a high degree of co-optation, somewhat similar to that existing in the Armed Forces. They are the only ones having the educational background to pass the stiff written exams. As for the oral examination administered by the civil servants, manners, speech, and social background continue to play an important role. It is these young men that occupy the central position in the central ministries (Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance), and play the crucial role in the various other governmental agencies, notably economic planning.

There are a number of ways for the civil servants to exert power and influence. They advise the Minister, and execute the ministerial policies in a manner that allows them discretion; they also have independent scrutinizing and controlling functions. This is notably the case with the Inspector of Finance and the Court of Accounts. The first is intimately associated with the preparation and the execution of the budget, and the second with the overall scrutiny of all government disbursements. The Council of State has both a consultative and judicial role, as we shall see, while the prefectoral and diplomatic corps are involved in deliberation, policy-making, and execution within

a varying range of discretion. The civil servants are actively engaged in legislation—each and every law today tends to be a statement affirming certain broad principles and basic rules (*loi-programme*) or broad objectives (*loi d'orientation*) to be implemented by the Minister. This gives to the Civil Service a broad area of discretion to issue orders and regulations within the spirit and the letter of the law. This means, of course, freedom to act or not to act.

Within the central government, civil servants increasingly exercise influence both in policy-making and execution because of the development of interministerial committees to thrash out policy questions and make suggestions on matters concerning them. Similarly, the development of a host of other organizations to promote state intervention in economic and social affairs—planning, construction, regional development, savings, etc.—which do not have a ministerial status, are directly headed by civil servants. The top civil servants, like their British counterparts, have grown to know each other (instead of remaining isolated in their Ministries) and to develop a common attitude, a common language, and a common *esprit de corps*. The old departmentalization and parochialism of the Ministries has given place, through the osmosis of the interministerial committees and the regulatory agencies of the state, to a "national" Civil Service, not only in law, but in fact.

From "Mandarin" to "Technocrat"

Under de Gaulle the role of the Civil Service has grown—for the general trend has been to put the civil servant right at the top of policy-making. As we noted, de Gaulle's staff is almost exclusively composed of civil servants detached from their ministerial or other duties; one-third of the cabinet consists of experts and top technicians and of civil servants, and the general stability of the Cabinet, despite minor reshufflings, has also corresponded

to the stability of the Minister's staff, the *cabinet ministeriel*, which consists of civil servants. In the national services, and at the top of the Economic Planning Commission, civil servants initiate, implement, deliberate, and often decide. Many claim that the present system is a "technocracy"—a government by the expert and the technician (i.e., the civil servant).

But in a peculiar way, as today's "technocrats" have been gaining influence, the character, and with it the role, of the Civil Service has been changing in a manner that reduces its legal power. The civil servants are no longer, as the "mandarins" (as they were called) of the past—guardians of the statist administrative tradition: neutral, impersonal, remote, and legal-minded. They have undertaken the "dialogue" with interest-groups, with regional groups, and with the professions, both in the performance of their general functions and with regard to economic planning and regional development. The businessman, the industrialist, and the farmer have become their constituency.

This development is due to at least three reasons. First, the weakening of the parliament, and to a great extent of the parliamentary committees and subcommittees, has shifted drastically the thrust of the interest-groups. Groups attempt to influence those who have power. In the past, their point of access was the deputy, the committee, or even selected members of the Cabinet in a weak coalition Cabinet. Now their thrust is almost primarily directed to the civil servant who, on behalf of his Minister and a cohesive Cabinet, has the ultimate word. The confrontation between a spokesman for an interest-group and a civil servant often results in an agreement, a compromise, or a bargain. Secondly, as the state services begin to resemble those of a private firm or a private industry, the civil servant finds himself increasingly at home with the company director, business executive, and banker. The concerns are common, very often the training is not different, and the social

status not dissimilar. Nothing illustrates this better (though it suggests more) than the growing "*pantouflage*"—the shift from Civil Service positions to private jobs. Thirdly, the dialogue has become increasingly institutionalized through the creation of thousands of advisory committees, bringing together interest- and professional groups with the civil servants in a deliberative process. This is notably the case with economic planning and regional development, as well as urban redevelopment. From purveyor of authority, the civil servant becomes a link, and from an executor, a deliberator. In the process, the sharp lines that divided what is public and what is private have been not only blurred, but seriously undermined. No wonder that the civil servant has become today one of the most important advocates of a "participant democracy" as opposed to one that juxtaposes state authority and the individual. Some civil servants, organized in political clubs, have been the most articulate spokesmen of a continuing and institutionalized dialogue between the state and the individual, between the Civil Service and the interest-groups. The aversion to face-to-face relations is giving place to a dialogue from which greater participation, more bargaining, and a more pragmatic orientation are likely to emerge. It is something of an irony (but not uncommon in France) that such an important change is initiated from the top: the civil servant, who embodied the impersonal power of the state, is now eroding his legal supremacy to become an instrument of service and cooperative action.

The Changing Role of the Civil Service: Two Illustrations

Nothing illustrates better the role the Civil Service has played in becoming a bridge between the state and the country than French Economic Planning and Regional Development. Economic planning was initiated by Jean Monnet, in cooperation with a small group of

the higher echelons of the Civil Service, in order to meet specific needs and demands arising from World War II. The first task, as we saw in Chapter III, was to modernize and rebuild the equipment of the country devastated by World War II. Thereafter, the Plan covered many other branches of economic activity and emphasized "productivity." The planners began to rely increasingly upon cooperation and consultation between business and industry and the civil servants. With the Second (1954-55), Third (1958-61), and Fourth Plans (1961-65), they set out to modernize by projecting a growth rate of about 5-6% a year. Attention was given to growth of consumption, social reconstruction, and welfare measures. The planners introduced more sophisticated techniques of forecasting economic development for each branch of economic activity, began to develop ways to handle problems of regional development, and took comprehensive measures to improve the agricultural situation of the country—caused in part by low income and a great number of marginal farms, but also by falling prices, inadequate processing facilities, and downright lack of information and know-how on the part of many farmers. The Fifth Plan (1966-70) projects an annual rate of expansion of 5% in gross domestic production, a sharper rise in private consumption, and a massive expenditure in social programs, foreign aid, and defense. The Plans have been successful, and the figures we gave earlier about the rate and degree of French modernization attest to it. It is, in great part, the work of the General Planning Commission that prepares it, and submits it for approval to the Minister, and, through him, to Parliament. The Commission consists of about 40 specialists, drawn mainly from the Civil Service, and about 500 executive and clerical personnel. The top 40 play the key role in preparing the Plan, assisted by the National Institute of Statistical and Economic Studies that prepares the economic forecasts.

A major work is done by the so-called mod-

ernization committees. There are 25 such committees concerned with various aspects of the economy, and they are invariably headed by members of the Commission and civil servants from various Ministries. The most important economic and professional interests, in business, industry, commerce, agriculture, labor, and banking, are represented. To be specific, in the preparation of the Fourth Plan (1961-65) there were 114 labor representatives, 20 farmers, 198 business managers, 239 executives, 170 "experts" drawn from the professions and the universities, and 200 *civil servants*. It is at this level that the new important role of the Civil Service—dialogue—and the new development that we noted—cooperation between civil servants and the professional interests—takes place. At the regional level, representatives of the regional interests and public servants form the so-called Committees of Regional Economic Development to assess the impact of the Plan upon their region and make suggestions.

What is strikingly novel about French planning then, is that it has generated a constant contact between the Civil Service and the community at the national and local levels, but not in the form of what Max Weber calls "imperative coordination." The powers of the Civil Service to command are limited both in its drafting stage and in its implementation, the Plan and Planning authority relies on cooperation and consultation. It is to the interest of the professional groups (industry, labor, agriculture, etc.) to learn about the indicators and trends of economic activity—and the planners are in a position to tell them. It is to their interest to know something about population trends—and the planners know. It is to their advantage to get a view of price trends for the future, and it is finally to their interest to know where and how much the state plans to spend—since the state is the largest producer, investor, and consumer. The Plan gives an overall idea, and frequently a very specific one. Within the context of the Plan, then, decisions

can be made about such matters as investment, expansion, and the like, by individual firms and persons, and the state can help with low-interest loans, with tax rebates, with subsidies or by writing off taxes in return for an assurance that the firm will reinvest a part of its profits. Both the private and the public sector have to gain if there is cooperation that involves balanced growth. This is what the Plan has done, and in doing so it has increasingly altered the nature of the French economy and by modifying the role of the Civil Service is injecting new habits and values that are beginning to seriously change the political attitudes of the average Frenchman. He is beginning to cooperate with the state and its agents, and to participate in decisions that were made in the past in Paris behind the closed doors of Ministerial offices.

Regional Development

Equally significant are the procedures set up for the regional development and urban

FIGURE 7-2 *Highly-developed (dark grey), developed (light grey), and underdeveloped (white), regions of France.*



redevelopment of France—two problems that, as we know, are currently plaguing our own country. For France the problem has a special interest. If the demographic and industrial trends are left without control, Paris will dominate the rest, and in the process, may well become unlivable. There are about 8.5 million people in the Paris agglomeration now, accounting for about 18% of the population of France—whereas New York City accounts for not more than 4% of the population of the United States! Paris has one-fourth of all governmental workers—about 600,000—and 54% of all publishing houses and newspapers; it accounts for half of the country's business turnover; and a majority of all companies have their central offices in it. Twenty-five percent of all industrial workers live in the Paris region, and one-third of all industrial jobs are in Paris.

The second problem is the division of France between developed and underdeveloped regions. If you look at the map in Fig. 7-2 you will see the line that divides East and West. Both in terms of per capita income, population, and industrial jobs, the East is advanced and the West relatively behind. But the dark area situated in the Northeast comprises only 19 Departments, with about 38% of the population, and 20% of the territory. They account for 46% of French production. Productivity in this area is 25% above the average. Seventy percent of the university students and specialized technical schools are located in Paris or the Northeast.

Finally, the last problem is that of the rural areas. They have been steadily losing population. While in 1851, 27 million lived in rural areas, about 7 million in towns, and 1.9 million in Paris, by the year 2,000 A.D. the figures are projected to be 8.0, 50.0, and 14.0 respectively. There is no way to arrest this process—but there is a way to organize agriculture in such a manner that it will be able to provide for the food required by the growing city population. There is also every reason to make available to the farmer all the facilities of city life. Thus the

elimination of marginal farms, the development of mechanized agriculture to suit the particular type of crops, the growth of processing and marketing facilities, and (above all) refrigeration, canning, and transportation become predominant.

The reader begins to have a view of the enormity of the problem. It is not only a French problem, for it relates to problems that all modern industrializing societies face: slow transportation, water and air pollution, inadequate recreation facilities, the trauma-inducing shifting of populations from the centers where they live and the occupations to which they are accustomed to new ones. How and what decisions will be made is a political problem. The novelty of the French experiment is that it is undertaken on a nationwide basis with a vision—based upon careful study—not only of what the situation will be 30 years from now, but of how it *ought* to be. Every plan and every target is, in other words, a commitment to the new generations.

Under the overall supervision of the Planning Commission and the Cabinet, a National Commission for Integrated Development has been set up. Its job is primarily to forecast and suggest targets and goals. It has 80 members consisting of various professional groups, and headed by a commission of civil servants and other specialists divided into a number of study groups. Implementation is in the hands of a "Delegation of Integrated Development"—an interministerial committee of 27 that cooperates closely with the Planning Commission. It supervises the execution of the Plan in the 20 regions. The interministerial committee screens all ministerial expenditures that relate to investment, equipment, and modernization. It can urge outright expenditure in one region rather than another, ask accordingly for modification of the Plan at its deliberative stage, and suggest the granting of loans, subsidies, and tax rebates, depending upon where an industry plans to establish itself. (Generally, when it comes to economic expansion, priority is given to the

underdeveloped areas and to the decongestion of the Paris area.)

Planned as an interrelated unit, France, without losing geographical diversity—indeed, by cultivating it—will become more alike in the income, skills, and education of its children. But it should be noted again that all the decisions made are made with the advice and the participation of the interests involved, and those of the various regions, through the regional committees of development and through the advisory bodies that participate in the final formulation of the Plan. The role of the Civil Service becomes increasingly that of a catalyst, a bargainer, a compromiser. The authoritative traditions give place to a genuinely political activity, without which the cooperation of the interests involved could not be readily solicited and institutionalized.

THE COUNCIL OF STATE (CONSEIL D'ÉTAT)

One of the most remarkable institutions in the government of France is the Council of State, whose parallel cannot be found in England or the United States, but which has been widely copied in most of the Continental countries. Founded by Napoleon, it originally consisted of top-ranking civil servants who screened executive orders and decrees and became the "watchdog" of the administration. All litigation involving civil servants or the state would be heard by it. Today, the Council of State continues to perform important advisory and deliberative functions. A number of government executive orders require its approval before they go into force. It is reputed to consist of the best lawyers in France. Once admitted, the "*conseiller d'état*" achieves, by custom, permanent tenure in the Civil Service. Until the Fifth Republic, no *conseiller* had ever been arbitrarily dismissed by the government.

The Council of State has, however, emerged

primarily as a court. It hears cases involving acts of civil servants in their official capacity and cases arising between an individual and the state. Instead of being the watchdog over government administration, the Council has today become the defender of individual rights—both property and civil rights—against the state. This change has been the result of a jurisprudence developed over the years by the Council. It has declared executive orders or acts of the government to be illegal if they are not consistent with the “parent law”: if they are *ultra vires* (i.e., beyond the powers authorized by law); or if the reasons for which an executive order is issued are not clearly set forth. It has obliged the state to pay damages to private individuals whenever negligence on the part of civil servants could be

proved. Finally, in some decisions it has held that the government is obligated to compensate the plaintiff even when no negligence has been proven. In each of the following cases, a public officer and, through him, the state were declared liable even though negligence was absent: a Prefect suspended the publication of a newspaper; a mayor refused to allow a peaceful religious ceremony to be held; munitions exploded in a state depot.

Thus the Council of State has attempted to curb the arbitrary actions that are inherent in any powerful and centralized administrative system and to protect the individual in all the cases where he has no redress before the civil courts. As a result, its jurisprudence has been one of the most progressive in the world.

VIII

Governmental Performance under the Fifth Republic

An evaluation of the performance of the Fifth Republic may well be premature. In operation since January, 1959, it is more of a government of one man than a political system. De Gaulle symbolizes, as we noted, the Bonapartist tradition in France. It is he who governs and it is he, rather than the Constitution and the governmental institutions we examined in the preceding chapters, who embodies legitimacy. Perhaps the most crucial problem facing the country is. Will the governmental institutions remain the same after de Gaulle? Will the succession to the office of the Presidency be accomplished without serious dissension or will the present governmental machinery, and perhaps the Constitution, be radically transformed? With these troubling questions in mind, we will now attempt to present the balance sheet of the regime and to assess its performance.

INDEPENDENCE FOR THE FORMER COLONIES

During 1956-57, one of the most important steps in French colonial policy was taken when the Parliament of the Fourth Republic endorsed legislation granting the various African territories of France and Madagascar extensive local autonomy. These territories were given the power to legislate their internal affairs and to establish their own responsible governments, while matters concerning finance, defense, foreign policy, higher education, customs, and radio remained under the jurisdiction of the French government.

In 1958, President de Gaulle pledged to all these territories a new political arrangement—the French Community—and at the same time explicitly promised to respect their right to independence, if they opted for it in the referendum of September 28, 1958, by voting

"No." All the territories, with the exception of Guinea, voted "Yes," and thus the French Community came into being. The territories became Republics "federated" with France. They were governed, however, by the President of the French Republic who was also President of the Community (de Gaulle), with the assistance of an Executive Council, consisting of a number of French Ministers charged with common Community affairs and the Prime Ministers, or their delegates, of the African Republics and Malagasy (formerly Madagascar). A Community Senate, with mostly consultative powers, was also established, and a Community Arbitration Court was created for the purpose of hearing and passing on controversies among the member states.

In the course of 1959-60, the Community was abandoned. All African Republics and Malagasy have become independent and all of them have become members of the United Nations. France under de Gaulle has thus liquidated her colonial Empire. In doing so, she has improved her position in Africa, where she is now assured of a reservoir of good will. Large subsidies to the African Republics and Malagasy guarantee their economic modernization, which will improve the living standards of the African people and is eventually bound to increase both French trade and investments in Africa.

Algeria

Progress in Algeria, where a powerful French minority and a strong Army were well entrenched, was slow. After many hesitations, equivocations, and two uprisings by the military and the French in Africa against de Gaulle, negotiations were concluded, granting Algeria her independence. The agreements provided for an immediate cease-fire and for the establishment of a provisional caretaker government in Algeria to organize a referendum on self-determination; they gave to the Algerian pop-

ulation an opportunity to express in a referendum a choice between outright independence, independence in cooperation with France, and integration in the French Republic. Since it was presumed that the Algerians would opt for independence in cooperation with France, the Evian agreements provided detailed stipulations on the status of the French citizens. They were to remain French citizens. Even if they opted for Algerian citizenship within a period of three years, they could still retain their French citizenship and return to France; their property and freedoms were guaranteed. They were further guaranteed their own schools and publications. Special rights were to be bestowed upon the French who became Algerian citizens; a number of seats in the future Algerian Parliament were to be allotted to them, and they were to be given special representation in the large municipalities.

France maintained her rights to test atomic weapons in Sahara (which became part of Algeria), to maintain the naval base of Mers-El-Kebir for 15 years, to maintain control of three airports for three years, and to maintain the French Army on Algerian soil (but to reduce it progressively in numbers) for a period of three years. Special arrangements guaranteeing the French rights over the Sahara oil were inserted and agreements have been concluded since. In return, France pledged to continue economic assistance to Algeria for at least three years, to maintain Algeria within the franc zone, to allow free transfer of money from and to Algeria (something of capital importance, since there are about 400,000 Algerians working in France), and to continue to provide for cultural and technical aid.

When these accords were ratified by Metropolitan France in a second referendum of April 8, 1962, the way was paved for Algerian independence. On July 1, 1962, a referendum took place in Algeria, and 99% of the voters opted for independence in cooperation with France. On July 3, de Gaulle formally granted

Algeria independence and dispatched the first French Ambassador to Algeria. Thus a long, bitter war that lasted seven and a half years, at a high cost for France and considerable loss of human life on both sides, came to an end. Even more, the political passions that it had unleashed that brought down the Fourth Republic and twice endangered the Fifth were, if not buried, considerably weakened. As it was with the policy of colonial disengagement in Africa, the way was paved for better relations between France and an independent Algeria.

FOREIGN POLICY¹

On June 1, 1958, when de Gaulle returned to office, the decline of French power in the world was only too obvious. The Suez adventure had swept aside the French cultural, political, and economic influence in the Middle East. In Indochina, the last French soldier had departed long before, leaving a feeling of bitterness and distrust. Morocco and Tunisia had become independent. In Algeria, the rebellion was gaining ground, and a praetorian army was in near revolt against the Republic. In Africa, signs of discontent were becoming ominous. In N.A.T.O., France's position was weak, especially when compared with the rising strength of West Germany. As in 1940, de Gaulle considered it his task to weave patiently the fabric of national unity and work for the restoration of French power.

De Gaulle has a vision of a renovated and strong France, with global commitments and world responsibilities. He wants France to weigh heavily in the contemporary balance of forces and to aspire once more to a vocation of world leadership. It is to this task that he has devoted all his energies.

¹ For a more detailed discussion of French foreign policy, see Roy C. Macridis (ed.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, 3rd edn. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), Chapter 3.

The Memorandum of September 23, 1958

Immediately after his return to power, de Gaulle asserted that it was not the purpose of France to limit her foreign policy "within the confines of N.A.T.O." On September 23, 1958, he addressed a memorandum, still technically secret, to Henri Spaak, Prime Minister Macmillan, and President Eisenhower. He proposed the establishment within N.A.T.O. of a "directorate" of three—England, France, and the United States—with responsibility for elaborating a common military and political strategy for the whole of the planet, for the creation of Allied commands for all theaters of operation, for joint deliberations about strategy, and for joint decision on the use of atomic weapons. "The European states of the continent," he stated on April 11, 1961, "must know exactly with which weapons and under what conditions their overseas allies would join them in battle."² There was also a threat in the memorandum. France would reconsider its N.A.T.O. policy in the light of the response of England and the United States.

Though ostensibly addressing problems related to N.A.T.O., de Gaulle was actually attempting to place France on a level to which no other European power in N.A.T.O. could aspire. N.A.T.O. was to remain a broad organization, but with three of its members—France, England and the United States—jointly in charge of global strategy. The three great powers were, in the best tradition of the old diplomacy, to be in charge, at the N.A.T.O. level, of the Atlantic problems, and jointly in charge of planetary strategy. De Gaulle has remained adamant. When his suggestions were rejected, France withdrew the Mediterranean Fleet from N.A.T.O. command, she refused to integrate her

² News Conference, April 11, 1961, in *Speeches and Press Conferences*, No. 162, pp. 7-8.

air defense with N.A.T.O.; she prevented the building of launching sites and the stockpiling of atomic warheads over which she could have no control. But this stand against military integration was to bring France in conflict with West Germany. This became painfully evident during Adenauer's visit in December, 1959, and throughout 1960, when de Gaulle and his advisers talked freely about an "independent" Western European strategy and apparently foresaw even the possibility of the withdrawal of American forces.

With the end of the Algerian war, there was no doubt at all as to where de Gaulle stood and what he wanted. First, European problems had better be left to the European nations. This involved even the problem of German reunification. Second, European nations, notably France, had worldwide commitments that transcended the regional limits of N.A.T.O., just as did the United States. Hence the future of the national armed forces and their deployment and posture was a national matter belonging to France. Third, without ever stating it, de Gaulle seemed to infer that the presence of American troops in Europe was becoming, at least politically, a liability. Fourth, N.A.T.O. and its integrative aspects were to be thrust aside and replaced, at most and on the basis of expedience and contingency, by a classic alliance among individual and separate states—an alliance that was to be negotiated and renegotiated as the circumstances demanded. De Gaulle has never rejected the desirability of such a classic alliance, but while insisting on its form—a pact between individual sovereign states—he has never specified its content. It has seemed clear, however, that such an alliance was to be construed narrowly. The partners would be free to differ on everything that did not involve their defense against a specified foreign attack under the stipulated conditions. France would be free to move in her own way in China, in Southeast Asia, and in Latin

America, as well as reconsider her relations with the Eastern European countries or the Soviet Union. De Gaulle's revisionist policy with regard to N.A.T.O. was, in other words, an explicit reformulation of France's full-fledged independence to act as a world power. If and when the interests of the United States and France converged, so much the better; if they diverged, each would be free to act independently of the other. This, in effect, would put an end to N.A.T.O.

In March and April of 1966 the French government communicated its decision to withdraw its forces from N.A.T.O. on July 1, 1966, and demanded the withdrawal, by April 1, 1967, of all United States forces and personnel and of all N.A.T.O. instrumentalities from the French soil. The only remaining possibility was that American forces could be stationed in France, and French forces in Germany, on the basis of bilateral arrangements, a possibility that, if accepted, would in effect lead to N.A.T.O.'s destruction as an integrative military alliance. The alternative left the United States was to persist in the continuation of N.A.T.O. without France, but with the support of England and West Germany.

Since 1960, the political and military reasons that accounted for de Gaulle's acceptance of the economic provisions of the Common Market have become increasingly apparent. The Common Market suggested the possibility that a larger European whole could be placed under the leadership of France, armed with atomic weapons that were denied to Germany by virtue of the Paris Accords. Britain's participation was highly desirable, provided Britain was willing to abandon the intimate Atlantic connections that underwrote the dominance of the United States, and also provided that Britain brought into a European pool—under some form of Franco-British control—her atomic and hydrogen weapons and knowhow. Britain's nuclear power was to be its dowry in the contem-

plated marriage with the Common Market.³ Thus the heart of the matter was and remains political and strategic: England, de Gaulle fears, would remain under the domination of the United States, and her entry into the Common Market would reinforce America's influence.

With England at least temporarily out of the picture, de Gaulle turned to Germany. A Franco-German alliance providing for frequent consultations, and possibly for the elaboration of common policy on military, foreign, cultural and economic questions, would provide the hard core that would consolidate Western Europe and, given France's military superiority, safeguard French leadership at the same time. In January, 1963, a Franco-German Treaty, embodying the principle of consultations on matters of defense, foreign policy, and cultural affairs, was signed. However, the very logic of the Treaty raised serious questions. It was again based on the assumption that West Germany would accept French, rather than American, leadership and protection. But in the light of its military and economic ties with the United States, and especially in the light of the overwhelming superiority of the United States, it was unlikely that any German political leader would acquiesce to this.

In the meantime the Common Market remained a successful economic arrangement. It had, by 1967, reached the stage when increasing commitments to supranationality were to be made, and when some decision could be made by a qualified majority of the participants. In other words, the Market had moved to the critical stage when it was about to assume, even to a limited degree, genuine supranationality. However, such a supranationality is contrary to

de Gaulle's basic assumptions about the nature of international relations. Alleging the unwillingness of the other five members to accept common agricultural policies (policies, incidentally, quite advantageous to French agriculture), de Gaulle instructed his ministers, in the middle of 1965, to withdraw from the Council of Ministers of the Common Market. He also attacked the supranational character of the Rome Treaty and claimed that the assumption of power by a body of "stateless" functionaries was prejudicial to the independence of the sovereign member states. The Treaty of Rome, he concluded, had to be revised in order to do away with all supranational clauses. In effect, he urged that the Market remain a purely economic arrangement, held together by the will of sovereign and independent states, and subject to the veto power of each and all.

From a purely economic point of view, however, the Common Market continued to progress. All internal tariffs were to be abolished before the end of 1968, and it was expected that by that time there would also be a common external tariff. A common agricultural policy has been endorsed—after prolonged and often highly contentious debates—and internal agricultural tariffs are being rapidly reduced. Trade among the countries in the community has grown three times as fast as the external trade, and French trade with her European partners has more than doubled. Movement of capital and labor has become greatly liberalized, and efforts are being made to equalize welfare measures among the Six.

Inevitably, despite de Gaulle's objections, European political institutions began to develop. In the summer of 1967, the various organs of economic cooperation and coordination were all merged into one executive, the Commission, and one legislature (even if it has only consultative powers)—the European Assembly. Though major decisions are still made by the Council of Ministers, consisting of the Foreign

³The reader will find a review of some of the most important recent publications pertinent to this discussion in "Le grand débat nucléaire," *Bulletin Sédès*, No. 910, Supplement (February 10, 1965). Significant articles have also appeared in *La politique étrangère*.

Ministers of the Six (wherein each continues to have what amounts to a veto), the direction lies in the development of greater coordination, and, ultimately genuine supranational bodies wherein decision will be made by majority vote.

THE "OPENING TO THE EAST"

With the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split, with the relative weakening of the Soviet Union's expansionist trends, with the growing preoccupation of the Russians with many internal problems, and, lastly, with the emerging aspirations of many Eastern European nations for independence, the time appeared propitious to establish friendly relations with Eastern European nations and the Soviet Union. De Gaulle's emphasis upon a "European Europe," his often-repeated statements about a Europe stretching from the Urals to the shores of the Atlantic, were designed to suggest such a relaxation. Its implementation proved to be a much harder problem. One way was to achieve a genuine Franco-German entente within the context of the Common Market, and then to begin a dialogue with the Soviet Union on matters of German reunification. This proved difficult because of the unwillingness of the Germans to substitute French protection for American, and because of the legitimate doubts of American policy makers about the advisability of such a course of action. De Gaulle then made repeated overtures in the direction of the Eastern satellites. Cultural and economic ties were stressed; visits were exchanged, a number of leaders of Eastern European countries visiting Paris; and France refused to consider any arrangement that would give the Germans a say about nuclear arms. Thus, under de Gaulle, France is returning increasingly to the pre-World War II arrangements—in which an understanding with the Soviet Union is indispensable to the maintenance of peace in Europe, and in which Germany must reenter

the concert of European powers, but without the ultimate weapons. This might well have been the objective of General de Gaulle's visit to Russia in the summer of 1966 and of Premier Kosygin's return visit to France six months later.

De Gaulle as a National Spokesman

Since 1958 (and until the Quebec visit in mid-1967 in which he seemed to endorse Quebec's independence and sovereignty), de Gaulle's foreign policy has, according to all public opinion polls, received widespread approval. There was never an occasion when less than 65% approved of his foreign policy. It is unwise to assume that, with de Gaulle's death, a docile France will return again to the Atlantic fold. Nor is it necessary to assume that with his death, the Fifth Republic will collapse without leaving any trace on domestic institutions and foreign policy. France is more powerful, has a better sense of its role in the world, has tasted the fruits of independence and the poison of the atomic era, and has regained the posture she had temporarily lost after the shattering defeat of 1940. But it will be also difficult to believe that, in the years to come, France will be in a position to maintain her present intransigent attitude of independence. There will be no return to a position of tutelage and dependence upon the United States, as happened after 1947, but it is unlikely that there will be a full-fledged separation and independence from the Atlantic commitment. It is also unlikely that the development of closer European ties can be thwarted. To begin with, the demands for national independence will have to be qualified by a return to what France refused to accept in 1954: a common European military arrangement. Second, European political and military unity will require that one member of the "Anglo-Saxons"—England—be invited to participate. Finally, Europe will inevitably assume greater independence in the world, still, however, requiring the American guarantee and perhaps

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even the presence of American soldiers. N.A.T.O. will therefore have to be reconsidered, not as underwriting French dependence, but rather as an indispensable instrument of protection and common strategy, unless and until de Gaulle's great vision of integrating the Soviet Union into Europe is realized.

A NEW DEFENSE

On February 13, 1960, France exploded her first atomic device in the Sahara. It was followed by three more atmospheric tests on the same site, the last of which took place in March, 1961. Since then there have been a few underground tests while preparations, both physical and diplomatic, have been underway for nuclear testing in the Polynesian possessions of France in the Pacific, where additional tests were conducted in the summer of 1966. The first French H-bomb is scheduled to be exploded there. New legislation has reorganized the French military forces and a new strategy has been evolved, with emphasis on the atomic force—the *force de frappe*. A new system of selective rather than universal military service has been introduced. Military service has been reduced to 16 months, and total annual recruitment is expected to average about 200,000 men, out of a total of some 350,000 available for service. Two "program-laws" for defense (1961–65, 1965–70) provide, in addition to the existing Air Force capabilities, for surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 miles, and a first nuclear submarine (presumably, by the end of 1970) armed with sea-to-ground ballistic missiles with thermonuclear warheads. It is planned that by 1972–73 all three services (Air, Army, and Navy) will be fully armed with nuclear weapons. The French Army will consist of the Strategic Nuclear Force, the Force of Maneuver (six highly mechanized and mobile divisions), the Naval forces and Air Force, and the forces for the Operational Defense of the Territory (D.O.T.), consisting of one Alpine

brigade, five combat regiments, and 20 commando infantry regiments. The heart of the military machine will be the nuclear force and the mechanized divisions—the latter presumably operating, if circumstances demand it, in conjunction with N.A.T.O. (assuming that this organization is still in existence).

THE ECONOMY

As we saw in Chapter III, economic modernization has been stepped up in the decade of the Fifth Plan. The national product has grown by over 50%, and industrial production by the same—sometimes as high as 6.5% per year for industrial products and about 3% for agricultural products. Housing construction has averaged about 300,000 units, and it is expected to be considerably higher in the years of the Fifth Plan. Inflation—in the past a serious problem—has been controlled, if not stopped. Individual purchasing power has risen by about 30–35%. The balance of payments has been favorable almost without interruption ever since 1959, and today France holds over \$7 billion worth of gold and foreign assets. The push from the farm to the city has continued, and with it the signs of modernization have grown; agricultural workers become fewer, the number of industrial workers remain constant, and the tertiary sector of the employment has been growing. The consumer—mainly in the city, and less so on the farm—is better off. There is more leisure, and paid vacations for workers have become more widespread, and lengthened to three weeks. In a 20-odd-year period, the number of householders owning cars has grown from 14% to 60%; those owning television from only a few in 1947, when it was introduced, to 73%; refrigerators from 3% to 73%, and washing machines from 2.5% to 55%. The government continues to pour money into the social sector of the economy, with public investments amounting to about 21% of the total. Welfare measures, despite recent changes

efficiently as possible. They tend to consider that a wealthy society should provide better living conditions for the workers and by so doing put an end to the secular conflicts between managers and workers, between the bourgeoisie and the working class. The Catholics among them believe that the task of a good Catholic is to cooperate with others on concrete and specific issues without letting religious differences become divisive.

The trend of modernization is also bound to change the attitude of the workers. They, too, may realize that the traditional arguments about capitalism and Socialism are becoming sterile, that a democratic state gives them the opportunity to use their numbers and power in order to satisfy their claims. The more they do so the more pragmatic and practical in their outlook they should become and the more inclined to set aside their ideological quarrels. The British Labour Party (despite its present divisions), the German Social Democratic Party, and, from a different point of view, American trade-unionism provide working examples of how the laboring class can organize itself politically to gain a strong voice in determining what share of the country's wealth it will receive.

Many of the social-economic groups associated so closely with the Third and Fourth Republics (the shopkeepers, artisans, and small farmers) threw their support behind Poujade, but are now being squeezed out by the inexorable progress of modernization. Businessmen are beginning to understand that mass production and mass consumption lead to higher profits and are abandoning the protectionist mentality that characterized them for so long. They have accepted the European Common Market, the liberalization of trade, and a policy of cooperation with and investment in the former African colonies. The younger civil servants seem increasingly sympathetic to new rules of fiscal policy and to state controls over credit, interest, and public investment.

We have already noted how these socio-economic

changes have begun to affect the political system. We noted that stability and executive leadership are beginning to be valued; that the Presidential system itself has created an electoral situation in which two camps are likely to join forces behind two candidates; we pointed out that the emergence of a majority in the National Assembly has forced the opposition groups to increasingly coalesce, and that the party system has become simplified. In our discussion of the Communist Party, we indicated that although still anchored to the ideologies and practices of the past, it is showing a reformist spirit, on the basis of which a viable cooperation with the other parties of the Left may become possible. Finally, we discussed at some length the new role of the Civil Service in bringing the citizen and the state together. All these changes are reinforced by the mass media—the newspaper, but more particularly radio and TV—that create a “national constituency” to obliterate the particularisms of the past. The winds of change, in other words, are here, and the likelihood that the French will transform their previous ideological attitudes into pragmatic and cooperative ones is real. If and when this happens, then politics will be transformed from a set of embattled ideological visions and imperatives into a set of accepted rules of how to make decisions, how to agree, and how to disagree. In other words, a Constitution will become legitimate.

The difficulties, however, remain equally impressive. First, as we have seen, the transformation of the political parties has been slow and painful. At the slightest provocation, the broader formations that make up the party system today—the Gaullists, the Democratic Center, and the Federation—may break up into their constituent units. From a four-party system, France will again become a fragmented system, and the intra-party divisions will erupt. This possibility is a real one, since as yet the discipline of the new party formations has not been tested. The Presidential election of 1965,

in fact, took place in such a manner as to exclude the political parties: the dialogue did not take place. Similarly, the overwhelming power and prestige of President de Gaulle has undermined a serious dialogue between the executive and the legislature. Despite the orderly functioning of the legislature and its participation in the legislative process, it has played primarily the role of a forum. Policy has been generated and directed by the President, not the party leadership. Nor is the constitutional debate over. Disagreements about the role and the powers of the President, the functions of Parliament, the limitations imposed upon it now, relations between Prime Minister and the National Assembly, the Prime Minister and the President, the two branches of the legislature, and the role of the Constitutional Council, continue. The Constitution and the political parties will receive their first genuine test only when de Gaulle leaves the scene.

AFTER DE GAULLE, WHAT?

What will the French political regime be like a few years from now? Obviously, such speculation is very tenuous and the most we can do is simply outline on the basis of existing conditions, a few developments that may possibly take place.

A Military Dictatorship

Until the war was ended in Algeria, it was widely believed that in the event of de Gaulle's disappearance, the Army might have been inclined or obliged to step in and assume governmental powers. It was the only cohesive force in France; it had been increasingly involved in politics; it had been responsible for the overthrow of the Fourth Republic and had been strong enough to defy at times even de Gaulle's authority.

With the termination of the hostilities in

Algeria and the declaration of Algerian independence, a *coup d'état* is extremely unlikely. The Army has been purged of many of the more extremist officers, and the development of an atomic and nuclear Army is beginning to attract its full attention. The Extreme Right-wing forces and the deputies—particularly among the Independents—who advocated the maintenance of French rule in Algeria were, as we saw earlier, literally decimated in the last elections. It is more likely that the Army will return to the role it played before 1940—that of a silent observer of the political world. Only a national crisis—such as a war, a rapid dissolution of the authority of the Republic, or a resurgence of Communist strength—is likely to impel it to step in. Since 1940, the Army has played in one way or another a very active political role. With de Gaulle out of the picture, many of the habits it learned in the last 25 years might return in a time of internal or external stress.

A "Reformed" Fifth Republic

The Fifth Republic is de Gaulle. But a number of institutional arrangements may outlive him. It is possible that the present relationship between government and Parliament may continue, characterized by limited parliamentary sessions, executive leadership, and limited legislative competence. The right of dissolution and the restriction of the censure motion may give the Prime Minister and his Cabinet the control and stability they lacked under the Fourth Republic. But none of these rules can be effective unless there is a majority to support a Prime Minister (which again raises the question of the political parties) or unless there is a powerful President who can use the right of dissolution, can appeal over the heads of the deputies to the people through a referendum, and who, above all, has the popularity that de Gaulle enjoys—an unlikely hypothesis.

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efficiently as possible. They tend to consider that a wealthy society should provide better living conditions for the workers and by so doing put an end to the secular conflicts between managers and workers, between the bourgeoisie and the working class. The Catholics among them believe that the task of a good Catholic is to cooperate with others on concrete and specific issues without letting religious differences become divisive.

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Algeria and the declaration of Algerian independence, a *coup d'état* is extremely unlikely. The Army has been purged of many of the more extremist officers, and the development of an atomic and nuclear Army is beginning to attract its full attention. The Extreme Right-wing forces and the deputies—particularly among the Independents—who advocated the maintenance of French rule in Algeria were, as we saw earlier, literally decimated in the last elections. It is more likely that the Army will return to the role it played before 1940—that of a silent observer of the political world. Only a national crisis—such as a war, a rapid dissolution of the authority of the Republic, or a resurgence of Communist strength—is likely to impel it to step in. Since 1940, the Army has played in one way or another a very active political role. With de Gaulle out of the picture, many of the habits it learned in the last 25 years might return in a time of internal or external stress.

A "Reformed" Fifth Republic

The Fifth Republic is de Gaulle. But a number of institutional arrangements may outlive him. It is possible that the present relationship between government and Parliament may continue, characterized by limited parliamentary sessions, executive leadership, and limited legislative competence. The right of dissolution and the restriction of the censure motion may give the Prime Minister and his Cabinet the control and stability they lacked under the Fourth Republic. But none of these rules can be effective unless there is a majority to support a Prime Minister (which again raises the question of the political parties) or unless there is a powerful President who can use the right of dissolution, can appeal over the heads of the deputies to the people through a referendum, and who, above all, has the popularity that de Gaulle enjoys—an unlikely hypothesis.

It was precisely the purpose of the constitutional amendment of October 28, providing for

the direct popular election of the President, to give to de Gaulle's successor a direct popular mandate, and thus to strengthen his position. Only after de Gaulle's retirement from the political scene shall we know, however, whether it will produce the desired effect. De Gaulle himself did not manage to win on the first ballot, and the strength of the Communist Party makes it very unlikely that any President ever will. However, the direct popular election of the President will give to the French a sense of immediate participation in politics—something which has been lacking in the past. Thus it may strengthen the Presidency and pave further the way toward a simplification of the party system.

A Return to the Fourth Republic

Whether these reforms are effective or not, another hypothesis should be entertained: the gradual return to the institutions and practices of the Fourth Republic, characterized by a weak President and the supremacy of the legislature. The pull in this direction stems from the social, economic, ideological, and political forces we discussed in the early chapters. They can be summed up, perhaps, in one phrase: *There is no political majority in France*. Without a political majority (popular or parliamentary), there can be no strong executive leadership of the American Presidential type or the British Cabinet type. It will be very difficult for the French to elect a President (other than De Gaulle) by a majority that will give him the political strength he needs to govern effectively. If it takes gerrymandering and other political and electoral manipulations to make such an election possible, the authority that is rooted in popular political support—the only true cornerstone of a democratic system—will be lacking. Nor will the Prime Minister and the Cabinet fare much better. The Prime Minister will have to seek parliamentary support, which

presents again the problem of finding a parliamentary majority.

Nothing illustrates better this perennial cause of political instability in France than Table 9-1. It includes one in every ten Departments and compares the vote in a referendum, in the Presidential election, and in the legislative elections for 1962, 1965, and 1967 respectively. Two "majorities" and a "multi-party" situation emerge. The "Gaullist majority" *for a referendum* is the largest; second comes the Gaullist "majority" (in fact, only a minority on the first ballot) *for the Presidential election*; and the "legislative election" shows, despite the development of larger political formations, the persistence of multipartism. In one nation there are three constituencies, depending on whether it is a referendum, a Presidential election, or a legislative election! This underlines the potential instability in the system, since with de Gaulle out of the picture, the situation is likely to *approximate for all types of popular consultations the distribution of the vote in the legislative elections*—i.e., a return to multipartism and lack of a majority. Under these circumstances, the forces that were active under the Fourth Republic may reassert themselves. There may again be many parties and groups and coalition Cabinets—and a weak executive.

But supposing that a majority emerges? Even then, difficulties lie ahead, for the present Constitution allows for serious conflicts at the institutional level. A conflict between the President and the Prime Minister is ever-present, and this conflict may well spill over all the other divisions, ideological and party, that have agitated the French political scene for so long. With de Gaulle in power, the Prime Minister is only a subordinate. But a Prime Minister, supported by a majority and (according to the letter of the Constitution) in charge of the country's policy, is likely to balk against a strong President—any President other than de Gaulle. In this case, the conflict between Prime

TABLE 9-1

From Referendums to Legislative Election: The Decline of the Gaullist Vote

	Yes Referendum of 1962	De Gaulle Presidential election, 1965	"Gaullists" Legislative election, 1967
AIN	85,245	71,246	53,969
ARIEGE	27,597	26,206	22,454
CORREZE	60,206	53,010	37,605
EURE ET LOIRE	80,631	67,747	54,741
LOT	39,903	33,246	29,999
MEUSE	78,895	57,477	46,865
PYRENEES (BASSES)	146,533	118,496	84,467
SAVOIE	96,134	53,185	49,671
TARN ET GARONNE	33,363	32,736	30,852

Minister and President will have to be resolved with the victory of one over the other. Then the system will become either a Presidential one—or a Cabinet one, like the British. Finally the French Constitution may produce a severe conflict between a President and a Prime Minister even when there is a majority that supports them both, if there is rivalry between the two.

In all political systems, the government is shaped and fashioned by the existing social and ideological forces. In France, the splintering of ideologies, the sharp divisions between major

social groups, the distrust between social classes and political traditions, have not yet been quite laid to rest. The French political system—outside the virtually Bonapartist form now in effect—has not been able to provide the wide areas of agreement necessary to weld conflicting interests and ideologies together into national parties that are able to produce working political majorities. We indicated that there is a trend in this direction, but that many forces are still in the way. It will be some time before the student of French politics can be sure of the direction the system will take.

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2. *Sondages*: distributed quarterly since 1945 by the Institut Français de l'Opinion Publique, this publication gives results of opinion surveys.
3. Since 1963 the *Revue Française de Science Politique* has regularly published articles, under the title *Les Forces Politiques*, which give excellent accounts of the development of, and trends within, political parties.
4. *Tableaux de l'Économie Française*, published by the National Institute of Statistical and Economic Studies, is an excellent compilation of social, demographic, and economic data.
5. *Le Budget de la France*, published annually by the Ministère de Finances, gives a comprehensive and clear view of French public finance.

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THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Karl W. Deutsch and Eric A. Nordlinger

I

Introduction

Among the great industrial powers of the world, West Germany—the German Federal Republic—by the mid-1960's seemed very prosperous and stable for the time being, most enigmatic in its long-run future, and crucial for world peace. In the world, it ranked ninth in population (with over 56 million people), third in gross national product (about \$112 billion in 1965), and second in exports (about 10% of the world total). Already by the end of the 1950's, the exports of the Federal Republic had overtaken those of the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic had achieved and maintained full employment. It had found shelter and work for more than 13 million German expellees and refugees from Eastern Europe and from Communist-ruled East Germany. Between the years 1955 and 1965, its national income grew at almost 8% a year, and in the 1965-1968 period it averaged between 4 and 6%—so rapid a rate that total West German national income had already outstripped the income of France by 1960 and overtook that of Britain in 1964, when West Germany became the third-ranking economic power in the world.¹

A PICTURE OF STABILITY

Starting in 1950 and continuing down to 1967, prosperity in economics had been accompanied by remarkable stability in politics. Parties catering to political extremes elicited next to no response from the voters. Early in the 1950's, less than 3% of the total vote was cast for the Communists, and less than 5% for the German Reich Party (DRP) and other

splinter parties of the Extreme Right; when the Federal Constitutional Court outlawed the Communist Party and the D.R.P. in 1953, the decision was accepted with scarcely a ripple of protest by the bulk of the public. In 1966 and 1967, the extreme nationalist National Democratic Party (N.D.P.) received at most 8% of the votes at some provincial ("Land") elections, and their nation-wide share clearly would have been less if national elections had been held in either of those years.

If moderate parties consistently commanded the support of over 90% of the electorate, a single party of moderately conservative leanings, the Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.), retained at all times between one-third and more than one-half of the popular vote and the clear preponderance of effective political power. Its main rival, the Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.), concentrated on promoting the interests of labor and policies of social welfare, within the framework of constitutional democracy, and relegated its traditional ideological appeal of socialism and the nationalization of industry to second place. These moderate policies secured for the S.P.D. between one-quarter and nearly two-fifths of the national vote, a national coalition government with C.D.U. in 1966 and 1967, a share in the government of several of the states of the Federal Republic, and the control of a number of important municipal governments, including such cities as Hamburg, Bremen, and Frankfurt. Between them, the two major parties steadily increased their share of the popular vote, from 60% in 1949 to 77% in 1965, gaining 90% of the seats in the Bundestag (the federal legislature) in the latter year.

No genuine two-party system, however, thus far has become stabilized. The voting strength of the S.P.D. never was sufficient to carry it into federal office on its own, and the strategy of the C.D.U. together with that of the smaller middle-class parties, such as the Free German Party (F.D.P.), effectively barred the Socialists from

any coalition government at the national level until 1966. Whether the first national coalition government of C.D.U. and S.P.D., which took office in that year, will bring a lasting change in this pattern, remains to be seen. From 1949 to 1966, in any case, West Germany was governed by what was called a "one-and-a-half-party" system, under which the C.D.U. dominated the federal executive, but the S.P.D. made its own substantial contributions in the federal legislature, and even more at the state and local government level. The result has been a remarkable degree of social peace and political tranquility which the coalition government since 1966 has striven to consolidate still further. Strikes were few, orderly, and relatively easily settled; political riots and violent demonstrations were conspicuous by their absence; and the police have had to worry mainly not about political unrest but about the rapidly swelling automobile traffic.

A PROVISIONAL PRESENT

Despite these achievements, the German Federal Republic is still in many respects a provisional structure in law as well as fact. In a sense, it is the youngest of the great powers. A German Federal Government with limited powers was set up in West Germany under the auspices of the occupying powers—the United States, Britain, and France—only in 1949, after four years of foreign military rule. This Federal Republic was given legal sovereignty in 1955, but had not yet attained full military sovereignty by 1967.

Recent in time, the Federal Republic is also incomplete in space. It includes only two-thirds of the area of present-day Germany, and only three-quarters of its population. One-third of the area and more than 17 million Germans are included in the Communist-ruled "German Democratic Republic" (G.D.R.). A discussion of the institutions and politics of that entity

would go far beyond the framework of this section; and they should better be discussed, in any case, among the political institutions of the other Soviet-bloc countries, which the government of the G.D.R. now resembles far more than it does those of the German Federal Republic, or of other Western countries.

It is widely believed in the West, and particularly in West Germany, that the Communist-dominated government of the G.D.R. lacks popular support; that it would fall as soon as Soviet Russian military backing were withdrawn from it; and that the territory and population of the G.D.R. would then quickly become reunited with those of the Federal Republic under a single national German government. Accordingly, the government of the Federal Republic—like that of the United States and the other Western Allies—denies all formal recognition to the G.D.R., but by the same token it has officially considered the Federal Republic only as the forerunner and trustee of the future reunited German national state.

This reunited national state would then comprise more than 70 million Germans, and it would form by far the strongest power in Europe, and one of the three or four strongest powers in the world. The Constitution of that future reunited Germany would have to be drawn up by the representatives of its entire population. Until that time, according to West German political and legal doctrine, the present Federal Republic with all its laws and institutions is in theory provisional, since nothing must take away the right of the future all-German constitutional convention to change the structure of the government.

Not only the frontiers of the Federal Republic, but even those of a reunited Germany, according to West German doctrine, are provisional. The government of the Federal Republic, backed by the United States and other Western allies, has emphatically refused to recognize the Eastern frontiers of the G.D.R.—the so-called "Oder-Neisse Line"

—and it insists, again in theory, on the full or partial restoration of former German territories east of that frontier, most of which in 1945 were put, with Allied consent, under Polish administration. These lands were then annexed by Poland, with the backing of the U.S.S.R., and were settled after 1945 by the Poles, following the expulsion of almost all their German inhabitants. In the view of many Poles, these proceedings were justified as the only practical way in which Poland could collect from Germany some reparations for the devastation she had suffered as a result of Hitler's invasion in 1939—and as an essential compensation for the loss of certain eastern Polish territories to the Soviet Union as a result of World War II, which Nazi Germany had unleashed. While the Communist-ruled G.D.R. regime has officially accepted the Oder-Neisse frontier as permanent, the West German government, as well as more than 80% of the West German voters, emphatically reject it, and it is thus impossible for anyone in the Federal Republic to say with any authority just where the definite Eastern frontiers of a reunited Germany would be.

These problems are not likely to lead to any early political action on the part of the West German government and people. They are likely to persist and to influence political attitudes for some time to come. About 10 million expellees, even though successfully resettled in the Federal Republic, cannot help but keep alive, at least until the mid-1970's, the memories of their lost homes and territories in the East, as well as the theoretical claim for their return, or else for generous compensation. Many politicians are likely either to share these feelings, or at least to find it expedient to cater to them.

Moreover, between one-quarter and one-half of all West Germans have close relatives or friends in the Soviet-dominated German Democratic Republic, while almost all the inhabitants of the latter, owing to the large-scale exodus from East Germany to West Germany

between 1945 and 1961, when the Berlin Wall was erected, now have personal friends or relatives in the Federal Republic. Even if the demand for German reunification should remain utopian under the prevailing conditions of international politics, it will thus continue to have a great deal of direct personal relevance for a large part of the German people for a considerable period of time. The Federal Republic is thus considered provisional in its boundaries, as well as in its Constitution; and the latter has been called officially since its adoption in 1949 not a "Constitution" but "Basic Law," in order to underscore its temporary character.

The French have a proverb which says that nothing lasts as long as the provisional. When more than a decade had passed since the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949, spokesmen for the ruling C.D.U. Party in 1960 suggested in the Bundestag that it was hardly good citizenship for the Opposition still to harp on the provisional character of the Federal Republic. Its laws, practices, and institutions, the government spokesmen implied, had been tested by time and had become embodied in the habits of its population. The East German population after reunification, they intimated, would just have to adopt them with few, if any, major changes, for the institutions of the Federal Republic had now acquired a tradition and a past

behind them that commanded their retention. Since the Social Democrats joined the coalition government of the country in 1966, references to the provisional character of its institutions have become still rarer.

Some of these arguments may represent bargaining positions from which concessions might be made, if reunification should become a possibility in practical politics. In the meantime, however, the German Federal Republic is the only German-speaking state that claims to represent the entire German people, with its history and its traditions. It has backed this claim by a national policy of resettlement and indemnification of German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe, which has committed the West German taxpayer to come to the financial aid of millions of persons who had not been citizens of the Germany of 1937, or even of 1913, solely on the grounds that they could be considered German in terms of language and culture and of social and political traditions. The implied appeal to German tradition and the past had a strange ring for the ears of some listeners. For, interwoven with the long and proud history of a great nation, there is also a darker German tradition and a less praiseworthy past that stretches for decades and centuries behind the nearly 20 peaceful and prosperous years of the Federal Republic.

II

The German Political Heritage

The German Federal Republic is young among states, but it governs a people that is more than a thousand years old. Words like *theutiscus* for "German," and the tradition of a "German" people go back to the age of Charlemagne. The First German Empire, styled the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation," goes back at least to the year 842 A.D., when Charlemagne's heirs divided his empire at Strasbourg into three realms and thus gave rise to the beginnings of modern Germany, France, and a third "realm of Lothar," comprising much of today's Netherlands, Belgium, Alsace, and Lorraine.

Every German schoolchild is taught to see the 1,100 years of German history since then as a long search for German unity. He is reminded that the German Empire of those early days included a variety of quite different Germanic tribes, speaking distinct dialects, such as the Franks in the Rhineland, the Saxons in Northern Germany, the Alemanni or Swabians in the Southwest, and the Bavarians in the Southeast. Each of these major tribes extended beyond what eventually became modern Germany. Descendants of the Franks also make up most of today's Dutchmen in the Netherlands and Flemings in Belgium, and others have become part of the French people, to whom they have given their tribal name. The Saxon people and their distinctive forms of speech are found also in some districts of the eastern Netherlands and perhaps of southern Denmark, and Saxon tribes contributed the major element in the Germanic settlement of England. The Alemannic tribes also make up the bulk of what is now the German-speaking part of Switzerland, and descendants of the Bavarians also make up most of the population of present-day Austria and of the German-speaking population of South Tyrol, which now forms part of Italy.

Each of these major tribes could have become a separate nation, and to weld the bulk of these

and many lesser tribes into a single and cohesive German people took many centuries. The factors that played a part in this long, drawn-out process of integration were many: the centralizing pressure of royal or imperial rule; the rewards of interregional trade; the benefits of contacts among the knights, merchants, and artisans of the different "tribal duchies" and regions (all speaking some mutually intelligible variety of German); the unifying educational and administrative influence of the Church, particularly from the ninth to the twelfth century; and the silent but cumulative effects of migration, intermarriage, and, in some cases, resettlement. A major element singled out for emphasis in much of German historiography and education, is the role of a central government with substantial political and military power, and with the will to use that power to compel national unification.

THE MIDDLE AGES

For something like the first 500 years, from the ninth to the fourteenth century the unification of Germany by some powerful ruler seemed inextricably bound up with the political unification of most of Europe under the same ruler, backed mainly by German military power. German unity and European unification appeared as one and the same task to be accomplished by a German emperor. During its three centuries of greatness, from the coronation of Otto the Great at Rome in 962 to the beheading of Emperor Konradin at Naples in 1268, the medieval German Empire laid more or less effective claim, as the "Holy Roman Empire," to the dominion of all of Western Christendom.

German empire during those centuries implied the claim to world empire. German government claimed to be, and sometimes was in fact, world government within the Western world; the profound appeal of this idea even for some non-Germans is echoed in Dante Alighieri's famous treatise "On Universal Monarchy" (*De Monarchia*), in which the poet proposes world government by the German emperor. The image of some world-wide mission, peculiar to one's own nation, has become a familiar trait in the nationalistic movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but there hardly exists a great country in the world where the image of such a universal national mission is as deeply rooted in the national past and as vividly present in the background of contemporary history and education as it is in Germany.

Despite its glory and appeal, the medieval German attempt at world empire ended in failure. The German Empire of those three centuries lacked the administrative and financial machinery essential for an effective government. What little resources, personnel, and competence in these matters its emperors could command they had to borrow from the Church. What amounts of ready money they could lay their hands on, they largely had to get from the Italian cities, which were then largely governed by their bishops. When, after 1075 A.D., the Church revolted against the political domination and exploitation by the German emperors, the main material and psychological foundations of German imperial power were eventually destroyed. Losing control of Italy and of the Church the emperors in time lost control of the princes, nobles, and towns of Germany. By the late thirteenth century, Germany was becoming what it was to remain for the next three centuries: a conglomeration of feudal domains and city states, presided over by a nominal emperor with little or no power.

The causes of this collapse of the medieval German empire were not clearly understood at the time. Few, if any, German historians or laymen saw clearly that this empire under the glamorous Hohenstaufen dynasty had lived politically and economically far beyond its means, and that its rulers had attempted the unification of Germany and of Europe in complete and

irresponsible disregard of the narrow limits of their actual resources. Rather, the image conveyed by many popular historians and retained in folk memory was one of heroic and glamorous emperors, thwarted by German disunity, by the insubordination of the German princes, and by the devious machinations of foreigners, mostly Italians and Frenchmen, and including notably the Roman Popes. If the Germans had only been more united and more disciplined, and if the German clergy had listened more to the German emperors and less to foreign popes, this image suggested, the medieval German world empire need never have fallen.

THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL UNITY

Even without any strong central government, however, the German people remained predominant in Central Europe during the next 300 years, from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. German princes, knights, and cities extended their sway deep into Eastern Europe. Far beyond these expanding limits of German political rule, German merchants, knights, artisans, and peasant settlers were welcomed by Eastern European rulers as valued immigrants and accorded privileged status. No major invasions of Germany took place from the eleventh through the sixteenth century, with the exception of a brief Mongol attack in 1241 which had been stopped by local forces at Liegnitz in Silesia. Without any strong ruler, Germany was safe, while the Hanseatic cities, the Teutonic knights, and the dukes of Austria expanded German power to the north, the east, and the southeast, and German crafts and cities flourished in prosperity.

In the second half of the fifteenth century, however, the foundations of this German prosperity began to crumble, and by the beginning of the seventeenth century Germany was ruined, before the first shots of the Thirty Years

War (1618-1648) were fired. Some of the major causes of this economic decline were remote, indirect in operation, difficult to visualize, and yet devastatingly effective. With the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, the trade of Italy and Germany with the Eastern Mediterranean declined, and the subsequent Turkish advance northward across Southeastern Europe to the gates of Vienna in 1529 further diminished Italian and German trade with that area. An even more fateful shift in the routes of world trade away from Central Europe and to the Atlantic coasts occurred after the discovery of America in 1492 and the opening of a sea route to India in 1498. Germany and most of Central Europe became backwaters of international trade; cities stagnated or shrank, and princes found it harder to raise revenues at a time when the costs of warfare and government were rising.

During this same period, more powerful monarchies emerged in Western Europe and changed the scale of politics and warfare. Between 1480 and 1610, Spain, England, France, and Sweden all emerged as vigorous national monarchies, dwarfing the resources of the German petty princes and city states with whom they came in competition for territory, trade, or influence.

The only German dynasty that attained major strength during that period was the House of Habsburg, and it did so mainly by strengthening its non-German connections. In this policy, it was eventually supported by the influence of the Church, which had repudiated in 1462 a religious compromise peace with the Protestant Hussites of Bohemia and was now interested in the rise of a strong Catholic power in Austria, so as to oppose both the Bohemian Protestants and the Turks to the southeast. By a remarkable series of intermarriages, the Habsburgs, between 1477 and 1526, acquired lands and wealth from Burgundy and Spain, and eventually the succession to Bohemia and Hungary. The wealth of Spain in particular, de-

rived from the conquest of Mexico and Peru, permitted the Habsburgs to play a major role in German politics—but it was not a role that led to German unity.

After 1517, Germany was shaken by the appeal of Martin Luther's Reformation, which was followed by more than a century of religious warfare. From these conflicts there emerged eventually a standard German language, based in large degree on the Central German dialect used by Luther for his translation of the Bible; and there remained a lasting religious division of the German people which by the beginning of our century was composed of about two-thirds Protestants and one-third Catholics, with the latter mostly in the Rhineland, Bavaria, and Silesia.

IN SEARCH OF STATEHOOD

It was in this period that Germany went through the first stages of political modernization. Between 1500 and 1750, the German principalities passed through the transition to the modern bureaucratic state, which collected taxes in money, paid a standing armed force, and was administered by professional officials. The bureaucrats themselves were paid in money, and they carried on most of their work in writing, and increasingly in accordance with fixed rules of more or less rational procedure. They were organized and disciplined in some hierarchical pattern of command and were effectively subordinated to their immediate superiors, as well as ultimately to the monarch.

Similar developments during the same centuries in England and France were in part counterbalanced in their social and cultural effects by growing economic prosperity, which increased the confidence and power of the merchants and the middle class. It taught them that they could often promote successfully, by their own efforts, their interests as individuals and groups, and that they could often conclude

profitable and honorable compromises with other interest groups or individual power holders. Indirectly, commercial and industrial prosperity in France and England increased the values of the lands of many nobles and of the rents derived from them. It also enhanced the opportunities for nobles and gentlemen to take part in profitable business ventures, as in the great companies of English merchants, or to obtain lucrative pensions or payments for nominal offices from the monarch's treasury, without having to perform any serious amounts of administrative work, as in the case of the French court under Louis XIV. The growing bureaucracies of France and England were thus limited by the power of other groups, and the major part of the aristocracies and of the middle classes of those countries did not merge with them.

In the German principalities, economic stagnation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led to the opposite effects. The open pursuit of group interests and the give and take of compromises between groups tended to be less rewarding and less reputable. The middle class stagnated and became weaker and more submissive in relation to the growing strength of the bureaucracies and of the petty monarchs who commanded them. The lesser nobles remained impecunious and their sons increasingly took to the service of the state as officers, or as civilian bureaucrats. The higher bureaucracy in the German states thus was less separate as a class, and less independent as a political force, from nobility and monarchy. Just for this reason, however, it gained by this close association a vicarious share in their prestige. The German terms for the new bureaucratic authorities of the period, *Obrigkeits*, and for their subjects, *Untertanen*, appear strikingly in Luther's injunction to his followers: "Be ye subject (*untertan*) to the authority (*Obrigkeits*) that has power over you." These German terms carry far stronger authoritarian and paternalistic connotations than any comparable terms in common

use in France, England, or the United States; and in German history they were heavily underscored by Luther's call for the savage repression of the German Peasants' Revolt in 1525.

The churches, too, became allies of and often instruments of princely and bureaucratic authority. After the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555, each prince retained the sovereign right to determine the religion of his subjects and to suppress or drive out dissenters. Most of the German principalities, in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, became officially identified with a single denomination, Protestant or Catholic, and the theological arguments in favor of the particular ecclesiastical regime established in each state served in effect as a political defense of the state, a safeguard of the reliability of its clergy, and a religious exhortation to civic obedience and loyalty.

The universities were the chief sources of the juridically trained administrative officials, which all of the modernizing states needed, as well as of the theologians and ministers, which each Protestant prince required in order to give religious backing to his claim of divine right to absolute political power. Between them, the German states, particularly the Protestant ones, maintained a larger number of universities and devoted a higher proportion of resources to them than was usual at the time elsewhere in Europe. The German universities had relatively great importance and prestige with their respective states. Professors, and eventually to a lesser degree all teachers, were viewed as somehow associated with authority, and were respected not only for their learning but also for their association with the authoritarian order of the bureaucratic and aristocratic princely governments. The results of these developments have added in the long run to the strength and glory of German learning and science, but they have also made a large part of the German universities into ready admirers and pliant servants of authority in periods of tyranny or war. For good or ill, the sixteenth

and seventeenth century combination of unusually strong universities and bureaucracies with an unusually weak commercial and industrial economy has marked German politics, society, and culture in the centuries thereafter.

In France and England, the growing wealth of the cities made it possible eventually for some one dynasty and region to defeat all its rivals and to establish a strong national state. The contemporary religious conflicts in those countries, bloody as they were, did not prevent this outcome. Rather, they often helped in the end to justify the defeat or expulsion of the losing parties and the confiscation of their property. In Germany during that period, on the contrary, there was not enough solid prosperity to finance the rise of any one prince or region to paramount power and its consolidation. Prosperous France and England won their national unity in the same centuries of religious wars in which stagnating Germany became more deeply divided to this day. Many Germans, however, blame the religious split for the long political division of their country and retain from these memories a longing for stronger national unity.

Economically impoverished and politically divided, early in the seventeenth century Germany became the scene and the victim of the power conflicts among her more effectively consolidated neighbors. In the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the great and lesser European powers, such as France, Spain, the Habsburg Empire, Sweden, and the Netherlands, fought one another on German soil, with the eager collaboration of the German princes, but with catastrophic consequences for the German people. The war reduced the population of Germany by one-third, and left the country impoverished in comparison to its Western neighbors for perhaps as much as 150 years.

The main responses of the survivors of this catastrophe were increased distrust and fear of foreign nations, increased dependence on the protection of familiar authorities, a greater acceptance of discipline and of sustained habits of

hard work, and, eventually, a greater acceptance of militarism as a means of strengthening their governments and their ability to protect their subjects against the terrors of war and foreign invasion.

Out of these experiences came the German people of the eighteenth century, with a prevailing national character that was different in some ways from that of their predecessors. If Tacitus had described the members of the ancient Germanic tribes as proud, freedom-loving, and lazy, the eighteenth-century Germans were more often submissive and diligent. If some observers in the late seventeenth century judged the Germans to be timid and peculiarly incapable of discipline, from the eighteenth century onward the German people were to impress foreigners increasingly by their discipline and military virtues.

THE PRUSSIAN STATE

A major agency in this transformation was the Brandenburg-Prussian monarchy, both through its practices and its example. Bureaucracy, austerity, mercantilism, and militarism were the hallmarks of its policy. Starting out from their holdings in the infertile Brandenburg region—"the sandbox of the Empire"—the rulers of the Hohenzollern dynasty soon acquired Prussia, a territory in the Northeast, where in earlier days the Knights of the Teutonic Order had imported German settlers, and imposed German speech and culture on the Baltic and Slavic original inhabitants. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia had managed to acquire a collection of widely scattered territories throughout Northern Germany, including strategic holdings on the banks of the Rhine, Weser, Elbe, and Oder Rivers.

In the pre-railroad age, these rivers carried a very substantial part of the trade of the various German principalities to the Baltic and North

Seas, to the Atlantic Ocean, and generally to the world of expanding overseas trade. If held by a powerful military force, these territories could be used to collect tolls from this river traffic and to impose a variety of tariffs and other economic regulations in accordance with the mercantilist practices of the time, and thus to divert a significant part of the wealth of the other German territories into the coffers of the Brandenburg-Prussian state. By spending most of its income on its army and bureaucracy, that state could maintain more soldiers, gain more territories, collect more tolls, impose more profitable regulations, and spend the proceeds again and again on more soldiers and conquests, in a slowly expanding spiral of power politics.

Under these particular conditions, militarism could be made to pay for itself, provided only that the tax receipts from foreign transit, and from domestic trade, were not squandered on luxury consumption by the monarchs and the nobles of the country. Ostentatious spending on expensive luxuries was widespread during much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries at other German courts, as it was throughout Europe at that time, but Prussia formed a conspicuous exception. By comparison with the rest of Europe, court life at Berlin and later at Potsdam sometimes seemed Spartan in its simplicity. Many of the younger sons of nobles had to depend on military or bureaucratic careers for their income; and they had to make greater efforts than nobles in other countries in order to acquire the academic training and the practical knowledge and skills necessary for the performance of their duties.

Even the peasantry followed a life of frugality and ceaseless diligence. From the middle of the seventeenth century to the early years of the nineteenth, the peasants, and even members of their families, were pressed into compulsory service on the estates of the nobles. During the slack season of the year, between spring planting and harvest, and particularly during the long winters, they had to spin, weave, or perform

other duties under the supervision of the landlord and his employees. Similar demands were made on the rural population in other parts of Germany, but in Brandenburg—or, as it was called after 1701, the Kingdom of Prussia—there emerged most clearly a new and disciplined pattern of life. It combined unceasing and diligent labor by the mass of the population with grim frugality on the part of their rulers.

The Prussian state thus functioned as an engine for extracting forced savings from its population. It channeled these savings into an ever-expanding army, and to some degree into the support of industry and education, using all these activities in turn to enhance the future economic resources and political power of the state. A French observer misunderstood the situation when he remarked that other states had armies but that in Prussia the army had a state. For the Prussian Army, too, was but one link in this chain of self-expanding power. Though it received funds more readily than other parts of the government, it, too, had to practice rigorous economies, and a German writer hit closer to the mark when he said that between 1640 and 1780 the state of Brandenburg-Prussia had starved itself into greatness.

The Prussian state won the acceptance, and eventually the loyalty, of many of its inhabitants, for it offered them a better chance of security against foreign attack, of predictable legality and honest administration, some educational opportunity, and long-term economic growth. At the same time, however, the austerity and authoritarian discipline of Prussia repelled many Germans, particularly those outside its borders. They saw it as a vast barracks yard, ruled by a royal drill sergeant. They resented its harsh tariff policies, its ruthless methods of recruiting or impressing young men from other territories into its armies; its unscrupulous policies of territorial expansion and aggression—and they thanked their stars that they were not among its subjects. Yet in 1756, when

this dreaded and hated Prussian state under Frederick II defeated for the first time in several centuries a French army in open battle at Rossbach, many of these same Germans rejoiced. "We all were pro-Fritzian then," Goethe reported of the people of the free city of Frankfurt at that particular time.

The attitude of the Germans in the southern and western parts of what is present-day Germany toward Prussia was a mixture of dislike and admiration. When and where Prussian power seemed unneeded or menacing, dislike would prevail, but where Prussian strength seemed needed against a foreign threat or where Prussian drive and efficiency might promise a way out from pettiness and stagnation, Prussian leadership could seem attractive.

In the meantime, the rest of eighteenth-century Germany remained divided into many weak and sleepy little states. Yet crafts and industries revived, the ravages of the Thirty Years War were slowly healed, and the most gifted and skilled men in many of these petty states came to think of themselves as citizens of a wide and vague "republic of letters," in which their works would be appreciated and in which they themselves might find employment at the courts of hospitable princes, regardless of state boundaries. German composers, scientists, and writers in the eighteenth century did indeed move from one German state court or university to another, or else their works or their pupils did so, and a growing network of German theaters, concert orchestras, publishing houses, and periodicals facilitated the dissemination of their works. Philosophers such as Leibniz and Kant, writers such as Schiller and Goethe, composers such as Bach and Beethoven made Germany one of the major contributors to world civilization. At the same time, however, none of these men, nor indeed most of the educated Germans before the end of the eighteenth century, felt that the unification of the German people into a single national state was at all urgently needed.

With the Napoleonic Wars and the French occupation of Berlin in 1806, this situation changed. Soon a number of German intellectuals became bitterly anti-French and wished for more powerful governments—or even one strong government—for Germany. At the same time, the rulers of Prussia, as well as those of Austria, found it expedient to take advantage of this mood, and to appeal not only to the territorial patriotism, but also to the German nationalism of their subjects. In Austria, this policy was again abandoned in 1810, but in Prussia it was strengthened by partial but important reforms and carried through to the immensely popular and ultimately victorious war against France in 1813–15. Victory was followed by a temporary swing back to conservatism, but an important beginning had been made toward linking the aspirations of German intellectuals—and of the German middle class generally—with the military prowess of the Prussian aristocracy and the power interests of the Prussian state.

GERMAN UNIFICATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In 1815, Prussia acquired the Rhineland, including the Ruhr area, and soon became the main industrial power in Germany. Under Prussian leadership, a customs union, the *Zollverein*, from 1834 onward united the territories of all German states with the exception of Austria. In the half-hearted and short-lived revolution of 1848, German liberal leaders tried to unite Germany in a single empire on a constitutional and middle-class basis, but failed to win either the cooperation of the Prussian court and aristocracy or the sustained support of the mass of the population. In the following two decades, however, the growth of German industry and banking, a German railroad network and postal system, and a unified code of commercial law all served to knit the German states

more closely together than ever. Through a skillful combination of political and military moves in three wars in 1864, 1866, and 1870–71, the Prussian statesman, Otto von Bismarck, succeeded first in greatly enlarging the territory of Prussia and then in establishing a new unified German Empire that preserved and indeed enhanced the power of the Prussian monarchy and aristocracy, while winning almost solid middle-class consent and widespread popular support.

THE SECOND GERMAN EMPIRE, 1871–1918

This new German Empire was ruled by the Prussian monarch, who now also became the German Emperor, with sweeping emergency powers at his disposal under the new Constitution. The Emperor appointed a Chancellor who was responsible to him rather than to the legislature. The Chancellor, in turn, was in control of the Ministers of his Cabinet; he, rather than the legislature, could appoint or dismiss them.

The Imperial Legislature had very little power, and was divided into two Chambers. One, the *Bundesrat*, consisted of delegates of the 25 states, with Prussia furnishing 17 out of the total of 58 and usually commanding additional votes from several smaller states. Moreover, since 14 votes sufficed to block any constitutional amendment, Prussia had an effective right of veto on such matters. The Prussian delegates to the *Bundesrat* were appointed by the Prussian government, which was subservient to the Emperor in his role as King of Prussia; and the Prussian Legislature was elected by an extremely unequal three-class franchise that insured its effective control by the landowning nobility, and to a lesser extent by the upper middle class of industry and commerce, while virtually disfranchising the rest of the population. In contrast to this extreme form

of class franchise for the Prussian Legislature, Bismarck's Constitution for the Empire provided for a second legislative Chamber, the *Reichstag* (chosen by popular election), which was designed to attract a greater share of popular interest and, in time, loyalties, to the Empire. However, while the *Reichstag* made a good sounding-board for speeches and debates, it had no real power to decide, even the taxes for the imperial budget could be collected and spent by the Imperial Government without the *Reichstag's* consent.

The German Emperor thus had vast powers and was subject to no effective constitutional control. The first Emperor, Wilhelm I, accepted Bismarck's personal prestige and influence as Chancellor, so that the system worked not too differently from the way a British Prime Minister and Cabinet might have functioned. From 1888 onward, however, the weaknesses of Bismarck's Constitution were becoming visible. A new and erratic Emperor, Wilhelm II, succeeded to the throne, Bismarck himself was soon replaced by a succession of less able but more subservient Chancellors; and German policy began its fateful drift toward diplomatic isolation, the arms race with Britain, France, and Russia, and the precipice of World War I.

It would be wrong, however, to see the main causes of the German drift into World War I in the personal shortcomings of Wilhelm II, or in the constitutional defects of the "Second Empire." The policies of high protective tariffs for industry and agriculture, of active efforts at colonial expansion; of a frantic search for international prestige, and of ever-increasing expenditures for armaments—all these were backed by the most powerful interest-groups and elites of the empire. They were overwhelmingly supported by the German middle class, and had substantial support throughout the population. Germans, during the decades between 1890 and 1914, found themselves in a world of rising tariffs and expanding colonial empires. Coming late upon the scene of colo-

onial expansion, many of them accepted blindly the proposition that was then enunciated by French and British, as well as by German statesmen, that any great industrial country had to win colonies, "living space," and "a place in the sun" for itself, if it was not to lag behind, and eventually to perish, in the struggle for national survival. The old memories of a hostile foreign environment, retained since the days of the Thirty Years War and the Napoleonic invasions, now developed into the notion of a Germany encircled by envious and hostile rivals, and eventually into the widespread belief that war would be inevitable—a belief coupled, as we now know, with almost complete ignorance of what such a war would be like.

World War I proved devastating beyond anyone's expectations. About 2 million German soldiers lost their lives in it, and almost another million civilian lives were lost through the hardships of the food blockade imposed by the Allies during the war and prolonged for some time after the Armistice of November 11, 1918. By the end of the war, Germany was thoroughly spent and defeated. In the peace that followed, Germany lost all her overseas colonies, and in Europe she had to give up Alsace-Lorraine to France and important territories in the East to a reconstituted Poland. Most of Bismarck's territorial acquisitions were thus lost again. There was left an impoverished and exhausted country, which now turned into a Republic but which remained burdened with a large debt of reparations owed to the victorious Allies.

Despite its end in catastrophic defeat, Bismarck's Empire lives on in popular memory. Forty-five percent of German respondents to an opinion poll in 1951 considered the Second Empire (1871–1918) the best period in recent Germany history, and in repeated polls in the 1950's a plurality of respondents named Bismarck as the man who did more for Germany than any other. The stigma of defeat in World War I has been largely transferred in the Ger-

man popular mind from the Empire which actually suffered it to the Republic that emerged in November, 1918, to pick up the pieces.

THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, 1918-1933

The political and military collapse of the Empire in 1918 found most German parties and leaders unprepared. The Emperor personally, and the regime to a lesser extent, had lost the confidence of the Socialists, the Conservatives, and many of the Army Generals. But at the same time the Empire collapsed into a vacuum, for prior to 1918 there had hardly been any thought given to the possibility of a different Germany—a Germany without a Kaiser. And since democracy had been presented to Germany because no other alternative presented itself, rather than democracy being the end-product of a struggle led by a dedicated and courageous group of men, the new Republic found itself without a respected democratic leadership.

About one-quarter of the electorate continued to hold nationalist and militarist views. They would have preferred to see the old Empire go on unchanged, with its black, white, and red flag, its Army, and its authoritarian institutions. Most of these nationalist voters came from the middle class and the peasantry. They were represented by the conservative Nationalist Party and by the (at first much smaller) National Socialists; and they never forgave the new Republic for representing, in their eyes, a betrayal of all the traditions and aspirations of the Army and the Empire in World War I.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the Left wing of the German Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.) split off and eventually emerged as the German Communist Party (K.P.D.), which during the next 14 years often polled between 10 and 15% of the vote. This group, too, rejected the "bourgeois" Republic (although on

quite different grounds), as did the conservative Nationalists and the Nazis, and thus the Republic was faced at all times with the open and bitter hostility of more than one-third of its population.

The majority of the Socialists retained the old party name (Social Democratic Party), remained on a more moderate course, and soon rallied to the active support of the Republic. In early 1918, however, most S.P.D. leaders had not thought seriously about anything more radical than a constitutional monarchy, and neither had the leaders and members of the moderate middle-class parties—the liberal German Democratic Party and the Center Party, which represented the particular interests of Roman Catholic voters. Before 1918, none of these groups had advocated a Republic for Germany, and when in that year the monarchy suddenly lost so much of its former popular support that only a Republic appeared practicable, nobody seemed prepared to draft its Constitution or to make it work if practical difficulties should arise.

The Republic thus started out as a makeshift type of government—and it did so within almost anarchical conditions. In order to suppress the challenge from the radical Left in the tense winter of 1918-19, the S.P.D. and the moderate middle-class parties allied themselves with the German Generals and officers who still controlled units of the armies which had returned to Germany after the Armistice in November, 1918. The military indeed supplied the main force to suppress radical Leftist uprisings, such as the "Spartacus" revolt of January, 1919, and in return they received a great deal of formal and informal influence over the reduced armed force of the Republic—the *Reichswehr*, whose strength the peace treaties eventually were to fix at 100,000 men. This informal but fateful arrangement came into existence long before the formal Constitution was drafted and ratified, but it was to exercise a crucial influence over the fate of the Republic in later

years. For one thing, the Socialist Party's turning to the Army for use against their former Leftist comrades, made the party split on the Left irrevocable and thus increased the power of the Right. For another, it quickly made the Army a state within the state, effectively exempted from civilian control; the Army soon extended its protection and covert aid to various extreme Right-wing groups and organizations, some of which later contributed to the rise of the Nazi Party.

The Constitution was actually drafted in the small town of Weimar, symbolic as the residence of Goethe and Schiller in the classic period of German literature, and safely removed from the labor unrest and political turmoil of Berlin and the other industrial regions of the country. The main provisions of the Constitution were remarkably democratic. In fact, it was the drafters' primary aim to bring into existence a democratic governmental system representative enough of the people to be worthy of the adjective "democratic." But at the same time many of the drafters recognized that it would be very difficult to transform the political habits of a people overnight. Thus, in order to preserve democracy, the authors of the Constitution also tried to balance the democratic features of the Constitution with strong executive powers as safeguards. For example, they concluded that the country needed a strong President as a focus for the people's desire for a respected authority figure standing above parties, thereby providing an *Ersatzkaiser*—a substitute for a formerly revered Kaiser who had just recently abdicated.

The Constitution of Weimar gave first place to the elected legislature, the Reichstag, and it gave to that body the power to approve and dismiss the Chancellor and his Ministers. At the same time, however, it raised a second power to the same level: a popularly elected President was given the power to nominate the Chancellor, to dissolve the Reichstag, and, in case of a national emergency, to rule by decree

Much of the power of the Republic could thus become concentrated in the hands of two men, or even subservient to the will of one, a strong President with a compliant Chancellor, or, more likely, a strong Chancellor with a compliant President, could use the vast emergency powers of government to destroy the constitutional regime—a development that actually took place later in 1932 and 1933.

Compared to this strong centralizing bias, the federal theme was muted. The second legislative Chamber, the *Reichsrat*, which included representatives of the state governments, was mentioned last in the Weimar Constitution, and its powers were largely limited to minor matters of administration. In addition to this, the huge state of Prussia was preserved, comprising two-thirds of the total population, so that even state government was far more centralized than would be the case in the United States.

The Record of Weimar

The basic rights of individuals were listed in the Weimar Constitution and protected by it (in contrast to the Second Empire, when they had been left to the various states), but far-reaching emergency provisions could be invoked by the federal government with relative ease to suspend these constitutional protections. This actually happened in the last years of the Weimar Republic, and these sweeping emergency powers, together with the extreme concentrations of power in the hands of the President and the Chancellor, did much to smooth the way to dictatorship in 1933.

This disastrous outcome, however, cannot be attributed only, or primarily, to technical mistakes in constitution-drafting. The Weimar Republic suffered from political and social weaknesses even more dangerous than its legal ones. In the record, six such weaknesses stand out.

The first weakness was at the governmental level. The Republic lasted for a mere 14

years, and within that time a game of musical Cabinet-chairs was being played in the French style, these cabinets having an average lifespan of nine months. In its last years the continual presidential use of emergency powers allowed conservative Chancellors to govern without a majority in the legislature. Throughout the Republic's existence, the civil service and the army were able to dilute or bypass their constitutional responsibility to the people's elected leaders.

The second weakness was at the level of the political parties. In the Reichstag, the legislative center of gravity continually moved to the Right. Until 1922, the democratic parties of the Left and Center managed to carry on the government without the aid of the rightist deputies, a coalition of the Social Democrats, the Center Party, and the Democratic Party forming the government. From 1923 to 1930, the democratic coalition was forced to join forces with the (Rightist) People's Party. In 1930, the middle-class parties insisted on meeting the deepening Depression by a policy of deflation, wage reductions, and cuts in welfare services. When the Social Democrats and the labor unions remained opposed, the middle-class parties broke up the coalition, forcing new elections. Then in the elections of September, 1930, 107 National Socialist deputies entered the legislature, making it impossible for *any* coalition of parties to find a majority. President von Hindenburg used his emergency powers to appoint Chancellors responsible to him rather than to the Reichstag. And with each successive Chancellor between 1930 and 1932, the government moved to the Right, culminating in the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor.

At any one time there were usually a dozen parties represented in the legislature. In and of itself, this does not necessarily point to the failure of democracy. But the multiparty system, in combination with the political styles of the parties, did. They were largely parties of expression rather than of action—that is, each

tended to specialize in expressing the special demands and resentments of some particular group in the population, rather than in getting different groups to cooperate to get things done. Even some of the larger parties limited their appeal mainly to a single element of the population, as the Social Democrats and the urban workers, or the National People's Party and the land-owning Junkers and their rural followers. Some parties based their appeals on emotionally charged ideologies, breeding hatred and dogmatism. The outcome was that the parties could never transcend their differences, nor form stable coalition governments capable of producing effective legislation. They could not compromise because their narrow appeal turned them almost into mere pressure groups tied to the particular interests of one section of the population, and their dogmatic *Weltanschauungen*, allowed no place for bargaining and cooperation.

The third weakness was on the level of mass opinion. The Republic remained illegitimate in the eyes of roughly one-third of its population. Throughout the 1920's, about 20% of the voters backed the German Nationalist People's Party and similar Rightist groups, which longed for the restoration of the monarchy and for a victorious war of revenge for the defeat in World War I, and about 10% voted for the Communists, who urged the replacement of the "bourgeois" Weimar Republic by a Soviet-style "dictatorship of the proletariat," by which they meant essentially that of the Communist Party. Both the Extreme Right and the Extreme Left saw the Republic as a regime of treason. To the nationalists, it represented the betrayal of the monarchy and of the supposedly "undefeated" Imperial army in 1918, while to the Communists, the same Weimar Republic represented the betrayal of Socialism and of the Russian November Revolution.

Such extremist views, and the intense emotions of hatred and contempt that went with them, were not unusual in European politics

between 1918 and 1933, but what was unusual was the large share of the electorate that persisted in these attitudes in Germany through one and a half decades. This hostility of 30 to 40% of the voters in turn produced an unusually great risk of "negative majorities" in the federal legislature, since an adverse vote by only a small part of the deputies from the other parties, when added to this large permanent opposition, was sufficient to produce an antigovernment majority—but a majority unable to agree on any positive action. (See Table 7-1 on page 409.)

The fourth weakness was in the executive and in the instruments of law enforcement. Against any violent attempts to overthrow it, the Weimar Republic depended for its defense precisely on some of the groups that were implacably hostile to it. Against the "Rightist" Kapp Putsch of 1920, the Republic had to invoke a general strike of the workers, including the Communists; and against repeated Communist uprisings between 1919 and 1923, the Republic depended on the extremely nationalistic officers and judges who remained its bitter enemies. This dependence on profoundly antidemocratic officers and judges, in fact, undermined the entire security of the Republic. It permitted the assassination of many of its leading statesmen, as well as of many less prominent liberals and Leftists, with virtual impunity, and it left the Republic almost paralyzed in the face of the mounting terrorism of the Nazis after 1930.

By 1928, the Weimar Republic seemed to have survived well despite these four weaknesses. The fifth and sixth ones, however, proved fatal. The fifth source of Weimar's failure was the relative instability and precariousness of its economic institutions, and the succession of disastrous economic experiences which became associated in the mind of many Germans with the Republic. The first of these experiences was the period of widespread hunger and poverty which followed upon the defeat of Germany in World War I and which was ag-

gravated by the prolongation of the Allied food blockade against Germany in 1919. A second economic disaster was the runaway inflation of 1923, in which the government permitted the value of the mark to drop to less than one-thousandth of a billionth of its value. When the currency was finally stabilized with United States aid in 1924, one new "Rentenmark" was worth 4,200,000,000 of the old ones. A large part of the savings and pensions of the German middle class were wiped out, and many in this group and their children blamed, not the deferred costs of the war, but the Republic for their ruin, and especially the S.P.D. that had brought the Republic into existence.

After a brief period of spectacular recovery, fueled by a stream of private loans from the United States that spurred the technological re-equipment and modernization of German industry, the third disaster struck. After the "Black Friday" of October, 1929, on the New York Stock Exchange, the flow of American credits dwindled, and the German economy suffered particularly heavily from the worldwide depression. By early 1933, about 6 million workers were unemployed—roughly about one-third of the industrial work force of the country. The unemployed, their families, and particularly the young people who graduated from the schools and universities straight into unemployment, blamed the Republic for their misery. The first two of these disasters—the hunger of 1919 and the inflation of 1923—would probably have been tolerated by a majority of voters, in fact, after three years of recovery, the elections of 1928 had considerably strengthened the moderate and prodemocratic parties. The third disaster following hard upon the heels of the preceding ones and rekindling the bitter memories of the previous two economic crises, however, was too much. From 1930 on, an increasing portion of German voters, and soon a majority, cast their votes for extremist and anti-democratic parties, the Nationalists, the Communists, and the hitherto

unimportant National Socialist Party of Adolf Hitler.

In the face of this growing danger, the sixth weakness of the Weimar Republic was to prove decisive: the lack of imagination, competence, and courage in the economic and political policies of its leaders during its last years. In several other industrial countries, such as the United States after 1933, unemployment and depression were eventually controlled to some extent by programs of public works and various measures of credit expansion and government spending. The statesmen of the Weimar Republic, however, whatever their party, remained fearful of inflation, a recent and unhappy memory; they clung to a policy of "sound money," and deflation, which resulted in mounting unemployment, while doing almost nothing for the unemployed except providing some pitifully meager relief payments for those condemned to months or years of involuntary idleness. Even less help was provided for the small middle-class shopkeepers and businessmen who lost their businesses in the Depression.

Between 1930 and 1933, as governments seemed incapable of acting, a feeling of desperation spread among many groups—a feeling that something had to be done, regardless of risk or cost. "If you must shoot," the poet Erich Kästner wrote in his *Address to Suicides*, "please do not aim at yourself." Kästner's own sympathies were liberal and humanitarian, but many of the young men whose desperation he echoed were becoming ready to shoot at any target that a plausible leader might point out. At a time when elder statesmen seemed to equate experience with impotence, and when rational discussion seemed to produce only excuses for inaction and frustration, millions from all classes were getting ready to overthrow the restraints of reason and experience, of curiosity and doubt, of kindness and pity, of tradition and religion, in favor of their blind need for security and certainty, for hate and aggression, and above all for action and for power, regard-

less of the cost in cruelty and suffering to others, and ultimately to themselves as well.

THE HITLER ERA, 1933–1945

In the politics of the German Federal Republic, the years of Hitler's rule are rarely mentioned, but never forgotten. All Germans over 40 years of age have vivid personal memories of that epoch, and these are the age groups that include practically all political leaders, high-ranking government officials, and military personnel; almost all leaders of interest groups; in short, almost the entire political elite. In order to understand the memories that still shape in one way or another many of their political thoughts and actions, we must look more closely at this unique and crucial period in their past.

Hitler's ideas were basically simple and so was the Nazi ideology derived from them. They offered a primitive but striking explanation for all the troubles of Germany and of the world. The Jews, Hitler asserted, were guilty of everything. They were the rich plutocrats of Wall Street and of all the world's stock exchanges, who were profiting from high interest-rates and the misery of debtors and were benefiting from war, inflation, and depression. But the Jews, according to Hitler, were also the agitators for strikes and trade unions, the wirepullers for Communism and subversion. Their conspiracy, as depicted in such pamphlets as the forged but widely disseminated one attributed to Sergei Nilus, *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, depicted them as the masters of Wall Street and the Kremlin, which were the twin arms of a single plot against the world, and first of all, against the German people. Hitler actually seems to have believed these fantasies, but he also shrewdly noted in his book, *Mein Kampf*, that it was part of the art of the successful political propagandist to present several quite different

opponents in the guise of a single enemy, and thus providing a single target for a skillfully aroused and directed popular hatred.

His appeal was aided by the highly visible concentration of Germans of the Jewish faith in journalism, law, and retail trade, including some of the large department stores. As the Depression deepened, the law, the established press, and the department stores became more unpopular, particularly among small businessmen to whom Hitler's ranting began to sound more credible.

According to some of his biographers, Hitler was a man who needed to hate, perhaps even more than he needed to belong to a group, to feel important, to believe in his own superiority, to be a member of a superior race, to be a great leader, and indeed to be a genius-inspired artist, molding the German people and, if possible, all of Europe and the world into the obedient shape dictated by his visions. A poor, half-educated man of illegitimate birth, he had been marginal even in the provincial middle-class society in the small town of Braunau where he had been born. He had failed to win a scholarship to art school, and as a young man he had been torn between his longing to rise to the level of the social elite and his fear of sinking down into the class of unskilled workers.

Other observers have read Hitler's mind differently. They point to his undoubtedly extraordinary gifts, particularly as a propagandist, and to the lack of adequate opportunities for such a brilliant talent in the rigid social system of pre-1914 Germany. The rage and hate that he so often demonstrated later may have been engendered by the frustration and rejection of his youthful aspirations. Or he may even have found it profitable to display more hate than he actually felt, in a calculated effort to whip up the emotions of his audience.

All observers agree, however, on Hitler's love of the military life and military values. The German Army of World War I had offered him, together with physical danger, the psycho-

logical and emotional security of its uniform; and when he stayed in service after 1918, it was the German Army that first sent him as a political intelligence agent into the strong labor meetings of the early Weimar Republic. It was here that Hitler discovered his gifts not only as an orator but as a master propagandist who was later to put down the principles of his craft quite frankly in *Mein Kampf*. Talk to people at meetings in the evening, he wrote, for then they are tired and less apt to resist your suggestions. Crowds are like women, he added: they like to be dominated. The bigger an untruth, he wrote, the more apt are people to believe it, since it seems incredible to them that anyone should lie so much. People who blindly disbelieve all they read in the papers, Hitler noted, are just as easy marks for propaganda as those who believe all that is printed. Above all, he concluded, successful propaganda is based on endless repetition that varies the form of the message so as to keep up the interest of the audience, but that hammers home the same unvarying content with ceaseless persistence.

Hitler did not hesitate to use every device of propaganda or of violence that would serve his purpose. At bottom, he believed, he stood for a great truth—the truth, so he believed, that all life was a pitiless struggle for existence, that nature was the "cruel queen of wisdom," that war as a social institution was eternal, and indeed good, for it subjugated or exterminated the inferior races while elevating the superior peoples and races to mastery. Only superior persons and races, he felt, were truly human, no others deserved consideration. The German people, as he saw it, had no other choice than that between victorious conquest or contemptible suffering. It was his destiny, he was convinced, to lead them, and if they were worth anything, they would eventually follow.

Hitler's hopes and dreams, just as his barely suppressed fears and rages, were those of millions of his countrymen. He represented much of their own feelings and desires, in heightened

form. Many of them vibrated to his message because it was their own tune that was being played. At the same time, it copied some of the appeals of Communism: the vision of revolution, the promise of national solidarity and social justice, the emotional security and discipline of a tightly organized party, the heady sense of historical mission. But Hitler's ideology also included many themes borrowed from the ideas and practices of the West. The glorification of colonial empire and of a white master-race; the misapplied ideas, borrowed from Robert Malthus and Charles Darwin, about an eternal struggle for survival among human beings; the rejection of mercy, pity, and the traditions and ideas of the New Testament as unsuited to the real world of eternal struggle—all these ideas had been propagated by various writers in England, France, and the United States, many decades before Hitler discovered them at second hand and bent them to his purpose.

In a nutshell, National Socialism was thus German nationalism plus a demagogic social promise, and minus moral inhibitions. Its leader, Adolf Hitler, promised to accomplish what many Germans wanted—from high-ranking officers and industrialists all the way down to many lower-middle-class clerks and small farmers. He promised to make Germany a very great power, with an empire as large and splendid as the British Empire was believed to be; to make her formidably armed and universally admired and respected; and he promised also to ensure for the German people within this greater empire the high level of economic security and living standards that befitted a "master race," comparable to the standards that were supposed to be the rightful due of white men in Africa and Asia.

Even before the coming of the Great Depression, between one-quarter and one-third of the German voters might have approved of some such goal, and an ever larger proportion—including a part of the Communist vot-

ers—would have agreed that the world was largely ruled by naked power, force, and fraud so that nothing great could be accomplished in it without extreme ruthlessness.

Like many nationalists and others who confused cynicism with realism, Hitler proclaimed himself a realist, merely because he assumed that the world was inevitably ruled by power and ruthless competition—that the strong and clever were fated to rule, while the weak or gullible were destined to slavery or death—and that in this inexorable struggle, the German people, like all peoples and races, had the choice to be hammer or anvil, victors or victims—in the last analysis of the struggle for biological survival to be killers or to be killed.

To be sure, this was an extravagantly oversimplified picture of the world, with no possible room for basic changes in human nature, culture, and society; no room for international cooperation among equals; no common victories of science over nature for the benefit of all. The important point was, however, that at bottom this was the sort of thing that, in somewhat less extreme and consistent terms, many German nationalists had long believed. Hitler thus seemed to them to voice their own beliefs with extraordinary force and fervor, and without introducing any frustrating inhibitions of traditional morality, or any doubts about the adequacy of his knowledge of international politics, economics, and military matters.

Conservative nationalists had also long been irked by the coolness of German workers, and generally of the broad masses of the German people, to their programs. Hitler promised to arouse just these masses, and to put the hopes and dreams of the poor and the workers behind the drive for a much bigger German empire than that of Bismarck's day. Even though Hitler in fact won far more support among the lower middle classes than he did among the workers, he did seem to offer an alternative to the appeal of organized labor, and it is not surprising that he found at least some sympathy and support

throughout most of the 1920's in some military and business circles when his movement was still relatively insignificant and his one attempt at a coup in 1923 had remained a comic-opera affair. After the coming of the Great Depression in late 1929, however, the scale of this support grew very large, just at the time when masses of ordinary Germans became more inclined to listen to his message.

Even in 1933, however, the susceptibility to Hitler's appeal was quite unevenly distributed in the population. A German sociologist, Rainer Lepsius, has estimated that in 1933 Hitler gained about one-tenth of the Socialist and Communist workers, one-tenth of the practicing Catholics, half of the conservative rural Protestants, and as many as nine-tenths of the urban Protestant middle- and lower-middle classes. But even among those who did not vote for him, few moved toward active resistance.

In the electoral campaign of 1930 and thereafter, the Nazis had far more money to spend than their competitors—on posters, leaflets, advertisements, political uniforms, a private army of brown-shirted storm-troopers and black-shirted "elite guards," on trucks to drive their men to mass meetings, for meeting halls, loudspeakers, spotlights, and all the other machinery of political propaganda. Much, perhaps even most, of this money came from the rank and file of Hitler's followers, for the Nazis were experts at collecting contributions, but much of it also came from prominent leaders of German industry and finance, such as the steel magnate Fritz Thyssen, who saw in the Nazis not only a counterpoise to Communism but also a tool to force down the high costs of trade-union wages and to prevent the welfare state that was being advocated by the Social Democrats.¹

A much-publicized meeting of many of the best-known names in German heavy industry and in the German high nobility took place in

October, 1931, at Bad Harzburg.² The meeting demonstrated the alliance of Hitler and his lieutenants with the old-style German nationalists, led by the newspaper publisher and film magnate Alfred Hugenberg, whose newsreels and chain of provincial papers began to transmit to their large unsophisticated audience a favorable image of Hitler and his movement. The Harzburg meeting dramatically underscored this new image of Hitler. Within a few months after the conference, which was featured in words and pictures by the press, Hitler lectured in January, 1932, to the industrial elite of Germany, at the Industrialists' Union at Dusseldorf, and the results of this "break-through," according to Hitler's press chief, Otto Dietrich, "became manifest in the following difficult months."³

During the last two and three-quarter years of its existence, the Weimar Republic was governed by political conservatives—President Hindenburg and a succession of right-of-center Chancellors, Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen, and Kurt von Schleicher. Their governments were supported mainly by the Roman Catholic Center Party and the Social Democrats (S.P.D.), although these parties—and particularly the S.P.D.—had little influence on the deflationary policies that were becoming ever more unpopular with the electorate. Nevertheless, the two moderate parties lost only a few votes and retained the loyalty particularly of their older voters. The old-style Nationalists also changed little in their voting strength.

The popular appeal of Hitler and the Nazi ideology is seen in the spectacular growth of electoral support given to the Nazis between 1928 and 1932, growing from 3% to 33%. This support was mainly derived from members of

¹For an outstanding scholarly work, giving a partial list of those present, see Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (The Dissolution of the Weimar Republic), 3rd edn (Villingen Ring Verlag, 1960), pp. 407–414. An English translation of this work is being published by the Yale University Press.

²Cited in Bracher, *op. cit.*, p. 441, see pp. 438–442.

³Much later, the disappointed Thyssen wrote a book entitled *I Paid Hitler*.

the lower middle class who had previously voted for the liberal parties. By 1932 the middle-class liberal parties enjoyed only about one-fifth of the support that they had in 1928. At the same time, a number of small moderately rightist, nationalist, and conservative parties and groups crumbled, and their members and voters went over to the Nazis. There was a mounting protest vote from millions of former habitual nonvoters, including many women, and from young voters and the unemployed, which was shared by the extremist parties—the Communists and the Nazis. After examining the various studies of Hitler's electoral support, one political sociologist offered the following description of the typical Nazi voter in 1932 (although there were, of course, other types as well): "He was a middle-class, self-employed Protestant who lived either on a farm or in a small community, and who had previously voted for a centrist or regionalist political party strongly opposed to the power and influence of big business and big labor."⁴

Hitler was finally appointed Chancellor of Germany by old President von Hindenburg on January 30, 1933. Not strong enough to topple the state from without, Hitler entered it by invitation and transformed it from within. Hitler thus came to sit at the head of a cabinet in which a few Nazi ministers were greatly outnumbered by Conservatives, including Alfred Hugenberg and Franz von Papen. Elections were called for March 5. Two weeks before that date, the empty building of the Reichstag, the German Parliament, was set on fire and a Nazi rule of terror started. According to the preponderance of such evidence as has survived, the fire was set by the Nazis. There is no doubt that they exploited it to perfection. The Communist Party was blamed for the fire and suppressed at once. In Prussia—which covered two-thirds of Germany—the Nazi Storm Troopers were deputized as auxiliary

police. Everywhere in Germany the press and the meetings of all parties still opposing the Nazis were drastically curbed; mass arrests, beatings, and acts of torture served to intimidate opponents. Even under these conditions, however, the Nazis got only 43% of the popular vote. Only together with the Nationalists, who had polled another 8%, could they claim to represent a bare majority of the German electorate.

On March 23, 1933, however, a cowed Parliament, including the Center Party, voted Hitler an Enabling Bill with sweeping powers. Only 94 Social Democratic votes were cast against it. The suppression of the Social Democrats and the major trade-unions came in May; the Nationalists dissolved themselves in June; the Center Party—disoriented by a Concordat which Hitler had signed with the Vatican—was obliged to do so in July; and on July 14, 1933, the National Socialists were declared the only political party in Germany. A bloody purge in 1934 eliminated dissident Nazis and some conservatives, and Hitler's power became, for most practical purposes, absolute.

Once entrenched in power, Hitler communicated assurances of moderation to foreign statesmen and promises of extremism to his followers. He talked peace and prepared rapidly for war. At that time, Germany was still largely disarmed. As a result of the restrictions imposed on her by the Peace Treaty of Versailles, her armed forces lacked large trained reserves, any kind of military aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery, submarines, and full-sized battle-ships. Nor did she have any substantial fortifications in the West. All these deficiencies were overcome step by step, between 1933 and 1939, with the toleration and sometimes the approval of British and French statesmen, whom Hitler soothed with his anti-Communist declarations. Occasionally, he also assured the Soviet government of his peaceful intentions toward them and publicly pledged his friendship to the authoritarian government of Poland.

⁴S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 149.

The Nazis in Power

Hitler proclaimed that this empire would last a thousand years. It lasted 12. The main events are familiar. During the first six years, Hitler achieved full employment and temporary prosperity, through controlled currency inflation and rearmament, which brought profits to industry and took hundreds of thousands of young men off the labor market by putting them into uniform. Added to this was an expanded program of public works—super-highways, new public buildings, and some low-cost housing—and improvements in some social benefits, such as government loans for home repairs and a popular "Strength through Joy" recreation program. As in most dictatorships, bread was supplemented by circuses. There were political and military parades, songs and martial music, and party congresses that became spectacles for millions. A network of press, film, and radio propaganda under the virtuosic direction of Dr. Joseph Goebbels disseminated these spectacles throughout the country and completed the intoxication of the German nation.

During the same six years, the persecution of the Jews and the terror against all political opposition were organized into a system. The Jews were driven from all learned or free professions, from journalism, literature, the arts, from finance and industry—where they had been much less prominent than the Nazis had pretended—and finally from practically all kinds of business and employment. They had to wear yellow stars on their clothing, and their children were barred from ordinary schools and universities. Those who did not succeed in emigrating sold off their possessions piece by piece in order to live, waiting for a tomorrow that seemed to be becoming ever more bleak. Thousands of Jews were imprisoned and brutally treated in concentration camps, and so was an even larger number of German critics of

Hitler; the annual number of concentration camp inmates in the 1930's has been estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000. In these years, the Nazis became masters of the art of concealing from the German people just enough of the crimes committed against their victims in the concentration camps to avoid arousing any widespread disgust or moral revulsion, yet they revealed enough to intimidate thoroughly most of the potential opposition within Germany.

But while concealing their crimes, the Nazis publicly used their victims as scapegoats for all of Germany's difficulties. A whole series of so-called enemies was discovered or manufactured. There were the perpetrators of the "stab in the back" that had caused Germany's defeat in World War I; the international capitalists who were bleeding Germany of its economic sustenance, the Marxists who wanted to destroy Germany and hand it over to Stalin, the pacifists who bled Germany of the strength to resist, which was crucial since the country was surrounded by foreign enemies on all its borders, and the Papist Catholics who gave their first loyalty to Rome. The Jew, however, was all these rolled into one. He was at once a Marxist and an international capitalist, a pacifist and an internationalist, a Freemason and an ally of the clericals. Above all, the Jew was a debaser of the purity of the German race, with his lewd and perverted sexual interests in blond German women.

The success of Nazi propaganda was not due solely to the expertise with which they wielded it. If propaganda is to be deeply infused by a people it must satisfy the people's pre-existing attitudes and emotions. The genius of the Nazi propagandists is seen in their expert exploitation of the Germans' dormant emotions and prejudices. Anti-Semitism had existed for such a long time in Germany that it was part and parcel of the culture. The military defeat and the humiliation attending it made the Germans hungry for uniforms, which the Nazis were glad to provide for their Storm

Troopers (S.A.) and Elite Guards (S.S.). A nation that had been taught for generations to revere force and strength would have many people willing to see in Naziism's propagandistic and actually successful violence a movement to be respected. And, among a people that had been used to authoritarian governments, many were ready to believe that the masses indeed were incapable of deciding for themselves what they wanted and what was to be done—and that it was a good idea to have the Nazi elite and the Führer decide for them.

While "enemies" were persecuted, the German nation was put into a totalitarian straight jacket through the process of *Gleichschaltung*, or "coordination", of all aspects of German life according to the Nazi pattern. All the institutions of society—political, cultural, economic, and educational—were subjected to Nazi control and a "cleansing" operation. All those individuals who were thought to be unreliable were replaced by Nazi Party members, and the remainder were fearful enough of losing their jobs to send them into the recruiting arms of the party and its auxiliary organizations. The Nazis then went one step further by creating new youth and labor organizations, and even organized their control down to the level of the party block made up of a group of adjacent apartment houses. These organizations went further than controlling the people's nonpolitical activities. They were also used to spy upon the population. Hitler Youth members were ordered to report their parents if they made critical remarks about the Nazis or listened in on foreign radio broadcasts; some of them complied, while others merely kept their parents cowed.

Despite this shadow of fear and terror in the background, Hitler's partial and short-lived but well-publicized benefits made a profound impression: 40% of the respondents to a national opinion poll in 1951 named the Hitler years of 1933–39 as the time when Germany had been best off. An even larger proportion,

45%, named the pre-1914 Hohenzollern empire as Germany's best period, and only 7% were willing to say as much for the Weimar Republic.⁵ In a 1948 poll, 41% recalled having approved of the Nazi power seizure in 1933, and 57% agreed with the statement that National Socialism was a good idea which had been badly carried out.⁶ Later, in 1956, among a sample of young men, nearly half called National Socialism a "good idea," either without qualification (16%) or "in part" (33%), while 29% gave no opinion, and only less than one-quarter called it a "bad idea."⁷ This favorable view is fading only slowly. From 1955 to 1956, the number of those who agreed that "without the war Hitler would have been one of the greatest statesmen" shrank from 48% to 42%, while those denying this proposition increased from 36% to 38%. Thus at that time in the Bonn Republic a preponderance of the public were admirers, to some extent at least, of a total nationalistic dictatorship.

The favorable surface image of Hitler's rule in 1933–39 was reinforced by the conspicuous tolerance, if not connivance, of foreign statesmen before World War II. Between 1934 and 1936, Britain accepted the establishment of a German Air Force, a limited German program of battleship and submarine construction, the introduction of conscription for a new German mass Army, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland—all measures explicitly forbidden under the Treaty of Versailles. Only somewhat more reluctantly, France likewise accepted each of these steps in Hitler's rearmament. In those early years of Nazism, either Britain or France—or, of course, both of them together—could easily have stopped in its beginnings the creation of that German armed force that a

⁵ Elisabeth Noelle Neumann and Erich Peter Neumann, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung*, Vol. 1 (1947–55), p. 126. (Henceforth cited as *Jahrbuch*, I.)

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 134.

⁷ *Jahrbuch*, II (1957), p. 149; from a sample of 1,000 men born 1929–1939.

few years later was to be used against their countries and peoples. Yet their governments chose to accept passively the creation of these German forces, hoping either that they would not be used, or that they would only be used against some other country.

The most obvious "other" country among the great powers was the Soviet Union, and Hitler's pose as the protector of Western civilization against Communism won him important sympathies outside Germany. These sympathies, no less than the fear of his conspicuously growing military and air power, kept the British and French from contesting his annexation of Austria in March, 1938. At the Conference of Munich in September of that year, Britain and France agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the annexation of the Sudetenland, and they acquiesced in Hitler's occupation of much of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939. If Hitler's aggression thus seemed to be directed southeastwards, the Soviet government found it to its obvious interest to turn Hitler's ambitions elsewhere.

In August, 1939, Hitler and Stalin concluded one of the most cold-blooded bargains in the history of power politics, a Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact which left Hitler free to attack Poland and to make war on the West, and assured him of the benevolent neutrality of the Soviet government, which during the preceding four years had loudly called for an international common front against the Nazi menace. Finally, in September, 1939, Hitler took the German people into war against Poland, England, and France. But for the preceding six years, his respectability had been attested to at one time or another by diplomatic collaboration, often including formal treaties of friendship, with all the major European powers, and including even Poland and the Vatican.

In the end, Hitler betrayed all the governments and groups who had trusted his regime, or who had attempted to collaborate with him for their own ends. He violated his 1933

Concordat with the Vatican and persecuted the lay organizations, and often the priests, of the Catholic Church. He made war on Poland, France, England, Russia, and many other countries. And as a result, between 1939 and 1945, he led the German people into the depths both of degradation and of suffering. His Air Force started the practice of large-scale bombing of civilian populations, at Warsaw in 1939 and at Rotterdam in 1940. In August, 1941, at the peak of his military triumphs, he gave orders to begin the extermination of the Jews—men, women, and children, he called it "the final solution" of "the Jewish question." Special camps were built with gas chambers and with crematoria for the bodies. From then on, badly needed manpower, building materials, fuel, and transport were diverted from the increasingly hard-pressed German armies to this infamous project of the Nazis. "We could process 2,000 head per hour," the Commander of the death camp at Auschwitz, Franz Hoess, later told the International Court at Nurnberg. By the end of the war in 1945, an estimated 6 million Jews had perished. The shoes of executed children had been sorted into large piles for further disposal, the national bank of Germany had been enriched by a sizable amount of gold melted down from the gold fillings broken from the teeth of the dead, and some thrifty Nazi officials had tried to have some of the corpses used for the manufacture of soap. During the same years, German armies were ground up at the battlefronts while Allied aircraft rained fire and explosives on German cities. In a few nights at Hamburg in 1943, an estimated 200,000 persons lost their lives in a series of Allied air raids that set uncontrollable firestorms raging through whole city blocks, baking countless civilians even in the air-raid shelters.

The war became a nightmare, and German defeat ever more certain. Yet the Nazi control of the German people held until the end. No German town or village rose, no German factory crew went on strike, no German troops

mutinied, or surrendered without authorization. Thousands of Germans were executed during those years for opposing the government, or for daring to say that the war was lost; but the combination of Nazi propaganda and terror remained effective, since it was backed almost everywhere by the Nazis and Nazi sympathizers among the population, who supplied the Secret Police with support and information. In addition, the compulsory activities of the Nazis took up so much of the free time of the population that any popular needs for collective political activity became oversaturated, and most of the non-Nazi Germans were left with a mere longing for passivity and privacy—which left the Nazis in control until the end.

A desperate attempt at a *coup d'état* by offi-

cers and civilian opponents of the Hitler regime on July 20, 1944, was smashed, and was followed by large-scale executions. The population at large remained passive and obedient. Even under the impact of daily Allied bombings and Allied armies pushing further and further into German territory, there was not a single group of Germans that rose up to overthrow even local Nazi authorities. In the end, Hitler died under the ruins of Berlin. Germany was occupied by the American, British, and French troops from the West and Soviet forces from the East. The remaining German armed forces surrendered on May 7 and 8, 1945, and the Allied military authorities found themselves in charge of Germany's shattered cities and people.

III

PARTITION AND ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1945–1949

Germany Divided Between West and East

After the collapse of Hitler's German Empire, Germany was reduced to a territory smaller than that which had been left her by the Treaty of Versailles. The Nazi annexations of 1939 and 1940 were restored to their original owners. Thus Austria again became independent and the Sudetenland was returned to Czechoslovakia, and Alsace-Lorraine to France. Of the German territories of 1937, those to the east of the river Oder and Neisse (the "Oder-Neisse line")—notably including East Prussia and industry-rich Silesia—were detached from the rest of Germany. Being in fact occupied by Soviet troops, these "Oder-Neisse territories" were administratively separated from Germany with the consent of the Western powers at the Yalta Conference. The Northern half of East Prussia was put under the "administration" of the U.S.S.R., the Southern half, together with Silesia and the rest of the Oder-Neisse territories, came under the "administration" of Poland.

In theory, the fate of all these territories was to be finally decided only by a future peace treaty of all the Allies, Western and Eastern, with Germany. In fact, no such peace treaty has come into existence—or even seems in prospect. Rather, the governments and the people of both Poland and the Soviet Union consider that the Yalta arrangement was merely a face-saving gesture by the Western powers to mask their actual acceptance of the Polish and Russian annexation of these territories. These areas were quickly incorporated into the Polish and Russian national territories. Their German population—in a tragic and ironic reversal of the ear-

lier population transfers of the Hitler era—was terrorized and expelled into the reduced Germany of 1945, and the territories were resettled by Poles and Russians. Thus the devastated German city of Breslau was gradually rebuilt and resettled as the Polish city of Wrocław, and Königsberg in former East Prussia became Kaliningrad in the U.S.S.R. A similar fate befell the German minorities in the territories that had not belonged to the Germany of 1937 but which Hitler had temporarily elevated to the status of a “master race” among their neighbors, such as the 3 million Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, and the smaller minorities of *Volksdeutsche* in Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland. Almost all of these, too, were expelled into the reduced Germany of 1945.

This remaining Germany was occupied by the victors and divided into four zones of occupation—Soviet, American, British, and French—in accordance with wartime agreements. The city of Berlin, which had been the capital of Germany since 1871 and the capital of Brandenburg-Prussia since the seventeenth century, was similarly divided into four sectors of occupation and put under a separate regime. In theory, Germany was to be governed as an economic unit under an Allied Control Council, and Berlin similarly was to be under an Allied Kommandatura. In practice, although these joint bodies came into existence, the differences between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies proved unbridgeable; each zone was run separately by its controlling power, and the remaining trickle of interzonal trade was carried on much as among different nations.

Within their zones, the Western powers, particularly the United States and Britain, tried to restore gradually some fabric of German administrative effort and political life. After establishing German municipal administration, the Western Allies proceeded to set up regional governments, called *Laender* (Lands), somewhat analogous to the states in the United

States. During the same period, the German press and radio were revived, under personnel screened by the Allies. Political meetings and parties were permitted, and eventually so were elections to representative bodies at the municipal level (January, 1946) and the Land—i.e., regional—level (June, 1946).

From Ex-Enemy to Ally

During 1946, Western policies toward Germany went through a major change. In September, the United States Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, in a speech at Stuttgart, called for a unified German economy and the early creation of a provisional German government, and he treated Germany, by implication, as a potential ally of the West. In the same month, Sir Winston Churchill, speaking at Zurich, called for a united Europe, including Germany, to defend Western values and traditions.

Earlier, in July, 1946, the United States invited economic mergers of their zone with any other zone, and Britain accepted the invitation. Also in July, in the first of several amnesties, the American occupation authorities began to allow the return of former Nazis into high levels of public and private employment, from whence they had been ousted in large numbers by procedures of “denazification.” These amnesties were intended to ease the recruitment of experienced civil servants and other personnel for the task of reconstructing West Germany, and perhaps also to help reorient the more moderate sectors of German nationalist opinion toward an eventual posture of alliance with the West. These policy changes were followed in December, 1946, by the establishment of joint committees of German representatives from the eight Länder comprising the British and American zones, and the Byrnes-Bevin agreement between the United States and Britain merged the economies of their two zones into a “Bizonia.”

During 1947, a German Economic Council was created for the Bizone, a revised plan for West German industry set the 1936 level of German production as its aim, and the preparations for the Marshall Plan and the European Recovery Program opened new and increasingly attractive opportunities for German cooperation with the Western family of nations. In 1948, after the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia alarmed the West, the unification of West Germany and its merger with the Western coalition of powers were accelerated. At the London Conference of February, 1948, the fusion of the three occupation zones of the United States, Britain, and France was clearly envisaged, and so was the early creation of a federal type of German government. In March, 1948, a Soviet walkout ended the Allied Control Council for Germany, and on June 16, a similar Soviet move put the four-power Allied Kommandatura in Berlin out of operation. Two days later, a carefully prepared currency reform was put into effect in the three Western zones, greatly spurring their economic revival but severing another of the previously agreed-on links between the Western- and the Soviet-occupied parts of Germany.

On the same day, the Soviet Military Government announced its decision to blockade West Berlin from June 19 onward. This was followed quickly by a currency reform for the Soviet zone and East Berlin and, on June 24, by the interruption of railroad traffic to West Berlin. Thus started the Berlin "blockade." A dramatic Allied airlift, using most of the disposable transport aircraft of Britain and the United States, enabled West Berlin to hold out for more than half a year, and the unsuccessful Soviet blockade was lifted on May 12, 1949. By that time, three important precedents had been set: the Soviet government had not attempted to dislodge the Allies from West Berlin by force, the Allies did not attempt to use force to break the blockade, and no Soviet pressure on

West Berlin, short of force, had been able to compel the Allies to leave the city or to abandon their plans to establish a united and democratic West German state.

The Formation of the Federal Republic

Allied steps toward the creation of such a state proceeded throughout the blockade. By August, 1948, travel restrictions were abolished between the French zone and "Bizonia," creating, in effect, a "Trizonia." On September 1, a West German "Parliamentary Council," which was, in fact, a Constituent Assembly, met in Bonn to draft a constitution for Germany—or rather, since Soviet-occupied Eastern and Central Germany were not represented, the Council limited itself to drafting a "Basic Law" for the German Federal Republic, until such time as an all-German Constituent Assembly could replace it with a Constitution agreed on by the entire German people. By the end of May, 1949, this Basic Law had been drawn up by the Parliamentary Council, adopted by most of the 11 Land Parliaments, and formally promulgated.

After a general election in September, 1949, followed by the choice by the Bundestag—the popularly elected Chamber—of Dr. Theodor Heuss as Federal President and of Dr. Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor (by a majority of one vote), the Western Allies were willing to see the Federal Republic actually launched. The Allies had in the meantime worked out three related "instruments": (1) an Occupation Statute, which defined the residual powers of the Allies in the Federal Republic; (2) a Trizonal Fusion Agreement, which set up an Allied High Commission for Germany, and (3) a Charter for this Commission, defining its organization and procedure. After the acceptance of these Allied instruments by the President and Chancellor of the German Federal Republic

lic at Petersberg on September 21, 1949, the German Federal Republic formally came into existence.

The formal establishment of the German Federal Republic was followed quickly by the creation, on October 7, 1949, of a Communist-dominated German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. The government of the Federal Republic as well as the Western Allies, however, refused to concede this rival creation any legal standing whatever. They insisted on considering the Federal Republic as the sole legal representative of the German people, pending its eventual reunification; and the strict maintenance of this position, and of the policies based on it, was still an important preoccupation of West German foreign policy in early 1968.

A CONVALESCENT REPUBLIC, 1949-1955

During the first years of the German Federal Republic, its sovereignty was considerably limited under the Occupation Statute of 1949. Step by step, these limitations were reduced, first by the very nature of the Petersberg Agreement, then by the Contractual Agreement of 1952, and finally by the Paris Agreements of 1955, which made the German Federal Republic in most respects sovereign. It was authorized to form its own national Army, subject only to the major remaining restriction that the Federal Republic renounce certain types of heavy military and naval weapons, and particularly so-called "ABC" weapons—atomic, bacteriological, or chemical. The Republic was prohibited from equipping its own armed forces with such weapons or from producing them for any other country.

Between 1949 and 1955, about 10 million German expellees and refugees from Eastern Europe and East Germany were successfully absorbed by the Federal Republic. West Ger-

man industry was rapidly reconstructed and the country began to experience prosperity. The 1936 level of aggregate gross national product was surpassed in 1950, and that of the 1936 per capita G.N.P. in 1951. By 1955, the net national income was 179% of that of 1936.¹ A good part—20 to 25%—of this income went into new investments, but by 1953 per capita consumption had also reached 114% of the 1936 level. Thus throughout most of the 1950's the population of the Federal Republic was better off economically than it had been before the war. These conspicuous economic successes had been made possible by massive economic aid from the United States—which pumped an annual average of between 0.5 and 1.0 billion dollars into the Federal Republic—as well as by more modest economic aid from Britain and by the very efficient use made by the West German industries and government of the American aid.

The total amount of this aid up to June, 1956, was given by the Germany ministry of Economic Cooperation as almost \$10 billion, of which \$6.4 billion had gone to the Federal Republic proper and \$3.6 billion to West Berlin.² The forms of this aid varied; almost \$4 billion were accounted for publicly by the United States government as aid under the Marshall Plan and its several predecessor and successor programs. Some of the rest may have come in the form of commodity surpluses, the spending of American occupation troops, and American payments for the offshore procurement of military supplies, but some of the dollar receipts of Germany in those years, as was the case with the receipts of some other countries, were not

¹Wolfgang F. Stolper, *Germany between East and West* (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Assn., 1960), p. 11, with reference to *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik*, 1956 edn., p. 520.

²Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, *Der Europäische Wirtschaftsrat* (O.E.E.C. Handbuch, 1956), p. 70; see also K. W. Deutsch and L. J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 145-151, with further details and references.

publicized and remained in what the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe described as "the twilight zone of quasi-strategic information."³ There was no doubt, however, about the effectiveness of the American contribution to the "economic miracle" of the Federal Republic: "it was 'dollar therapy,'" said a German official publication, "and the tonic effect of an American blood transfusion. . . . Every Marshall plan dollar spent in Germany has resulted in \$10 to \$20 worth of goods produced and services rendered."⁴

Although the United States primed the economic pump, other factors markedly contributed to the country's economic recovery. However, German management and labor had lost none of their traditional efficiency. The trade unions generally avoided strikes because of their belief that it was more important to increase production than to win a better distribution of the national income for the workers. The millions of refugees from the East provided a cheap and plentiful labor force, willing to work especially hard in order to refashion their lives. Moreover, the world-wide Korean War boom of 1950 came at just the right time for a Germany eager to recapture her foreign markets, and capable of doing so by 1950. Much credit also has been given to Economics Minister Erhard for efficiently combining *laissez-faire* market economics with governmental incentives for industry and welfare services for labor.

Domestic Conditions and Foreign Policy

Side-by-side with this rapid economic reconstruction went the gradual recovery of Germany's position in international life. The Federal Republic became a member of the

Marshall Plan and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1949, an associate member of the Council of Europe in 1950, and a full member in 1951. In 1951, the Federal Republic also joined the International Labor Organization (I.L.O.), the World Health Organization (W.H.O.), and the United Nations Organization for Educational and Scientific Cooperation (U.N.E.S.C.O.). Guided by the prudent and steadfast policy of her government, and aided by the diplomatic support of the United States, the German Federal Republic was regaining for the German people something that many Germans had always deeply desired, a respected and honored place in the international community.

At home and abroad, the government of the Federal Republic strove to establish a reputation for reliability, moderation, and conservatism—well-suited to the inclinations of its leading statesmen and to the mood of a majority of the electorate. In the pursuit of these policies, however, the government not only strengthened Germany's political credit with its major foreign allies, it also established important precedents for the development of German domestic policies and institutions. From the outset, refugees and expellees who were German by language and culture were accepted on a basis of full political equality, regardless of what citizenship they had held before the war. From the inception of the Federal Republic, Adenauer's C.D.U./C.S.U. Party has been the major member of the coalition governments. From December, 1949, onward—with the endorsement of all major parties—both the Chancellor and the Bundestag have put themselves on record as favoring a German military contribution to Western defense—that is, have favored some form of German rearmament, albeit on a modest scale. After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, a contribution to European defense was voted by the Bundestag in 1952, and a force of 500,000 men was promised for 1957.

³See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1953*, pp. 19–20.

⁴Federal Republic of Germany, *Germany Reports*, 1953, pp. 239–243.

In contrast to post-1945 developments in Britain, France, and Italy, no significant industries or services were nationalized, and the main emphasis of federal economic policy favored private enterprise. The exclusion of the Social Democrats from a share in the Federal Cabinet until 1966 was significant. At the same time, social services by federal *Land* and local authorities were maintained at a relatively high level; an "equalization of burdens law" (*Lastenausgleich*) further helped to improve the lot of expellees, refugees, and bombed-out families from the Federal Republic; and by 1955, unemployment was down to about 4% of the work force, and dwindled still more in the years that followed.⁵ The pattern was thus set for a moderately conservative welfare state in politics, combined with a notable willingness on the part of businessmen, politicians, and government officials to promote investment and innovation in and the re-equipment of industry and commerce—a combination that was to persist with apparent success well into the 1960's.

In foreign policy in the 1949–55 period, Bonn concentrated on maintaining close relations with the United States, and also with France. There was noticeably less emphasis put on ties with Italy, and perhaps still less on those with Britain; and there were no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, or any other member of the Soviet bloc.

In contrast to this Cold War climate toward the East, Dr. Adenauer proposed as early as March, 1949, a French-German economic union. In 1951, the Federal Republic signed the agreement establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) with France, Italy, and the Benelux countries. In the same year, after repeated personal interventions of Chancellor Adenauer in its favor, the German-Israeli Reparations Agreement was signed, pledging to Israel \$822 million, in goods, over a 12-year period. Already in 1952, steps were taken

⁵From figures in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany* (New York: Crowell, 1966), p. 40.

to outlaw the Communist Party and the extreme nationalistic Socialist Imperial Party (*Sozialistische Reichspartei*, or S.R.P.); the outlawing of the latter party formally took place in the same year, while the legal proceedings against the Communists reached their culmination only in 1956. Germany's old foreign debts were cut in half, from about \$7 billion to about \$3.4 billion, by the 1953 London Agreements on German Foreign Debts with the Western powers.

In 1954, pursuing the same policy of accommodation with France and close collaboration with the United States, Germany ratified the E.D.C. Agreement which would have created a West European Army. E.D.C. was rejected by the French Parliament, but Germany later in the year signed the Paris Agreement, thus becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.), and signed agreements with France on the Saar territory and on French-German relations. In May, 1955, with the ratification of the Paris Agreement, the German Federal Republic became sovereign, limited only by the few remaining restrictions on nuclear and other special armaments, noted above. Germany slowly built up its national Army, which French statesmen had tried to prevent earlier, and it stood ready to get back the Saar territory from France in the near future—an event which was consummated in 1956 when the attraction of West German prosperity had come to reinforce the Saarlander's sense of German national identity. Adenauer's policy of German-French friendship had paid off; and it was going to continue.

BONN'S RETURN AMONG THE POWERS, 1955–1967

The years after 1955 brought the rapid return of the German Federal Republic to the rank of such powers as Britain and France. It became not only juridically equal, but increas-

ingly able to diverge from the policies of these European powers and to apply pressure in the pursuit of its own preferred goals. At the same time, the Bonn government showed itself increasingly independent from the day to day policies of its principal ally, the United States, even though the long-term alliance between Bonn and Washington continued.

Thus Chancellor Adenauer's government in September, 1955, opened formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In 1956, West German public opinion favored Egypt against France and Britain in the Suez crisis, and the Bonn government remained friendly to Egypt. In 1958, Bonn was the first Western power to recognize the new government of Iraq which had been installed by an anti-British revolution.*

Again, in December, 1955, the Bonn government yielded readily to pressure from mass opinion and the Bundestag, and cut back the term of military service from 18 months—as demanded by the N.A.T.O. authorities, as well as by the German military—to a mere 12 months, the 18-month term of service was not restored until early in 1962. The target of 500,000 German troops, to be placed at the disposal of N.A.T.O., which had first been promised for 1957, and then for 1960, was officially postponed, despite some N.A.T.O. and United States objections. By mid-1967, Germany still only had about 470,000 men in her armed forces, her coalition government was discussing plans for a small reduction.

Throughout most of the 1950's, West German defense expenditures remained in the neighborhood of 4% of national income, and thus at a proportion similar to that of Denmark, and below that of Sweden and Switzerland, which each spent about 5% of their national income on defense, as against 7 to 8% spent in France and Britain, about 12% in the United States, and an estimated 20–25% in the Soviet

Union. It was only in 1959 that the defense spending of the Federal Republic approached 5% of its national income. In the 1962 budget, however, this ratio climbed sharply to almost 7%, the \$1.1 billion (16.5 billion DM) budgeted for defense amounted to almost one-third the federal budget.⁷ By mid-1967, however, a reduction of the defense budget was under discussion.

In sum, by putting off its scheduled contribution to N.A.T.O., the Federal Republic was able to devote a higher proportion of its manpower and financial resources to its own industrial development than it otherwise could have done. This decision was, in all likelihood, a wise one and in the best interests of both West Germany and her allies. The point here is, however, that it was a decision taken by the Executive and Legislature of the Federal Republic, and against the advice of the Western powers, and particularly the United States, which for so long had had a major voice in Bonn's decisions.

The Bonn government had been in no hurry to divert a large part of its labor force from industrial development to garrison duties, but its Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, and a number of its Generals began in the late 1950's to press for the eventual equipment of the Federal Army—the *Bundeswehr*—with nuclear weapons, either in the form of a European nuclear force or on a national basis. German soldiers, Strauss argued in June, 1960, ought to be equipped with every kind of weapon that a potential enemy might use against them. This argument sounded moderate enough, but since the "potential enemy" was clearly the U.S.S.R., and since the U.S.S.R. had long been racing the United States in a contest for leadership in rockets and nuclear weapons, the Minister's argument amounted in substance to a demand

⁷From figures for 1962 in *Archiv der Gegenwart* (Bonn), 32 4 (January 21–26, 1962), 9636y. for 1959, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik*, 1961 (hereafter cited as *SJB*, 1961), p. 426, Table 2, for mid 1950's, U.N., *Economic Survey of Europe*, 1955.

*Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* pp. 199–200, 226–227.

for qualitative—although not quantitative—German parity with Russia and the United States.

At the same time, the Bonn government officially expressed its willingness to cooperate in the organization of a N.A.T.O. nuclear deterrent, that is, some form of a joint force within which German soldiers would be trained in the use of nuclear weapons and presumably have a share in their custody. However, discussions about such a N.A.T.O. atomic force among the Allies broke down in 1963; France remained opposed, and the bulk of German opinion was unenthusiastic or critical. General de Gaulle's construction of a national French nuclear striking force furnished a conspicuous precedent for an eventual West German demand for a nuclear force of its own, but no such demand was pressed in the mid-1960's. German elite and mass opinion overwhelmingly remained content with a "division of labor" in the Western Alliance which left nuclear weapons to the United States, or at most to the five countries

possessing them in 1967. On this basis, the German government was willing in principle to accept a treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Common Market

From 1962 on, the main seat of West German power was in the field of economics. The Federal Republic was a party to the European Common Market Treaty of 1957, together with other members of E.C.S.C., who became known as "the Six." Germany's economic position was both a cause and a consequence of her membership as one of "the Six," which organization was to establish a common external tariff and a free movement of goods among its members by 1969 or 1972 at the latest. Its industries were particularly able to compete in the markets of France, Italy, and the Low Countries, which were opened by the gradual tariff reductions stipulated by the treaty (Table 3-1). Its financial strength enabled the Federal Republic

TABLE 3-1
German National Income and Foreign Trade Ratios, 1870-1965
(In rounded-out billions of marks, at current prices)

State	Years	G.N.P.	National income (Y)	Imports (M)	Exports (E)	Trade (M+E)	Percentage of national income	Percentage of G.N.P.
German Empire	1870-79 ^a	—	14	3.6 ^b	2.5 ^b	6.2	45%	—
	1900-09	—	35	6.7 ^b	5.5 ^b	12.2	35	—
Weimar Republic	1928	—	72	14	12	26	36	—
Hitler's Reich	1938	—	80	6	5.6	11.6	15	—
German Federal Republic	1950 ^c	98	88	11	8	19	22	19%
	1958	232	211	31	38	69	33	30
	1961	326	297	44	53	97	33	30
	1965	449	402	70	75	145	36	32

^aSource for 1870-1938 figures: K. W. Deutsch and A. Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Decline of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959," *World Politics*, 13:2 (January, 1961), 274-276 and 282, with references.

^bAverage imports and exports from 1872-1879 and 1900-1908, respectively.

^cSource for 1950-1965 figures: German Federal Republic, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik, 1965*, p. 24. Compare also K. W. Deutsch, L. J. Edinger, R. C. Macridis, and R. L. Merritt, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance* (New York: Scribner's & Sons, 1967), Table 13-4, p. 234.

Note the unchanged ratio of foreign trade to national income, 1928, 1955, and 1965, and the as-yet-unattained levels of 1870-1879.

to make a major, and perhaps a crucial, contribution to an agricultural fund under the Common Market. The fund, which was to be used for the support of agriculture, helped to win the consent of French and German farmers and other agricultural interest groups to the implementation of the Common Market treaty in the field of agriculture.

From 1962 until 1967, the chief remaining question before the six members of the Common Market was the admission of Great Britain, under conditions lenient enough to permit her to retain some of her special trade relations with the Commonwealth, and also to permit her a transition period to allow for a gradual change in the British system of agricultural subsidies. Since the French government under President de Gaulle seemed rather unwilling to make any substantial concessions to British interests, much hinged on the attitude of Bonn. Both industrial rivalry and Chancellor Adenauer's policy of close cooperation with France tended to range West Germany against Britain on this issue, while the French policy permitted Bonn to remain inconspicuously in the background of the conflict. Early in 1963 a special treaty providing for greater cooperation between France and West Germany was signed, and on January 28, 1963, France vetoed Britain's entry into the Common Market. It was generally believed that the Bonn government had not pressed hard enough for Britain's entry. This situation had not changed by 1967, when Britain was again trying to bring together enough support from the other five Common Market countries in order to prevent a final French "non."

Since the Common Market countries prospered, their economic intergration seemed to prosper, too. During 1955-65, the six countries increased their share in world exports and imports, and their trade among themselves increased still more, in almost exact proportion to the product of these increased shares. This, however, was no more than what could have

been expected on the basis of mere chance. Earlier, between 1913 and 1954, there had been a genuine gain in structural integration among "the Six" — their mutual trade had grown by about twice as much than could have been expected from mere random probability. From 1955 to 1965, by contrast, the process of structural economic integration among the Common Market countries seems to have stood still. In 1966, most of the new automobiles registered in France were still of French manufacture, and most of those registered in Germany still were German-made. The economic integration of "the Six" — quite apart from the question of Great Britain — was still some decades away from the level of unity normally found within a single country, and for the next decade or so, the economy of the German Federal Republic, like that of France, is likely to remain predominantly national.⁸

The Threat of Soviet Power

American and Russian policies, too, came to feel the newly strengthened influence of Bonn. Since 1958, the Soviet government had been creating an intermittent "Berlin crisis" by threatening to conclude a formal peace treaty with East Germany (the G.D.R.) and to hand over to that state the control of the Allied access routes to West Berlin, forcing the Allies to choose between a new blockade and the necessity of dealing with the authorities of the G.D.R., which they had thus far so steadfastly refused to recognize. President Kennedy refused to be forced to such a choice. With the consent of American congressional and public opinion, American troops in Germany were demonstratively strengthened.

Even after the building of the wall around West Berlin, American and other Allied access rights were respected, and much of late 1961

⁸ See K. W. Deutsch, L. J. Edinger, R. C. Macridis, and R. L. Merritt, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance* (New York: Scribner's & Sons, 1967), pp. 218-239.

and early 1962 was filled with American-Soviet negotiations in search for some agreement that might permit both great powers to retain their essential positions, as well as their prestige, but to trade sufficient concessions in nonessentials to bring about a substantial lessening of the potentially dangerous tension between them. These American-Soviet negotiations, however, were more than once subject to thinly disguised criticism from Bonn. Chancellor Adenauer announced that he expected little if any good to come from them, and his government made clear its objections to most of the Western steps toward a possible accommodation with the Russians that were mentioned as considerations for discussion. Bonn's fears, of course, were directed against any possible American concessions to the Soviets at West Germany's political expense, somewhat as the Ulbricht regime in the G.D.R. feared any possible Soviet concessions to the West that might weaken the grip of dictatorship in the G.D.R.

President Kennedy, in turn, made evident his displeasure about the manifestly unhelpful attitude of Bonn. Nevertheless, Chancellor Adenauer stuck to his main position: no recognition for the G.D.R. and no substantial reduction of Allied and West German anti-Communist activities in West Berlin. On the American side, proposals which came within the limits of what had been indirectly or directly rejected by the Chancellor tended to recede in public discussion. Owing to the profound engagement of the United States in Berlin, West Germany, and Western Europe, the Bonn Republic had acquired an informal veto over an important range of American policy decisions.

The Problems Ahead

Powerful in diplomacy and economics, powerful even against such victors in World War II as Britain, France, and the United States—such was the international image of the German Federal Republic in 1967, 12 years

after its attainment of sovereignty under the Paris Agreements. Yet how much solid political strength—how much dependable civic consensus—stood behind this impressive international position? How was the political system of the Federal Republic likely to function in the face of major decisions, and how well was it likely to deal with a crisis, political or economic?

At least a part of the international strength of the German Federal Republic came from situations outside its control. It was the rivalry between President de Gaulle's France and the United Kingdom that enabled Bonn to have such a seemingly decisive influence on the fate of Britain's application to join the Common Market, which would have an enormous influence on the future of Britain, of the Commonwealth, and of European integration. It was the long-standing tension between the United States and Russia that made West Germany and her government such key factors in the calculations of both Washington and Moscow. But while Chancellor Adenauer's government was speaking in a more independent tone of voice to its Western Allies, the Federal Republic remained dependent for its defense on the presence of American and British troops on German soil.

Bonn has given its support to Paris to keep Britain out of the Common Market, but the West German government has not been eager to have Britain withdraw her troops from the Rhine and have the German taxpayer—and the manpower of West German youth—replace the British contribution. A British refusal to go on supporting the policies of the Federal Republic in regard to West Berlin, or a British recognition, *de facto* or *de jure*, of the G.D.R.—perhaps followed by similar action by other members of the Commonwealth—would mean a serious diplomatic defeat for the Bonn government. If such an extreme British action seemed almost unthinkable in 1967, it seemed no less unlikely that Bonn could or would use its power on the side of French President de Gaulle's efforts to

keep Britain out of the Common Market for a long time, especially in opposition to the United States' preferences.

The fundamental dependence of the Federal Republic on the United States remained even greater. Although this dependence was mutual, Bonn's need for friendly relations with the United States remained greater than the need of the United States government for even minimal good relations with Bonn. West German exports, as well as domestic prosperity, continued to depend in good part on American defense, tax, and tariff policies as well as on the continuing confidence of American investors. An American stock-market decline, such as that of "Blue Monday," May 28, 1962, had immediate effects on the economy of the Federal Republic. American taxes on the investments of their nationals abroad, or fears among American and European investors of military or political instability in West Germany, or generally in Western Europe, could influence West German prosperity and balance of payments very rapidly indeed. Under these conditions, the persistent news from Washington that Chancellor Adenauer was being much less frequently consulted by the Kennedy Administration than he had been by its predecessors in the 1950's served as a reminder that Bonn's new power was in fact still a good deal less than it seemed, and that it had best be used with very great caution.

In fact, the international position of the Federal Republic was not strong enough to sustain the rigid policies of the Chancellor. West German policies became slightly more flexible under his successor, Chancellor Erhard, and noticeably more so under the coalition government of Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (C.D.U.) and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt (S.P.D.), which undertook diplomatic overtures to several Soviet-bloc countries and opened diplomatic relations with Rumania in 1967.

In many ways, the end of an era in West German politics seemed to be drawing near by

the late 1960's. Many of the political and economic gains of the preceding two decades seemed solid enough. Yet to the careful observer at least some of the power positions and aspirations of Bonn still seemed built on precarious foundations. The Federal Republic steadily had been getting stronger, but perhaps it still was not nearly as strong as it seemed on the surface.

Under these conditions, much would depend not only on the changing conditions of world politics, which West Germany for the most part could not control, but also on the underlying political, social, and ideological strength of the German people and on the wisdom of the political elite.

THE CONTINUING DIVISION OF GERMANY

One dark shadow has fallen across the Federal Republic ever since it was established. The Communist-ruled German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) has continued to exist and to remind West Germans of the persistent division of their country. This rivalry between two states and two governments, each claiming, in theory, the leadership of the entire German people, did not come into being all at once.⁹ The Soviet authorities after 1945 first favored a policy of treating all of Germany as a unit, since they considered their zone of occupation as a potential bridgehead from which to appeal to German national feeling and to extend their influence into the Western regions of the country occupied by the Allies.

Political parties in East Germany—the Communists (K.P.D.), Social Democrats (S.P.D.), Liberals (L.D.P.), and Christian Democrats

⁹The following account owes much to the illuminating summaries by Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany* (New York: Crowell, 1966), pp. 182–202, and Elmer Plischke, *Contemporary Government of Germany* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 181–211. Both of these should be consulted for further details.

(C.C.D.N.)—all were licensed for organization on a nationwide level in 1945, earlier than in the West, where the Allies insisted first on a prolonged stage of local political organizations and activities. Although the Communists were given key positions in the administration, their party limited itself to a relatively moderate policy, promising a multiparty system with free elections and suggesting the possibility of a special German road to Socialism. The expropriation of the large factories and the landed estates of the Junkers was justified on grounds of Communist ideology which saw Fascism as the creation of landowners and capitalists, as well as on anti-Fascist grounds, rather than as part of any overt program of social reform. Large landowners and industrialists, it was said with some truth, had often been friendly to the Nazis; hence their economic power had to be abolished now to prevent a Nazi comeback later, and all parties were expected to support this policy through an anti-Fascist bloc that was to assume political monopoly. While some politicians were beginning to withdraw from such Soviet-inspired and directed arrangements, the bulk of the non-Communist leaders, particularly in the S.P.D., accepted these reforms as largely desirable.

Matters, however, did not stop there. It soon became clear that the Communists had overestimated their chances of becoming popular and that they could not hope to win a free election in the Soviet zone, let alone in West Berlin or in West Germany. By the end of 1945, the Communists began to press the East German Social Democrats to join with the Communist Party, but in the end only a minority, led by the chairman of the Social Democratic Central Committee, Otto Grotewohl, accepted this proposal as a national policy. In West Berlin, only 12.4% of the Social Democratic Party members supported the merger, while 82% opposed it.¹⁰ The pro-merger minority of the Social Democrats did join the Communists, and formed a

¹⁰Heidenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

new party, called the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (S.E.D.), which turned out to be Communistic in substance. The S.E.D. was refused a license to operate in West Germany by the Allies, so the Communists there had to function under their own name as K.P.D. until their suppression in 1956. The S.E.D. became, in effect, the sole ruling party of the Soviet zone, reducing the two remaining middle class parties—the C.D.U. and the L.D.P.—to the role of powerless appendages.

The Creation of the GDR

Following the creation in West Germany of the German Federal Republic in 1949 and its attainment of substantial sovereignty through the Paris Agreements of 1955, a German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) was set up in the Soviet zone in 1949, and its sovereignty was recognized by a G.D.R.-U.S.S.R. Treaty in September, 1955. Although former Social Democrats have served in a few conspicuous positions (such as Otto Grotewohl as Prime Minister from 1950 until his death in 1964, and Friedrich Ebert, son of the President of the Weimar Republic, as Mayor of East Berlin), since 1955 the G.D.R. has been ruled by a Communist dictatorship, exercised through the S.E.D. Party and dominated by the veteran Communist and First Secretary of the S.E.D. Politburo, Walter Ulbricht. After 1960, Ulbricht also served as Chairman of the Council of State, the most powerful body of the formal government of the G.D.R. As we have indicated before, the details of that regime cannot be discussed here. What mattered for the political development of the Federal Republic were the economic, social, and political changes in the G.D.R. that impinged directly and indirectly on the political realities and expectations of the Bonn Republic and its people.

In 1955, the G.D.R. had about 17 million inhabitants, roughly 2 million more than its territories had had before World War II; and

despite heavy emigration, it still had a population of more than 17 million in 1965.¹¹ Its income was beginning to surpass the pre-war level, but it was still much poorer than the Federal Republic. According to a United States scholar, in 1957 the gross national product of the G.D.R. "was only 20% above the 1936 level, compared to a 90% increase over the 1936 level recorded by West Germany."¹² Moreover, consumers in the G.D.R. received a much smaller share of the national product than was the case in the Federal Republic. "Output of basic and production goods rose to 168%, and of investment goods to 174% of 1936, while consumer goods and food, drink, and tobacco, reached only a level of 75% and 119% of 1936, respectively."¹³ Since the population in 1955 had increased by a million against pre-war times, the survey concluded: "While the total real G.N.P. was in 1957 on a per capita basis about 12% above 1936, consumption was undoubtedly still below it, though probably not very much so."¹⁴ By the late 1960's, however, further economic progress has been made and reports of a new prosperity in the G.D.R.—albeit modest by Western standards—were appearing in the Western press.

CONTRAST WITH WEST GERMANY. This continuing lag behind West German prosperity is attributed by experts to four major causes.¹⁵ First of all, the Soviet government, during the first years after the war, dismantled and removed substantially more productive equipment from its zone of occupation than the Western powers did from theirs, and the Soviet Union insisted on substantial reparations payments out of the current production in the G.D.R. until at least 1953, amounting by West-

ern estimates, to about one-quarter of industrial production. While the U.S.S.R.—which had been devastated by the war—was taking wealth out of Central and Eastern Germany, the United States—whose economy had flourished during World War II—was pouring relief, Marshall Aid, and other forms of economic assistance into West Germany.

In the second place, the Federal Republic had a much larger supply of labor, owing not only to its size and population, but to the 13 million expellees and refugees it had accepted. Therefore, it had both the capital to employ these people and the labor supply to make the best use of its capital. In this way, it was possible in the Federal Republic to increase output, productivity, and real wages very considerably, while maintaining only moderate wage increases, thereby avoiding inflation.

The third set of conditions holding back the economy of the G.D.R. centered around its own economic institutions. The division of the estates of the landed aristocracy—the old Junker class—had been carried through for political as much as for economic considerations, but it left the G.D.R. with many inefficient small private farms, which absorbed a relatively large proportion of the labor supply and whose owners often were quite unenthusiastic about economic planning or the prospects of farm collectivization. At the same time, the typical Communist emphasis on heavy industry held back the allocation of capital to agriculture. The G.D.R. in 1955 had only about 34,000 tractors, and this number rose by 1959 to about 42,000, while agriculture in the Federal Republic in the latter year employed about 754,000 tractors—six to eight times as many in proportion to the land used for agriculture in West Germany than was the case in the G.D.R. (Table 3-2). The greater capital investment in West German agriculture seems evident, even if one allows for the concentration of the G.D.R. on a smaller number of much larger tractors, intended for the sizable fields of its collective farms. These

¹¹Heidenheimer, *op cit*, pp. 44-46, which also provides a more detailed breakdown of the population.

¹²Stolper, *Germany between East and West*, p. 11.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵The account that follows here owes much to Stolper, *op cit*, pp. 15-17.

handicaps were combined with the difficulties inherent in large-scale economic planning, the low levels of sophistication in G.D.R. planning methods, and the lack of experience and competence of G.D.R. planning personnel; all these taken together produced a not inconsiderable amount of waste.

TABLE 3-2
Tractors, 1959

	Fed. Repub.	G.D.R.	
	Units	Units	15 H.P. Equivalent
Agricultural areas (in thousands of hectares)	13,200*	6,400	6,400
Tractors (in thousands, all types)	754	47	63
Tractors per thousand hectares	57	7	10

Source: *S.J.B.*, 1961, pp. 163, 165, 574; *Statistisches Jahrbuch der D.D.R.*, 1959, p. 426, Tables 6 and 7.

*Figures for 1960.

The fourth group of conditions hampering economic growth in the G.D.R. was largely international in character. The Federal Republic was quickly integrated into the trading and credit community of the Western countries, which included the richest countries in the world, in a period of business prosperity. The G.D.R. was integrated—much less smoothly—into the Soviet bloc, whose members were on the whole much poorer, and where international economic interchanges were much less well coordinated, although some improvements did start in 1957 and continued in the 1960's.¹⁶

Unrest in the G.D.R.

During much of the 1950's life in the G.D.R. for many of its inhabitants was far more

¹⁶For details, see Stolper, *Germany between East and West*, p. 17.

harsh and unpleasant than it was in the Federal Republic. The efforts of the Communist-led government to win popular favor by developing the arts, particularly the theater and music, were none too successful, nor did its use of radio and other instruments of propaganda succeed in convincing the population that they were well off now, and would soon be much better off. Since much of this propaganda was so obviously at variance with everyday experience, it tended to infuriate many people rather than to convince them; and since no effective legal expressions of opposition were permitted, those who were dissatisfied felt particularly bitter about the claims of the Communist regime to have "liberated" the working people of the G.D.R.

Throughout the 1950's, thousands of people expressed their dissatisfaction with their feet. They walked out of the G.D.R. into the Western-occupied parts of Berlin and claimed asylum; then, after having been screened in West Berlin, they were flown to West Germany for further screening and eventual resettlement. The Soviet military authorities, as well as those of the G.D.R., were powerless to stop this flow, short of cutting off most of the movements of persons between East and West Berlin—a move which the Western powers would have considered illegal, and the Soviets inexpedient. The alternative of cutting off the movement of persons between East Berlin and the G.D.R. was even less attractive, since such a move would have deprived the G.D.R. of its most important city. The flow thus continued, and the government of the Federal Republic, as well as the Allied authorities in Berlin, in effect did a great deal to encourage it, even though there were also some efforts to urge East Germans to stay in the G.D.R. and hope for eventual reunification. As a result of this migration through West Berlin and into the Federal Republic, the G.D.R. suffered from 1950 through 1961 an average net loss of more than 190,000 persons each year, or a total net loss of nearly 2.3 mil-

lion, which followed the loss of another 0.5 million in 1945–49—more than offsetting her natural population growth. Some details of the ebb and flow of this migration can be seen from the data in Table 3–3.

These net figures are smaller than the ones publicized by the Bonn government, but they tell a story of a serious—though not fatal—drain on the manpower resources of the G.D.R. They also show that the peak period of that drain occurred during 1953–55 and that the peak year was 1953, when the net loss to the G.D.R. rose to 320,000, or almost double the 17-year average. On June 17, 1953, strikes and riots

in East Germany approached the dimensions of revolt, challenging the dictatorial power of the East German government and the tanks of the Soviet forces backing it. The riots, however, were quickly suppressed. Earlier broadcasts from West Berlin, the Federal Republic, and the American stations in Europe had done much, wittingly or unwittingly, to encourage the spirit of revolt in East Berlin and the G.D.R., and the American station RIAS had been particularly emphatic. At the time of the actual riots, however, the West German broadcasts urged calmness and caution, and the verbal attacks on the Soviet regime in the G.D.R.

were not followed by any effective Western action supporting the rebels by force, because of the risk of local defeat by Soviet troops or the start of a new World War.

In fact, United States policy toward Berlin under President Eisenhower in 1953 remained very much the same as it had been under President Truman during the Berlin blockade in 1948 and 1949. We were pledged to resist any forcible Soviet or East German interference in Allied-held territory, but we refused to use any substantial military force to interfere in territories held by the Soviet Union or its allies. The same policy was followed later by President Eisenhower during the Hungarian uprising against the Communist regime of that country in 1956, and it was again followed by President Kennedy when the East German authorities built a wall between West and East Berlin in 1961. Throughout the period, neither the United States nor the Soviet governments showed any desire to use their armed forces for fear of initiating a war in Europe that might have incalculable consequences in the age of nuclear weapons.

If the unrest of 1953 in East Germany was thus quickly suppressed, it nevertheless was not without results. In the G.D.R. and in East Berlin, it reminded the Communist rulers of the extent to which they had alienated popular feeling; it hastened the ending of reparations payments to the Soviet Union; and it started the transition to a policy of at least beginning concessions to consumer needs and to creating better living standards.

In the Federal Republic, the East German uprising of June 17 was taken as a promise of the early collapse of the G.D.R., and as a confirmation of the wisdom of Bonn's policy of consistent nonrecognition of its Eastern rival. Thereafter, June 17, was celebrated in the Federal Republic as an official holiday—the "Day of German Unity"—but by the early 1960's it seemed that most West Germans were taking it as an occasion for peaceful family outings

rather than for attending political rallies and official speeches.

By the beginning of the 1960's, the annual net outflow of refugees from the G.D.R. into the Federal Republic had fallen back to the level of the early 1950's, averaging about 161,000 per year in 1959–61, as against 151,000 in 1950–52. This flow does not seem, in itself, to have been an intolerable drain on the economy of the G.D.R., which had borne the much heavier outflow during the mid-1950's. If backed by the Soviet authorities, the East German government could have cut off at any time the movement into West Berlin of persons from the territories it controlled, and it could thus have stopped the westward flow of persons whenever such a step seemed worth its probable political cost.

In August, 1961, the East German regime and its Soviet backers finally exercised their option. A wall was built which completed the existing Communist system of enclosures around West Berlin; crossings were permitted only at a very few heavily controlled checkpoints; and practically no East Berliners or inhabitants of the G.D.R. were permitted to cross to the West. A few desperate individuals still succeeded in making dramatic escapes to the West, but during the first half of 1962 they made up at most a trickle in place of what had been a stream. The United States and its Allies strengthened their troops in West Germany, but held to their policy of refusing, as long as their control in the Western-held territories was respected, to interfere by force in the Communist-held territories and thus to risk making Germany a theater of war.

The people of the Federal Republic remained closely connected by ties of family and old friendship, as well as of national sentiment, with the population of the G.D.R. By the mid-1950's, nearly one-quarter of the population of the Federal Republic were natives of East Germany. Forty-four percent of the respondents to a poll in 1953 claimed relatives or

friends in the Soviet zone of Germany, together with those West Germans who had personal acquaintances there, a majority of West Germans had at least some personal contacts with the population of either the G.D.R. or East Berlin.¹⁷

Nearly two-fifths of the West Germans, polled in February, 1953, claimed to be writing letters sometimes to the Eastern zone, and nearly one-third had sent Christmas packages there—a claim confirmed by the 24 million packages sent in 1956, which was exceeded by the 30 million packages reported for 1957. In December, 1961, after the building of the wall around West Berlin, the number of Christmas packages increased further, indicating that human relationships were continuing despite political restrictions.¹⁸

The Future of the G.D.R.

In the face of the political and human desires for unity between the Western and Eastern parts of Germany, the foreign policy of Bonn in the 1950's had little more to offer than the hope for the eventual collapse of the government of the G.D.R., or for some drastic loss of power or change of policy on the part of its Soviet backers. None of these hopes of the Bonn government came true in the 1950's, and the outlook in the early 1960's seemed no more promising.

During the 1950's, the planned economy of the G.D.R. continued to develop, growing at rates not very different from those of West Germany. In the judgment of an expert West-ern observer:

It must be recognized that in the course of the 1950's average annual growth rates in East Germany have been not far below those of the Federal Republic, the figures are estimated at

about 8.5 and 10.3% respectively for the period 1950-57. On a per capita basis—population having declined in the East and increased in the West—there is probably little difference in East and West German growth rates between 1950 and 1957. Of course, the continuing depressed level of East German living standards should be noted, on the other hand, it is likely that this disparity will lessen and a distinct possibility that East Germany may for a while actually register higher future per capita rates than the Federal Republic.¹⁹

In the course of the 1960's, some of the factors retarding the economic growth of the G.D.R., relative to that of the Federal Republic, continued to weaken. The effects of the Soviet reparations policies of 1945-53 diminished while the flow of American dollars into West Germany declined somewhat—on a per capita basis and in some years even absolutely. The large-scale migration of German-speaking labor, much of it skilled, from Eastern Europe into the Federal Republic likewise had come to an end, and the building of the wall around West Berlin in August, 1961, ended the chances of any sizable flow of refugees from the G.D.R. into West Germany. Planning methods and the competence of planners in the G.D.R. improved somewhat with experience, and the partial economic reforms in the G.D.R. and other Soviet-bloc countries, which began to give a freer hand to management and greater attention to sales and prices in the market, worked in the same direction.

The international environment of the two rival German states also seemed less likely to favor the Federal Republic as strongly as it had in the past. If the Soviet Union and its bloc of East European countries prospered, as they had been doing during the 1950's and 1960's, they would be able—if their governments consented—to offer more rewarding trade opportunities to the G.D.R.; on the other hand, if the economic boom in Western Europe and the United

¹⁷Deutsch and Edinger *Germany Rejoins the Powers* pp. 178-179, with references.

¹⁸See Richard L. Merritt's study of West and East Berlin, *Divided City*, forthcoming.

¹⁹Stolper, *Germany between East and West*, pp. 11-12.

States slid into a business slump, then the pace of West German economic growth would lessen. This possibility materialized in 1961, when the annual economic growth rate of the Federal Republic fell to 4.5%—about average for the non-Communist world in the later 1950's, but well below West Germany's earlier and later performance. Between 1962–1966, the growth rate averaged 8%, dropping to 6% in 1966.

A serious economic depression in the West might, of course, make things much worse for the Federal Republic; and such a possibility seemed less remote after the American stock market decline during the first half of 1962 than it had seemed in earlier years. Even without any more drastic economic troubles, however, a prolonged period of slowed-down growth in the Federal Republic would give the forced-draft planned economy of the G.D.R. a chance to catch up eventually with the per capita income levels of its Western rival. This threat seemed remote in 1967, but if it did materialize there seemed to be little that Bonn could do about it.

By the beginning of 1967 the G.D.R. was still without diplomatic recognition by most governments outside the Communist bloc. In accordance with the "Hallstein Doctrine"—named after the German diplomat and former professor, State Secretary Walter Hallstein—the Federal Republic announced that it would break off its diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the G.D.R. Only the U.S.S.R. was exempted from this principle of West German foreign policy. In 1957, when Yugoslavia recognized the G.D.R., Bonn somewhat reluctantly did break off diplomatic

—though not trade—relations. But by the beginning of 1967 the Hallstein Doctrine seemed to be passing into history, as Bonn began the process of establishing diplomatic relations with some of the East European countries and in early 1968 diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia were resumed.

This new diplomatic approach to the Soviet-bloc countries may indicate the hesitant beginnings of a slow but ultimately basic change in West Germany's foreign policy. Prior to 1967 it had appeared as if the only possible way to establish the firm footing of Bonn *vis-à-vis* her Eastern neighbors was through reliance upon American diplomatic and military power, even when this spelled the maintenance of the division of Eastern and Western Europe running through the two Germanies. In early 1968 it looked as if Bonn was interested in establishing a situation of *detente* in the European sphere of the East-West conflict, and thereby hopefully opening up a path to German reunification that would be acceptable to all the parties concerned. These efforts paralleled the efforts of the United States to promote such a *detente* between itself and the Soviet Union. But at the same time the German leaders continue to realize that a final solution to the unification problem rests largely with the Soviet Union and the United States, and that their alliance with the United States must also be maintained in this area of policy. Nearly two decades after its establishment, the German Federal Republic is perhaps the only country in the world in which one of its most pressing and emotion-charged national problems remains to be largely decided outside its own borders.

IV

Political Culture: Attitudes and Ideology

When we know an individual well, we know which things he will be likely to do often, and which *ones rarely or not at all*. We know his likes and dislikes, his patterns of probable attention and inattention. We may know what particular images and memories he carries in his mind, and which among these are particularly important to him; what kinds of messages or experiences will lead to their recall into awareness, and what particular kinds of perceptions this combination of old memories and new messages and impressions is likely to produce. We know what he is apt to notice and what to ignore, *what to seek and approach, and what to avoid or reject*.

All these are matters not of certainty but of frequency or probability. We infer these probability distributions of his future actions and preferences from his past behavior, and we call them his *predispositions* or his *attitudes*. The particular combination of attitudes found in an individual we call his *character*. Our inferences about it we call our *judgment* of his character, and his subsequent actual behavior may show us whether our judgment was realistic or mistaken.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND NATIONAL CHARACTER

Just as any single individual can be said to have a certain set of political attitudes, so large numbers of people can be said to have typical political attitudes. Such attitudes toward different aspects of politics are characteristic of a nation, and in particular respects they differ significantly from the typical attitudes of many other nations. We call these characteristic political attitudes a country's *political culture*, which is, of course, a part of its general or national culture.

It is also sometimes useful to think of the relation of the national culture to the ensemble of attitudes of many individuals, which we call their *individual character* or *personality*. In relation to the most widespread personality characteristics among its constituent individuals, we sometimes call the national culture of the people of a nation their *national character*. When talking about politics, our use of "national character" often will come close to the meaning of "political culture," but with a slightly different focus of interest on the relevant personality structure of individuals.

"Political attitudes" or "political culture" may refer to any aspect of politics and government, whether it be attitudes toward governmental authority, political participation, partisanship, or the type of government that is desired. These attitudes are made up of a set of images, beliefs, evaluations of political phenomena, and degrees of emotional detachment or involvement. But these political attitudes are embedded in something broader and deeper—in the character of the individuals, groups, and nations that hold them.

Once we are able to describe a country's political culture and national character, we can raise a number of related questions. How does the political culture help us to understand and explain the operating characteristics of a country's government? In what ways does the political culture help or hinder democratic government? What were the origins of the political culture—those events and conditions that led to its formation? How are these typical attitudes transmitted from one generation to the next? Most of these attitudes are taught by the family and schools and by the cumulative effects of many examples in daily life, through which each succeeding generation learns the attitudes of the preceding one. Sometimes a conscious attempt is made to inculcate a new set of attitudes, as in post-war Germany, where the occupying powers reorganized the schools in the hope of developing democratic attitudes among the students. Present-day West German attitudes

are thus the outcome of the conflicting influences of events and memories from long-past German history, of recent or current institutions and practices in society and family life, of old and new images and ideas about human relations and politics, and of social and political developments since 1945.

HISTORY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

The long and often violent history of the German people has left them with deep-seated memories that have colored their political decisions in the past and will continue to do so for years to come. These memories are embedded in German schoolbooks and in learned histories, in words of creative literature and in the minds of individuals. These historic memories recall that for centuries the international environment has not been kind to Germany. From the horrors of the Thirty Years War to the desperate struggles of Frederick II's Prussia and the Napoleonic Wars, foreign economic and military developments are remembered as having threatened or injured Germany, and to this are added memories of the overwhelmingly strong foreign coalitions that united to defeat Germany in World Wars I and II. In such a dangerous world, these memories seem to suggest, Germans should not show any weakness or disunity, or any excessive trust in foreigners or foreign powers. This impression is reinforced by memories of real or imagined exclusion of peaceful German trade from many overseas areas, both before 1914 and between the World Wars—and perhaps today, though to a lesser and steadily diminishing extent—through the lingering or continuing effects of colonial administrations, currency blocs, linguistic preferences, formal and informal controls over credit and trade, all of which were believed to have functioned somehow to the disadvantage of Germany.

In the past, many Germans believed that they

worked harder and more efficiently than the members of any other great industrial power in Western Europe, and many also believed that for their efforts they received relatively less in terms of real income, domestic living standards, and international prestige. Members of other nations could move about distant parts of the globe and yet feel respected and at home in the colonies of their nation, but Germans at best had to enter as foreigners and always had to adapt themselves to the ways of others.

THE GERMAN "NATIONAL CHARACTER"

In the face of an environment that thus seemed often less than fair to their aspirations, many Germans felt that they had to hold on to their particular virtues as a people. Outstanding among these virtues was a capacity and liking for hard work. Most people seem to consider the members of their own nation as hard-working, but the Germans do so to a far greater extent. While 68% of American respondents to a U.N.E.S.C.O. poll applied this term to their own people in 1948-49, and respondents in six out of seven other countries claimed the same distinction for themselves with lesser majorities or pluralities, the Germans interviewed in the poll proclaimed their faith in the diligence of their own people with a solid 90% majority.¹ Later polls confirmed this image, majorities of 60% in 1955, and 56% in 1956, reiterated in German polls the conviction that their own people were "more efficient and gifted than the other peoples."²

There is no doubt that these images are based on very real German virtues. Foreign observers, as well as Germans, have attested time and again to the energy, diligence, and thoroughness of Germans in their work, both phys-

ical and intellectual. There is a high degree of care and thoughtfulness in German workmanship, there is steadfastness in the face of difficulty, and great courage and discipline in the face of danger. There is a tradition of selflessness, of readiness to sacrifice and suffer, of solidarity with one's group—national, social, or ideological; there is a serious concern for justice and a deep well of imagination. Not all Germans, of course, have all these virtues at all times; but many Germans have shown them often, and under critical conditions. It is these virtues that stand out in the symbols of German literature and poetry; it is these themes that have moved, and still can move, many Germans in political appeals; and it is these qualities that Germans may often still be expected to show in their actions.

Yet the German "national character"—or those frequent elements and patterns in German culture, traditions, and personality that have relevance for their political behavior—is more complex. Like similar patterns in other countries, it moves often in polarities, that is, in pairs of opposites. Thus German political and cultural styles have moved between the poles of idealism and materialism. Both German and foreign observers have spoken of a German fascination with abstract doctrines and ideas, and sometimes of the preoccupation of Germans with wealth and material success—as once again today people talk of the "success Germans" of the Bonn Republic.

Other polarities exist between the rival images of German profundity and practicality or matter of factness (*Sachlichkeit*); and between chivalrous romanticism and pedestrian stolidity. A romantic nobleman, Walter Stolz, is opposed by an obtrusive critic, Beckmesser, in Richard Wagner's opera, *Die Meistersinger*, or a romantic, searching scientist, Dr. Faust, is contrasted with his diligent but uncreative assistant, Wagner, in Goethe's *Faust*.

German political styles sometimes have been dominated by similar contrasts, or have oscillated between them. Periods of admiration for

¹I. W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other. A Study in Public Opinion* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), pp. 46-47.

²*Jahrbuch*, II, p. 139, see also Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Joins the Powers*, pp. 32-34.

grandiose or even demonic heroes have been followed by periods of contentment with solid mediocrity; and periods of great resistance to change have been followed by periods of its over-acceptance. More than once in German history, dependable moderate courses of action were firmly held for years and decades, until some strain became too much, and a rapid and intense realignment of political sympathies and styles of action followed. Thus the "blood and iron" period of Bismarck followed nearly a half-century of predominantly moderate and peaceful politics. Hitler followed the years of moderation under the Weimar Republic (thus it is vital for the peace of the world that the present period of stability under the Bonn Republic should prove to be durable). In this manner, much of German history has been a history of breaks in political style.

German attitudes toward politics have often oscillated between an insistence on the virtues of being "nonpolitical" or "above the parties" and a willingness to accept the most extreme partisan commitments of totalitarian fanaticism. Both attitudes derive from the same fundamental view of politics, which sees the world of politics as fundamentally evil, governed by the laws and necessities of what St. Augustine described as the city of robbers; which Machiavelli had seen as ruled by the pragmatic necessities of force and fraud, rather than by traditional morality; and which Luther had seen as a world of princes who had to be obeyed even if they were immoral, since they were set by Providence to rule over subjects corrupted by original sin.

In fact, this was a very naïve version both of actual politics and of the views of Augustine, Machiavelli, and Luther, all of whom had been more complex and subtle thinkers. It was a simplified version, however, which fitted the emotional needs of an educated people who lacked any deep or rich experience of responsible political participation, and who found themselves bewildered by what little of politics they ac-

tually saw. To conclude that politics was basically wicked, then, meant that one kept away from it as long as possible, but that—if one had to act in politics at all—one might be quite willing to accept some quite ruthless or extreme political practice or ideology, for that was in any case what politics really was like. By no means have all Germans at any one time been stranded on the poles of this nonpolitical or hyperpolitical dilemma, but a sufficient number of them have been often enough in the past to give to German political attitudes a characteristic cast and potential.

Some of these polarities perhaps can be traced back to the influences of German history, and so can some of the potential political weaknesses which they imply. German history is rich in memories of authoritarian princes and magistrates, and of the dependence of their subjects on them for protection. Eighteenth-century Prussia differed significantly from other European states in the governmental structure and the ideas which served to legitimate it. Prussian government under Frederick I and Frederick the Great was not only archetypically autocratic, but his autocracy was based upon a blending of civil and military affairs, the militarization of social life, and the development of an exceptionally powerful and centralized bureaucratic apparatus. This autocratic bureaucratic government was to a large extent legitimized by the political docility found in orthodox Lutheranism, the German idealistic (and metaphysical) notion that the bureaucracy was the state, and that rights and liberties were to be found within its hierarchical embrace.

Some of this authoritarianism was reinforced by the patriarchal tradition of the preindustrial West European and German family structure and patterns of bringing up children; and in turn it reinforced this tradition in Germany. In this way, a stronger element of authoritarianism—a willingness to submit to those in authority combined with a tendency to demand obedience from subordinates—has been trans-

mitted from generation to generation, and transferred into the formation of German national character and political attitudes. The extent to which the Germans continue to emphasize the notions of order and authority is brought out in a 1966 survey in which the respondents were asked which qualities should be primarily emphasized in bringing up children. The responses indicate that 18% of the Germans favor "obedience and submission," and another 49% think "love of order and thrift" ought to be primarily emphasized, while only 29% mentioned "self-sufficiency and independence."³ Not all Germans, by any means, are authoritarian, but more of them seem to be so to a higher degree than are the populations of, say, France, Britain, and the United States.

The Lack of a Strong Commercial Class

Another historic legacy may be the result of the long period of relative weakness of the commercial middle classes in Germany from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century—that is, during a period when these classes became relatively strong in England, France, and the United States. And even into the twentieth century the successful entrepreneurs remained highly deferential to the Junker aristocracy, seeing as the highest culmination of their lives, admission into aristocratic and military circles, despite the concomitantly required debasement of their commercial professions. Whenever given the opportunity to choose, the *haute bourgeoisie* would gladly accept the disdainful values toward business held by the Junkers, at the expense of their own. As a result, some of the characteristic political assets of a mercantile civilization may have become somewhat underrepresented in German culture.

In commerce, as in politics, it is important to be able to bargain easily and successfully, without being either duped or angered, and without expecting either to give in or else to have things all one's own way. Merchants learn to accept bargaining and compromise as natural, rational, and honorable, while to aristocrats these two practices may seem frustrating and somehow dishonorable. These two contrasting attitudes may carry over into politics, where the word "compromise" has long had a ring of illegitimacy in German ears.

Merchants also need to be capable of some degree of empathy, it helps them greatly to be able to perceive quickly and accurately the moods of their customers, to put themselves in their customers' place. These skills of perceptiveness, sensitivity, and empathy are common ones for the merchant and the politician—and for the types of diplomats, civil servants, and political leaders that England has long been training at Oxford and Cambridge—but they have not often been conspicuous in German politics. German empathy has come more often from imagination than from perception. German rationality has been more often not the rationality of the negotiator but rather that of the soldier, the scholar, and the bureaucrat.

The German lack of a strong mercantile tradition and the German authoritarian heritage do not make it easy for Germans to deal smoothly and effectively with equals, or to feel at ease in relations with them. "It is not easy to come to a strange country," the German poet Bertolt Brecht once wrote; "you do not know at whom you may shout, and before whom you must doff your hat."

This difficulty of relating easily to equals, which is characteristic of the so-called authoritarian personality, has been reinforced by German geography and history. For long periods, Germany's Western neighbors appeared to be clearly richer and more advanced, and thus potential objects of envy, while the peoples to the East seemed clearly poorer and more backward,

³From an unpublished 1966 national survey conducted by the Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung, the University of Cologne. Hereafter this survey will be cited as "The 1966 Survey."

and thus potential objects of contempt; but there were few, if any, prolonged periods in the history of the German people during which they could look upon any other large nation as just about their equals. Remembering a highly stratified environment abroad, it was difficult for Germans to think of their domestic and foreign policies in equalitarian terms.

POST-WAR CHANGES
IN POLITICAL ATTITUDES

In the face of this complex heritage of psychological and political assets, liabilities, and contrasts, the Bonn Republic has done remarkably well. It has gone far towards making the politics of compromise appear both successful and legitimate. It has increased the degree of equality in German society and politics, through nearly full employment, broader educational opportunities, and a mitigation of class consciousness among the workers, and class exclusiveness among the bourgeoisie. It has acted toward the other countries of Western Europe, and particularly toward France, as an equal. More generally, it seems to have lowered the levels of bitterness and tension that could be found in earlier decades in the life and outlook of the German people; and this seems the more remarkable since tensions might have been expected to rise after a defeat in war.

In the early 1930's, the sharp rise in the frequency of suicides was cited by political spokesmen of various parties as evidence of the increase of such bitterness and desperation. It is not easy to say to what extent changes in the suicide rates do, in fact, reflect changes in the level of tensions and frustrations in a country, but the data in Table 4-1 throw at least a suggestive sidelight on the problem.

The figures suggest that, under the Bonn Republic, suicide rates have fallen between one-quarter and one-third below their pre-war levels, while they have not done so in the Ger-

TABLE 4-1
*Average Suicide Rates among Men,
1893-1959*

Year	Regime	Suicides among 10,000 men	
1893	Second German Empire	3.5	
1913	"	3.5	
1924	Weimar Republic	3.5	
1928	"	3.6	
1931	"	4.9	
1933	Hitler's Reich	4.1	
1934	"	4.1	
1939	"	3.9	
		Federal Republic	G.D.R.
1955		2.6	3.5
1958		2.6	3.7
1960		2.6	3.5

Sources of data: (1) 1893-1939-Roderich von Ungern-Sternberg, "Die Selbstmordhäufigkeit in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart," *Jahrbucher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 171:3 (Stuttgart: Fischer, April, 1959), 187-207, especially 198-199. (2) 1955-1960 - German Federal Republic, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik*, 1961, pp. 84-85, 566.

man Democratic Republic under Communist rule.

Most important, perhaps, the Federal Republic has provided time, security, and opportunity for a new generation of young Germans to grow up and to reach the threshold of political life.

The political performance of the Bonn Republic has matched this improvement in the general cultural and psychological climate. In contrast to the Weimar Republic, Bonn's governments have been highly stable; not one government has been overthrown by the opposition parties in the Bundestag, whereas Weimar's governments were toppled on the average of one every nine months. For the most part the government has operated in accordance with the rules set down in the Basic Law, unlike Weimar with its political violence and the excessive influence of the military-bureaucratic complex. And both the government and the parties have been fairly responsive to the de-

mands of the voters and their pressure groups, making for a realistically representative democracy. Finally, the governments of the Bonn Republic have managed to carry out some consistent long-range policies, and for the most part these policies have been judged to be highly successful by the population. Thus the Bonn Republic has been stable, representative, and effective.

Are there then any changes in the political culture that can help to explain Bonn's success? Given the fact that the Germans lived under a totalitarian regime for 12 years between the collapse of Weimar and the formation of the Bonn Republic, it would seem that this intervening experience would have played an important part in the alteration of basic political attitudes. Perhaps the single most important effect of the totalitarian experience is the resulting breakdown of the simple traditional German identification of "freedom" with order and with the capacity to act, and hence in practice with the powerful and authoritarian state. The tradition which merged the German quest for liberty with the acceptance of authoritarian government has been largely shattered by the experience of a brutal totalitarianism combined with a devastating military defeat. Thus when asked whether they identify the ideas of freedom and order with democracy or National Socialism, 70% of the Germans interviewed in 1966 identified both freedom and order with democracy.⁴

The revulsion from the unsuccessful totalitarian experience also produced a new basis for evaluating the state: the state would now be judged on the basis of what it could do for the people, and not what the people could do for the state. The purpose of the state was placed squarely in the realm of the purely pragmatic, becoming the utilitarian servant of the people. Emerging from the country's economic and industrial ruin, the Bonn Republic was assigned

as its chief purpose the job of reconstructing the economy. Even in the late 1950's and early 1960's, after the job of reconstruction had been more than completed and the Bonn Republic had entered into a period of previously unrivaled prosperity, the West Germans continued to conceive of the state's functions primarily in terms of its success in maintaining a high level of economic affluence. The Germans' support of the Bonn regime, and more generally their attachments to democratic government, thus have primarily grown out of the regime's success in overseeing the "economic miracle."

This raises an important question about the kind of political culture that is most likely to maintain an effective and stable democracy. It is possible to distinguish two types of cultural supports for democracy.

First, there are the purely pragmatic attachments to democratic government: if the government is able to produce what the people want, then they will support the government. Since the Bonn Republic has more than satisfied the economic expectations of the people, there is a growing support for the regime. When asked in 1951 in which period things have been best in Germany, only 2% mentioned the present; 42% referred to the years between 1933 and 1939. By 1963 these proportions had been dramatically reversed, with 62% mentioning the present and only 10% pointing to the 1933-1939 period as the best time for Germany.⁵ And in 1966, 80% of the Germans surveyed identified "prosperity" with democracy, compared to a mere 3% who identified it with National Socialism.⁶ Corresponding to these changes in assessing the desirability of their present situation, the Bonn Republic and democracy in general have enjoyed a growing support. For instance, German opinion polls annually asked the people interviewed whether they thought a country would benefit more from having a number of political

⁴ *Statistik*, III, p. 232.

⁵ *The 1966 Survey*, p. 111.

parties in order to freely represent different opinions, or just one party in order to achieve the greatest amount of unity. In 1951, 61% thought it better to have more than one party, with the proportion increasing to 73% by 1961.⁷ And the proportion saying that democracy was the best form of government for Germany increased from 57% in 1953 to 76% in 1964.⁸

The second type of commitment to a democratic government is based upon emotional attachments. It is here that we find an important gap in the political culture. For the Germans have not yet developed a set of unquestioning emotional commitments to the ideas of democracy, nor do they manifest strong attachments to the legitimizing symbols of the Bonn Republic. One way to identify affective attachments to the regime is to ask a national sample of the population the question: "Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of?" When this question was asked in several countries, it was found that the Germans have much less pride in their government than do Americans and Englishmen. The proportions of people who said that they are proud of their governments is 85% in the United States, 46% in England, and a mere 7% in Germany. The Germans direct their pride to the economy, to the personal virtues of Germans, and to their scientific and artistic accomplishments.⁹ Moreover, in a democratic country we would expect that those people who feel that they can participate in politics—who believe that they can influence governmental decisions—would also evidence a greater amount of pride in their government than the people who see themselves as politically ineffective. This is

true of Americans and Englishmen, but in Germany there is no relationship between an individual's sense of political effectiveness and the likelihood that he will express pride in his democratic political system.¹⁰

On the basis of this distinction between purely pragmatic and emotional attachments to their democratic government, the conclusion emerges that the political culture serves to support German democracy, but it is not the type of support that is most conducive to democracy. For a pragmatic support of democratic government is conditional; it will continue only so long as the people are satisfied with the governmental "outputs." If there were to be a sharp economic recession, or a foreign-policy crisis, for example, given this conditional support for the regime, there would be little certainty that democracy would survive. In contrast, if the Germans placed a high value upon democratic institutions irrespective of whether any particular government was faced with economic difficulties, or was even thought to have brought them about, then we could be far more confident of Germany's democratic future. The democratic outlook in Germany is not necessarily bleak—but it is not by any means certain.

The "All-Weather" Supporters of Democracy

In fact, it may be more significant that the Germans have not deeply rejected democracy, which they may very well have done considering their past history and the fact that democracy was given to them as a "gift" by the victorious Allies, than is the absence of emotional commitments to democracy. Moreover, even though they do not constitute a majority of the population, there is a large group of Germans who exhibit a continuous and broad-ranging set of democratic attitudes, and a still larger group that is conditionally committed to

⁷*Jahrbuch*, I, p. 249; *Jahrbuch*, III, p. 428.

⁸E.M.N.I.D., *Information*, 1964. Also see S. Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 139.

⁹G. A. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 102–103.

¹⁰S. Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–145.

the Bonn Republic for as long as their expectations are realized.

For most purposes, consistent defenders of democracy constitute about one-quarter of the West German electorate, and there is some evidence that they have grown in the course of the 1960's to one-third or more. Only on a few issues did the support of the democratic position in the 1950's and 1960's drop to about one-fifth of the total, as it did in 1966 in the case of only 15% approving of differences in customs and religions among Germans. One-fourth of the respondents to polls in 1952 condemned Adolf Hitler without qualification, demanded, in 1954, access to high government offices for members of the anti-Hitler resistance; declared, in 1953 and 1956, that they would do all they could to prevent the return of any Nazi-type movement to power; said, in 1956, that Germany was not better off for having no Jews, and expressed, in the same year, their acceptance of democracy in terms not only of rights but also of duties. A somewhat larger fraction, 29%, approved the Constitution in 1956—the so-called Basic Law of the Federal Republic, and between 30% and 34%, depending on the wording of the question, endorsed in the same year its black, red, and gold flag—a clear gain from the 25% who had done so in 1954. And in 1960, 25% approved of naming a public school after one of the heroes of the resistance against Hitler.

On many issues, the hard core of 25% "all-weather" democrats are joined by larger numbers of their countrymen. Already in 1952, as many as 71% demanded that a good political party should be "democratic", and as already noted, in 1964 76% approved of democracy for Germany—a substantial increase over the 57% who did so in 1953. Smaller numbers (38%) in 1956 denied that Hitler would have been a great statesman even if there had been no war; 40% in several polls in 1951–54 endorsed peacetime resistance against the Nazi regime; 47% in 1952 recorded a "bad opinion" of Hitler; and the same proportion in 1956 put the main guilt for

World War II on Germany—a substantial increase over the 32% who had done so in 1951. When asked if they would vote for or against "a man like Hitler," the proportion who would vote against such a man increased from 67% in 1953 to 83% in 1967.¹¹

A Politically Cautious Pragmatism

These opinion data have provided a description of the attitudes of the committed democrats constituting about one-quarter of the population. But as we have already noted, the German political culture is primarily characterized by pragmatic attitudes toward the democratic regime. It is to the attitudes of these pragmatists, making up about half the population, that we now turn, although it should be pointed out that this keen concern with security and the material benefits provided by the government is found in a more diluted form among the committed democrats as well.

The hard core of the pragmatists is found in the 15% of the electorate who usually stay at home and the additional 25% who vote only occasionally or who tend to switch their votes from one party to another; they also include most of the 5–15% who say "undecided" or "don't know" in the opinion polls. They seem to have no commitments and no ideology, and they have been called by many names "fellow-travelers of democracy," "success Germans," "the skeptical generation." This group seems larger in Germany than in most other advanced countries. As far as many political issues are concerned, the Federal Republic is like a ship with half its cargo not secured—cargo ready in stormy weather to slide in any direction.

Yet this uncommitted section, too, shares to some extent a body of common commitments

¹¹Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–41, *Jahrbuch*, II, pp. 126, 145, 165, 173, 279, communication of poll results from EMNID Institut, Bielefeld, 1957, 1964, 1966, and 1967.

and a common ideology. They have a lively sense of concrete benefits, which they prefer to abstract slogans. In their reactions to political posters, this group showed that they preferred an emphasis on jobs and homes to such abstract terms as "Socialism" or "free enterprise." They are interested in security and solidarity, and they are willing to accept and support policies and leaders that seem to promote these values. And they find these values clearly embodied in the Western rather than the Eastern and Communist ways of life. In 1965, 32% of West Germans expected America to be stronger than Russia at the end of the next five years, compared to half that number (17%) who expected Russia to be stronger, while in 1955 as many as 68% expected the Western way of life to prevail in Europe, and only 6% thought that the East would prevail.

The trend of changing expectations is shown in Table 4-2. The figures suggest an increasing belief in a persistent stalemate in the realm of nuclear East-West power politics. (This trend continues today.) These figures also show that

the faith in the attractiveness and vitality of the Western way of life is vastly greater than the belief in the superiority of Western power, and despite the growing expectation of a power deadlock there has been almost undiminished confidence in the victory of the Western way of life in Europe.

In addition to being overwhelmingly pro-Western, the uncommitted half of the West German electorate is strongly middle-class in outlook. To learn that a politician had a "thoroughly bourgeois outlook" (*eine durchaus bürgerliche Gesinnung*) would have been a good reason to vote for him among 56% of the respondents to a 1956 poll, and to learn that a politician's views were "thoroughly un-bourgeois" (*unbürgerlich*) would have been a reason to reject him for 79%; only 2% of the voters sampled would have considered a candidate with an "un-bourgeois" attitude worthy of support.¹² Business groups have worked untiringly to reinforce this commitment of between two-

¹²*Jahrbuch*, II, pp. 122-123; see also pp. 116-121, 265-276

TABLE 4-2
Expectations about the East-West Contest, 1953-1965

	Aug. 1953	Sept. 1954	Oct. 1955	Nov. 1957	Dec. 1958	Oct. 1959	Oct. 1961	Oct. 1963	Oct. 1965
Expected winner, if World War III breaks out now									
America	—	43%	—	22%	27%	—	27%	32%	—
Russia	—	22	—	20	16	—	14	11	—
Neither, no opinion	—	35	—	58	57	—	59	57	—
Expected to be more powerful five years from now									
America	32%	—	21%	22	—	20%	—	—	32%
Russia	11	—	16	21	—	23	—	—	17
Both, no opinion	57	—	63	57	—	57	—	—	61
Way of life that will prevail finally in Europe									
Western	72	—	68	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eastern	4	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other, "don't know"	20	—	24	—	—	—	—	—	—

Source: Data in E. P. Neumann, *Public Opinion in Germany*, 1961, pp. 58-59; E. N. and E. P. Neumann, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung*, 1957 (*Jahrbuch*, II), p. 338; *Jahrbuch*, III, 1965, p. 556; E.M.N.I.D., *Informationen*, October, 1965.

thirds and four-fifths of the electorate to middle-class values and attitudes and to minimize dissension between the various "bourgeois parties"—all of whom had to go to the same business-backed "sponsors' associations," "civic associations," and similar disbursing agencies for much of their campaign funds. All this, in turn, contributed to the past and present difficulties of the S.P.D. in attracting a larger part of the floating or uncommitted voters, most of whom have been floating only within the non-Socialist camp.¹² But by the middle 1960's, not only had the S.P.D. formed a coalition government with a "bourgeois" party, but its campaign style had become increasingly "bourgeois" in order to attract the floating vote. As Heidenheimer has observed of the 1965 election:

Following the advice of depth psychologists, the S.P.D. replaced the "provocative" or "low-class" symbols . . . on its posters and handbills with "high-class" and "reassuring" ones. Thus the most widely utilized symbol was the one that frames the party initials within a replica of a German automobile license plate, a symbol of prosperity and achievement. Its numerous publications featured the smiles of happy, prosperous children rather than the frowns of militant workers.¹³

A third manifestation of the uncommitted voters' desire for security is their willingness to follow leaders and elites. The main Christian Democratic poster in the 1957 election showed only the sun-bronzed, impressive face of Chancellor Adenauer and the slogan "No Experiments!" It was developed with the advice of experts in public opinion and persuasion, and it was a resounding success. Even apart from such campaigns, elite opinion may safely depart quite far from mass opinion in many matters, including specific measures of foreign policy

and armament—since in the end the majority of the voters may be expected to accept, or at least passively support, the policies of their leaders.

The independence of elites may be seen, for example, in the C.D.U.'s selection of a successor to Chancellor Erhard in November, 1966. When asked whom they would prefer as a successor to Erhard, in August, 1966, only 3% of a national sample mentioned Kurt Georg Kiesinger.¹⁴ Yet it was Kiesinger whom the C.D.U. chose as their new leader, and thus as Chancellor. In 1965 there was a direct conflict between mass opinion and the government, and here too, elite opinion successfully prevailed. The statute of limitations, according to which the perpetrators of war crimes could be brought to justice, was to expire in 1965. Even though the public knew that a significant number of war criminals had not yet been apprehended, the majority opposed the suggested extension of the statute of limitations because they no longer wanted to be reminded of the Nazi era. Heidenheimer has aptly summarized the situation.

Especially because the issue arose in an election year, German politicians were placed in a dilemma. Elite opinion in allied countries as well as in the Federal Republic strongly urged the extension, and the Bonn politicians knew that if they did not act it would be grist in the mill of the East German propagandists who always sought to link Bonn to pro-Nazi tendencies. At the same time they knew that most of their constituents opposed the measure.¹⁵

In the end, the statute of limitations was extended; prosecutions of Nazi personnel for mass murders were pressed somewhat more vigorously, and these measures were accepted by the public.

A fourth trait is an interest in national power and prestige, not uncommon among the voters in any modern nation-state, but tempered in West Germany since World War II by a sober sense of realism. The great mass of West Ger-

¹²Juan Linz, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–95; U. W. Kiesinger, *German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), pp. 130, 202, 207–217; Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "German Party Finance: C.D.U.," *American Political Science Review*, 51 2 (June, 1957), 369–385.

¹³Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany op. cit.*, p. 104.

¹⁴DIVO, *Präsidenten*, November, 1966.

¹⁵Heidenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

man voters will back any government measure that promises to increase German prosperity, security, prestige, or power, provided that its risks are moderate. Since 1945, the great majority of the West Germans have had no interest in desperate adventures; they very much want peace, and they have shown no inclination to underrate the strength of other countries, either of the United States or of the Soviet Union. Thus in 1965, when asked if they thought that Germany would ever become a major world power again, only 17% said "yes."¹⁷ Only 26% of respondents in 1956 favored fighting an atomic war in defense of democratic freedom rather than let Europe fall under Soviet rule; 36% said they preferred to avoid war even at this price, and the rest were undecided. In 1958, 71% had opposed equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, and 81% had opposed the installation of launching platforms for nuclear rocket weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic.¹⁸ And in 1966, only 8% of West Germans thought that German reunification should be brought about by more intensive pressures, entailing an increased risk of war. In 1961, a bare majority (52%) favored retaining the Bundeswehr, while 29% would have preferred to abolish it.¹⁹ Thus, despite their overwhelmingly pro-Western orientation—being pro-American in the Cold War and favoring the "Western way of life" to the Communist one—these attitudes suggest the willingness of the bulk of West German voters to accept defense policies at moderate levels of visible risk, but a distinct unwillingness on the part of the voters to go much further.

Unexpected circumstances could strain or shatter this limited consensus on policies of cautious national advance. The long drawn-out crisis of West Berlin under Soviet pressure has

received unceasing publicity throughout the Federal Republic, while the popular sentiment for German reunification seems to have grown somewhat, rather than receded, since the early 1950's. Inflamed by various incidents, these feelings may get out of hand and create situations which the Bonn government may find hard to control, and which may confront its Western allies with agonizing choices. A sharp deterioration of economic conditions, a rapid gain of power and confidence among the West German armed forces if they should acquire nuclear weapons, the consistent demands for reunification on *Western* terms might be other sources of serious instability, as could any sudden major threat or provocation by the Soviet-bloc powers.

How the Federal Republic's leaders will succeed in maintaining democracy, moderation, and the limited consensus among the different ideological elements of its population under the difficult conditions of the future may well test their statesmanship. By mid-1967, it seemed that this level of statesmanship had prevailed. Though the economic boom had slackened and financial worries had increased, the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition government, like the Adenauer and Erhard Cabinets before it, had maintained economic solvency and civic peace. In mid-1967, the federal government was proposing a moderate reduction in West German defense expenditures and troop strength, possibly back to a level of about 400,000 men, paralleling the moderate reduction in United States troops in Germany, which then was under consideration in Washington because of United States concern with its balance of payments and the demands of the Vietnam war. In August, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson and Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger announced that neither government would reduce its troops in Germany without full prior consultation with all its N.A.T.O. allies—indicating a desire on both sides to avoid any drastic changes.

West German democracy thus far has been

¹⁷Institut für Demoskopie, June, 1965.

¹⁸*Jahrbuch*, III, p. 258; E. P. Neumann, *Public Opinion in Germany*, 1961, pp. 52–53; E.M.N.I.D., *Informationen*, January 31, 1967.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

based largely on the collaboration of a significant number of committed democrats with an even larger number of "fair-weather" democrats whose allegiance is primarily based upon what they expect to get. This purely pragmatic orientation of the latter is by no means the best cultural foundation for democracy, nor is it the worst. It has given democracy in the Federal Republic only few convinced defenders, but it has cut down even more the number of its enemies.

Political Passivity and the Absence of Extremism

Emotion-charged radicalism, extremist ideologies, and the politics of the street which were characteristic of the last years of Weimar, have dwindled under the regime of Bonn; they have been replaced by a cautious pragmatism that generally clings to the security of the political Center, rejecting the appeals of both the Extreme Right and Left. Economic prosperity has led the electorate to support the moderate parties of the middle, while the share of the more radical Right-wing parties has remained below 8%, and the Communist Party, which never received more than 5% of the vote, has been declared illegal. The absence of extremist parties on the Left and the Right has freed the two Center parties from parliamentary obstruction and from attempts to win away the Right-wing supporters of the C.D.U. and the Left-wing supporters of the S.P.D., thereby encouraging these two parties to compete for the undecided voters in the center of the political spectrum rather than the disgruntled ones on their extremist wings. The predominance of the two Center parties also indicates that a broad-based procedural consensus—a fundamental agreement on the constitutional rules of the game—has emerged, as perhaps most clearly seen in the formation of a C.D.U.-S.P.D. coalition government.

The absence of intensely emotional political

attitudes is also manifested in a series of opinion polls. In evaluating Adenauer's performance as Chancellor, the proportion that considered his work "very good" at one extreme and "bad" at the other hovered at around 10%, with the bulk of the population falling in between, indicating a lack of "black or white" political evaluations.²⁰ In contrast to the intense partisan rivalries of Weimar's politics, expressions of support for Adenauer were frequently found among supporters of parties other than his own C.D.U.²¹ More moderate approval for Adenauer's chancellorship ranged from about 35% in the early 1950's to between 45 and 55% in the early 1960's, and it remained at this higher level for his successor, Ludwig Erhard. The work of the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition government in 1966-67 was similarly endorsed by over 60% of poll respondents.²²

The West Germans' passive and unemotional political posture is apparent in a comparison with American and British attitudes toward political participation. Whereas in the United States and Britain 51% and 39% (respectively) of those interviewed said that the individual ought to be active in local community affairs, only 22% of the Germans interviewed agreed with this viewpoint.²³ And when asked whether they would attempt to influence their national governments if a law was being considered that the individual thought of as "unjust or harmful," similar differences were found among the three countries. Among the Americans 21% replied

²⁰EMNID, *Information*, October, 1958, cited in Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

²¹Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 139. In a series of polls taken in 1954 and 1955, the people being interviewed were asked if they would prefer a party that has a firmly entrenched program, or one that seeks to follow a middle way. While almost half the people interviewed opted for a firmly committed party (though not necessarily an ideological one), more than a third preferred a middle-of-the-road party. Gerhard Schmidchen, *Die Befragte Nation*, 1959 (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach), p. 118.

²²Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, *Tabulations of Poll Data from the Institute of Democracy* (Allensbach, Germany), 1949-1967, communicated to the authors, July, 1967.

²³Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

that they would not do anything; the British figure was 32%; but the total jumped to 56% of "do-nothings" among the Germans.²⁴ The admirable voting habits of today's Germans notwithstanding—almost 90% of the eligible voters cast their ballots in national elections—even their attitude toward this political exercise is seen to exhibit a passive quality. Rather than seeing the vote as a means to control their political leaders, 31% of the Germans (a proportion higher than that in England and America) consider the vote as an obligation that they owe to their country. Furthermore, many Germans have said that their obligation to participate in politics is fulfilled simply by voting. As a German worker put it, one's responsibility to the local community was to "choose a mayor at election time. That's all you need to do. The mayor takes care of everything."²⁵

It is always risky to generalize about a country, a people, or a generation, and yet we cannot avoid putting our impressions into general terms if we are to think coherently. With all due caution, then, we may note a few impressions about the young Germans of the 1960's. They seem to have many or more of the strong points and virtues of their fathers, and they seem to have them more *sans phrase*—without overassertion or selfconsciousness. They seem more relaxed and more confident; less defensive and less envious; more sensitive and more concerned with moral values; more skeptical of high-sounding phrases, and yet more ready to experiment and innovate. Many of them have played as children in the ruins of their cities; and yet they seem a remarkably hopeful generation to have grown from this heritage. Much may depend on whether they will find time and peace during the next two decades to develop their full contribution to a democratic Ger-

many. They welcome ideas; but they distrust overly rigid ideologies.

IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES AND GROUPINGS

"Ideology" is a label we sometimes apply to the belief systems of other people. It is a sobering experience to discover that we, too, hold many beliefs that we take for granted; that many of these beliefs are coherent and mutually supporting; that we use this collection of our coherent beliefs as a map of reality, or a frame of reference, on which we enter whatever new information we receive, and by which we try to make sense of it. In particular, we are using ideologies as instruments to organize our fragmentary and disjointed knowledge of the world, and to make it look more complete and more consistent than it actually is, sometimes to allay our own anxieties. In short, we, too may be said to have an ideology which serves us, and inevitably influences us, both in orientation and in action. It would be utterly naive to deny that ideology exists, and only a little less naive to claim that it exists exclusively in others. To be more realistic, we must try to assess ideology and its effects critically in each case, both in others and in ourselves.

Germany was a highly "ideological" country between 1930 and 1945, with an intense degree of ideological commitment among the Nazis and most of their opponents. Between 1945 and the present, the situation has been quite different. Intense ideological fanaticism has been rare; even many of those who were deeply committed to political ideas kept them within the limits of pragmatism and moderation. Under this landscape of moderate and practical politics in the Bonn Republic, however, many ideological commitments and cleavages have persisted, and some of these may show up again in times of political or economic stress. This is true not merely of some older people in holding on to the attitudes of their

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 203.

²⁵Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 148. Similar findings are reported in Wolfgang Hartenstein and Gunter Schubert, *Mitlaufen oder Mitbestimmen*, 1961 (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt), pp. 36–37.

past. During the last two decades, younger people in Germany have accepted new political ideas that may again sharpen into more intense ideological commitments under the stimulus of some crisis.

The Popular Rejection of Communism

One earlier ideology, however, has practically disappeared from West German politics. The Communists, who attracted an average of 13% of the votes cast, during the seven national elections between 1924 and 1933, have dwindled into insignificance in the Bonn Republic. This change was complete even before the outlawing of their party in 1956. In the 1949 Bundestag elections, the Communist share dropped to less than 6% of the valid votes cast. In 1953, the Communist strength dropped still further, to about 2%, of the votes cast.²⁶

The votes in the Land elections confirm this trend. Thus in Bavaria, where the Communists received the support of an average of nearly 5% of the electorate in the seven national elections between 1924 and 1929, they again received 5% in the Land election of December, 1946. Their share then dropped to 2% in 1950, and it remained at or below the 2% level for the rest of the party's legal existence. In West Berlin, too, the share of the electorate voting for the Communist-led S.E.D. Party dropped from 12% in 1946 to 2% in 1954 and 1958.²⁷

Poll results consistently show the same picture. Expressions of sympathy for the Commu-

nist Party, or for the Communist regime in the G.D.R., are down to, or below, the 2% level, while 96% of West German respondents—a staggeringly high proportion—say they are certain that living conditions in the Federal Republic are better than in Communist-ruled East Germany.

In West German politics, Communism is as unpopular as sin—or, if possible, more so. The reasons for this change from the 1920's are complex. The division and occupation of Germany at the end of World War II and the excesses of Russian troops cannot account for all of it. Communist votes in West Germany were higher in 1946–49, when the memory of any such excesses would have been fresh; they dropped only later, when the events of 1945 were receding into the past. Moreover, in Finland, which was also occupied by Soviet troops and lost important territories to Russia, the Communist Party continued to receive a much higher degree of popular support.²⁸ Popular revulsion from Communism in West Germany may have been promoted by the continuing stream of expellees and refugees from Communist-ruled areas; by the inflow of these intensely anti-Communist millions into the least-skilled and worst-paid occupations, where the Communists otherwise might have hoped for converts; and most important of all, by the unprecedented rise and spread of economic prosperity after 1948, combined with effective social welfare legislation.

The Changed Emphasis of Democratic Socialism

Even the democratic version of Marxist ideas, traditional for generations in the Social Democratic Party, has greatly receded. The Social Democrats have always been implacably opposed to Communist ideas of violent revolu-

²⁶Pre-war data from Sydney L. W. Mellen, *The German People and the Post-war World, A Study Based on Election Statistics, 1871–1933*, *American Political Science Review*, 37 4 (August, 1943) Table 2, 612–613, post-war data from Erwin Faul (ed.), *Wahlen und Wähler in Westdeutschland* (Villingen Schwarzwald, Ring Verlag, 1960) pp 321–323. The latter is an outstandingly useful and thoughtful collection of studies on voting behavior in the Federal Republic. An important recent study is Erwin Schenck, and Rudolf Wildenmann (eds.), *Zur Soziologie der Wahl* (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1965).

²⁷From data in Faul, *op cit*, pp 329–335, 366–367.

²⁸These points are made by Juan Linz, *The Social Basis of West German Politics* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, Inc.), Columbia University Ph. D. Dissertation, 1959, pp. 64–65.

tion and dictatorship, but they had accepted Karl Marx's belief in the central importance of class conflict and in the necessity of a fundamental change in property relations in industry, banking, and large-scale agriculture, to be brought about by far-reaching policies of nationalization. While some ideas of this kind were still voiced in the early years after 1945 by such S.P.D. leaders as Kurt Schumacher, they did not prove popular in the elections of 1949 and thereafter, since they had become associated in popular memory with the economic shortages, austerity, and rationing of the early post-war years. Since the late 1950's, the S.P.D. has tried to change its public image from that of a "workers' party" to that of a "party of all the people", stressing human rights, welfare policies, full employment, and the guidance of a private-enterprise economy through tax and credit policies, somewhat in the style of a large part of the Democratic Party in the North of the United States. The "basic program" of the S.P.D., voted by a special party congress at Godesberg in 1959, formally expressed this change of emphasis; and in 1962, when it was suggested that the customary Socialist form of address, "comrade," be dropped, it was only decided to retain this old salutation "for the sake of long tradition." And at a special meeting of the S.P.D. in December, 1967, the hall was not decorated by the red flags that had previously appeared at official party gatherings. These symbolic changes are one manifestation of the impact of the younger generation on West German politics. Many of these men and women feel oversaturated with the trappings of close human community in politics, such as political salutations and the ritual use of the familiar "thou," all of which became discredited through their use by the Nazis.

Nazi Ideology and the Extreme Right

Compared to Communist inspired ideologies, those of the Right have retained

greater strength in their extreme versions and even more in their more moderate versions. From the mid-1950's to the late 1960's, about one German in 20 could still be counted as an intense hard-core Nazi, while one in eight professed explicit Nazi sympathies. Thus in a 1953 poll, 13% said they would welcome the attempt of a new Nazi Party to seize power, including 5% who promised their active support.²⁹ In repeated polls during the years 1949-63, similar proportions of 7 to 15% said (1) they liked Hitler and his rabid Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, (2) professed Nazi race doctrines about the Jews, and (3) blamed foreign powers, and not Germany, for the outbreak of World War II in 1939.³⁰ Almost the same proportion of explicit Nazi sympathies has been found among the younger generation. In three polls in 1953, 1954, and 1955 among young people between 15 and 25, an average of 10% professed favorable opinions of Hitler and of National Socialism.³¹ In July, 1956, in a special poll of young men, 16% declared without qualification that National Socialism had been "a good idea."³²

Another 10 to 15% of Germans in the 1955-65 period were unmistakable, though less fervent, sympathizers of National Socialism or extreme nationalism. Together with the 10 to 15% of professed Nazi sympathizers, they bring up the ideological Right wing of the German electorate to about 25%, or one-fourth of the total. The same proportion, about one-quarter of poll respondents, expressed "predominantly favorable" opinions of Hitler, his deputy, Rudolf Hess, and the Nazi youth leader Baldur von Schirach; rejected in repeated polls

²⁹*Jahrbuch*, II, pp. 277, 279.

³⁰On these and the following points, see Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers*, pp. 40-42; and poll data in *Jahrbuch*, I, pp. 126, 132, 136, 138, 174, 276; *Jahrbuch*, II, pp. 141, 277-279; *Jahrbuch*, III, pp. 216-217, 233, 297.

³¹From data in Rolf Frohner, *Wie stark sind die Halbstarken Dritte* E.M.N.I.D. *Untersuchung zur Situation der deutschen Jugend* (Bielefeld: Stackelberg Verlag, 1956), pp. 119-121, 305-310.

³²*Jahrbuch*, II, p. 149.

the black, red, and gold flag of the Federal Republic, registered an unfriendly attitude toward democracy, blamed domestic sabotage and treason as the main causes of Germany's defeat in World War II, insisted "unconditionally" that in 1933 Germany had had no other choice except Communism or National Socialism, and wanted to bar from high government positions in the Federal Republic any man who had taken part in the wartime resistance against Hitler.³³

On many particular issues, a considerably large proportion of Germans agreed with Nazi views. A number of differently worded polls through the mid-1960's consistently found 30 to 40% of the respondents expressing anti-Semitic views.³⁴ The reality of the attitudes indicated by these poll results was demonstrated in December, 1959, and January, 1960, when a Jewish tombstone and a synagogue in Cologne were disfigured with painted anti-Jewish slogans and Nazi swastikas. These acts of vandalism received wide and unfavorable publicity in the West German press, radio, and television, but were promptly followed within about four weeks by 470 similar incidents, at first particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia, but later, in the wake of the mounting publicity, in all Lands of the Federal Republic. A journalistic survey of crime waves in Germany later cited this chain reaction of outrages as a typical example of "sequential crimes"—that is, of cases where an already existing predisposition toward a particular type of crime or psychopathic outrage is triggered off by the news of a similar act having been committed elsewhere.³⁵ The West German authorities, both Land and Federal, were quick and unequivocal in condemning these outrages, and so were most articulate

Germans. Yet the fact that there should be so many latent offenders, ready to commit so many imitative outrages in so short a time, vividly suggests how much tinder still resides beneath the tranquil surface of West German politics.

The 1961 trial in Israel of one of the chief organizers of the mass killing of Jews under Hitler, Adolf Eichmann, seems to have had a distinct impact on German opinion. Eichmann confessed the fact of the organized killings of men, women, and children, but defended himself on the grounds of having obeyed superior orders. The fact that 6 million Jewish lives were lost as a result of Nazi persecution was established once again by expert testimony at the trial. Earlier, in 1952, about two-fifths of Germans polled had opposed legal punishment for anti-Semitic propaganda, poll results published in 1957 showed that nearly two-thirds of the respondents had rejected a lower estimate of 5 million Jewish victims of the Nazis as "too high", and that 37% had called it "grossly exaggerated." By January, 1960, however, only 7% insisted that the perpetrators of hostile actions against Jews should not be punished by the courts, while another 15% avoided a yes-or-no answer to this question. In April, 1961, two-thirds of German poll respondents condemned Eichmann as a criminal and murderer; only 15% wanted a mild judgment for him, another 19% answered "don't know," 35% demanded the death penalty for the Nazi executioner, and another 31% wanted him to get penal servitude for life. Whether the impact of the Eichmann trial on German opinion has been only temporary, or whether it has contributed to a long-run change, only the future can reveal.³⁶

Nazi ideas or practices receive support from a broader sector of the German electorate on a variety of other issues, particularly where national solidarity or military considerations are involved. In many such cases, national solidar-

³³*Jahrbuch* I, pp. 135-137; *Jahrbuch*, II, pp. 144-170, 172-173; *Jahrbuch*, III, pp. 232-233, 235.

³⁴*Jahrbuch*, II, p. 126; *Jahrbuch*, III, pp. 216-217; Erich Luth, "Deutsche und Juden heute," *Der Monat*, 10 110 (November, 1957), 47, 49; *The New York Times* (March 28, 1958); Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* p. 41.

³⁵*Der Spiegel* 16 27 (July 4 1962), 47-49. According to Arnold Heidenheimer in *The Governments of Germany*, p. 88, the official count of outrages finally rose to 685.

³⁶Data in this paragraph from *Jahrbuch*, I, pp. 125-137, Erich Luth, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 49; Erich Peter Neumann, *Public Opinion in Germany, 1961* (Allensbach and Bonn: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1961), pp. 48-49.

ity seems to outweigh more universal standards of ethics or morality among a sizable group of voters. Thus, in a poll published in 1961, as many as 36% said that even "if after 1933 a person was firmly convinced that wrongs and crimes were being committed under Hitler," he should not have offered any resistance; and when further asked what such a person should have done during the war, the group rejecting any resistance rose to 49%, with 34% advising the moral objector to "wait until after the war," and another 15% saying simply "neither then nor ever." In the 1956-60 period between 40 and 49% opposed the alleged proposal of a city government to name a public school after a well-known hero of the German wartime resistance.³⁷ Similarly, 39% said in 1954 that anti-Hitler refugees should be barred from high government positions in the Federal Republic; in 1960, 30% declared that "without the war, Hitler would have been one of the greatest German statesmen," accepting apparently within this judgment his concentration camps, mass murders, and dictatorship; more than 50% in 1951 asked for the lifting of the ban on the wearing of the Nazi war decorations, and opposed their being reissued with the swastikas removed; and 55% in 1953 denied that there had been major war crimes by the German military, and insisted that the German soldiers of World War II had no cause for any self-reproach for their behavior in occupied countries.³⁸

Most of the potential strength of the extreme Right-wing ideology in Germany rests upon just this partial overlap with the beliefs and attitudes of broader sections of the German people. Ideological hard-core activists have become very few in West Germany, well below 2% of the electorate in the case of the Communists, and about 5% in the case of the Nazis and related Right-wing extremists. But while much

of the Communist ideology implies a sharp break with many popular German traditions and beliefs, the ideology of the Extreme Right often represents an extreme exaggeration of more widespread popular habits and beliefs. Where the few remaining Communists in West Germany are isolated within a wall of popular rejection and distrust, the hard core of Extreme Right-wing and Nazi adherents can be likened to the central layers of an onion, surrounded by layer upon layer more distant from the core, but with few sharp breaks between them. The position in terms of poll results from the early 1950's is summarized in Table 4-3.

TABLE 4-3
*Popular Views of the
Legitimacy of Extremist Parties*

	Negative views	Neutral or no opinion	Positive views	Total
Respondents' views of:				
Communists	80%	9%	11%	100%
Right-wing extremists	42	46	12	100

Source: Data in Juan Linz, *The Social Bases of West German Politics* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, Inc.), Columbia University Ph.D. Dissertation, Mic 59-4075, 1959, pp. 114-116; and E. N. and E. P. Neumann, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung, 1947-1955* (*Jahrbuch*, I) (Allensbach am Bodensee: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1957), pp. 272-275.

In interpreting these data it must be remembered, of course, that a positive judgment of the legitimacy of a party—that is, of its right to exist as part of an accepted political system—does not necessarily imply any agreement with its views. Thus, while less than 2% of West Germans voted or declared themselves as Communists, no more than 11% would concede them even the right to exist, while 80% rejected them as illegitimate, and only 9% were un-

³⁷E. P. Neumann, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-47; *Jahrbuch*, II, p. 145; *Jahrbuch*, III, p. 235.

³⁸Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers*, p. 42; *Jahrbuch*, II, p. 278; *Jahrbuch*, III, p. 233.

decided. The contrast to the popular image of the Right-wing extremists is striking; only 42% saw them as illegitimate in the Bonn Republic, while a plurality of 46% registered themselves as undecided.

The Extreme Right is thus not isolated in West Germany. While the discredited Nazi leaders and symbols cannot be paraded in public with any chance of success, thousands of former Nazis have returned as employees of the government at all levels, or have been elected to various positions of influence. The political significance of the extreme Right-wing ideology is based on this continuity of the contacts of its adherents with broader strata of the West German electorate, with some sections of the West German elites, and with some parts of the West German government.³⁹

Very slowly, some of this Right-wing strength is being eroded. The 12% who insisted on a one-party system for Germany in 1959 were the remnant of a larger sector, 22%, who had expressed this view in 1951.⁴⁰ The proportion of people who would vote for "a man like Hitler" decreased from 15% in 1954 to 4% in 1967, although 13% in 1967 replied that they do not have any opinion on the subject.⁴¹ We have noted above the decline in overt anti-Semitic responses to polls in the early 1960's. However, the recent sudden growth of electoral support for the Right-wing National Democratic Party indicates that neo-Nazi supporters continue to exist. The National Democrats only received 2% of the vote in the 1965 Bundestag election. However, in four Landtag elections carried out in 1966 and 1967 they polled between 7 and 12% of the vote—in Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse, Bavaria and Bremen. And in a 1966 national survey, 10% preferred to see the further growth of the N.P.D., with another

19% replying that they had no opinion on the subject.⁴²

Although the leader of the National Democrats does not have a Nazi past, some of the members of the central executive do. And the party's appeal is in some ways reminiscent of Nazi propaganda before 1933. The National Democrats recurrently charge that the federal government is controlled by an "unscrupulous clique" that is undermining "national values." The C.D.U. and the S.P.D., they say, have "sold out" to foreign interests, allowing the country to be deeply penetrated by foreign capital and workers. The vice-chairman of the party once denied the party's anti-Semitic orientation, but added that "the foreign workers are for us what the Jews were for the Nazis."⁴³ And the party newspaper carries advertisements for a four-volume edition of Hitler's speeches. The party's neo-Nazi tendencies are also manifested in a 1967 poll which asked whether the respondents would vote for or against "a man like Hitler." Among the N.P.D.'s supporters, 36% said that they would, compared to 11% of the N.P.D.'s sympathizers, and 3% of the population as a whole.⁴⁴

The National Democrats remain politically insignificant in Germany's national and state legislatures, but, given sudden electoral gains in combination with the continued existence of a significant body of neo-Nazi sympathizers, there is little certainty that their political power will not develop into a force that has to be reckoned with in German politics. The danger stems not so much from the surfacing of neo-Nazis alone, as from the possibility that Right-wing extremists may effectively appeal to the dissatisfied of all classes under a nationalist banner. The general trend toward a weaker Extreme Right indicated by the opinion polls may

³⁹For an excellent discussion of these matters, see Alfred Grosser, *Die Bonner Demokratie* (Dusseldorf: Juhl, 1960), pp. 263-289.

⁴⁰E. P. Neumann, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

⁴¹EMNID, *Informationen*, March, 1967.

⁴²The 1966 Survey *op. cit.* There is no relationship between N.D.P. sympathies and age.

⁴³Cited in Walter Laqueur, "Bonn Is Not Weimar," *Commentary* (March, 1967), p. 37.

⁴⁴EMNID, *Informationen*, March, 1967.

also be counterbalanced by the succession of the age group born between 1912 and 1927 to positions of influence, since among them the effects of Nazi indoctrination were somewhat stronger. And the seniority system in the Civil Service, which will fill most of the topranking positions after 1965 with officials first appointed during the Nazi period of 1933-45,

may work in the same direction. Yet on balance, the extremist trees are not likely to grow into the sky, and during the first 20 years of the Federal Republic a stronger bloc of adherents to the ideology of democracy has had an opportunity to consolidate itself. Here the search of the younger generation for acceptable values may well prove crucial.



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Germany has long been predominantly urban and industrial, and it became somewhat more so during the 1950's. In 1965, cities and towns contained nearly four-fifths of the population of the Federal Republic, excluding West Berlin. Large cities above 100,000 population accounted for 34%, middle sized cities with 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants added another 16%. As much as 28% of West Germans outside West Berlin, however, still lived in small towns of between 2,000 and 20,000 people, and the remaining 22% lived in still smaller and for the most part rural communities. No political party stressing mainly rural interests could hope for a majority, but since 50% of the voters still live in communities of less than 20,000 people, the parties could hardly omit making an appeal to rural and small-town voters and their values. However, the Right-of-Center parties have been significantly more successful in attracting the vote in communities of less than 20,000 people. Whereas 41% of the S.P.D. supporters live in these communities, 55% of the C.D.U. supporters, 51% of the F.D.P. supporters, and 58% of the N.P.D. supporters come from these medium-size and small towns.¹

The Second World War had left its mark on the population. At the beginning of 1960, there were still 53% women to 47% men in West Germany, and in the important age-group between 30 and 40 years, from which many men had been killed in the war, women made up 55%. During World War II and the years immediately following it, fewer children were born, so that in 1959 the Federal Republic had more inhabitants aged between 50 and 60 years than it had youngsters between five and 15. The somewhat unusual age structure of the population of Germany can be seen from the comparisons in Table 5-1, which shows that

¹ *U.S.J.B.*, 1965, p. 41, Table 11, D.I.V.O. Institut, *Umfra-*

gen, October, 1966

TABLE 5-1
Age-Groups in Germany and Other Countries

A. Five Age-Groups in the Federal Republic

Age	Percentage
0-15	21%
16-30	23
31-45	18
46-60	21
60 plus	17

B. Some Summary Comparisons

	Under 15	15-45	Over 45
German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.)	21%	37%	41%
German Federal Republic	21	41	38
United Kingdom	23	39	37
France	26	39	36
Switzerland	24	41	34
Italy	25	34	31
United States	31	40	29
U.S.S.R.	29	47	24
Japan	30	48	22

Source: *SJ.B.*, 1961, pp. 29, 46-49.

the population of the Federal Republic, as well as that of the G.D.R., is old even by West European standards.

The various political and social attitudes of age groups differ considerably. The younger people are more prosperous and nonpolitical; the oldsters are worse off and more conservative, as is shown in Table 5-2. Instead of leading to any Left-of-Center radicalism, economic deprivation in the Federal Republic has mainly hit the older people and has left them as conservative, or moderate Right-of-Center, as ever, if not more so.

Special interest also attaches to two particular age-groups. The first, aged in 1960 between 45 and 60, includes many who made their careers first during the Hitler years after 1933, when they were between 18 and 33 years old; the normal retirement of still older men brought the members of this group into many

senior positions by 1965. The second group, aged in 1960 between 30 and 45 years, had to spend a large part of its formative years under Hitler's rule, but it also experienced the failure and collapse of the Nazi dictatorship at an impressionable age; this group is likely to succeed to senior offices in government and private life between about 1970 and 1975. The strength of these age-groups in the 1959 population of the Federal Republic, as shown in Table 5-1, was somewhat less than one-fifth for the 30-45-year group (18%), and nearly one-quarter for the 15-30-year-olds (23%). The groups under 15, and between 45 and 60 years, respectively, were about equally strong, with 21% each, and 17% were over 60 years old.

In short, the preference of the West Germans for reconstruction over reproduction between 1945 and 1955 has made West Germany a country with one of the oldest populations among the large nations. Under these conditions, the appeal of youth in Germany is likely to be slightly weaker, and the appeal of age and experience slightly stronger, than in the United States. These facts may have had something to do with the seemingly perennial popularity of the late Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, known in Germany as *Der Alte* or "the old one" (he was 88 when he resigned as Chancellor), but they are likely to persist in the public appeal of white-haired statesmen like Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, who in 1967 continued to outshine the more youthful image of his S.P.D. Vice-Chancellor, Willy Brandt.

THE STRENGTH OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS

Nearly half the people of the Federal Republic in 1961 were members of its workforce of 26.8 million.² The rest are for the most

²These and the following data are based on figures in *SJ.B.*, 1961, pp. 142, 149, 213-216; *SJ.B.*, 1966, p. 449, based upon the 1961 census.

TABLE 5-2

Age-Groups and Attitudes

<i>Attitude reported in polls</i>	<i>18-29</i>	<i>30-44</i>	<i>45-59</i>	<i>60 and over</i>
Personal economic situation (May, 1955)				
Better than pre-war	36%	26%	17%	15%
Worse than pre-war	21	40	50	57
Talk occasionally about politics (June, 1956)	39	57	53	53
Right-of Center in politics (Feb, 1956)	31	39	41	44
Left-of-Center	15	22	21	19
Do not know meaning of 'Right' and 'Left'	37	25	22	24

Source: *Jahrbuch*, II (1957), pp. 35, 46, 48

part their dependent children, other family members, and some pensioners.

The Federal Republic is one of the most highly industrialized countries in the world, only 14% of its work-force is engaged in agriculture. Nevertheless, only a little less than half its work-force—48%—are actually engaged in industry or crafts. The sizable remaining group of 38% is occupied in commerce, transportation, and services, both private and public. There are not enough farmers to bring victory to a traditionalist party, but there are enough to press effectively for special economic and political concessions.

Nor are there quite enough workers to bring success to a straight class appeal. Industry proper absorbs only 38% of the work-force; of these about 6% are various kinds of white-collar employees, and only 24%, or about 6 million, are industrial workers of the kind which Karl Marx had expected to become a majority of each industrialized nation. Even if one adds to their number the workers in large enterprises outside of industry, such as those in transportation, the proportion of "proletarians," in the Marxist sense of the term, within the West German working population falls far short of a majority. Only by adding to their

number all "blue-collar" employees in small businesses, workshops, and service establishments, as well as the few remaining rural laborers (2%), and the 1% registered unemployed, can the aggregate proportion of workers of all kinds be brought to 51% of the work-force. By contrast, the workers in factories with over a thousand employees—whom Lenin considered the best prospects for Left-wing radicalism—number only about 3 million, or roughly 12% of the total.

After the 51% workers, the strongest group consists of white-collar employees, who make up about 26% of the working population and who include about 5% public officials and perhaps 1% of high-level employees and managers. Another 11% consists of the self-employed urban middle class and the members of their families assisting them in their enterprises. The main groups within this middle class are small businessmen in commerce and the service industries (6%), artisans (4%), and the small group of professional men (3%). The remainder are peasants (5%) and family members working on their farms (7%).

These figures show the remarkable strength of the self-employed group. Together with the members of their families working in the family

enterprises, they made up an unchanged 23% of the total in 1950 and in 1959—11% in the towns and 12% in the country, and totaling nearly half as much as the workers. Under these conditions, the 26% white-collar employees are often likely to prove the decisive group in mass politics: without their support, neither labor or middle-class appeals are likely to be successful. Moreover, two of the subgroups included among them—the same 5% public officials and somewhat more than 1% soldiers—may actually or potentially carry influence well beyond mere numbers.

There is a strong tendency for the workers to vote for the S.P.D., and the employers, professional people, and farmers to vote for the C.D.U. (See Table 2, Chapter VII).

LEVELS OF EDUCATION

All West German children must go to school for at least eight years, but four-fifths of the students leave school at age 14 when they finish their primary education. Thus, in the early 1960's, only 18% of West German youth in the 15- to 19-year age-group were full-time students, compared to 31% in France and 66% in the United States.³ Nearly one-quarter (22%) of the 16-year-olds in 1959 were getting the *Mittlere Reife*, which is the German counterpart to an American non-academic high-school education.⁴ This was a considerable improvement over the education received by their parents. According to polling data from the mid-1950's, only 12% of the general population above 18 years had attained this educational level.⁵

Graduation from a full-fledged German academic high-school—the *Abitur*, which is the equivalent of an American junior college—had

been achieved by only 4% of the general population in the mid-1950's, but it was being attained by as many as 6% of the 19- and 20-year-olds in 1959—by about 10% of the men and 2% of the women.⁶

There was similar evidence of substantial broader access to university education. Between 1957 and 1965, the number of university students almost doubled, rising from 112,000 to 212,000, when about 6% of the 19-year-olds were entering the universities—8% of the men and 4% of the women.

Compared to the total population of all ages, about four out of every thousand were attending some university or technical college, as against the earlier proportion of two per thousand in 1950 and in 1932 at the end of the Weimar Republic, and against only one student per thousand population under Hitler's regime in 1938.⁷ Quietly and without much rhetoric, the Bonn Republic by the mid-1960's had opened the gates of the German universities about twice as wide as they had ever been opened. While the West German levels are still well below the United States figure of 18 students per thousand population—and of perhaps 12 American students per thousand above the junior-college level which corresponds to the German *Abitur*—and while thus there still was no very broad college-educated group in the West German electorate, the proportion of university-educated men and women had grown significantly, and promised to continue to do so.

The widening of opportunities for higher education also has brought with it a broadening of the social composition of the student body. Nearly half the West German students now receive modest but effective aid from scholarships under a national foundation; and the top students, approximately 1% of the total, get

³Thomas Ellwein, *Politische Verhaltenslehre* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1963), pp. 131–134.

⁴These and the following figures are based on data in S.J.B., 1961, pp. 46, 97, 105, and 108, unless otherwise indicated.

⁵*Jahrbuch*, II, pp. xlv and 4.

⁶*Ibid.*, S.J.B., 1961, pp. 46, 97, 105, and 108; and S.J.B. 1966, pp. 99, 101.

⁷From same sources as above; and William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), p. 252.

more substantial grants. There are probably still not more than 5 to 10% sons of workers among the students at West German universities, but even this proportion is larger than it has been under any previous regime, and it seems likely to grow in the future. Together with the absolute increase in the number of students, the increase of the share of students from poorer families has meant that the total opportunities available to students of, say, working class background have improved appreciably. At the same time, this process is giving to the Federal Republic a substantially larger share of academically educated voters, recruited from a wider variety of backgrounds, and this may well have some effects on the future style and trend of West German politics.

It is more difficult to gauge exactly the potential political implications of this expansion in the share of the better educated among the electorate. In the United States, college education has been on the whole a liberalizing influence, in many surveys and polls, the college educated have shown a greater interest in facts, a markedly greater tolerance for views other than their own, a greater readiness to compromise on matters of ideology or tradition, and a greater commitment to human rights and civil liberties. In Germany under the Weimar Republic, on the other hand, students and university graduates were on the average more nationalistic, militaristic, and intolerant than the bulk of their countrymen. After 1933, the Nazi government cut university enrollments in half within six years; the Nazis tended to impose political screening upon the remaining students, and even more upon the university faculties and especially upon new appointees to academic posts. Although these controls were not perfectly efficient, they had their effects. A major survey in 1950 still found pro-Nazi and anti-Western sentiments significantly higher among German holders of academic degrees than among the population at large. The nationalism of German academics, as it appeared

in this survey, was exceeded only by that of peasants, and of men with more than six years of military service.⁸ The education now offered at West German universities is permeated with a more moderate and democratic spirit, even though there were still, among the prominent professors in 1967, men with a past record of Nazi sympathies, or party membership, or past public endorsements of Nazi leaders or doctrines. On the other side, there are many German scholars who maintained an honorable record of integrity during the Hitler years, and of opposition to the Nazi tyranny. Quite a few of these men suffered exile, imprisonment, or other persecution. Nevertheless, a survey for the year 1955 did not find among the published biographies of the heads of 38 institutions of higher education a single mention of an anti-Nazi record.⁹

Among the students, the traditional, extremely nationalistic student groups of the drinking and dueling type had been for the most part arch-conservative rather than National Socialist in political outlook. Despite their opposition to the totalitarian claims of the Nazi regime, their past record of hostility to democracy, contempt for Western countries and values, and sympathy for aggressive militarism brought them into discredit and eclipse during the first years after the Nazi collapse in 1945. During the 1950's, however, these dueling fraternities had a partial revival, strongly aided by alumni in high positions in German industry, business, and to a lesser extent the Civil Service, who made it known that a student's membership in their old and now reconstituted fraternity might greatly benefit his later career. By the beginning of the 1960's, an estimated 5% of university students were Nazi sympathizers, and another 15 to 20% were members of the

⁸Friedrich Pollock, ed., *Gruppenexperiment Ein Studienbericht* (Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie, Band 2 (Frankfurt Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1955), pp. 236-272, see also Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Power*, pp. 40-43.

⁹Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.* p. 123.

revived drinking and dueling fraternities—a proportion corresponding roughly to the 25% share of holders of Right-wing sentiments found among the general electorate.

Whatever the views of German students, they are putting on record their willingness to make sacrifices. Whereas in a general sampling of young men between 17 and 27 years, only about half were willing to admit that there are any goals worth risking one's life for, as many as 80% of the university students in a 1960 poll took this view.¹⁰ As Table 5-3 shows, there is an interesting difference between the particular values endorsed by the students on the one hand, and by the general sampling of young men on the other.

	As named in 1960 by:	
	Young men 17-27 years	University students
Liberty, human dignity, humanity	7%	35%
Christian religion	—	22
The family, persons near and dear	12	8
Germany, the Fatherland	13	6

Source: Erich Peter Neumann, *Public Opinion in Germany, 1961* (Allensbach and Bonn: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1961), pp. 32-35.

The West German universities, in contrast to the ideological regimentation of their counterparts in the G.D.R., are still an arena of conflicting ideas and trends. As elsewhere in the Western world, the majority of their students are interested in their personal problems, in their studies and careers, and in the enjoyment of their university years. Nonetheless, they cannot help absorbing, directly or indirectly, political attitudes and values. They express views of their own, and as future opinion lead-

ers they will pass them on to many of their countrymen. On the whole, these student opinions today—as far as the majority is concerned—appear to be considerably more democratic, realistic, internationally oriented, and peaceful than at any previous period in this century.

INCOME GROUPS, STATUS GROUPS, AND SOCIAL CLASSES

The distribution of income in the Federal Republic is somewhat more unequal than it is in Britain or in the Scandinavian countries, and the leveling effects of post-war taxation have gone somewhat less far.¹¹ Nevertheless, income distribution in Germany appears to be less unequal than it is in France, and much less unequal than it is in the Mediterranean countries of Europe.

Under the Bonn Republic, most Germans have been less interested in the just distribution of a fixed income than they have been in seeing this total income increase, and in having their own incomes rise with it. The results are shown in Table 5-4.

These rising income figures, and the increase in the number of households in the middle-income bracket—during a period in which German prices did not rise very much—have found tangible expression in the lives of West Germans. There is an impressive list of durable household goods that have become widespread. To cite two examples: the proportion of households with electric refrigerators rose from 10% in 1955 to 74% in 1966, while the proportion owning electric washing machines grew from 23% to 49% between 1958 and 1966.¹²

¹¹United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*; Bruce M-Russett, H. R. Alker, Jr., K. W. Deutsch, and H. D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 243-247.

¹²*Jahrbuch*, I, pp. 27-28; E. P. Neumann, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17, 24-25; and D.I.V.O., *Pressdienst*, July, 1966.

¹⁰E. P. Neumann, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-35.

TABLE 5-4
Income Levels, 1950-1961

(Net monthly income of principal provider, percentage of households)

	1951	1954	1958	1962	1966*
Up to DM 399 (\$100)	89%	76%	49%	21%	12%
DM 400-800 (\$100-\$200)	11	24	44	61	45
DM 800 and more (\$200+)			7	18	39

Source: Data supplied by Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach, and DIVO Institut.

*Four percent of the respondents did not answer the question in the 1966 survey.

Germans have long been a highly status-conscious people, and the distribution of status differs in some respects from the distribution of income. Occupations requiring more education, clerical work, and either private or public trust rank more highly in status than the pay they bring might indicate. A majority of respondents (56%) to a poll in March, 1955, said that the population in general would have more respect for a commercial clerk earning 300 DM (\$75) a month than for a foundry worker earning 450 DM (\$113). In the same month, nearly half—45%—of employed workers in a poll said that they would switch to a clerical job for the same pay, if they should be given the opportunity to do so.¹³

In three polls between 1952 and 1955, over two-thirds of the general population expressed their preference for collaboration between the classes, and so did three-fifths of the workers polled. The idea of class conflict was endorsed by only 15% of the general population and by about one-quarter of the workers.¹⁴ Employers in 1955 were considered efficient, rather than merely greedy, by about half the public, but

52% said in December, 1956, that employers cared only for their profits, and not for the welfare of their employees. Two-thirds of the workers thought so, and so did 43% of white-collar employees and public officials, as well as 44% of small-business and professional men. A majority of the public—53%—agreed that the employers had to be compelled by law to respond to the wishes of their workers and office employees.¹⁵ The total picture is one of moderate status envy, willingness to cooperate with employers without any great trust in them, and a preference for limited but effective governmental regulation.

The West German social structure has remained remarkably stable during the last several decades of political convulsions. The actual distribution of classes and status groups in the Federal Republic has changed only a little from that which prevailed in Hitler's Germany, and Hitler's Reich differed in this respect but little from the Weimar Republic. The relative strength of the differing strata among fathers and sons in a large sample of the German population taken in 1955 is shown in Table 5-5.

The most important fact is the expansion of the upper middle-class strata, from about 3% among the fathers of the present generation to nearly 5% among this present generation itself. There are more than three upper-middle-class jobs available to the present generation for every two such jobs that were within reach of their fathers. Near the other end of the scale, the proportion of farmers and farm workers has contracted. While many of the children of these groups have entered the ranks of unskilled or semiskilled labor, these lower groups of labor have also shrunk a little.¹⁶ There has been a partial but significant upward movement throughout the society. A summary of more complex tables of social mobility across a generation is shown in Table 5-6.

From these figures, it can be estimated that

¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 246-247.

¹⁴References are those given in Table 5-5.

¹⁵*Jahrbuch*, I, p. 244.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 244-245.

TABLE 5-5
Social Strata in West Germany, 1955

<i>Population sampling</i>	<i>Present generation</i>	<i>Father's generation</i>
Upper-middle strata: Professionals, managers and proprietors of larger establishments, and upper civil servants	4.6%	3.0%
Lower-middle strata: Minor officials, clerical and sales persons, small businessmen, and independent artisans	28.0	24.6
Upper-lower strata: Skilled workers and employed artisans	13.3	12.4
Lower-lower strata: Semiskilled and unskilled workers	34.9	31.6
Farmers	10.6	22.0
Farm workers	3.7	4.6
Unclassifiable*	4.9	1.8
Number of cases	(3,385)	(3,385)

Source: Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 64:1 (July, 1958), 6-24, and Table 3, p. 10; and Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers*, p. 262, and, generally, pp. 36, 260-266.

*Includes those war and social-security pensioners to whom no occupational position could be meaningfully assigned.

only about half the West Germans of 1955 still were in the same social stratum in which their fathers had been, while as many as 30% re-

ported that they had risen in the world, and only about 20% said that they had stepped down, by one or more steps. With half the adult population having changed its social class within its own lifetime, any political appeal to permanent class interests was likely to find only very limited support. And with nearly one-third of the voters having stepped up in the social scale, their outlook on the Bonn Republic was likely to be at least cautiously optimistic—and perhaps also a little concerned to hold on to the improved social status which they and their families had gained. Appeals to conservatism, moderation, and collaboration among classes might sound more meaningful to them in times of prosperity; and unless new cleavages should open between the classes, appeals to national solidarity and perhaps to nationalism might well move a great many West Germans in times of crisis.

All these effects of social mobility—as well as of geographic mobility—were reinforced in the case of the expellees and refugees and their

TABLE 5-6
*A Summary of
Intergenerational Mobility, 1955*

<i>Strata in present generation</i>	<i>Share of present strata in present total</i>	<i>Strata of recruitment from father's generation</i>		
		<i>Lower</i>	<i>Same</i>	<i>Higher</i>
Upper-middle	4.6%	72%	28%	—
Lower-middle	28.0	46	51	3%
Upper-lower	13.3	46	29	25
Lower-lower	34.9	22	57	21
Farmers and farm workers	14.3	—	76	23
Unclassifiable	4.9	—	—	100
Total present generation	100.0			

Sources: The same as in Table 5-5, especially Janowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 12, Table 7; and Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-263.

West German-born children—totaling altogether about 10 million in 1950 and 12 million by mid-1962—who made up nearly one-quarter of the population of the Federal Republic in the latter year. They had the same share of jobs in the public service, but less than half of that share among the self-employed, as well as of the jobs in banking, commerce, and in industrial plants. The only activities in which their share exceeded that in the general population were the receipt of social services (23%) and positions as officials of the federal government (25%).¹⁷

As newcomers, these expellees and refugees cannot but help to break down the differences between regions, classes, and even religious groups, and to strengthen the patterns of national solidarity, nationwide mobility, and—particularly as far as the older generation is concerned—a continuing and lively interest in the revision of the frontiers to the East. The children of the expellees, on the other hand, are most interested in making their homes in West Germany where they now live. Despite the strenuous efforts of such expellee and refugee youth organizations as the *Deutsche Jugend des Ostens* (D.J.O.), the rights and wrongs of East European politics are beginning to sound as remote to most of them as the troubles of the Old World used to sound to the children of American immigrants who were hardly concerned with the political claims and quarrels their parents had left behind them.

REGIONAL AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS

It is said that Chancellor Adenauer once described Germany as being divided naturally into three parts—the Germany of wine, the Germany of beer, and the Germany of schnapps, or hard liquor—and that he expressed

his love for the first, his sympathy for the second, and his willingness to do his duty for the third. Much has been written by others about the cultural and psychological differences between the wine-drinking Rhineland, beer-drinking Bavaria, and liquor-drinking Northern and Eastern Germany; and in less picturesque language, the West, the South, the North, and the Central and Eastern regions are widely accepted as the main geographic subdivisions of Germany. The first three of these now constitute three informal regions of the Federal Republic. The fourth has been turned into the G.D.R. and the Oder-Neisse territories, but it lives on in West German politics through the memories of one-quarter of its population, who are refugees and expellees, and through the memories of an even larger proportion of some of the crucial elite groups of the Federal Republic. Thus in a survey of over 500 members of German foreign policy elites in 1956–57, as many as 41% of the military leaders, 29% of the diplomats, and 41% of the S.P.D. leaders came from the Central and East German areas.¹⁸

The political and administrative structure of the Federal Republic is built upon 10 states, or "Lands." In some instances, these Lands continue the traditions of earlier German political units, as in the cases of Bavaria, Hamburg, and Bremen, while others, such as North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, and Lower Saxony, represent post-war creations in which earlier territorial units have been merged.

The 10 Lands, and the three regions into which they may be grouped—though somewhat arbitrarily—are shown in Table 1 in Chapter VIII. By far the largest Land is North Rhine-Westphalia. It comprises nearly one-third of the population of the Federal Republic, and it accounts for more than one-third of the national economic activity. The second most populous state, and the largest in area, is Bavaria, followed by Baden-Württemberg and

¹⁷SJB, 1961, pp. 54–55

¹⁸Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers*, pp. 126–127, 134

Lower Saxony. All the remaining Lands have less than 6 million population each. Indeed, only Hessen and Rhineland-Palatinate are even middle-sized; the rest each have less than 2.4 million people.

The Western part of West Germany, prosperous and densely populated, thus consists of one large state, North Rhine-Westphalia, two middle-sized ones, Hessen and Rhineland-Palatinate, and the small but coal-rich Saarland, which was reincorporated into the Federal Republic only in 1957. South Germany consists of two large Lands, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, while North Germany is made up of one large state, Lower Saxony, one small and predominantly rural Land, Schleswig-Holstein, and two old and prosperous city-states, Hamburg and Bremen.

Religious Composition

Western Germany and South Germany have Roman Catholic majorities; North Germany is overwhelmingly Protestant. In the Federal Republic, without Berlin, there were in 1964 more than 26 million Catholics, who form a strong minority of 47% of the total, while the 27 million Protestants constitute just 50% of the population. Most of the remaining 3% do not belong to any religious denomination. Of Jews, about 20,000 were left in the Federal Republic in 1964, most of them elderly; only some 200 Jewish children were born there in that year. The addition of West Berlin would add 2 million Protestants, 300,000 Catholics, and 6,000 Jews to the respective totals.

These figures show a shift from 1955, when among adults a somewhat larger majority of 52% Protestants confronted a minority of only 44% Catholics, while 4% were reported as "other,"¹⁹ but most of the difference seems caused by the inclusion of children in the figures since 1958. In 1963, Roman Catholic baptisms equaled very nearly 50% of the children

born in that year, while Protestant baptisms accounted for only another 45%. There were about 512,000 Catholic baptisms of children in 1963, as against about 476,000 Protestant ones. On the other hand, conversions in 1958 had brought the Protestants a net gain of about 4,000 converts, as against a net loss of nearly 3,000 Catholics. At these rates, the slight Protestant majority in the Federal Republic, even without West Berlin, seemed likely to persist for most of the rest of the century, while any reunification with the largely Protestant G.D.R. would increase it substantially.²⁰

A Protestant majority of 52% or 51% among the voters in the Federal Republic—as against 45% or 46% Catholics and 3% or 4% unaffiliated or scattered—thus seemed likely to persist well into the 1980's, and perhaps beyond. The Protestant share was substantially larger, however, in a sample of the German upper middle class, where it was as high as 60% in 1955, as against only 31% Catholics, 5% unaffiliated, and 4% other denominations.²¹ Since the upward social mobility of Protestants also was found to be somewhat higher than that of Catholics,²² and since the Catholics generally were represented somewhat more strongly among the less highly skilled and educated strata of the population, the Protestant hold on perhaps three-fifths of the upper-middle-class positions in the Federal Republic seems likely to persist.

All these figures have political significance. There is evidence from polls that Roman Catholics in the Federal Republic go nearly twice as diligently to church as do Protestants, and that, with much active encouragement from the Catholic Church and lay organizations, they tend to furnish three-fifths of the C.D.U. vote,

²⁰From data in *S.J.B.*, 1961, pp. 59, 94, and *S.J.B.*, 1965, p. 90.

²¹Computed from data in Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 64:1 (July, 1958), 10, Table 3, and 15, Table 8; cited in Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, p. 262, Table II.3, and p. 264, Table II.6.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 264, Table II.6.

¹⁹*Jahrbuch*, II p. 3; and *S.J.B.*, 1965, p. 90.

two-thirds of the steadfast C.D.U. voters, and three-quarters of the C.D.U. membership, as well as two-thirds of the C.D.U. members of the Bundestag and a majority of the Federal Cabinet before the C.D.U. formed a coalition with the S.P.D. in 1966.²⁹ In turn, the C.D.U., the formal functioning of the federal and Land governments, and perhaps the informal effects of the regions all contribute something close to majority status upon the Catholic minority. Some aspects of this process are shown in Tables 5-7a and 5-7b.

²⁹See *Jahrbuch*, II, pp. 77, 264, Gerhard Loewenberg, *Parliament in the German Political System* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 100-101, Juan Linz, *The Social Bases of West German Politics* (Ann Arbor, Mich. University Microfilms, Inc.), Columbia University Ph.D. Dissertation, Mic 59-4073, 1959, p. 44 with reference to Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *La Reine Française de Science Politique*, 73 (July-September, 1957), p. 635. U. W. Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, pp. 223-233, and references in p. 223, n. 1, Deutsch and Edinger, *op cit*, pp. 131, 135.

The West German States or Länder

The figures in Table 5-7 illustrate, first of all, the considerable differences in population, area, and wealth among the Länder. By any account, North Rhine-Westphalia stands out. Together with Bavaria, these two states account for nearly one-half the population of the Federal Republic. The "volume of business" figures, technically called economic turnover, show something of the levels of economic development in each Land. Very roughly speaking, national turnover data for the G.F.R. tend to amount to perhaps three times the national income. The city-states of Hamburg and Bremen are noteworthy, of course, for their high per capita basis, and also the absolute wealth going through Hamburg is impressive. They are followed by North Rhine-Westphalia, with its

TABLE 5-7a
Länder and Regions of the German Federal Republic (Economic Aspects)

Land and Region	Population 1965 (in millions)	Area (in 1 000 sq kilometers)	Volume of business 1963	
			(in billion DM)	per capita (in thousand DM)
North Rhine-Westphalia	16.7	34.0	113.3	7.5
Hessen	5.2	21.1	33.7	7.4
Rhineland-Palatinate	3.6	19.8	18.0	5.5
Saarland	1.1	0.8	6.3	6.1
Total Western Germany	26.6	75.7	171.3	6.6
Bavaria	10.0	70.5	57.5	6.4
Baden-Württemberg	8.4	35.8	54.7	7.3
Total South Germany	18.4	106.3	112.2	6.9
Lower Saxony	6.9	47.4	39.1	6.2
Schleswig-Holstein	2.4	15.7	13.0	5.4
Hamburg	1.9	0.1	20.8	12.0
Bremen	0.7	0.1	20.7	8.9
Total North Germany	11.9	63.3	93.6	8.1
Total G.F.R. without Berlin	56.9	245.3		
West Berlin	2.2	0.5	391.9	7.2*

Source: Data in *S.J.B.* 1966 pp. 27, 550.

*These totals include West Berlin.

TABLE 5-7b

Länder and Regions of the German Federal Republic (Social and Political Aspects)

<i>Land and region</i>	<i>Percentage of Population Expellees and refugees 1961</i>	<i>Roman Catholics 1963</i>	<i>Percentage of 1965 votes for C.D.U./C.S.U.</i>	<i>Seats in Bundesrat</i>	<i>Governing party or coalition, 1967</i>
North Rhine-Westphalia	14.5%	50%	47.1%	5	S.P.D./F.D.P.
Hessen	17.0	31	37.8	4	S.P.D.
Rhineland-Palatinate	8.1	56	49.3	4	C.D.U./F.D.P.
Saarland	1.7	36	46.8	3	C.D.U./F.D.P.
Total: Western Germany	13.0	48	46.6	16	- -
Bavaria	17.3	66	55.6	5	C.S.U.
Baden-Württemberg	15.5	43	49.9	5	C.D.U./S.P.D.
Total: South Germany	16.4	54	53.1	10	
Lower Saxony	24.3	16	45.8	5	S.P.D./C.D.U.
Schleswig-Holstein	27.2	5	48.2	4	C.D.U./F.D.P.
Hamburg	11.3	8	37.6	3	S.P.D.
Bremen	13.9	10	34.0	3	S.P.D./F.D.P.
Total: North Germany	19.4	13	42.2	15	
Total: G.F.R. without Berlin	16.6	49	47.6	41	Coalition C.D.U./S.P.D.
West Berlin	15.9	13	-	4	S.P.D./F.D.P.

Source: Data in *S.J.B.*, 1966, pp. 46, 90, 141, 144.

industry, but all the remaining areas for which we have data are below the national average, with the rural states of Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower Saxony at the bottom of the per capita rank order.

As Table 5-7a and 5-7b suggest, the post-war arrangement of Länder and regions has been least favorable to North Germany. That region is by far the smallest of the three, yet it is divided into four states, and the economic "raisins" of Hamburg and Bremen are separated from the "cake" of their hinterland in Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein—in striking contrast to the American practice that has left the tax resources of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and New Orleans within the respective states whose territories they largely serve. North Germany is the region of Protestantism, and of relatively least support for the C.D.U., but it is small, divided, partly

poor, underrepresented in most national elites, and generally less influential in national affairs than it was under the Hohenzollern Empire and the Weimar Republic.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that the present arrangement is unpopular, even in North Germany. The continued separate statehood of Hamburg and Bremen appeals to a proud civic tradition, and it has provided the Social Democrats with excellent opportunities for winning and holding control of the government of these city-states, in partial compensation for their long exclusion from federal office. Moreover the Protestant Church, and particularly its main constituent bodies, the Lutheran churches, have a tradition of non-political submission to whatever political authorities there be, and of a deep cleavage between the working classes and the somewhat authoritarian Protestant upper middle classes

and their culture—a double tradition that would have reduced the political effectiveness of German Protestants in any case well below the level of their numbers. If the Social Democrats have welcomed their special political opportunities in Hamburg and Bremen, nationalists and conservatives have also welcomed countervailing opportunities for Right of Center politics in Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein. If some well-informed observers have stressed the considerable uniformity of politics in the Federal Republic, and the minor importance of regional differences on many issues,²⁴ then these views should be qualified in the light of what has just been said, and of such interregional differences in poll data as are shown in Table 5-8.

The poll results in Table 5-8 suggest that North Germany suffered more than the rest of

the country in World War II; that it is poorer, and that its people on the whole apparently have no strong attachments to their states. The results also indicate that its voters are more highly aware of politics, more to the Right-of-Center, more nationalistic, and more intensely insistent on German reunification than are the voters of the other two regions, and that there is more potential support in North Germany for an active military and political policy toward this end. A part—but not all—of the difference could be accounted for in terms of North Germany's greater share of refugees and expellees, but on several issues the contrast to the attitudes of South Germany is far greater than would correspond merely to this single factor.

Only West Berlin shares some of the attitudes, but not the poverty, of North Germany. The West Berlin attitudes are almost equally far to the Right; and in some matters of nation-

TABLE 5-8

Some Regional Differences in Opinion Polls, 1956 (Percentage of totals for each region)

Response	National average	West	South	North	West Berlin
Home destroyed in World War II (June)	29%	30%	23%	37%	30%
Running water in present home (March)	84	88	86	73	98
'Can manage well' on income (Aug.)	33	35	32	27	40
Favor separate Land citizenship in addition to Federal (Oct.)	8	5	12	7	3
'Right of Center' (Feb.)	38	35	35	47	45
Doesn't know political meaning of "Right" and "Left" (Feb.)	27	28	32	20	17
Favor West German Army (May, 1955)	40	35	39	44	60
Division of Germany "intolerable" (Sept.)	53	56	44	57	84
Demand reunification "again and again" (Sept.)	65	65	59	73	81
Favor moving federal government from Bonn to Berlin (Dec.)	44	45	29	55	88

Source: Data from E. N. Neumann and E. P. Neumann, *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung* (1957), pp. 20, 21, 37, 48, 189, 281, 295, 316

alist or reunification policies, the readiness to take risks for more radical steps seems to be still greater. Together with the West Berlin voters' preference for social welfare policies, it is this intense concern with anti-Communism and German reunification which has set the conditions for the political appeal—economically moderate but nationally militant—which Willy Brandt had to make in order to succeed as a national leader of the S.P.D., and later as Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of a national coalition government, but first of all, as the popular Mayor of that embattled city.

The South German attitudes usually deviate from the national average in the opposite direction. South Germany suffered least from the war, can manage tolerably well on its income, and has little more than a one-third of its voters describing themselves as being to the Right-of-Center. Its voters have markedly stronger local attachments, and markedly less interest in general ideological concepts, than do those in the rest of the country. Differently put, social distinctions are more moderate in South Germany, and a larger share of middle-class voters see the center point of the political scale itself a little farther to the left. South German voters do favor reunification, but they are much less concerned about it; and only less than a third of them have any use for dramatic and risky gestures that might intensify the struggle for Berlin.

The Western German region, finally, emerges as the one that is most nearly representative of the political attitudes of the entire country. It is less nationalistic and intense than the North, but less locally preoccupied and non-political than is the South. Even its greater prosperity only represents a state of affairs which the other regions wish to reach as soon as possible; and on the general issues, its attitudes are usually closest to the national average. In addition to the size of its population, economic resources, and higher share in important national elites, it is perhaps this representative

character of many Western German attitudes that has fitted this region so well for national leadership.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LAND GOVERNMENTS. Altogether, the system of Lands and regions has had remarkable political results despite its shallow roots. These roots are shallow, first of all, in the seven of the 10 Lands—all except Bavaria, Hamburg and Bremen—that are relatively recent conglomerations with no long and inspiring history of their own. An average of one-quarter of their populations are refugees and expellees and their children, with no old ties to the Land in which they happen to reside; and since an average proportion of about 2% of the population of the Federal Republic moved from one Land to another in each of the years from 1955 to 1959—and presumably a similar proportion did so in the preceding years—not much more than 50% or at most 60% of the voters in each Land are likely to be native to it.²⁵

Even so, the Lands carry out a large part of the functions of government, and their budgets and payrolls are substantial. In 1964 the Lands received, and then spent, 50 billion DM, or nearly one-third of the 160 billion DM passing through the total government sector—federal, Land, and municipal—in that year. Since the 1964 national income of the Federal Republic was 317 billion DM, this indicates that about 22% of the national income was spent by the federal government, and 16% by the Land governments. Measured by this financial yardstick, the Land governments, taken together, are almost two-thirds as important as the federal government, including the latter's control of the federal railroads and the postal, telegraph, and telephone service; and the Lands are significantly more important, in terms of income and spending, than are the total of municipal authorities.²⁶ The relationships are set

²⁵See migration data in *S.J.B.*, 1961, p. 71.

²⁶See sources cited in Table 5-9.

forth roughly in Table 5-9. The figures in this table involve technical problems of aggregation and should be used with caution, but the relative orders of magnitude are clear.

In terms of employment, the public sector employs one tenth of the total work force of the Federal Republic, but it provides more than one-quarter of all the white-collar jobs in the country. Within the government sector, the Lands provide nearly half the official positions, and nearly half the clerical jobs. The majority of the federal officials are employed by the railroads and mails. The number of other federal officials is relatively small. The great bulk of official positions, other than with the railroads or mails, is in the Land administrations

and subject to the processes of Land politics. Some details are shown in Table 5-10.

Regional diversities are thus met by the partial decentralization of politics through the institution of the Lands; and this system of Lands, in turn, has enhanced the political importance of local and regional politics. The system has helped to adapt government to the inequalities of economic development among the different territories. It has permitted favored regions to retain some of their advantages, while using redistributive taxation to reduce gradually the interregional cleavages. The system has perhaps also served to isolate a part of the Protestant Right in North Germany from the mainstream of national politics, while

TABLE 5-9
Budgetary Stakes of Politics in the Federal Republic; National, State, and Local, 1959 and 1964

	Billion DM		Percentage of national income	
	1959	1964	1959	1964
National income	192.2	316.5	100%	100%
Budgetary income, federal government	42.5	62.9	22%	20%
Plus federal railroads, mails, telegraph, etc.	11.9	17.5	6	6
Total Federal sector	54.4	80.4	28%	26%
Budgetary income, Land governments ^a	29.7	50.5	15	16
Tax income, municipal governments	8.6	38.7	4	12
Total Government sector	92.7	169.6	47%	54%
Public expenditures (direct): federal	30.9	62.4	16	20
Federal railroads and mail	11.4	8.4	6	3
Total Federal sector	42.3	70.8	22%	23%
Lands ^b	24.3	50.7	13	16
Municipalities	18.8	39.1	10	12
Total Government spending	85.4	160.6	45%	51%

Source: Rounded figures computed from Germany, *SJB* 1961, pp. 340, 372, 427, 434-436, 544, and *SJB* 1966 pp. 359, 386, 442-443, 551.

^aLands include city-states (Hamburg, Bremen, West Berlin).

^bLand incomes include 5.8 billion DM in Federal grants (4.0) and loans (1.8). This tends to overstate the size of the government total sector.

TABLE 5-10

Public Employment in the Federal Republic: National, State, and Local, 1965 (In thousands)

<i>Source of Employment</i>	<i>Officials</i>	<i>Clerical</i>	<i>Workers</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percentage of work force</i>
Federal	73	91	101	266	
Federal railroads, mails	490	49	316	855	
Other economic institutions	0	1	3	4	
Total Federal personnel	563	141	420	1,125	4%
Lands (including city-states)	584	316	105	1,005	
Land economic institutions	8	9	49	66	
Total Land personnel	592	325	154	1,071	4
Municipalities	125	282	194	600	2
Total Public employment	1,280	748	768	2,796	10
Total Work force*	1,246	5,852		26,821	100

Source: Computed from data in Germany, S.J.B., 1966, p. 449

*According to the 1961 census.

it has amplified the influence of Western Germany, of the Roman Catholic Church, and of the C.D.U./C.S.U. Party combination.

At the same time, however, regionalism and the system of Land governments have served to protect political diversity and to keep alive a strong and responsible opposition. Excluded from federal office until 1966, the S.P.D. has drawn strength and experience from its successes in the government of various Lands. In 1967, the S.P.D. governed Hamburg and Hessen, and was the leading partner in the governing coalitions in Lower Saxony, Bremen, and West Berlin. The F.D.P., which had been ex-

cluded from federal office during 1957-61, and after 1966, continued to share in government at the Land Level as the junior coalition partners in six of the 11 Land governments.

Although every party wants to win a share in the federal government, the opportunities in regional and municipal governments seem substantial enough to keep opposition parties alive, if need be, for an indefinite length of time. In these, and other ways, the opportunities of regionalism and Land government have contributed substantially to the stability and adaptability of democracy in the German Federal Republic.

VI

The Basic Law of the Federal Republic

The Basic Law of the German Federal Republic is its Constitution, not in name, but in fact. Its language suggests that it is provisional, and its concluding Article 146 says, "This Basic Law loses its validity on the day on which a Constitution comes into effect which has been freely decided upon by the German people." Yet its principles were intended to be permanent, and, with the passage of time, its provisions increasingly have come to be accepted as permanent.

The fundamental decision to organize a democratic and federal German government in the three Western zones of occupation, and to have it based on a written constitution, drafted by a constituent assembly and confirmed by popular ratification, was taken by the Foreign Ministers of the Western powers at their meeting in London in February, 1948. Machinery to carry out this decision was set in motion when the three Military Governors of the Western powers met on June 30, 1948. On the following day, they presented the Ministers President of the German Lands with documents empowering them to convene a constituent assembly not later than September 1 of that year, and to consider also modifying the boundaries of the then-existing German states. A third document dealt with the powers which the Allies intended to reserve for themselves until the occupation should be terminated.¹

The Ministers President objected on the grounds that they wanted to avoid any hardening of the division of Germany, and they requested that the new political organization should not bear the character of a sovereign state, and that the procedures followed in its

¹Elmer Plischke, *Contemporary Government of Germany* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 21-22. Despite its conciseness, this is a particularly well-informed account of legal and administrative aspects of the emergence of the Federal Republic.

creation should distinctly evidence its provisional status. Following joint Allied-German discussion, it finally was agreed that the German conclave would be called the 'Parliamentary Council' (rather than Constitutional Convention) and that the constitutive act would be called the . . . 'Basic Law' rather than . . . 'Constitution.'²

Out of such provisional beginnings came a constitutional document embodying an uncommon wealth of dearly bought historical experience and expert skill. The Parliamentary Council and its committees had at their disposal the advice of a number of constitutional and political experts, including distinguished specialists from the United States. Nevertheless, and despite the expressed wishes of the occupying powers—particularly France—in favor of a more strongly decentralized and federative solution, there emerged a document that was essentially German in conception and content, and that bore the clear marks both of professional skill and of successful resistance to outside interference.³

One of the primary motivations of the men who drafted the Basic Law was to correct what were considered the constitutional faults of the Weimar Constitution in the hope of preventing a repeat performance. Unlike the Weimar Republic, the new state created by the Basic Law was to be stable; unlike Bismarck's Empire and Hitler's Reich, it was to safeguard the liberty of individuals and groups, and to resist any stampede into dictatorship or aggressive war. It was to be federal so as to resist better any drive toward militarism or dictatorship and so as to win the approval of the Land legislatures, which had delegated the members of the Parliamentary Council and which had to ratify the final document.

Accordingly, the Basic Law decentralized

particularly the means of state power and persuasion. It left the Lands with a substantial part of the bureaucratic machinery of administration and left the federal government dependent on the Lands for the execution of most of its own legislation. The Lands were to be in control of the police, except for very small federal units that were to be used for special purposes; and the Lands were to have charge of all schools and education and of the bulk of radio and television, for the Basic Law restricted the federal power to matters expressly delegated to the federal government, thus leaving—according to some jurists, by implication—all residual powers to the Lands.⁴

At the same time, the Federal Republic, as created by the Basic Law, is better equipped than the Weimar Republic to form and maintain a stable political will, that is to say, to formulate and carry out consistent policies and to make specific decisions in accordance with them. The great powers given to the Federal Chancellor, including his effective control over the membership of his Cabinet; the provision that the Chancellor can be ousted from his office by the Bundestag only if the latter can agree on a successor for him—the so-called "positive vote of no confidence"—thus preventing purely negative majorities from dismissing a Chancellor, as in Weimar days; and the narrow limits set to judicial review of federal laws and of acts of the government—all these tend to concentrate and stabilize the power of legitimate decision-making on the federal level. The explicit recognition of political parties in the Basic Law, together with the exclusion by the Electoral Law of splinter parties (those with less than 5% of the valid votes cast in a national election) from the distribution of seats in the legislature (the so-called Exclusion Clause) likewise tend to encourage

²*Ibid.*, p. 22.

³Sigmund Neumann, "Germany," in Taylor Cole, ed., *European Political Systems* (New York: Knopf, 1954), p. 351; Alfred Grosser, *Die Bonner Demokratie*, p. 59.

⁴Theodor Eschenburg, *Staat und Gesellschaft in Deutschland*, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Schwab, 1956), pp. 563, 765. Some conservative German jurists disagree and would assign some of the residual powers to the federal government.

the prevalence of large, powerful parties. Small parties are squeezed out or forced to compromise their differences.

A GERMAN TYPE OF FEDERALISM

The same goal—to avoid any dangerous concentrations of power, but to facilitate the formation and execution of a single national political will—is also served by the peculiar German variety of federalism which the Basic Law has adopted. The classic concept of federalism in American, British, and British Commonwealth doctrine and practice has its essence in the simultaneous existence of two governments—federal and state—over the same territories and persons, with each of these two governments impinging directly upon the same individual, with each claiming sovereign power within its sphere of jurisdiction, subject only to judicial review by the highest court.³

The type of federalism, developed in Switzerland and later adopted in Germany and Austria, and now revived in the Basic Law, is quite different. Here, too, the citizen is subject to two governments, federal and Land, but these are far more intermingled. In Germany, the federal authorities in most matters have a clearly superior position. As a matter of general principle, as would be familiar from American experience, the Lands retain the residual powers to legislate about all matters in which the basic law itself has not explicitly given exclusive or competing legislative powers to the federal authorities (Articles 70–72). Whether West German judicial practice will accept the same principles of interpretation still remains to be seen. In any case, the explicit federal powers are very great, and on many important subjects, the Land administrations serve as the executors

of federal law, guided by federal administrative directions, and under federal supervision (Articles 72, 74, 75, 84, 85 of the Basic Law). Substantial spheres of “exclusive” legislation are reserved to the federal government, and the Lands may legislate only if empowered by specific federal law (Articles 71, 73). In other areas of “concurrent” legislation, the Lands may legislate only to the extent that the federal government (called the Federation) does not make use of its own legislative powers (Article 72). In these matters, federal law overrides Land law (Article 31).

The Federation is thus clearly predominant in the area of legislation, while the Lands retain the greater part of the administrative tasks and personnel. As long as government and politics remain within the confines of legality and legitimacy, the federal authorities have a clear preponderance of power; in situations of crisis, however, any illegal or illegitimate attempts to establish a dictatorship or to stampe public opinion will encounter a major obstacle in the federal dependence on the administrative co-operation of the Land bureaucracies and governments, and the Land governments’ control of the police forces. This arrangement increases the capabilities of the federal government for legitimate decision-making, while providing for strong obstacles in the way of any *coup d’état*.

THE GUIDING VALUES: HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS

The first paragraph of Article 1 of the Basic Law proclaims that the dignity of the individual must not be touched, to respect and protect it is the obligation of every state organ and authority. Article 1 has been interpreted broadly in West German legal thought, as implying in itself many of the more specific basic rights. It thus outlaws all torture or corporal punishment or any physical or mental ill-treatment of prisoners (a prohibition made

³For the best development of this view, see Kenneth C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, 3rd edn. (London: Oxford University Press, 1953).

explicit in Article 104), such as by excessive deprivation of water or sleep; and it bars similarly the use of "truth drugs" or lie detectors and the use of any evidence obtained with their aid, since all such methods tend to reduce or destroy the freedom of the will—and hence the dignity—of the defendant.⁶

Article 1 is also particularly important because it directs that the basic rights listed thereafter are to bind all executive and judicial authorities "as immediately valid law." The basic rights are many. They begin with the "free development of one's personality," "life and physical integrity," and "freedom of the person" (Article 2). The first of these bars, among other things, any prohibition of writing or painting, such as were imposed upon some artists by the Nazi regime. The second outlaws any sterilization and any medical experiments with prisoners, even in the case of volunteers, since under the circumstances their will cannot be considered wholly free.⁷

Further basic rights include equality before the law, equal rights for men and women, and nondiscrimination in regard to sex, descent, race, language, home and origin, or religious or political views (Article 3). This provision may have had special importance in barring any preference for local or West German residents as against expellees or refugees. Article 4 guarantees freedom of religion, conscience, the profession of religious or philosophic views, and the right to refuse armed military service, on grounds of conscience. Subsequent legislation and court decisions require that conscientious objectors must refuse to bear arms for any cause, not just refuse to bear arms in the service of some particular policy, and legitimate conscientious objectors may be required to render

an equivalent period of civilian service (Article 12.2).

Article 5 protects the freedom of opinion, research, and teaching, but adds that "the freedom to teach does not absolve from loyalty to the Constitution." Article 6 protects marriage and the family; it declares that "the care and education of children is the natural right of their parents," gives "every mother" a claim to protection and care by the community, and provides legitimate and illegitimate children with an equal claim to legislative protection of their social position and opportunities for personal development. The entire language of Article 6 shows the great interest and influence of religious groups, both Catholic and Protestant, and of the C.D.U. in all matters of the family and education, with some secondary concessions to the more secular viewpoint represented by the S.P.D. and F.D.P.

A similar distribution of influence appears in the wording of Article 7, which puts all schools under the supervision of the state (i.e., the Lands, according to Article 70.1). Religious instruction, according to Article 7, is to be a regular subject in the public schools, except for the "nondenominational" schools. Wherever it is taught in public schools, religion must be taught according to the principles of the respective churches. The parents decide about the participation of their child in such instruction, and no teacher may be obligated to give religious instruction against his will. The right to open private schools (including parochial schools) is guaranteed, provided they submit to state supervision, do not fall below the standards of the public schools, do not underpay their teachers, and do not promote a separation of pupils according to income.

The Basic Law goes on to guarantee the right of unarmed assembly without prior permission or announcement (Article 8) and the right to found organizations (Article 9). Here the trade unions get their innings. The right to form economic or occupational interest organizations

⁶Eschenburg, *op cit.*, pp. 417–419, with reference to the Federal Law of Criminal Procedure of 1950, par. 136a, 1 and 2; and to H. J. Abraham, O. Bühler, *et al.*, *Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz* (Hamburg: Hansischer Guldenverlag, 1950), Art. 1, p. 3.

⁷Eschenburg, *op. cit.*, 424, with references.

(such as employers' organizations or labor unions) is guaranteed "for everybody and all occupations." Agreements aimed at limiting or hindering this right are void, measures directed to any such purpose are illegal (Article 93). Exceptions to the right of assembly are provided in the case of outdoor meetings, which may be regulated by law (Article 82). Organizations whose goals or activities are criminal or "directed against the constitutional order or the idea of international understanding" are prohibited (Article 92). The constitutional guarantees of free choice of residence and occupation—particularly valuable to refugees and expellees—have been further enhanced in their importance by the fact that jobs and housing were available, thanks to the prolonged full employment and the great amount of housing construction in the Federal Republic during the 1950's and early 1960's.

The possibility of nationalization is explicitly provided for in Article 15. Land, natural resources, and means of production may be transformed into common property, or into other patterns of a mixed public-private economy, but only by means of a law which regulates the kind and extent of compensation, with the same legal safeguards as in cases of expropriation under Article 14. This article, by implication, guarantees the constitutional legitimacy of Socialist aspirations within the democratic order, and of socialist programs and measures, such as those advocated at various times by the S.P.D.

German citizenship may not be withdrawn in any case. Even involuntary loss of citizenship may only occur on the basis of law and only if the person concerned does not become stateless (Article 161). No German may be extradited abroad. The politically persecuted have the right of asylum (Article 162). Article 16 thus insures that even Nazi war criminals, if they are Germans, cannot be extradited to the countries demanding their punishment, but must be dealt with by German courts.

Many constitutional rights may be denied to those who misuse them in order to destroy the democratic system. Those who misuse the freedom of speech or of the press, the freedom to teach, the freedom of assembly or of association, the privacy of letters, mails, and telecommunications, the right of property or of asylum will forfeit these basic rights. This forfeiture and its extent will be declared by the Federal Constitutional Court (Article 18). The same court may outlaw political parties "which, according to their aims, or according to the behavior of their adherents, tend to harm or abolish the basic libertarian democratic order, or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic." This broad language makes parties liable not only for their programs but for the probable or expectable behavior of their followers (Article 21.2). This clause is influenced by the memory of the disastrous tolerance of Nazi subversion by the Weimar Republic, and by the ever-present shadow of the Communist dictatorship in the neighboring G.D.R. The provision for the banning of political parties acquired practical significance in the outlawing of the neo-Nazi *Sozialistische Reichspartei* (S.R.P.) in 1952, and of the Communist Party in 1956.

The basic rights listed in Articles 1 to 18 are particularly protected by Article 19 against any later amendments that might destroy them. No part of the Basic Law may be amended except by a law passed by two-thirds majorities of the Federal Parliament (Article 79.2). Article 19 concludes the section labeled "Basic Rights." Additional rights and values, outside the special protection of Article 19, are stated, however, in other sections of the Basic Law. Article 20 fixes the character of the German Federal Republic as a "democratic and social federal state"—a phrase that affirms in the connotations of the German word *sozial* the values of social compassion and of social justice, and that gives special constitutional legitimacy to welfare legislation. The Basic Law further establishes

popular sovereignty, representative government, and the separation of powers: "All power of government issues from the people. It is exercised by the people in elections and votes, and through separate organs of legislation, of the executive power, and of the judiciary." (Article 20. 1–3.)

The legislative power is bound by the constitutional order, and the executive and the judiciary are bound by law (Article 20.4). No change is permissible in the Basic Law that would infringe upon the principles stated in Article 20, those in Article 1 (the protection of human dignity and human rights), the division of the Federation into Lands, or the principle of the cooperation of the latter in the legislative process (Article 79.3). Together with the prohibition in Article 19.2 of amendments touching the essential content of any basic right, these are striking and somewhat unusual limitations upon the amending power, which testify to the intense concern and commitment of the drafters of the Basic Law to the future preservation of a constitutional and legal order.

Other rights or values are more specifically stated. Peace is specially protected. Actions which are both "apt and intended to disturb the peaceful co-existence of peoples, particularly to prepare an aggressive war, are contrary to the Constitution. They are to be made subject to punishment" (Article 26.1). There must be no special courts. No one must be denied trial before his legally appointed judge. Courts for particular subject matters may be established only by law (Article 101). The death penalty is abolished (Article 102). There may be neither retroactive punishments nor double jeopardy; an action may be punished only if it was legally punishable before it was committed (Article 103.2), and no one may be punished on the basis of the general criminal laws more than once for the same action (Article 103.3). There is an equivalent to the American right of habeas corpus: personal liberty may be limited only on the basis of law; arrested persons may not be

ill-treated, "physically or mentally"; the police may not hold anyone beyond the day after his arrest; on that day, at the latest, he must appear before the judge who must tell him the charge against him, question him, and give him an opportunity to make objections; the judge then must order him released, or else issue a written order for his arrest, including reasons; of every judicial order of arrest or continuation of custody, notice must be given without delay to a relative of the arrested person, or to "a person whom he trusts"—such as, his lawyer (Article 104.1–4).

The right to citizenship is regulated in the same spirit. A German, according to the Basic Law and other pending legal regulations, is "anyone who has German citizenship, or who has been received in the territory of Germany within the frontiers of 1937 as a refugee or expellee belonging to the German people, or as his or her spouse or descendant" (Article 116.1). Former German citizens, who during the Nazi regime of 1933–45 were deprived of their citizenship for political reasons, must have it restored to them if they claim it. They are deemed not to have been deprived of their citizenship at all if they have taken residence in Germany after May 8, 1945, and have not expressed their will to the contrary (Article 116.2). The result of these provisions, as well as of legislation in both the Federal Republic and the G.D.R., is that, "although there are at present two German state executives, two state territories, and two state populations, there is only one German citizenship: no German citizen is a foreigner in either of the two presently existing German state formations."⁸ Since far more Germans, whenever they had any effective choice, have preferred to live in the Federal Republic, the almost unprecedentedly generous and farsighted provisions of the Basic Law for their reception as citizens with equal rights, backed by the material opportunities created

⁸Theodor Maunz, *Deutsches Staatsrecht*, 5th ed. (Munich-Berlin, 1956), p. 27, cited in Eschenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

first by Western economic aid and later by West German economic development, have been of the greatest practical and political significance.

The aggregate of all these rights shows a particular concern to protect individuals and families, largely by restraining the power of the state. There is no catalog of positive rights, such as the right to work or to housing, even though some rights of this kind are mentioned in some Land constitutions. In the ruined and impoverished Germany of 1948, when the Basic Law was drafted, such rights might not have sounded realistic; in the prosperous Federal Republic after the early 1950's, they would have seemed to most voters unnecessary. A legal claim to the minimum of material support necessary to sustain an individual's life and dignity—that is, a basic legal claim to welfare support in distress—can be derived indirectly, however, from Articles 1 and 2, and from the characterization in Article 20 of the Federal Republic as a "social" state. Similarly, although the right to strike is not explicitly provided in the Basic Law, it is held to be implied in the freedom to form economic and occupational interest organizations—the so-called "freedom of coalition"—guaranteed by Article 9. The extensive West German social security, labor, and welfare legislation thus lacks specific constitutional protection in its details. The laws of which it consists could all be changed or abolished by simple parliamentary majorities, at least in theory, but the fact that workers and salaried employees together form the great majority of the electorate informally, yet effectively, guarantees their endurance.⁹

The limited goals embodied in the Basic Law are politically realistic, and they accommodate the aspirations of the major parties. They specifically meet the interest of the C.D.U. in religious instruction and in greater power for the Lands; the interest of the F.D.P. and C.D.U. in safeguards for private property and enter-

prise, and the interest of the S.P.D. in labor unions and welfare legislation, in the legitimate possibility of nationalization, and in equal rights for unwed mothers and for nonreligious pupils and teachers. Even the many members of a silent political group, the former members of the Nazi Party, the SS Elite Guard, the Gestapo Secret Police, and similar organizations of the Hitler period, all find substantial protection in the Basic Law and in the civil and human rights it guarantees. The Basic Law forbids all blanket discrimination against former members of political parties or organizations. Its Article 131 opened the way to the return of the large majority of former Nazi officials into public service, with the result that out of about 53,000 civil servants removed in the Western zones by denazification procedures, only about 1,000 remained permanently excluded through German official action, while most of the rest were gradually taken back into various official agencies.¹⁰

Fanatical Nazis, to be sure, remained hostile to the constitutional order despite its tolerance, but they were few. In opinion polls, only 6% of the electorate in 1956 still rejected the Basic Law as "not good," while the usual 29% of determined democrats endorsed it, as to the rest, 14% were undecided and 51% professed their ignorance.¹¹ Since the number of former Nazi voters and adherents has been well above 40%, of whom roughly half were still living in 1956, the poll data suggest that perhaps something like two out of three former Nazis have become reconciled, at least passively, to the system of constitutional government that offered dignity and security to themselves. In this manner, the Basic Law was not only a response to the ideological cleavages within the German people, which we surveyed in an ear-

⁹Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany*, p. 132, with reference to Taylor Cole, "The Democratization of the German Civil Service," *Journal of Politics*, 14 (February, 1952), p. 7.

¹¹*Jahrbuch*, II, p. 163.

⁹Eschenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 406, 419, 487–490, with references.

lier section, but was also an instrument for their modification. It aimed at establishing standards of legality and human rights that might soon win the respect and acceptance of a majority of the electorate, and eventually the support of the majority, particularly the younger generation.

Although this goal has not yet been reached, the first 18 years of government under the Basic Law have succeeded in bringing the goal substantially nearer. Part of this success has been due to such extra-constitutional factors as prolonged economic prosperity and peace, or at least a tolerably low level of international tensions. Another factor in this success, however, has been the efficiency and the actual functioning of the constitutional system which the Basic Law created. For the actual operation of parliamentary government is in very close conformity to the Basic Law, which has helped to legitimize parliamentary democracy; if the provisions of the Basic Law were being disregarded, it would obviously lead the citizens to lose a good deal of respect for the governmental system, and for democracy in general. It is these governmental institutions and the manner in which they operate that we must survey.

THE PREDOMINANCE OF FEDERAL POWERS

In the division of powers between the Federation and the Lands, the Federation has the most important powers, even though, as we have seen, the Lands under some interpretations of the Basic Law have all the legislative and administrative powers of the state, unless they are explicitly assigned to the federal government (Articles 30, 70). The areas of exclusive federal legislation are listed in Article 73. They include foreign affairs, defense, federal citizenship, freedom of movement and of internal trade, currency, railroads, mails and telecommunications, and the legal position of federal employees.

Further federal powers are in the area of concurrent legislation, listed in Article 74. These include all civil and criminal law and procedure; the regulation of organizations and assemblies; refugees and expellees; public welfare; war damages and restitution; all economic and labor legislation; nuclear energy; social security and unemployment insurance; expropriation and nationalization; prevention of abuses of economic power; agriculture; real estate and housing; health, physicians and drugs; shipping, automobiles, and road traffic. In these areas, the Lands may legislate only until and in so far as the Federation does not make use of its legislative powers (Article 72.1). Concurrent federal legislation is permitted only, however, in so far as there is a need for it: because the matter cannot be regulated effectively by the legislation of single Lands, or because such a Land law might impair the interests of other Lands or of the community at large, or because federal regulation is needed to preserve the legal and economic unity of the Federal Republic, particularly the uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of a Land (Article 72.2). Under the same conditions, the Federation may issue general rules (*Rahmenvorschriften*), but the details of implementation must be filled in by Land legislation for such matters as the legal status of Land and municipal employees, the general legal position of the press and motion pictures, the use of land and water resources, and the identification and registration of the population (Article 75).

The Federation guarantees the constitutional order in the Lands (Article 28.3). Federal law overrides Land law (Article 30). The Lands execute federal laws under their own responsibility, except where the Basic Law itself states or permits otherwise (Article 83). The Lands organize their own administrations and appoint and promote officials, but the federal government may issue general administrative regulations, and it may supervise the legality of the execution of its laws by the Land administra-

tions and may send commissioners to the highest Land authorities and, with the consent of the Bundesrat, also to the lower-level ones. Similarly, the federal government may be empowered, by a law passed with the consent of the Bundesrat, to give specific directions to Land authorities, even in individual cases (Articles 84, 1-3, 5).

If a Land does not fulfill its obligations under the Basic Law, or under any other federal law, the federal government, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may force it to do so by means of "federal coercion." In carrying out this federal coercion, the federal government or its commissioner has the right to issue directives to all Lands and their authorities (Article 37). Whether a Land has violated its legal obligations to carry out a federal law is determined by the Bundesrat, subject to appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court (Article 84.4). To ward off a threat to the basic democratic order of the Federation, or of a Land, a Land may request the services of the police forces of other Lands; but if the Land, in which the danger is threatening, is either unready or unwilling to combat it, the federal government may put the police forces of this Land, as well as those of other Lands, under its own direction. This federal takeover of Land police forces must terminate with the end of the danger, or whenever the Bundesrat so requests (Article 91). In short, the federal government can do little against any single recalcitrant Land, unless most of the other Lands, through their representatives in the Bundesrat, support it, with such support, however, its powers are overwhelming.

The distribution of financial resources between the federal government and the Lands is specified in the Basic Law (Articles 105-115). The list of taxes reserved to the Federation and the Lands, respectively, appears in Articles 105 and 106. The Federal Republic has thus become probably the only country on earth to enshrine the beer tax in its Constitution; Article 106.2.5 reserves it to the Lands, to the joy, presumably,

of the Bavarian representatives. Of the more important taxes, the turnover tax is federal, while the yield of income and corporation taxes is to be divided in the ratio of 38.62 between the Federation and the Lands; before 1958, the federal share was somewhat lower (Article 106.3). The details of the financial arrangements in the Basic Law and related legislation are very complex, but in one respect the rules are relatively simple: the Federation has legal control over all taxes, except local ones.¹² In the general setting of financial policy and in the conduct of the predominant part of financial practice, the federal controls, direct and indirect, are decisive.

The outcome of the system is that taxes are collected in the proportion 60%/25%/15% by the Federation, the Lands, and the municipalities, respectively. Since a part of the funds collected by the federal government is transferred for spending to the Lands and municipalities, the actual expenditures at these three levels of government approximate the ratio 41%/33%/26%. The federal share in total government revenues is thus significantly lower than in the United States.¹³

THE BUNDESTAG

The main agency of federal legislation is the Federal Parliament, or Bundestag, established under Articles 38 to 49 of the Basic Law. According to the Electoral Law of 1957, half its members are elected from 247 single-member

¹²Eschenburg, *op cit.*, p. 630, with references.

¹³Tax collection ratios for the Federal Republic from Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany*, p. 148, spending ratios computed from data in Table 5-9, above. Here, as everywhere in this study, the city-states of Hamburg and Bremen have been considered as Lands, in accordance with their legal and political position. A somewhat higher Federal share in total government spending—60%, including nearly 5% derived from the "equalization of burdens" program—is given in Pischke, *op cit.*, p. 335, and contrasted with a 40% ratio in the Empire before 1914, and a 70% ratio during the last years of the Weimar Republic.

constituencies by simple majorities or pluralities of the "first votes" cast by the voters in each district for the individual candidate of their choice. The other half are elected from party lists of candidates in each Land, by proportional representation in accordance with the share of their parties in the "second votes" cast by all voters at the same elections for the party of their preference. The outcome is a distribution of seats in fairly close accordance with proportional representation, but at the same time, the electorate's choice of individual candidates acts to personalize proportional representation, which otherwise usually involves voting for party lists rather than individuals.

In attempting to "democratize" the parties' internal organization by imitating the American primary and convention system, the electoral law provides that list candidates be nominated by assemblies of party members elected for that purpose in each Land and individual candidates, by similar assemblies in each of the 247 constituencies. Although constituency nominations are subject to an understanding between local and Land or federal party organizations, in law as well as in reality the local organization has the last word.¹⁴

Only those parties may obtain seats from this distribution according to party lists which win at least 5% of the valid votes cast in the entire Federal Republic, or whose candidates win majorities or pluralities in at least three single-member districts. This "exclusion clause" eliminates most splinter and regional parties. Each of the remaining parties is entitled to its proportionate quota of seats, which is made up from the party lists to the extent that the party has not already won a sufficient number of seats directly in the single-member constituencies. If a party wins more than its proportionate quota of direct seats, however, it retains these "overhang mandates," so that the final number of Bundestag deputies is usually slightly higher

than twice the number of single-member districts. Thus the Fifth Bundestag, elected in 1965, had 496 members, not counting the 22 nonvoting members from West Berlin.¹⁵ The size and political composition of the four Bundestags elected between 1949 and 1965 are given in Table 6-1.

The figures in Table 6-1 show that minor parties have been effectively eliminated and that no two-thirds majority, required for changes in the Basic Law, can be formed in the Bundestag without the support of members of the S.P.D.

The Bundestag deputies are elected by general, direct, free, equal, and secret vote, according to Article 38.1 of the Basic Law, but the electoral procedure can be, and has been, changed by ordinary federal law. According to the same article, the deputies are not subject to directions by anyone. In fact, however, the tradition of party discipline, the power of the parties over the placing of candidates in electoral districts and on Land lists, together with the need for funds to meet the costs of campaigning, have made the votes and actions of Bundestag members highly predictable.

Cases of defiance of important party orders by a deputy are rare. The exclusion clause would bar his re-election as an independent, and his chances to found a new party strong enough to surmount its requirements are remote. Moreover, the great majority of voters demand trustworthy party labels more than strong personalities, as many housewives prefer well-known brand names to the wares of less well-known individual tradesmen.¹⁶

All the members of the individual parties (the *Fraktionen*) meet frequently, for it is in these meetings that the important decisions regarding the Bundestag's position on legislation are taken. The *Fraktionen* determine the

¹⁵For a good account of the various stages of West German electoral legislation, see Plischke, *Contemporary Government of Germany*, pp. 69-71, 157-163.

¹⁶In a 1953 survey, only 4% of all voters mentioned the personality of the district candidate as a reason for their vote. See Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schütz, *Wähler und Gewählte* (Berlin: Vahlen, 1957), p. 345.

¹⁴Gerhard Loewenberg, "Parliamentarism in Western Germany: The Functioning of the Bundestag," *American Political Science Review*, 15:1 (March, 1961), 88.

TABLE 6-1

Party Representation in the Bundestag, 1949-1968

	1949	1953	1957	1961	CDU/FDP Coalition 1963-1966	CDU/SPD Coalition 1966-
I Small Rightist Opposition groups	26	3	0	0	0	0
II Potential Government coalition parties						
FDP	52	48	41	67	49	49
DP	17	15	17	0	0	0
CDU/CSU	139	243	270	242	245	245
Refugee Party	0	27	0	0	0	0
III Potential Opposition (1949-1965)						
Small Center Left groups						
SPD	22	0	0	0	0	0
Communists	131	151	169	190	202	202
Total Left Opposition	15	0	0	0	0	0
Actual Government coalition	168	151	169	190	202	0
Total voting numbers	208	333	328	309	294	447
	402	487	497	499	496	496

Source: Data in Putschke, *Contemporary Government of Germany* p. 71, and *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 31: 40 (October 10, 1961), 9371 C, Herdenheimer, *op cit.*, p. 113

general positions that the party deputies will take on pending legislation, going over the Bundestag Agenda point by point and taking positions on each one, even going so far as to determine the public arguments and the speakers to be used to express their positions. The decisions taken in these party meetings effectively bind both the words and the votes of the deputies in the Bundestag. Thus in the First and Second Bundestags, there was 99.8% cohesion among the CDU/CSU deputies, and 94.5% cohesion among the SPD deputies.¹⁷ Which is to say that party discipline is nearly perfect, the overwhelming majority of the deputies voting together as a block on all but a minuscule number of roll call votes.

The Bundestag determines when to end and reopen its sessions. Its President may call it into session earlier, and he must do so if the Federal President, or the Chancellor, or one-third of the members demand it (Article 39.3). A Permanent Committee is provided by the Basic Law to watch over the interests of the

Bundestag during the intervals between two electoral periods (Article 45). Two other Committees, on Foreign Affairs and on Defense, were provided by constitutional amendment in 1956 (Article 45a). The Permanent Committee and the Defense Committee also have the rights of an investigating committee, that is, they may gather evidence and proofs, by procedures analogous to those of general criminal procedure, including the power to compel testimony. Special investigating committees, on any matter other than defense, must be set up whenever one-fourth of the members of the Bundestag demand it. These committees have the same rights and procedures in regard to evidence and testimony. Their proceedings are public, unless a majority of the committee members vote to make a session confidential (Article 44). Since their composition is proportionate to the strength of the parties in the Bundestag, any strong opposition—e.g., the SPD—can compel the setting up of an investigating committee, even on a subject embarrassing to the government, but the majority of the members of the government coalition on

¹⁷Loewenberg, *op cit.*, p. 95, and the references cited there.

the committee may control much of the proceedings, as well as the language of the majority report, leaving the opposition to make its points by bringing out particular items of evidence and perhaps by issuing a minority report.

Most of the work of the Bundestag is done in committees, to a greater extent even than is the case in the United States Congress. There are more than three dozen committees, each dedicated to some special subject area, from the immunity of deputies and the verification of their mandates to cultural policy, economic policy, questions of German reunification and Berlin, and "atomic questions."¹⁸ Each committee has between 15 and 31 members, many of whom have been selected by their parties with an eye to their expert knowledge in the area of the committee's jurisdiction. Deputies are paid also for their attendance at committee sessions, as well as at sessions of their "fraction"—i.e., of their parliamentary party delegation. At the same time, the Bundestag has gone further than the British, French, and United States legislatures in delegating much of its work to committees. It has usually held only about 55 plenary meetings, but for every one it also held "no less than 20 committee and nine party meetings."¹⁹

The power of these committees and their members, however, is weaker *vis-à-vis* the executive than is the case in the United States. Fixed party positions and tight party discipline rarely leave much scope for individual committee members, except for the influence which these persons gain through their special concern and expertise. Moreover, since committee meetings ordinarily are secret, they cannot be

turned easily into instruments for publicity for particular deputies or interests. Each committee may require the presence of any Cabinet member at its meetings, and Cabinet members and civil servants also have their own right of access to committee meetings at any time (Article 43). In contrast to the United States Congress, the Bundestag committees have neither adequate professional experts and staffs of their own nor the aid of an adequate legislative reference service, so that many committee members, despite their experience and partial specialization, often find it difficult to maintain their views against those of the Cabinet ministers, which are bolstered by the expert testimony of the civil servants on their staffs. It is estimated, however, that about half the deputies have some expert help and secretarial assistance available through the offices of interest-groups at Bonn.

The chief officer of the Bundestag is its President, who is elected by secret ballot but is taken, in fact, from the strongest party. Three Vice-Presidents are elected by the chamber in the same manner; they are taken from the remaining parties, more or less in order of their strength. A Council of Elders, composed of these officers, together with other representatives of the parliamentary party delegations, is in theory only an advisory committee to the President of Bundesrat, but is in practice a very important body, somewhat comparable in its power to the Rules Committee of the House of Representatives in the United States. The chairmen of all other committees are not elected but are appointed in effect by the Council of Elders, which also schedules the debates on particular items of legislation—sometimes only one hour of plenary session for an important law—and allocates the times and order of speaking to the various parties and speakers.

The major sources of power and action in the Bundestag are the aforementioned "fractions", or parliamentary party delegations, which are recognized by the rules of procedures for every

¹⁸For brief discussions of the committee system, see Eschenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 549–553, with a list of committees; Grosser, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–95; Heidenheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–112.

¹⁹See Heidenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 133, and Gerhard Loewenberg, *Parliament in the German Political System* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 135 and 404, with reference to comparative statistics in "Wie die Parlamente tagen," *Das Parlament* (December 12, 1960), p. 11.

party having at least 15 deputies—another device to discourage splinter groups and minor parties. Only parties strong enough to form a fraction are represented on committees, may count on being assigned speaking time in plenary debates, may effectively initiate bills, direct parliamentary inquiries to the government—in short, take an effective part in the work of the Bundestag. After the 1961 and 1965 elections there were, as shown in Table 6-1, only three fractions left, those of the C.D.U./C.S.U., the S.P.D., and the F.D.P. The Bavarian Christian Social Union (C.S.U.), however, received separate representation on the committees and study groups within the joint C.D.U./C.S.U. fraction.²⁰

Each of these three fractions works somewhat like a small parliament. In the internal meetings of each party delegation, which are similar to the caucuses of parties in the legislatures in the United States, the delegations debate and decide whether to support or oppose some particular bill, or demand modifications in it. Individual deputies may vote for or against the proposed policies in the closed meeting of their fraction or caucus, but once a policy has been adopted for the entire party delegation by majority vote, all deputies are expected to support it and to vote for it in the plenum. Thus a bill endorsed originally only by a minority of deputies who form, however, the majority of one or two party delegations could become law through the working of party discipline within each delegation. Since the party delegations themselves are very large, power within them has largely shifted to their executive committees, composed of about two dozen particularly influential deputies. In the S.P.D. and C.D.U./C.S.U., power rests with inner executive committees of four or five deputies. In the case of the C.D.U./C.S.U., the party's Cabinet Ministers form a still higher layer of in-

fluence, superior to or at least equal with the top leadership of the parliamentary fraction.

The leadership groups of each of the fractions, and subsequently the entire fractions, meet before every major decision or debate of the Bundestag in order to set their policy, usually in concert with the leadership of their party outside the Bundestag. Since the parliamentary leadership group is also, as a rule, heavily represented on the national committee of their party, conflicts between national parties and their parliamentary delegations are rare. Together with the decisions of the Cabinet—and primarily of the Chancellor—it is the decisions of these leadership groups of the parliamentary and national parties that have the greatest influence on what happens in the Bundestag, even though many details of legislation are still modified by the suggestions of the civil servants and the political give-and-take of the legislative process in the Bundestag committees.

Deputies have the usual privileges and immunities, but they are not exempt from responsibility for "slandorous insults" (Article 46.1). They may be arrested or prosecuted only with the permission of the Bundestag or if they are arrested in the act of committing a punishable offense or within a day thereafter; if the Bundestag so requests, however, they must be released at once, and all criminal proceedings against them stopped (Article 46.2-4). They may refuse to name or testify about any persons they have received any information from as legislators or about the content of such information, within this area of privileged communication, no documents may be seized (Article 47).

Bundestag members are only moderately well paid—far less so than their colleagues in France or the United States, where national legislators are paid roughly on the scale of the top levels of the Civil Service in each country. In 1964 Bundestag deputies received a basic annual salary of about \$4,100, with another \$5,100 for various expenses, but with \$8 de-

²⁰For this practice in the 1950s, see Eschenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 534.

ducted for each absence regardless of excuse. From this they have to pay certain amounts to their parties (more heavily so in the case of the deputies of the S.P.D.), leaving them a net income of about \$4,800 per year.²¹

By the mid-1960's, the Bundestag and its members had come some distance in establishing themselves as respected members of the political system. On the other hand, the evidence indicates that there is still a good distance to travel before the Bundestag becomes highly valued by the great majority of West Germans. The growing extent to which the population trusts the deputies is seen in the responses to a question asking whether the deputies primarily represent the people or whether there are other interests which are more important to them. Between 1951 and 1958 the proportion of West Germans who said the deputies were primarily concerned with the people's interests rose from 25% to 41%. There has been a similar increase in the proportion of West Germans who believe that individuals must have great competence to become deputies; in 1951, 39% answered in this manner, rising to 61% in 1961. Annual polls were also taken which asked the following question: "What do you think of the Bundestag in Bonn as our representative assembly?" Between 1951 and 1965, the proportion replying that it was doing an excellent or a basically good job increased from 35% to 52%; the proportion who said that it was doing a fair job remained fairly constant at about 34%.²²

While such trends seem to augur well for the future, it should be noted that this growing respect for the Bundestag has perhaps not struck very deep roots. For one thing, over 85% of the population has not heard anything about the ac-

tivities of their own deputies—a proportion that has not changed since 1951. Nor are the West Germans likely to try to influence their deputies—directly or through the press—when they have a grievance; only 12% of the West Germans said that they would attempt to influence a national decision through their deputies, compared to 44% of the British and 57% of the Americans. Furthermore, the positive evaluation of the Bundestag has fluctuated as much as 19% from one year to the next. And when it is also noted that there is a close association between such a positive evaluation and the individual's preference for one of the governing parties at the time, it suggests that the West Germans' respect for the Bundestag is not based on deep-seated attachments, as is the case in Britain, for example. Thus not only democratic values in general, but respect for the national legislature has yet to strike deep roots, even though the attachments were stronger in the mid-1960's than during the Weimar Republic and the first decade of the Bonn Republic.²³

THE BUNDES RAT

The second branch of the federal legislature—the Council of Lands, or Bundesrat—is even less well known. In repeated polls, the proportion of West Germans who knew at least roughly "what the Bundesrat is here for," inched up slowly from a mere 8% in 1951 to a still feeble 14% in 1956.²⁴ Nevertheless, the Bundesrat is a coordinate branch of the federal legislature and has a significant share in the legislative process, as well as considerable powers in emergencies.

The Bundesrat is the specific organ through which the Land governments cooperate in federal legislation and administration (Article 50). It is composed of members of the Land govern-

²¹Letter from Ernst Paul, Member of the Bundestag, November 14, 1963, and Loewenberg, *Parliament*, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–52. For rates in the 1950's, see Theodor Eschenburg, *Der Sold des Politikers* (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1959), pp. 61–63.

²²E.M.N.I.D., *Informationen*, cited in Loewenberg, *Parliament*, *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 47, 429.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 426–430; Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, 225–227.

²⁴*Jahrbuch*, II, p. 280.

ments—that is, ordinarily of Ministers—even though these in turn are represented at many meetings by high-ranking officials of their Ministries. The Ministers do not serve, however, as individual deputies, but as members of the delegation of their Land, which must vote as a unit (Article 51.3). Each Land has at least three votes; Lands with more than 2 million inhabitants have four votes, and Lands of over 6 million inhabitants have five votes (Article 51.2). The 1965 distribution of Land votes in the Bundesrat was shown in Table 5-7b. If a Land is governed by a coalition of several parties, the entire vote of its delegation is cast as a unit in accord with an agreement of the member parties, usually following the views of the strongest party, which usually is also that of the Land Prime Minister. Bundesrat decisions require at least a majority of its constituent votes, so that abstention from voting on a proposal is equivalent to voting to reject it (Article 52.3). Most of the Bundesrat's work is done by 14 committees, on these, other members of Land governments, or their deputies, such as civil servants from Land administrations, may serve. Members of the federal government have the right and, if requested, the duty to attend any meeting of the Bundesrat or its committees (Article 53).

The Bundesrat has a share in all federal legislation. For constitutional amendments, a two-thirds majority of Bundesrat votes is required, just as it is of Bundestag members. About half of the remaining legislation is composed of the so-called "federative" or "consent" laws—perhaps something like 60 bills a year. These are all the laws for which Bundesrat consent is explicitly required by the Basic Law. Thanks to a successful broad interpretation of the Basic Law by the Bundesrat, all federal legislation which is to be carried out by the Lands and which thus has implications for their administrative institutions and procedures must also be approved by the Bundesrat. For all other bills, the Bundesrat has a suspensive veto,

which the Bundestag may override by simple majority. If the Bundesrat's rejection of the bill was by a two-thirds majority, however, a similar two-thirds majority in the Bundestag is required to override the bill (Article 77.4).²⁵

For any kind of bill, the Bundesrat may require within two weeks after its receipt from the Bundestag that it be submitted to a Joint Coordinating Committee of the two chambers, composed of 11 members of the Bundesrat, one for each Land, and an equal number of Bundestag members. In the case of "consent" legislation, the Bundestag itself, as well as the federal government, may also invoke the procedure before the Joint Coordinating Committee (Article 77.2).

During the First Bundestag period, 1949-53, when 805 bills were initiated—472 by the federal government, 301 by the Bundestag, and 32 by the Bundesrat—the Joint Coordinating Committee was invoked 75 times. Of these 75 cases, 73 ended by compromise, the Bundesrat cast three suspensive vetoes and was overridden by the Bundestag twice. Of the many bills requiring its consent, the Bundesrat vetoed six, of these, two were passed by it later in amended form, and four failed permanently.²⁶ The power of the Bundesrat is reflected, not in the few vetoes it cast, but in the many compromises which it forced on the Bundestag in the Joint Conference Committee, and in the extent of substantive changes which it thus imposed on the original draft legislation.

Unlike the Bundestag, the Bundesrat also has considerable powers in the area of administration. Its consent is required for all administrative ordinances of the federal government that are based on "consent" laws, or on the basis of laws which the Lands are required to execute as agents of the federal government, or that regu-

late the tariffs or conditions of use of the federal railroads, mails, and telecommunications.²⁷

The role of the Bundesrat is still more significant in emergencies, or in cases of conflict between the federal government and a Land, or between different branches of the government. Bundesrat consent is required for the initiation of federal coercion against any Land that fails to fulfill its legal obligations (Article 37), and the Bundesrat alone is competent to determine in the first place that such a failure on the part of a Land to meet its obligations has occurred (Article 84.4). The consent of the Bundesrat is also essential for the proclamation of a "legislative emergency" by the Federal President, in the case of a deadlock between the Chancellor and a negative majority in the Bundestag, and for the enactment of legislation during its duration. The federal government, without the consent of the Bundesrat, may put Land police forces under its orders to combat a danger threatening the existence of constitutional order of the Federal Republic or of any of the Lands; but any such emergency measure must be rescinded whenever the Bundesrat demands it (Article 91.2).

The Bundesrat has important assets to meet its tasks. Its members usually are Ministers in the Cabinets of their Lands, and its President—elected for one year and taken by custom in rotation each time from a different Land—is usually the Prime Minister of his Land. They thus have considerable status and prestige, and since the Ministers can draw upon the technical advice of the expert staffs of the Land bureaucracies, they also command a good deal of technical competence.

These assets have brought their temptations. Over the years, the Bundesrat has become increasingly inclined to play down its political and straight legislative role, and rather to stress the technical and administrative aspects of its activities. In practice, this tactic of disguising

political wishes or objections in the cloak of technical concerns is said to have been quite effective. Technical arguments thus seem to lend more strength to a proposed course of action than do political ones; and this fact testifies in its own way to a significant trend throughout West German politics: the increasing weight of administrative and bureaucratic considerations and the growing power of the federal executive.

THE CHANCELLOR

The Federal Chancellor holds the most important office in the Federal Republic. In effect, he appoints and dismisses all members of the Federal Cabinet, since his proposals are binding on the President of the Republic, who has the formal power of their appointment and dismissal (Article 64). Informally, the political parties whose deputies are to elect him to his office may stipulate in their agreement of coalition that certain ministerial portfolios should be given to certain individuals or to members of certain parties, but once the Chancellor is appointed, the parties have no effective control over his appointment policies, short of threatening to bring down the government by electing a new Chancellor.

The Chancellor has the power and the responsibility to determine the guiding lines of public policy (Article 65). His virtual subordinate, the Federal Minister of Defense, is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in peacetime, but as soon as the "case of defense"—that is, war or warlike emergency—is declared, the supreme command of all forces is vested in the Chancellor himself (Article 65a, added in 1956). This declaration is made by the Bundestag, or in the case of emergency, by the President of the Republic, with the counter-signature of the Chancellor (Article 59a). Unlike the President of the Republic, the Chancellor cannot be impeached; if a law bearing the required signatures of the Chancellor and President were

²⁷Article 37 and Eschenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 622.

found illegal, only the latter would be subject to possible impeachment.²⁸

The Chancellor has the "competence to determine competence" within the general framework of constitutional provisions—that is, he can assign the jurisdiction of the different Ministries, create new ones, or change their organization. He has the main effective control about personnel policies in the federal government.

There are three ways in which a Chancellor may be elected by the Bundestag: (1) nomination by the President of the Republic and by the votes of the majority of the members of the Bundestag; (2) in case of the failure of the presidential nominee to win such a majority, someone else may be elected Chancellor two weeks later by a majority of the Bundestag members, (3) if no candidate has been elected within those two weeks, another Bundestag vote must be taken at once, in which that candidate is elected Chancellor who gets the largest number of votes, even short of a majority. If the Chancellor has been elected by such a mere plurality, the President of the Republic must appoint him within seven days or else dissolve the Bundestag and thus bring about national elections of a new legislature (Article 63).

Once elected and appointed, the Chancellor is very likely to remain in office for the entire four-year period of the Bundestag. A hostile majority of Bundestag members can oust him only by a "constructive vote of no confidence"—that is, by electing another Chancellor, whom the President of the Republic is then obligated to appoint (Article 67). If the Bundestag returns a plain vote of no confidence against the Chancellor, without electing a successor, the Chancellor may remain in office or else the President of the Republic, if the Chancellor so requests, may dissolve the Bundestag within 21 days and thus bring about new elections (Article 68).

As long as a recalcitrant majority of the

Bundestag cannot agree on a successor to the Chancellor, the latter under certain conditions could govern quite effectively against it. German legislatures traditionally have not had a "power of the purse" comparable to that held by legislatures in English-speaking countries. Even if the Bundestag should fail to vote a federal budget for the coming year, the federal tax laws would continue to operate until they are specifically repealed, and the federal government would be entitled to collect taxes and other legal income, to continue to spend public funds in order to meet all obligations, to maintain all institutions, based on existing laws, and to continue to perform all tasks for which any amounts have been voted in earlier budgets. In addition to its continuing sources of income, the federal government in such a case also has automatic authority to borrow for such purposes up to one-quarter of the total amount of the last preceding budget (Article 111). The Bundestag always retains control, however, over new federal credits and guarantees that are to extend beyond a single fiscal year, for these must always be based on a federal law (Article 115).²⁹

The Chancellor may even bring about the enactment of federal legislation against the will of a hostile but divided Bundestag. If he has been defeated on an important bill, but not removed from office by the election of a successor, and if the Bundestag has not been dissolved by the President, the latter, on the motion of the federal government and with the consent of the Bundesrat, may declare a "state of legislative emergency" and have the bill pass into law in the form proposed by the federal government, in so far as it has been approved by the Bundesrat (Article 81.1–2). For a six-month period from the first declaration of such a state of legislative emergency, the Chancellor during his term of office may also cause any other legislative proposal of his government to be enacted in this manner, if it has been turned

²⁸Eschenburg, *op cit*, pp. 634–635.

²⁹On the whole problem of budgetary powers, see *Ibid.*, pp. 584–591.

down by the Bundestag. Only the Basic Law may not be changed or suspended, wholly or partly, by such emergency procedures (Article 81.3–4).

Together, and under favorable political and economic conditions, all these provisions tend to make even a weak Chancellor strong, and a fairly strong Chancellor a great deal stronger. His initial strength depends on his position in his own party and on the strength of that party, or on the strength and stability of the coalition of parties that back him. In time, however, if his administration is successful, particularly if it is further aided by economic prosperity and a favorable international climate, then the continuing concentration of power and publicity in his person will tend to make him a commanding figure in the nation.

Thus Konrad Adenauer, a moderately well-known regional leader of the Catholic Center Party in pre-Hitler days and long-time Mayor of Cologne, was elected Chancellor by a one-vote margin in the Bundestag of 1949, by 202 votes out of 402, but was re-elected with much larger majorities in 1953, 1957, and 1961. During his early years in office, opinion polls showed his popularity trailing behind that of his party, the C.D.U., but from 1952 on, Adenauer's popularity began to lead that of the C.D.U., and the party's 1957 electoral campaign exploited this personal leadership appeal with great success.³⁰ During the electoral campaign of 1961, a number of well-known writers, favoring the S.P.D., saw in Chancellor Adenauer a powerful personal symbol that would rally votes to the cause of such less popular potential successors as Minister of Defense Franz-Josef Strauss and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder.³¹ In No-

vember, 1961, poll results showed that 50% of the voters still consented that the 85-year-old Adenauer remain as Chancellor, either for a limited period (26%), or indefinitely (24%), at a time when the national vote for the C.D.U. in the September, 1961, elections had declined to 45%.³²

But in 1963 Adenauer's "mild feudal rule" as a "bourgeois emperor" had become more difficult and after months of expectancy, Adenauer realized that he had lost his firm grip over his C.D.U. disciples, and consequently resigned from the Chancellorship. Despite Adenauer's negative feelings toward Erhard, and his numerous attempts to prevent him from succeeding to the Chancellorship, Ludwig Erhard took over the reins of government in October, 1963. He was elected by a clear majority of the Bundestag, despite the fact that 24 of his nominal C.D.U. and F.D.P. supporters abstained.

At the outset, it appeared as if Erhard would retain his position for a long time to come, while continuing to dominate the Bundestag as Adenauer had done. Erhard's pre-eminent position was based upon his great popularity with the voters, leaving the C.D.U. deputies little choice but to support him. Thus "Chancellor democracy" continued after Adenauer. Erhard sometimes acted without the Cabinet's approval, remained beyond the Bundestag's day-to-day control (although he was more cordial to deputies than Adenauer was), and he played the most prominent role in the 1965 Bundestag election—the contest being viewed largely as one between two men, Erhard and Willy Brandt, the leader of the S.P.D.

Erhard's experience showed that the German political system allows the Chancellor to exer-

³⁰See the opinion data given in Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers*, pp. 65–66, with references; and for important additional data, U. W. Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, pp. 104–105; and E. Faul et al., *Wahlen und Wähler in Westdeutschland* (Villingen, 1960), p. 89 ff.

³¹Martin Walser, ed., *Die Alternative, oder Brauchen wir eine neue Regierung?* (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1961), with contributions by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Günter Grass, Inge Aicher-Scholl, and others.

³²D.I.V.O. Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Sozialforschung und angewandte Mathematik, *Bundestagswahl 1961, Repräsentativumfrage 326 Repräsentativerhebung* No. 322, July, 1961; No. 323, September, 1961; No. 326, November-December, 1961; Frankfurt, 1961, multigraphed; henceforth cited as D.I.V.O. 322, 323, and 326, respectively. The data cited are from D.I.V.O. 326, p. 15, Q.C. 36. The authors are indebted to Prof. Erwin Scheuch of the University of Cologne for making these materials available.

cise strong and independent leadership, but only as long as the Chancellor has the support of the country and his party—a situation that is very close to that of a British Prime Minister. Erhard, however, soon was to lose this support. The electorate became somewhat disenchanted with him when it became apparent that he was not as authoritative a figure as Adenauer, which left them with a mild feeling of insecurity and dissatisfaction, allowing rival party leaders and party dissidents (who thought he was not sufficiently “European” oriented) to assert themselves. Erhard’s political style allowed for open competition among competing policies and individuals until a consensus appeared, rather than attempting to force his own views upon the cabinet. Nor did Erhard build up a coterie of supporters in the cabinet and the party that were loyal to him, as Adenauer had done. In the words of one writer: “Possibly no major government leader has taken less advantage of the patronage power inherent in his office.”³³ Erhard’s popularity was further undermined when, as the German economy began to lose steam in 1965–66, he appeared to be unwilling to take any decisive remedial action, in seeming contrast to his earlier years, when he had built his reputation upon his direction of the “economic miracle.” Moreover, Adenauer’s direct and indirect public attacks upon him further undermined his position, despite the fact that Adenauer was violating the rules of party solidarity. Thus between August, 1964, and August, 1966, the number of Germans who held a positive opinion of Erhard declined from 85% to 48%.³⁴

In November, 1966, after Erhard’s resignation, the C.D.U.-C.S.U. deputies elected Kurt Georg Kiesinger as the new Chancellor by an absolute majority. Kiesinger had been a member of the Nazi party from 1933 to 1945, and an official in the Nazi government during World War II, responsible for some of its propaganda efforts directed at the Western allies.

He appears to have become disenchanted with the Nazis, however, since the mid-1930’s, and during the war he was accused of “sabotaging” some of the anti-semitic policies of the regime. After the war, Kiesinger joined the C.D.U., was elected to the Bundestag, and later became chairman of the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee. He had resigned this post in 1958 in order to become the Chief Minister of Baden-Württemberg where he made a good democratic record as leader of a coalition government.

Since the Free Democrats had recently left the federal government, leaving the C.D.U.-C.S.U. without an absolute majority in the Bundestag, Kiesinger’s first decisions revolved around the formation of another coalition government. After a month of negotiations with the Free Democrats and the Social Democrats, a broadly-based coalition government was formed with the latter. As leader of the S.P.D., Willy Brandt,—a veteran of the anti-Nazi underground, who in World War II had fought against Hitler’s Germany as a member of the Norwegian armed forces,—became Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister. Even the breach among the “European” and “American” oriented factions of the Christian Democrats seemed at least temporarily resolved, with the leader of the “European” faction, Franz-Joseph Strauss, returning as Finance Minister.

The resignations of Adenauer and Erhard indicate that the Chancellor’s powerful position is ultimately dependent upon the electorate’s evaluations and the confidence of his party’s deputies. But given this support, the Chancellor’s position is further enhanced by several agencies which are directly subordinated to him. Foremost among these is the Federal Chancellery (*Bundeskanzleramt*). This is, in effect, a super-ministry, the office of organization and coordination for the entire federal government. It often has decisive influence on the fate of legislative drafts. Such drafts are proposed by some Ministry, but they need the approval of the Chancellor and Cabinet, and thus the informal approval and guidance of the Federal

³³Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany*, p. 124

³⁴DIVO, *Presidents*, November, 1966

Chancellery is often sought even in the early stages of drafting. The Federal Chancellery also serves to mediate in conflicts between different Ministries, so that only the most important ones have to be decided by the Chancellor himself. It is headed by a Secretary of State, who is the top administrative aide of the Chancellor and who also may be his chief political assistant. Under the Secretary there are about twenty high-ranking civil servants, each of whom is charged with reporting on the affairs of one Federal Ministry. A strong Chancellor may concede certain Cabinet posts, or even the post of Deputy Chancellor, to members of other factions of his own party or of other parties in the government coalition, but he will seek to keep the Chancellery in the hands of men who are politically and personally close to himself.

Such considerations have long continued to focus attention on the Secretary of State, Dr. Hans Globke, for many years the closest collaborator of Chancellor Adenauer and considered at the beginning of the 1960's by a well-informed French observer "the most controversial and perhaps the most powerful man of the Federal Republic."³⁵ Globke's position has been compared with that of former Governor Sherman Adams during some years of the Eisenhower Administration, but his duties also included the supervision of the secret intelligence organization headed (until 1967) by General R. Gehlen. Since Globke's resignation, his successors have attracted less publicity.

³⁵Grosser, *Die Bonner Demokratie*, p. 106. Under the Nazi regime, Dr. Globke had written in 1936 for the infamous Nürnberg racial laws an official commentary, the reading of which he later described as repulsive and detestable. According to some writers, his commentary made these laws still more severe; according to others, it tended to narrow their application and thus saved many individuals. The attacks on Globke were not free from politics, and the Chancellor defended his associate to the utmost, taking him everywhere on his major travels. Some observers have seen in Globke a steadfast adherent of the Roman Catholic Church, who had at all times the confidence of its leaders and who remained in his compromising and distasteful job under the Nazis only in order to preserve a significant channel of information for the Church.

Another instrument of the Chancellor is the Federal Press and Information Office, which was headed by another close associate of the Chancellor, Felix von Eckardt, from 1952 to 1963. The Chancellor also has at his disposal a secret fund which was budgeted in 1955-56 at a little less than \$3 million and which permits the subsidization of favored periodicals, newspapers, and journalists.³⁶ The office is particularly effective in influencing the provincial press in rural areas and small towns, but the new C.D.U./S.P.D. coalition has made the fund publicly accountable, larger and less partisan.

Despite the concentration of powers in the Chancellor and the continuing efforts to enlarge them, it is not impossible that a Chancellor may be politically weak, without adequate support in his party and in the Bundestag and much in need of cooperation from other factions, parties, and branches of the government. In such a situation, the attitudes and powers of the President of the Republic may well prove crucial.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

The President is the ceremonial head of the Federal Republic in domestic and international affairs. As such, he has constant opportunities to contribute to the leadership of public opinion and to the setting of the tone and style of politics and culture in the country.

The first President, Theodor Heuss, a distinguished intellectual figure and professor of political science, did much to use these opportunities to elevate the prestige and dignity of Republican and constitutional institutions and to anchor them to unambiguously democratic values. His indications of dissent from some of Chancellor Adenauer's foreign and military policies were of little avail, but when he left

³⁶Eschenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 749.

office after two terms, 1949-59, he had won general popularity and high respect not only for himself as a person, but to a significant degree for the Republic which he had represented. While Heuss, a long standing leader of the liberal wing of the Free Democratic Party, had been elected President at a time when as yet no single political party or leader dominated the scene, his successor, Dr. Heinrich Lübke, a quiet farm leader who had been imprisoned by the Nazis, was selected for the Presidency from Chancellor Adenauer's own party at a time when the Chancellor's personal prestige and power had long been commanding. For the 10 years of his incumbency, President Lübke fulfilled his functions correctly and with dignity.

The President is elected for a five-year term and may be re-elected for a consecutive term only once. He is elected by a special Federal Convention, composed of the members of the Bundestag and of an equal number of members of Land legislatures elected on the basis of proportional representation, which brings the total to about 1,000 persons. Election is by majority vote of the members of this body. If in two votes no such majority has been obtained by any candidate, a plurality in a third vote suffices for election (Article 54). The rationale for the President's indirect election stems from the Weimar experience, in which a popularly elected President was able to compete with the legislature in claiming to represent the electorate—a situation fraught with potential conflict and stalemated government. In case of the President's incapacity or of the vacancy of his office before the end of his term, his duties devolve upon the President of the Bundesrat (Article 57).

All Presidential orders and decrees are valid only if countersigned by the Chancellor or by the competent Federal Minister. The Basic Law permits only three exceptions from this requirement, the appointment and dismissal of the Chancellor; the dissolution of the Bundestag in the event of its failure to elect a Chan-

cellor by majority vote, and the order to a Chancellor or Federal Minister to carry on the affairs of his office until the appointment of a successor (Article 58).

The President, nevertheless, has important reserve powers. If the Bundestag cannot be assembled in time, it is he who must decide whether to declare, with the countersignature of the Chancellor, that the "case of defense" has occurred, and thus, in effect, to declare war (Article 59.2). He must decide whom to propose first as a candidate for the post of Chancellor to the Bundestag and whether to dissolve the Bundestag if no Chancellor is elected by a majority vote of the members (Article 63). Similarly, he must decide whether to dissolve the Bundestag if it has refused the Chancellor a vote of confidence, but has failed to replace him by another (Article 68), or whether to back a minority Chancellor in such a case by declaring, at the request of the federal government, a state of legislative emergency (Article 81). The President thus can lend considerable strength to a weak Chancellor, or else he can compel him quickly to resign.

For his actions, the President can be impeached before the Constitutional Court, on the grounds of willful violation of the Basic Law or any other federal law. Impeachment is voted by the Bundestag or by the Bundesrat, by two-thirds of the members of the former, or of the votes of the latter, the motion to impeach, before it can be considered in either of these bodies, requires the backing of one-quarter of the Bundestag members or of the Bundesrat votes, respectively. After impeachment, the Constitutional Court may enjoin the President from exercising his office; if the court finds him guilty, it may deprive him of his office altogether (Article 61). These provisions underscore the separate legal responsibility of the President, which is distinct from the political responsibility of the Chancellor, and they tend to strengthen the President's hand in his dealings with the federal government by stressing

the autonomous character of his decisions, signatures, and actions, even in cases where the government has requested them. During the controversy over the ratification of the European Defense Community treaty, in December, 1952, President Heuss came close to setting a precedent when he requested an advisory opinion from the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the treaty. After a single interview with Chancellor Adenauer, however, he withdrew the request, a few hours before the court's opinion was to be made public.

On the whole, however, no major conflicts between the chief institutions and officers of the Federal Republic have arisen thus far, and the President's reserve powers have remained largely untested. On the other hand, some constitutional experts feel that the legal and political potentialities of the Presidency under the Basic Law have been by no means fully utilized. But until now, most of his activities have been taken up by more formal duties of representation and government routine.

THE MECHANICS OF LAW-MAKING

It may be convenient at this stage to summarize the roles of the different legislative and executive agencies in the normal process of legislation. The simplified flow diagram in Fig. 6-1 should be largely self-explanatory.

Bills can be initiated by the federal government, the Bundestag, or the Bundesrat. Those initiated by the federal government—more than half the total—first must be submitted to the scrutiny of the Bundesrat, while those few bills originating in the Bundesrat must first be commented on by the federal government. Then, however, all bills—including the nearly one-half that originated in the Bundestag itself—go through the main legislative process in the Bundestag. This starts with a First Reading and a vote in the full Bundestag—the “plenum”—on the general principles of the bill, fol-

lowed by intensive work on its details in one of the Standing Committees of the Bundestag, which in its report produces a draft version of the bill. This is followed by a Second Reading and a vote in the plenum on the specific details of the bill, and a Third Reading and vote to make sure of the cohesion and consistency of the changed bill that may have emerged. (It should be recalled, however, that before a bill goes through each successive stage, there are party meetings in which most of the actual decisions are made.)

After adoption by the Bundestag, the bill goes to the Bundesrat, and if not amended there, it passes on directly—as do more than nine-tenths of all bills—to the President of the Republic and to the Chancellor or the competent Federal Minister, for their signatures, and on to promulgation into law. For the one-tenth or less bills that are amended in the Bundesrat, another round of procedures is required, from the working out of a compromise version in the Joint Conference Committee to the approval of the compromise by each of the two chambers, before the approved text is returned to the main track for executive signatures and promulgation.

This formal description understates, however, the true influence on legislation of the Federal and Land Ministries and their officials. Many of the draft bills entered by Bundestag deputies actually have been drawn in some Ministry. Preliminary drafts are worked on in interdepartmental committees where both federal and Land officials participate, so that the views of the Bundesrat are often taken into account at this stage. Parliament then may make further corrections in these drafts, particularly if the civil servants have in their draft misjudged the political strength of one or more of the interest-groups concerned. In general, however, the Bundestag resembles the British Parliament, rather than the United States Congress, in expecting to receive legislative drafts more nearly ready for enactment.

The system looks somewhat cumbersome on paper, but it has worked well in practice, insur-

ing thorough consideration of most measures within a reasonable time. Even in a smoothly working system, however, some deadlocks and conflicts are likely to occur. To deal with these, another set of agencies is provided in the courts.


THE COURTS

The chief agency for resolving constitutional conflicts is the Constitutional Court, provided for in Articles 93 and 94 of the Basic Law. Broadly speaking, the Constitutional

Court is competent to deal with six kinds of cases:

1. *The control of the constitutionality of laws*
There is a hierarchy of laws, in which the Basic Law ranks highest, other federal laws next, then come Land constitutions, and finally other Land legislation. Any law thus may have to be scrutinized for its compatibility with a higher one, up to the Basic Law. The Constitutional Court may be invoked for this purpose by any other court of law, where in a pending case a conflict of this kind may have arisen, or by the federal government, or by any Land government, or by one-third of the members of the Bundestag.

FIGURE 6-1 *The passage of ordinary bills in the German Federal Republic Heavy line indicates the route of most bills. (Data taken from A. Grosser, Die Bonner Demokratie, p. 88; G. Lucwenberg, Parliament, p. 270; and T. Eschenburg, Staat und Gesellschaft in Deutschland, p. 622)*



2. Interpretations of the Basic Law, occasioned by disagreements about the limits of the rights and duties of any one of the highest organs of the Federal Republic. Here the court may be invoked by the President of the Republic, the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the Permanent Committee of the Bundestag provided for by Article 45 of the Bundestag, the federal government, or certain of the major parts of any of these, such as the one-tenth or one-fourth of the members of the Bundestag who have the right to initiate certain procedures there. In any case, however, the plaintiffs must show their specific legal interest in the case at issue.

3. Disagreements about the rights and duties of the federal government and the Land governments. Proceedings may be initiated only by the federal government for the federal authorities, and only by a Land government for any Land authorities.

4. Formal deprivations of certain constitutional rights, somewhat analogous to criminal proceedings:

a. Forfeiture of basic rights, on grounds of their anti-constitutional misuse, according to Article 18.

b. Banning of specific political parties as unconstitutional, according to Article 21:2.

c. Impeachment of the President of the Republic by the Bundestag or Bundesrat, according to Article 61, on a motion by the federal government, or the Bundestag, or the Bundesrat, or by a Land government in the case of parties limited to a single Land.

d. Impeachments of federal judges, on the motion of the Bundestag, according to Article 98:2.

5. Complaints against decisions by the Bundestag in regard to the validity of an election, or the acquisition or loss of membership in the Bundestag by a deputy or candidate, according to Article 41:2, on the motion of the rejected candidate, or of 101 voters, or of a Bundestag "fraction," or of one-tenth of the Bundestag members.

6. All constitutional complaints by individuals against any alleged violation of any of their basic rights, or any of the rights contained in Articles 33, 38, 101, 103, or 104 of the Basic Law. Such complaints may be initiated by any individual, but ordinarily he may appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court only after having exhausted his normal legal remedies in the regular courts. The Constitutional Court, however, may accept and decide such a complaint at once if it deals with a matter of general importance or if the delays of normal legal proceedings through the courts

would work serious and unavoidable harm for the plaintiff.

The Constitutional Court, located at Karlsruhe, consists of two Chambers or "Senates," each composed of eight judges, or 16 for the entire Court. Originally the First Senate was to deal with conflicts between federal and Land laws and the Basic Law, and with one another, while the Second Senate was to deal with conflicts between the highest organs of government. Experience soon showed that legal and constitutional disputes of the first kind were frequent, particularly the individual complaints (see point 6, above), while top-level political conflicts of the second type were rare. The court began to operate in 1951; within the first five years, the First Senate heard nearly 3,000 complaints, while the Second Senate had to deal with about 30. After the redistribution of the work load in 1956 and 1960, the First Senate now deals mainly with complaints against violations of civil and constitutional rights, leaving most other kinds of cases to the Second Senate, which consequently has somewhat gained in power.

The decisions of each Senate of the Constitutional Court are final. The legal interpretations embodied in them in each case are binding for future decisions by the other Senate. If that Senate wishes to depart from them, the matter must be decided by the full court—the plenum—which requires for a quorum the presence of at least two-thirds of the members of each Senate. In this way, the unity of decisions by the two Senates of the court is to be preserved. If a Senate should wish to reverse its own earlier legal interpretation, the matter presumably also might have to be dealt with by the plenum in a similar manner. The aim seems to be, not to make the legal views of the court immutable, but to make sure that the two Senates of the court will at all times function as two organs of a single judicial authority.

At times, there has been a tendency in the Federal Republic to pass difficult political

problems to the courts, and particularly to the Constitutional Court, so as to avoid the strains and stresses of handling them through the legislative and executive institutions. As in other countries, this tempting practice has threatened to engage the prestige of the courts in political controversy, but respect for the courts has remained high. In a country that still lacks deep-rooted habits and traditions of constitutionalism and democracy, it has been perhaps more necessary to call on the courts and the respect for law to limit political conflicts, to curb the excessive pragmatism and potential ruthlessness with which interest groups might come to press their claims, and to guard the basic essential rules and procedures of constitutional politics.

In addition to the Federal Constitutional Court, there are six other superior Federal Courts, each of which has the highest jurisdiction over appeals in its special field. The ordinary system of German civil and criminal courts is arranged in three ascending tiers, from the *Amtsgerichte* through the *Landesgerichte* to the *Oberlandesgerichte*. All these are part of the Land jurisdiction, but they apply Federal Law (the German criminal code of 1871 and the civil code of 1900, as amended, are valid in all states), and their decisions are subject to appeal to the Federal High Court (*Bundesgerichtshof*) at Karlsruhe. This court supersedes the old *Reichsgericht* and is the court of last resort in civil and criminal adjudication, insofar as it does not involve questions of constitutionality. The Federal High Court has three sections of five judges each. These sections deal with civil cases, criminal cases, and treason, respectively; for the last-named, the court's jurisdiction is original.

The five superior administrative courts include:

1. The Federal Finance Court (*Bundesfinanzhof*) at Munich, dealing with taxes and other fiscal matters.

2. The Federal Administrative Court (*Bundesverwaltungsgericht*) at West Berlin, dealing with

disputes among or claims against governments not involving constitutional questions.

3. The Federal Labor Court (*Bundesarbeitsgericht*) at Kassel, which deals with labor affairs.

4. The Federal Social Court (*Bundessozialgericht*) in Essen, which is competent to decide cases arising from social security and public welfare questions.

5. The Federal Court of Discipline (*Bundesdisziplinarhof*) at Frankfurt, which hears appeals from cases against federal public servants under the disciplinary regulations.

The first four of these are provided for by the Basic Law, the last is implied by it (Article 96,1 and 3).

The crowning body for this entire judicial edifice is to be the Supreme Federal Court (*Oberstes Bundesgericht*), which is provided for by the Basic Law (Article 95) and is charged with the task of safeguarding the unity of the application of the laws. Its judges are to be selected by a panel consisting of the Federal Minister of Justice and a special selection committee composed of the Land Ministers of Justice and an equal number of members elected by the Bundestag. After more than 18 years, however, no legislation implementing this complex arrangement has been passed, and the Supreme Federal Court thus far has remained on paper. Even so, the growth in the organization and stature of the West German judiciary has been impressive. In contrast to the Imperial and Weimar period—not to mention the degradation of the Hitler era—the judiciary under the Federal Republic is separated from the executive power. It is constitutionally protected in its separateness, and so is the independence of the judges. There is a distinct supreme tribunal to deal with questions of constitutionality, and there is an effective doctrine of judicial review, which has subjected the traditional bureaucratic-authoritarian patterns of German government to a far-reaching control by law. Together, these are in many ways far more profound and thoroughgoing changes than those worked by the 1918 revolution.

The changes in the constitutional role of the

judiciary contrast with the remarkable continuity of the judges. The personnel of the highest courts, and particularly of the Federal Constitutional Court, have been selected with conspicuous care, both as to their high professional qualifications and their clean political records. Elsewhere in the West German judiciary, as well as among prosecutors and Attorneys General of the Lands, and even of the federal government, cases of jurists with Nazi records kept coming up as late as 1967. Earlier, in 1962, a federal bill offered early and relatively attractive retirement terms to judges who would admit that they had imposed political death sentences under the Nazi regime, or had collaborated in procuring such death sentences for defendants who would not have been sentenced to death by other than Nazi standards.

A number of judges avoided proceedings by accepting this offer, but others continued to forget or conceal their pasts until confronted with evidence which produced startling head-

lines in the West German press. The bulk of the judges, however, have not been touched by these spectacular happenings. They are traditionalists and conservatives, not Right-wing radicals. As a group, they are remarkably tightly knit and closely related to the upper middle classes. By duty and intention, they are to be impartial appliers of the law. By background, marriage, and associations, they are overwhelmingly tied to a single class, and they are almost completely separated from, and uninformed about, that half of the German people which consists of workers—skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled—who are defendants in their Courts.³⁷ This, however, brings up a matter that goes beyond any problem of legal rules: the crucial question of which persons, elites, and interest groups *actually* operate the West German political system.

³⁷See Ralph Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Freiheit* (Munich: R. Piper & Co., Verlag, 1961).

VII

Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Elites

During the three generations from 1871 to 1967,

West Germany has undergone spectacular but uneven changes. Its constitutional arrangements have changed most often and most dramatically. Its political parties have changed somewhat less, and its most influential interest-groups have changed relatively least of all. To be sure, the word "relatively" is important here, among the major interest-groups, the great landowners and aristocrats who enjoyed such a large share of power and prestige in Imperial Germany, and who still wielded such considerable and even fateful influence in the decline of the Weimar Republic, have disappeared. Most of the other large interest-groups of the past, however, have re-emerged, and they pursue with zeal their social, economic, and political interests through the changed party system of the Federal Republic.

With the demise of the landowners, the second traditional great body of interests—big business and industry—has come into its own. For the first time, the business community has no major rival in its relations with the non-Socialist parties and in its claims for the solicitude of government. Farmers and labor organizations can and often do exert effective pressure in pursuit of their specific interests, but the very much greater influence and prestige of business in the Federal Republic is conspicuous. When different business groups oppose each other, their influence is weakened, but when business speaks with a united voice, its views, with rare exceptions, weigh heavily in Bonn.¹

¹The nearest thing to such an exception may have been the German-Israeli Reparations Agreement of 1952, which was opposed by some German business interests, but was pushed through by Chancellor Adenauer for reasons of morality, as well as of foreign policy, and which passed the reluctant Bundestag, thanks only to the solid support of the chief opposition party, the Social Democrats. See Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers*, pp. 168–176, and Kurt R. Grossman, *Germany's Moral Debt: The German-Israeli Agreement* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954).

Even the needs and demands of the most powerful interest groups, however, must be translated into political decisions and into administrative and legislative action. They must be made compatible with the interests of other interest groups, so as to secure for them an adequate measure of support, and they may have to be made palatable to potentially opposing interests by a process of political bargaining and mutual concessions. Although the great and persistent interest groups of the country most often get their way, they get it only through the political process, and particularly through the mediation and agency of the political parties.

THE CHANGING PARTY SYSTEM

At the first Reichstag elections in 1871, the parties of the Right and Center together won the votes of about 49% of the electorate of Bismarck's Reich.² Ninety-four years later, in 1965, the reorganized and renamed parties of the Center and the Right won the support of approximately 50% of the electorate of the German Federal Republic. During the intervening decades, the joint share of the Right and Center parties dropped to a low of 45% in 1919, and rose to a high of 61% in 1933. Through wars and revolutions, monarchies and republics, the regimes of Bismarck, Ebert, Hitler, and Adenauer, this electoral share of the German Right and Center parties never varied more than eight percentage points from a mid-point of about 53% of the electorate—a point not too far from their actual share of the electorate in 1965.

At that first election in 1871, only 2% of the electorate gave their votes to the Social Democrats, while another 49% made no use of their franchise. During the decades that followed, however, the voting habit spread. By 1912, a solid 29% of the electorate supported the So-

cial Democrats, while only 15% stayed at home. This broad distribution of the pattern of 1912 was to remain characteristic for much of German politics thereafter. In 1965, the Social Democratic share of the electorate of the Federal Republic stood at 33%. Throughout the intervening half-century, with all its dramatic changes, the share of the Labor and Socialist Parties of the Left had only varied between 38% in 1919 and 26% in 1924 and 1949—with the important modification that this entire share now is concentrated once again in a single party, the S.P.D., as it was in 1912; in the elections from 1919 to 1953, however, it was split between Social Democrats and Communists, and sometimes also Independent Social Democrats. Finally, the percentage of nonvoters ranged between a high of almost 26% in prosperous 1928 to a low of 12% in the crisis election of 1933, remaining at about 16% after the Bonn Republic was launched.

Within the first two of these three broad divisions—Center-plus-Right, Left, and Nonvoters—the shifts have been considerably more dramatic. The Right, including both Conservatives and National Liberals, started out with 27% of the electorate in 1871. The share of its successor parties dropped to a low of 12% in 1919, to rise again to a spectacular 47% in 1933, and to dwindle to an insignificant 2% of the electorate in 1965; this 2% supported small rightist parties, all of which, thanks to the 5% clause, failed to win representation in the Bundestag. The non-Socialist parties of the Middle started with 22% of the electorate in 1871, rose to 33% in both 1912 and 1919, but dropped to a fatally low 14% in 1933. These parties of the Middle, however, rose spectacularly under the Federal Republic, when they inherited the votes of most of the politically homeless former supporters of the discredited Right. As early as 1949, in the first federal election 49% of the electorate gave its support to a number of such non-socialist middle-of-the-road parties. By 1965, a much diminished number of such par-

²For these and the following data, see Table 7-1.

TABLE 7-1
Electoral Shares of German Parties and Groupings, 1871-1965
(By approximate percentage of eligible voters)

	1871	1912	Jan 1919	June 1920	May 1924	May 1928	Sept 1930	Nov 1932	Mar 1933	Aug 1949	Sept. 1953	Sept. 1957	Sept 1961	Sept 1965
Citizens entitled to vote (in millions)	7.7	14.4	36.8	36.0	38.4	41.2	43.0	44.4	44.7	31.2	33.1	35.4	37.4	38.5
Valid votes cast (in millions)	3.9	12.2	30.4	28.2	29.3	30.8	35.0	35.5	39.3	24.5	28.5	31.1	31.3	32.6
1. Far Right Nazis	—	—	—	—	5	2	15	26	39					
Conservatives	12	11	8	13	19	14	10	7	7	DP and	DRP		NPD	2
2. Moderate Right National Liberals	15	12	4	11	6	6	3	2	1	4	4	4	1	—
(19-33 DVP)														
Subtotal RIGHT	27	23	12	24	30	22	28	35	47	4	4	4	1	2
3. Progressives and Democrats (1928 State Party)	8	10	16	7	6	10	9	2	2	9	9	6	11	8
4. Center and Bavarian Peoples' Party	10	14	16	14	13	11	12	12	12	CDU	36	43	38	40
5. Particularists	4	9	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	13	7	5	2	—
Subtotal CENTER	22	33	33	22	20	22	22	16	14	49	52	54	51	48
6. Social Democrats	2	29	32	17	15	22	20	16	16	22	25	27	31	33
Independent Social Democrats	—	—	6	13	1	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—
7. Communists	—	—	—	2	10	8	11	13	11	26	2	27	32	33
Subtotal LEFT	2	29	38	32	26	30	31	29	27	26	27	27	—	—
8. Nonvoters	49	15	17	22	25	26	19	20	12	24	17	15	16	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: Dolf Sternberger, *et al.*, *Wahlen und Wähler in Westdeutschland* (Villingen/Schwarzwald: Ring Verlag, 1960), pp. 321-323; Sidney Meilen, 'The German People and the Postwar World', *American Political Science Review* 37.4 (August, 1943), 601-625. The elections of December, 1924, and July, 1932, have been omitted; their inclusion would not change any of the major trends. Because of rounding, all figures are approximate.

ties was backed by 48% of the registered voters—the C.D.U., supported by 40% and the F.D.P., backed by about 8% of the electorate. These and additional data are shown in greater detail in Table 7-1.

Throughout the days of the Empire and the Weimar Republic, the voting strength of the Center and the Right had been scattered over

many parties, with the only exception being in 1933 when the Nazis united a large part of it for their adventure in extremism. Never before the days of the Federal Republic had a moderate party succeeded in uniting under its leadership the bulk of this potential Right and Center vote, let alone in keeping it together through election after election. All this the C.D.U. has

accomplished, and in doing so it has become Germany's first example of a moderate and successful party of political integration.

THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (C.D.U.)

The Christian Democratic Union, C.D.U., together with its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, C.S.U., is the successor of the old Catholic Center Party, as well as of some small Protestant non-Socialist parties, such as the Christian Social People's Service (*Christlichsozialer Volksdienst*), and of parts of several middle-class and moderately conservative parties, such as the German People's Party (*Deutsche Volkspartei*), and others. For the first time in the history of German political parties, the C.D.U./C.S.U. has succeeded in uniting strongly committed Catholics and Protestants, together with voters of less intense religious feelings, in a single large party. At the same time, it has united rural and urban voters, farmers and businessmen, artisans and white-collar workers, professionals and housewives, employers and labor-union members, into a single broad party, which has succeeded in maintaining its significant appeal to every one of these diverse interests and groups.

All of these groups have, in fact, responded by giving a substantial part of their votes to the C.D.U., and they have continued to do so through four federal elections and a much larger number of elections in the Lands. They have differed significantly, however, in the measure of their support. The extent of these differences in the middle 1960's is shown in Table 7-2.

The figures in Table 7-2, as well as additional survey data, show that the C.D.U. is getting twice as much support from Roman Catholics as it does from Protestants—a fact which becomes particularly evident when it is recalled that the proportion of regular churchgoers

—who, in turn, vote still more solidly for the C.D.U.—is much higher among Roman Catholics than it is among Protestants.³ It also seems clear that the C.D.U. is getting most of the votes of farmers, professional people, and businessmen, both big and small. It gets more of the votes of the wealthy and the well-off, but it does fairly well in every income group. It has a strong appeal for voters over 60 years of age, who, we may recall, are more numerous in Germany than in many other countries. The C.D.U. does least well, but still not too badly, among Protestants, skilled workers, nonskilled workers, and rural laborers.

The sources of the C.D.U.'s electoral support are reflected in the composition of the leading bodies of the party. The formal decision-making body of the party, its national executive (*Bundesvorstand*), mirrors the diversity of the party's supporters and its strong local roots, particularly in Southern and Western Germany. Formal power in this executive is divided between leaders of regional organizations (*Landesverbände*) and the party's chief representatives in the federal government and in the Bundestag, between Protestants and Catholics, and between trade-union leaders and representatives of business and industry. More relevant for policy decisions, particularly in regard to foreign policy, has been an inner elite of the C.D.U. At the end of 1956, this group was composed of Chancellor Adenauer, the party chairman and the four vice-chairmen of the C.D.U., its cabinet ministers, and its parliamentary leaders, consisting of the chairman of the C.D.U. delegation in the Bundestag and his two deputies, the chairman of the C.S.U. delegation and his deputy, and the chairmen of the five major Bundestag committees concerned with foreign affairs, who also were C.D.U. deputies.⁴

³For data from 1953 surveys showing much the same picture, with a minor increase in Catholic preferences for the C.D.U. since 1953, see Juan Linz, *The Social Bases of West German Politics*, pp. 181–187, and especially p. 185.

⁴For these and the following data, see Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–69.

TABLE 7-2
Major Party Preferences, Fall, 1966

Categories	CDU	SPD	Others	No preference	No response	Total of group
1 Total respondents	30%	35%	6%	15%	14%	100%
2 Occupations						
Independent farmers	45	9	1	20	13	100
Free professions	41	35	—	6	6	100
Pensioners, and trainees	41	28	2	7	17	100
Rural laborers	39	26	—	16	16	100
Employers and self employed	33	26	1	12	18	100
Housewives	32	30	1	15	20	100
White-collar employees	31	36	2	18	9	100
Civil servants	26	39	3	23	7	100
Unskilled workers	20	48	1	13	15	100
Skilled workers	18	54	2	12	11	100
3 Income (monthly)						
Up to 299 DM	34	26	7	12	21	100
300 to 499 DM	31	32	5	15	17	100
500 to 699 DM	25	45	5	14	12	100
700 to 899 DM	27	41	5	11	15	100
900 to 1,499 DM	32	31	8	20	10	100
1,500 DM and above	40	21	8	18	13	100
No income data	35	12	9	18	26	100
4 Age:						
60 and older	34	27	5	16	18	100
50 to 59	28	34	9	16	12	100
40 to 49	21	38	8	17	16	100
30 to 39	26	45	5	13	11	100
21 to 29	30	36	6	16	12	100
Up to 20	38	29	5	8	19	100
5 Sex:						
Men	26	42	6	15	11	100
Women	33	29	6	15	18	100
6 Religion						
Roman Catholic	40	28	4	14	15	100
Protestant	21	40	8	16	16	100
Others and no denomination	8	49	12	23	8	100
No response	57	50	—	—	—	100
7 Strength of religious attachments						
Strong Catholics	58	16	3	11	13	100
Weak Catholics	29	37	5	16	14	100
Strong Protestants	33	26	11	17	14	100
Weak Protestants	20	43	7	16	14	100

Source: DIVO Institut, *Umfragen* October, 1966. For 1960 and 1961 data, confirming this general picture, see also Viggo Graf Blucher, *Der Prozess der Meinungsbildung dargestellt am Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 1961* (Bielefeld: EMNID, 1962). There have, however, been significant changes in the rank order of occupations in terms of their proportionate support for the CDU. These changes may be due to new evaluations based upon the CDU/SPD coalition.

For other policy decisions, chairmen of some other Bundestag committees might be more relevant; and there have been some changes in composition of the C.D.U. cabinet ministers and Bundestag committee chairmen between 1956 and 1967, but the general character of the party has remained sufficiently constant to make the picture of its inner elite still relevant for the mid-1960's.

This inner elite group in 1956 numbered 23 persons. It was composed overwhelmingly of West and South Germans (87%), and of nearly two-thirds Roman Catholics (65%). It was relatively old—52% had grown up under the pre-1918 Empire. Its members were well-educated; two-thirds had attended a university and nearly half of these had won doctorates. About 61% were military veterans; 39% had served in the First World War and 22% in the Second. Nearly two-fifth (39%) had been prominent members before 1933 of the Catholic Center Party or of its affiliate, the Bavarian People's Party. None had gone into exile during the Nazi era, but 35% had been imprisoned for anti-Nazi activities, 39% had an anti-Nazi record, and only 4% had served the Nazi regime in any official capacity. Three-quarters were of middle-class origin (74%); nearly one-quarter (22%) reported a labor background; only 4%—or one man—could be counted an aristocrat.

A similar composition was found among the 250 C.D.U. and C.S.U. deputies who sat in the Bundestag between 1953 and 1957. They were more than three-quarters middle-class and nearly two-thirds Roman Catholic. They were less well educated—30% had no formal education beyond the primary level. Far fewer—only 13%—had any clear-cut anti-Nazi record of arrest or imprisonment, and not one reported having been in exile. Since the middle-level leaders, such as these Bundestag deputies of the mid-1950's, are a likely source of new top leaders, it seems plausible that the proportion of top C.D.U. leaders with clear-cut anti-Nazi

records will decline. The characteristics of these two C.D.U. elites, and of their S.P.D. counterparts, are summarized in Table 7-3.

The data presented thus far do not tell us which specific interest-groups are represented within the C.D.U., nor by what particular arrangements their influence is exercised. Some inferences may be drawn, however, from general studies of interest representation in the Bundestag, of which the C.D.U. deputies constituted at all times a large part, and an absolute majority from 1953 to 1961. Thus, of the 467 deputies in the 1957-61 Bundestag, at least 13%—or some 60 deputies—openly represented business interests; another 13% represented farmers and their associations, while 10% were officials of trade unions and social welfare organizations.⁵ Of the last of these groups, a majority doubtless were members of the S.P.D., while the bulk of employer and farm representatives were members of the C.D.U. and F.D.P. fractions. Since the C.D.U. delegation outnumbered that of the F.D.P. about five to one, some 40 to 45 employers' representatives presumably were sitting as C.D.U. deputies, forming roughly one-fifth or one-sixth of the total delegation of that party. This proportion holds, even if we assume a still higher concentration of employers' representatives—perhaps as high as 31%—among the deputies of the F.D.P., which was the proportion of such employers' representatives found by a survey in the F.D.P. delegation in an earlier Bundestag.⁶

Despite the reality of direct and indirect interest representation in its councils—including such powerful interests as the Roman Catholic Church, big business and industry, farm groups, small businessmen's and employer's organiza-

⁵Deutsch and Edinger *op. cit.*, p. 91; "Die interessanzte Zahl," *Junge Wirtschaft*, V (December 1957), 522; Heinz Hartmann, *Authority and Organization in German Management* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958).

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 91, 94; Rupert Breitling, *Die Verbände in der Bundesrepublik* (Meisenheim: Hain, 1955), pp. 102-109.

tions, Protestant Church leaders, and Christian trade-unionists—the very multiplicity of these interests and the breadth of the party's electoral support gave the C.D.U. and its leaders a measure of independence against any single pressure group. The same facts, however, also increase the importance of the highly visible national leaders, who, after years of successful performance in government, have become unifying symbols for their party and its electorate, or for large parts of it. Chancellor Adenauer's power over his party is well known, but Chancellors Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Kiesinger, Finance Minister Franz Joseph Strauss, and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder have all built up significant personal reputations.

This unity of the C.D.U. has never been effectively threatened. All interest groups within the party stand to gain little and to lose much if it were lost. Some Protestant members may chafe at the predominance of Catholic politicians in the inner councils, but the C.D.U. provides more patronage for middle-class Protestants than the latter would be likely to secure by any voting strength which they could command by their own unaided efforts. Many Protestant workers vote in any case for the S.P.D., and the C.D.U. policy of allocating national regional and local patronage roughly in proportion to the overall strength of the denominations, with only minor deviations in favor of Catholics, also gives the C.D.U. Protestants the benefit of the quota of those Protestants who have been voting for the S.P.D.

Something similar applies to other groups. Catholic trade unionists have been dissatisfied with the steady rightward drift of the C.D.U., which has moved from stressing social reform and the acceptance of moderate Socialism in the party's *Ablener Programm* of 1947 to the conservatism and increasing identification with the views of business enterprise during the Adenauer era. Yet, as committed Catholics, these unionists are unlikely to join the S.P.D.,

and they have no realistic alternative to staying in the C.D.U. Farm groups likewise have found that they can get much through the C.D.U.—including substantial farm price supports as well as the prestige of having a farm leader, Heinrich Lübke, as President of the Republic—and any alternative political alignment they might make would offer them much less.

The relative satisfaction of all these groups with the C.D.U. during the years of mounting prosperity has tended to restrict the political chances of the S.P.D., almost regardless of the policies or skills of its leaders, even the slowing down of this prosperity after 1963, together with the demands for a more equitable distribution of some of the gains that are still being made, did not result in a loss of popular support for the C.D.U. in the 1965 elections.

The C.D.U. has been one of the most successful political parties in the world. Starting from a coalition of diverse elements, it has held them together and led them to many electoral victories, once, in 1957, the party won an absolute majority of the valid votes cast—which amounted to 43% of the total electorate—something never before achieved in German history by a single party in a free election. Although it could not hold its 1957 share of the vote, by 1965 it had consolidated many of its gains at a level of 40% of the electorate or more and seemed likely to remain the largest West German party for the indefinite future.

Within this spectacularly successful party, however, distinctive elements have persisted. One bloc of voters follows closely the direct and indirect lead of the Roman Catholic Church in political affairs; the stability of this group's commitment is strengthened not only by the influence of the clergy, but also by that of many local and community leaders who as youths were influenced by the various Roman Catholic lay organizations, in which many of the leaders are still active. Particularly important elements among these stable Catholic C.D.U.

supporters are rural groups and Catholic trade-union members. Similar but much smaller groups of strongly committed Protestant voters are also reliable C.D.U. supporters. All these stable groups back the C.D.U. regardless of the party's current electoral propaganda or of its financial resources.

These groups that consistently vote for the C.D.U. are not adequate to maintain a large party and give it a good chance to win each election. Many of the voters who ordinarily cast their ballots for the C.D.U. pay little attention to politics. They must be aroused anew at each election and brought to the polls in just the right kind of mood. All this costs a remarkable amount of money—far more than the C.D.U. can collect from its members. Although the C.D.U./C.S.U. in 1957 polled over 15 million votes, the party had only about 250,000 members, or one member for every 60 votes. Annual membership fees are estimated to have brought in less than \$300,000. About another \$400,000 per year came in from levies on Bundestag and Landtag deputies of the party, and the remaining \$400,000 or \$500,000 needed to make up the \$1.1 to \$1.2 million necessary to run the party organization even in a nonelection year had to come from private donations.

In the 1957 election, however, the private campaign expenditures on behalf of the C.D.U./C.S.U. by the party itself and through parallel campaigns—e.g., the special campaign on behalf of Dr. Ludwig Erhard—totaled perhaps \$9.0 million. This was about eight times the amount of off-year spending. By comparison, in Britain, a country with a comparable number of voters, the Conservative Party spent about \$1.8 million in the 1955 election. In other words, the C.D.U. collected on the average a little more than \$1 from each of its members, while spending about \$4 per member in an off-year, and about \$36 per member—or about 60¢ per vote obtained—in the 1957 election. These per capita figures approach American levels of campaign expenditure, in a

country with less than half the American per capita income.⁷

In contrast to the C.D.U., the S.P.D., in 1957, with 600,000 members—or one for every 16 votes—collected about \$2 million in dues, or an average of more than \$3 per member; it spent less than \$2.4 million in the election, corresponding to roughly \$4 per party member and 25¢ per vote obtained.⁸ In short, the C.D.U. in the 1957 election outspent the S.P.D. by more than 2:1 per vote, by about 4:1 in total campaign expenditures, and by 8:1 per member. There is little reason to think that these conditions have not persisted in the 1960's.

Much of this money is raised from economic interest-groups, primarily from those in industry, commerce and banking; the continuing need for money of this kind makes the C.D.U., and F.D.P. as well, more dependent on the support of organized business interests, and particularly of big business, than are comparable parties in England and the United States. As we shall see below, business interests in the German Federal Republic have special centralized institutions—the Sponsors' Associations and the Civic Associations—whose contributions are mostly tax-deductible and who get the most political value for their money.

However, the business associations have not been as reliable in their distribution of funds as the C.D.U. would have liked. For example, they temporarily cut off funds to the party when Adenauer displeased the industrialists by revaluating the currency. Because of this and other factors, the governing C.D.U.-F.D.P. coalition pushed through legislation for governmental subsidies to the three parties represented in

⁷For detailed figures, see U. W. Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, pp. 202–203, and 312, n.l. Kitzinger's careful calculations are lower than the off-year figures computed in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "German Party Finance: The C.D.U.," *American Political Science Review*, 51:2 (June, 1957), 369–385. The figures alleged in S.P.D. publications are substantially higher; for details see Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 304–312.

⁸Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–204.

the Bundestag. This sum has grown to almost \$10 million per year by 1964, to which was added another \$3 million from the Land and local governments.⁹

One further source of influence on the C.D.U. should be noted here. The figures for its 1957 campaign expenditures thus far have not included any sums spent by the federal government at the time of the electoral campaign to popularize its policies, nor do they include the services of government personnel, who also happen to be chiefly C.D.U. members, loaned to the C.D.U. for campaign purposes. The S.P.D. alleged that government spending in 1957 on what was in effect campaign propaganda for the C.D.U. amounted to another 40 million DM, or \$10 million. On this point, the cautious judgment of U. W. Kitzinger deserves citation:

It was generally admitted that Government funds were used on a large scale before and during the election to propagate the Government's foreign, military, and domestic policies among the electorate. The Chancellor's fund of 11 million DM per annum was one of the chief sources of finance for such activity, the Press and Information Office with its annual budget of 20 million DM used a certain proportion of its funds in a similar direction, and the information budgets of the various ministries particularly that of the Ministry of Defense, which amounted to 6 million DM per annum, were also used in part for overt and indirect activity of this kind. But no useful purpose would be served by attempting to calculate a wholly arbitrary figure of Government expenditure incurred more or less directly to return the Government parties to power. The line between propaganda for a government and its policies and for the Government parties and their personalities is not easy to draw in a state where the Opposition rejects such important parts of Government policy as was the case in the Federal Republic. This undoubted fact was used (even perhaps abused) by supporters of the Government to defend its information policy; but it is also a source of very real difficulty for any attempt at a break-

down of information accounts for the purposes of political studies.¹⁰

If, nevertheless, we do try to estimate the size of this indirect government intervention in the campaign, we might perhaps deflate the S.P.D.'s estimate about one half—that is, by the same ratio by which Mr. Kitzinger's careful estimates reduced the S.P.D. allegations of the electoral expenditures by the C.D.U. and parallel campaigns by private groups. This would leave us with another \$5 million of effective pro-C.D.U. campaign expenditure by the government, or somewhat more than half of all other campaign spending by or on behalf of that party.

If the government support of the C.D.U. is anywhere near this sizable level, the C.D.U. would be in an uncomfortable financial position if it ever lost control of the federal government. The old Center Party of Imperial and Weimar days was uncommonly stable, almost regardless of its political fortunes, but the C.D.U. seems far more dependent on a good deal of money and thus on the continued support of business and government in order to hold its many diversified and partly indifferent voters together.

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (S.P.D.)

The leaders and many of the members of the S.P.D. think of it as a grand old party with a great tradition, going back for nearly a century to the days of Ferdinand Lassalle, August Bebel, and even—although this is stressed less often—Karl Marx. They are particularly proud of the party's long record of firm commitment to democracy, maintained in the years of Nazi persecution, as well as against the appeals and threats of Communism, in both West and East Germany and in besieged West Berlin,

⁹Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany* op cit., pp. 95–96.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 311.

whose people have been electing S.P.D. majorities for a long time.

Although the party has long since shed much of the vocabulary of Marx, much of its concern for ideology, and much of its old, sharply-focused class appeal to industrial labor, the fact is that many of its old symbols—the red flag, the old Labor songs, and salutation “comrade”—still remind the members of the hope for a bright and fraternal future. The party has largely de-emphasized or dropped its former demands for nationalization of industries and has replaced them with a stress on indirect economic controls, reminiscent of Keynesian economics and the American New Deal and New Frontier ideas. It is trying to become a “people’s party,” rather than the party of a single class, and to break through the “40% barrier” within which its share of votes in the Federal Republic and in most of the Lands has been so long confined.

If the party has achieved this changed image in the eyes of many of its own members, it has not done so in the view of many of its more fundamentalist stalwarts or in that of a large part of the electorate. To most middle-class voters, the party is still “red.” To the Catholic Church, the S.P.D.’s treatment of religion as a strictly private matter, coupled with the actual religious indifference or heterodoxy of many party leaders, has remained unsatisfactory. To those of a conservative temper, including a great many women voters, the party still appears suspect. While the S.P.D. can change many of the sharp edges of its political style, it cannot shed its character as a party that is advocating more comprehensive reforms than is its counterpart, the C.D.U.; only when a majority of the German electorate becomes once more interested in any such reforms are the efforts of the S.P.D. at acquiring a more popular image likely to carry it closer to possible majority status. In the meantime, the S.P.D. continues to derive its most reliable voting support from trade-union members, skilled workers, unskilled workers, non-churchgoers, men, big-city resi-

dents, pensioners and trainees, and the lower-middle-and low-income groups—in roughly that order.¹¹

The party is based on a strong and disciplined membership. In 1932, before the Nazi dictatorship, the S.P.D. had had about 980,000 members; in 1946, the re-emerging party in the much smaller Federal Republic already had 710,000 members, or proportionately nearly the same number. This membership then rose to a peak of 840,000 in 1948, to decline to a stable 600,000 by 1957. During the same period, the annual membership dues collected rose from \$1.6 million in 1949 to over \$2 million in 1957—a clear indication of the consolidation and loyalty of the membership and a guarantee of the substantial financial independence of the party.¹²

Compared to these levels of income from membership dues, the income from special donations, advertisements, election contributions and the like, including the contributions from municipalities with S.P.D. majorities, cooperatives, and party-controlled publishing enterprises has been relatively minor. In the 1957 election, it amounted to little more than \$1.1 million, or about half the total S.P.D. expenditures in that campaign. None of its diverse sources seemed likely to exert effective influence or pressure on the party. The trade unions continue to be the main interest-group of whose views the S.P.D. is likely to be mindful. In contrast to the Weimar period, however, the major labor unions united in the German Trade Union Federation (D.G.B.) include not only Social Democrats but also the former Christian Trade Unions, whose members and functionaries support the C.D.U. and who would oppose any strong partisan commitment by their organi-

¹¹See D.I.V.O. and E.M.N.I.D. data cited in note to Table 7-2 above; and *Jahrbuch*, 1, p. 264.

¹²See Erich Matthias, “Die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands,” in Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.) *Das Ende der Parteien 1933* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1960), p. 119, n.2, with references; A. Grosser, *Die Bonner Demokratie*, p. 139; U. W. Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, p. 204.

zation. (The somewhat greater pro-S.P.D. activity of the D.G.B. in the 1953 elections ended in embarrassing political defeat.) For these and other reasons, active trade union support for the S.P.D. in the subsequent election campaigns remained peripheral.

A major source of strength for the S.P.D., together with its membership, are its functionaries—the chairmen of local party organizations, the party representatives elected to seats in the local and municipal governments, the national and district secretaries of trade unions, of cooperatives, and of the S.P.D. itself. These people are committed to the S.P.D., sometimes with all their bureaucratic virtues and weaknesses—steadfastness, discipline, and loyalty to a centralized hierarchy and routine, the party frequently insists that newcomers serve long political apprenticeships at low levels in the organization and is unwilling to let brilliant “young men in a hurry” make dazzling careers in the party.

The highest authority of the S.P.D. is its biennial Congress, but the real power lies in the party's National Executive Committee—the *Parteivorstand*—and in the leadership group of the S.P.D. delegation in the Bundestag. This Executive Committee is effectively in control of the party. Regional leaders have far less power than they do in the C.D.U. The Bundestag delegation has no tradition of open disagreement with the National Executive Committee of the party. The most prominent S.P.D. parliamentarians are members of the party executive as well, and many deputies are also employees of the party, or of some organization under its control. The S.P.D. Executive Committee forms a fairly homogeneous group. Data for its membership in late 1956 may still give us some insight into the nature of the S.P.D. leadership.

The S.P.D. leaders in 1956 formed a relatively unified group, clearly linked to the traditions of their party. 72% had been active in the party before 1933, 20% in major positions. During the Nazi regime, 24% had been in

prison or concentration camps, at least 33% had been in exile, and 70% had anti-Nazi records. Of the former exiles, a majority had worked together abroad against Hitler. Quite unlike the C.D.U. leaders, none of the S.P.D. leaders professed the Roman Catholic faith; while 35% were recorded as Protestants, the remaining 65% did not report any religious affiliations. The S.P.D. group was strongly linked to the issue of reunification 41% came from German territories now under Communist control. Northern Germany contributed another 14% to the group, and, in contrast to the C.D.U. leaders, only 38% came from Western and Southern Germany. The S.P.D. elite was younger and less formally educated than that of the C.D.U., only 31% had spent their youth in pre-1914 Germany; 69% grew up during or immediately after World War I, 59% had not gone beyond the secondary school level of formal education, and only 14% held doctorates. Unlike the C.D.U. leaders, they did not show a military past. 10% had served in World War I, only 14% in World War II, and another 3%—or one man—had served in both; but more than 72% reported no military service. No record was found of any member of the 1956 S.P.D. Central Committee ever having served the Nazi regime in any official capacity.¹³

The 162 S.P.D. deputies in the 1953–57 Bundestag constitute a part of the middle-level leadership of the party, and can be compared to the Central Committee of the S.P.D., on the one hand, and to the C.D.U./C.S.U. parliamentarians, on the other. The S.P.D. deputies were somewhat older than the top party leaders, and less well educated. A majority (56%) had not gone further than through primary school, as against only 28% whose formal education had stopped at that level among the top leaders. A majority of S.P.D. deputies (55%) reported middle-class origins, in contrast to only 28% among top leaders—among whom, however, another 21% were silent on this point.

¹³Deutsch and Edinger, *op cit.*, pp. 72–73

In contrast to the C.D.U., the domestic anti-Nazi record of the S.P.D. deputies was even stronger than that of the top leaders of their party: 32% of the Bundestag delegation, as against 26% of the top leaders, had been arrested or imprisoned by the Nazi regime. Fewer of the S.P.D. deputies, however, had been in exile: only 16%, as against 33% of the top leaders. Altogether, the middle-level leaders of the S.P.D. seemed to be as strongly and personally committed to an anti-Nazi stand as were the members of the Central Committee. If the top leadership of the party should in time come to be replenished from among the members of this middle-level group, the intense anti-Nazi commitment of the party will be likely to persist.¹⁴

The S.P.D. has had a more intense interest than the C.D.U. in German reunification and the recovery of the present D.D.R. territories, from which before 1933 much of the S.P.D. strength was traditionally drawn. The party was cool toward the N.A.T.O. military alliance with the West and would have preferred to buy German reunification at the price of German neutrality and continued disarmament, provided only that reunification should bring genuinely free elections in the D.D.R. areas. This, however, the government of the Soviet Union has never been willing to concede, and thus the S.P.D. willingness during the 1950's to accept some limited compromises with the Soviets has remained somewhat unreal. Gradually, the party has come to accept all the essentials of Chancellor Adenauer's proclaimed foreign policy, including German membership in N.A.T.O. and in the Common Market and the policy of firm alliance and increasing integration with the West. In June, 1960, this acceptance was formally put on record by the National Party Secretary, Herbert Wehner, speaking for the S.P.D. in the foreign-policy debate in the Bundestag.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 73; and Martin Virchow, "Die sozialdemokratische Fraktion," in Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schütz, *Wähler und Gewählte: Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen 1953* (Berlin: Vahlen, 1957), pp. 366-377.

Willy Brandt, the former Mayor of West Berlin, who as the leader of the S.P.D. became the Foreign Minister in the C.D.U.-S.P.U. coalition government, has become the symbol of this new S.P.D. course toward greater stress on national unity. The S.P.D. has remained less enthusiastic, however, about the pace and scope of German rearmament, and has retained a distaste for nuclear armaments on German soil, or in the hands of German troops. Although the S.P.D. and the C.D.U. were thus united on basic foreign policy in the middle 1960's, the S.P.D. position continued to be slightly more moderate and flexible than the rigidly uncompromising "hard line" of the C.D.U.

Within the S.P.D., there are fewer distinct interest groups than there are in the C.D.U. Labor unions and consumers' co-operatives, however, are directly represented in the party leadership and in the S.P.D. delegation in the Bundestag, through members who are or have been their paid functionaries. Another interest group is composed of the many S.P.D. functionaries and deputies who are linked to the municipal governments dominated by the party. These include the mayors of traditionally S.P.D.-controlled industrial centers such as Hamburg and Bremen, who may express the interests of these municipalities in the councils of the party. Finally, there are the expellees and refugees, who are now represented among the deputies of both major parties. Within the S.P.D., their representation is particularly effective through such leaders as Bundestag Deputies Ernst Paul and the late Wenzel Jaksch—the latter a co-author of the successful "Hessen Plan" for the resettlement of expellees.

THE FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (F.D.P.)

The last of the minor parties to survive in the Bundestag, the Free Democratic Party (F.D.P.), has a somewhat divided character and

heritage. It continues from Weimar days the tradition both of the liberal-progressive Democratic Party and of the moderate-conservative German People's Party (D.V.P.), which in turn had been a successor to the National Liberals of the pre-1914 era. The progressive tradition of the party links the F.D.P. to the liberal middle-class Protestants of South Germany, and the conservative tradition ties it to the Protestant and anticlerical business and professional elements in the North and West of the country. To the adherents of other parties, the F.D.P. appears as a party somewhat to the Left of Center, but its own supporters see it as a party of the Right. The latter view is the more realistic. Power within the F.D.P. has shifted from the liberal wing represented by the first President of the Republic, Dr. Theodor Heuss, to the somewhat more nationalistic and business-oriented views of Erich Mende, who was the party leader until late 1967.

At a time when both the C.D.U. and the S.P.D. have succeeded in winning support from a wide range of social groups and strata, the F.D.P. alone, in the words of a recent German study, "today still can be characterized as a class party."¹⁵ It has remained largely a party of the middle classes, of employers and of business management. Accordingly, it has sharply criticized the economic and social welfare policies of the C.D.U. While it has agreed with the S.P.D. in favoring the separation of religion and politics and in opposing the extension of church influence in education, public life, and government administration, the F.D.P. has not been able to agree with the S.P.D. on economic policy at the national level. No national coalition between the F.D.P. and the S.P.D. has thus been possible. In Bonn, the F.D.P. has often functioned as a political reserve of the C.D.U., available for a coalition with it, but unavailable to its S.P.D. rivals. This tactic reflects the interests within the F.D.P. in proportion to its size,

the party and its Bundestag delegation include more representatives of business interests than does the C.D.U., while in contrast to the C.D.U.'s trade-union wing, the influence of labor in the F.D.P. is negligible.

The existence of the F.D.P. offers business interests a second channel of representation in the political arena in addition to the C.D.U. The result is that the business interests, which support both parties, do not want the F.D.P. to fight the C.D.U. too hard, and they certainly do not want the F.D.P. to form a coalition with the S.P.D. in Bonn—which would be precisely the calamity that business contributions to political parties are intended to prevent. To the major business interests, the F.D.P. often has offered a kind of elite or "quality" version of the same basic policies espoused by the C.D.U. Lacking, however, the religious motivation and the sociological breadth of the C.D.U., the F.D.P. is far more unstable. Its gains in the 1961 Federal election were lost again in the 1965 election. However, with the 1966 coalition between the C.D.U. and S.P.D., the F.D.P. has become the only opposition party in the Bundestag. As such, its tactical opportunities for effective criticism of the two dominant parties might give it a new lease on life in the future.

A BROAD AND GROWING CONSENSUS

Whereas the Left- and Right-wing parties under Weimar were separated by a wide chasm of ideologies, the parties of Bonn show a good deal of affinity in their programs. Competing for the more numerous votes near the center of the political spectrum, all the major parties have come to emphasize moderate, middle-of-the-road policies. While the Right wing of the C.D.U. and the Left wing of the S.P.D. still exercise a good deal of constraint upon their respective party leaders, the center of gravity in both parties definitely resides with the more moderate elements. The relatively

¹⁵Viggo Graf Blucher, *Der Prozess der Meinungsbildung dargestellt am Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 1961* (Bielefeld E.M.N.D., 1962), p. 116, see also *ibid.*, pp. 31, 55-56.

smooth formation of the C.D.U.-S.P.D. coalition government in 1966 shows how far this consensus has developed.

The three great cleavages that characterized German party competition in the first half of the twentieth century have largely disappeared. The conflict between the supporters of democratic and dictatorial forms of government has been largely settled, as the C.D.U., the S.P.D., and the F.D.P. have all made it crystal clear that they accept the democratic rules of the game, founded upon a free and open society. Unlike the situation in the French Fourth and Fifth Republics, Bonn's parties do not disagree with each other about any procedural (i.e., constitutional) issues. Secondly, church-state issues have receded into the background at the federal level, and have lost most of their bitterness at the Land level, where the issue however remains a significant one, involving the Land governments' responsibility for educational matters—the issue having evolved into a debate about the assistance that the Land governments ought, or ought not, to give to the denominational (especially Catholic) schools. The third cleavage that has characterized German politics in the twentieth century—the conflict between nationalization and state control of industry, and the free-enterprise system—has also been effectively tamed. On the one hand, the Socialists have accepted the idea of a largely free market economy, and on the other hand, the C.D.U. has accepted some government intervention and antimonopoly measures that have, in the interests of the consumer, placed limitations upon business competition.

Thus, in 1964, when a sample of German elite members were asked to name "the most important differences between the major political parties," fully 59% replied that such differences either do not exist at all, or are at worst only superficial ones. The comments offered in response to this question further emphasized the broad consensus between the major parties: one of S.P.D. Chairman Willy Brandt's closest associates blandly defined the differences (between

the parties) as "some are in and others are not." An important C.D.U. leader said that it was difficult to find points of controversy with the S.P.D., quoting a current cabaret joke which held the S.P.D. in 1964 to be "the best C.D.U. we ever had." A few of the elite members, especially among the mass-media leaders, regretted the fact that the parties have lost their sharp differences and no longer offer the voters a real choice between alternative policies. But most of the elite sample, including the party leaders themselves, were not troubled by such considerations.¹⁶

INTEREST GROUPS

Political parties, especially when they are broadly based, as in the case of the C.D.U. and S.P.D., have "policy umbrellas" (platforms) that cover and protect as many diverse interests as possible so as to maximize their electoral support. It is then the function of interest groups to represent particular policy preferences at a lower level of aggregation than do the parties. They formulate and press for specific demands that parties then aggregate into more-or-less coherent platforms. Interest groups—or pressure groups, as they are often called—thus bring together into an organized form the preferences of like-minded individuals and groups, such as large business firms, for it is by organizing these individuals and groups that they can most effectively influence governmental policy.

Although we cannot reliably rank the democratic countries according to the importance and success of their interest-group activities, it is possible to suggest certain general characteristics that tend to enhance the significance of pressure groups. The first such characteristic is policy consensus. A wide-ranging policy consensus is most conducive to intense pressure-

¹⁶K. W. Deutsch, L. J. Edinger, R. C. Macridis, R. L. Merriitt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York: Scribners, 1967), p. 129.

group politics, sharp cleavages reduce its potency, for when fundamental differences of opinion exist, the comparative safety of the political arena is forsaken in favor of self-destructive competition between the parties. When party arguments come to revolve around, say, the legitimate governmental structure, or the relationship between the state and the churches, the conflicts involve too-broad principles and too-large sections of the population—for pressure groups are (or at least should be) concerned with more specific and limited objectives, and involve much smaller groups of people. On the other hand, when there is a general policy consensus, as there is in West Germany, politics revolve around limited and unemotional issues which the pressure groups are most concerned with and are best capable of handling. In short, when party conflicts are not intense—when they are based upon personalities and indistinct policy tendencies—pressure groups come into their own.¹⁷

The importance of interest groups is also related to the extensiveness of governmental activities in the economic and social spheres. As governmental involvement increases, so does the likelihood that pressure groups will be formed in order to affect governmental policy where it impinges on their interests. Although Bonn's governments have not created a centralized economic planning policy, the government is continually involved in the economic life of the country, and it has also developed a vast social-service state—two types of governmental activities that have encouraged the creation and active involvement of interest groups in these areas. Since individuals and groups have far more to gain or lose through governmental action in a welfare state, they will tend to form interest groups and intensify the pressures of existing ones.¹⁸ Moreover, the complex and bureaucratic nature of the welfare state necessitates the cooperation of the Cham-

bers of Commerce, farmers' organizations, and other associations in the work of advising the Civil Service on technical matters, and in administering certain regulations that can be handled better by the associations themselves rather than by the governmental bureaucracy.

Thirdly, the characteristics of the interest groups themselves play a decisive role in determining their importance and effectiveness. One of these characteristics is *wealth*, and we have already noted the extensive contributions made by the business associations to the C.D.U.—contributions which assure them of a significant voice in party councils. Another group characteristic is the *prestige* accorded them by the population, for if interest groups were not accorded this respect it would be easier for politicians to ignore their appeals. In Chapter 4 on political culture, it was seen that the Germans have not placed a high value upon the bargaining and compromises that are part-and-parcel of democratic politics. As such, pressure groups were suspect, given their "selfishness" and their rough-and-rumble competition, in contrast to an idealized politics which sees the public interest being represented by the state in an orderly manner. Such attitudes were particularly prevalent in the Weimar period, but despite continued criticism of their activities, the pressure groups have now come to be at least passively accepted as part of Bonn's political landscape. Thus by 1964, only 19% of the Germans interviewed said that pressure groups have more influence than they ought to have, and there was hardly any difference between the views of C.D.U. and S.P.D. supporters.¹⁹ And in the case of German business groups, they now do indeed enjoy an enormous prestige in a post-war culture that places exceptional emphasis upon material success and industrial production. In contrast, the labor unions are not accorded nearly the same amount of prestige by the middle class as business enjoys among many employees and workers.

¹⁷Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 31–32.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.

¹⁹EMNID, *Informationen*, No. 11, 1965.

Still another characteristic is size and comprehensiveness. When the pressure groups represent nearly the entire section of the population that subscribes to a particular set of interests, and if these pressure groups are effectively organized in order to press their demands upon the government, then again we can expect that they will be both important and successful. In Germany, both business and labor are effectively organized into nationally centralized organizations. Both are organized according to a hierarchical principle by which the so-called *Spitzenverbände* (the "peak associations") coordinate the activities of the local and regional associations, and then speak with one voice when negotiating with the government. The interest groups are strongly encouraged to organize on a national basis because the rules of procedure that are binding upon all the federal ministries require that civil servants deal only with the representatives of the national or "peak" associations; and these rules also provide that only those associations that have a nation wide membership be consulted in the preparation of legislative drafts.²⁰ German interest-groups are then as inclusive (having as members a very high proportion of the people whose interests they speak for) and well-organized as are British pressure-groups, and far more inclusive and tightly organized on a national basis than are interest groups in the United States.

Because of these factors, interest groups play a vital role in West German politics. Their influence and acceptance as legitimate parties in the formation of policy is evidenced in the regular consultations that take place between Cabinet members and pressure-group representatives well before any law is even framed for presentation to the Bundestag—a pattern that also prevails in England. The extensive demands and forceful pressures that the interest groups have directed toward Bonn led Chan-

cellor Erhard to complain publicly about the "*Interessentenhaufen*" (the "heap of interest-mongers") into which he saw the West Germans develop. Another indirect indication of the pervasiveness of pressure-group activity may be found in the resignation of a distinguished deputy and industrialist from the chairmanship of the Committee on Finance and Taxation, partly because of his disgust with the growing influence of pressure groups.²¹ However, in a recent sample survey of German elites, only a small minority complained of the excessive influence of pressure groups; the great majority felt that the power of particular groups was balanced by the power of others, without any single interest achieving dominance.²²

Having noted their importance, we can now ask which "targets" the interest groups aim at in attempting to realize their goals. Clearly the most important factor that determines through which channels the interest groups will exercise their influence is the governmental structure, or more specifically, the governmental institutions that have the power to affect their particular interests. The three prime pressure-group "targets" in Germany are the Cabinet Ministers (who are also the party leaders), the Bundestag specialized committees, and—with the devolution of vast powers to the bureaucracy in a social service state—the civil servants.

Although it is extremely difficult to estimate the frequency with which interest groups seek to influence these three centers of power, one piece of evidence underlines the efforts expended *vis-à-vis* the Cabinet. In the annual reports of the Federation of German Industry (B.D.I.) there is a list of the association's "most important memoranda," with the overwhelming

²¹Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber, "Some Remarks on Interest Groups in the German Federal Republic," in Henry W. Ehrmann, ed., *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 111.

²²Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York: Scribners, 1967), p. 130.

²⁰Rupert Breitling, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–90.

number of these petitions being addressed to members of the Cabinet.²² Cabinet Ministers are petitioned not only because they are the heads of vast governmental departments, but perhaps more importantly because of their role as leaders of disciplined parties. Considering the great powers of Adenauer, combined with his willingness to grant the interest groups access to the office of the Federal Chancellor, it is not surprising that the pressure groups selected the latter as one of their prime "targets"—a situation which accrued both to the power of Adenauer and the effectiveness of the pressure groups.²⁴

Unlike American congressional committees, the Bundestag's committees do not call upon pressure-group leaders to give testimony. Yet their influence on these committees may be all the more effective because deputies who have a direct connection or a personal interest in the area of any committee usually make up about half the committee's membership. Thus, of 21 members of the Committee for Foreign Trade in the 1949–52 legislature, almost 50% were leaders of employers' associations, or held leading positions in private business. And in the Committee for Refugee Affairs, 70% of the members were refugees from Communist-controlled German lands.²⁵ The interest groups' connections with the Civil Service are largely, though not entirely, based upon informal relationships based upon common backgrounds and shared experiences. It is such old friendships and professional contacts, often dating back to the Nazi regime, that appear to play a more-than-usual role in providing certain interest-group representatives with access to, and influence over, civil servants participating in the formulation and execution of policy. Moreover,

it is not unusual for civil servants to take leaves of absence in order to work for associations and private businesses, then returning to their Civil Service posts (without loss of seniority).

Having discussed the broad patterns of interest-group activity, we can now turn to a more detailed description of the organization and activities of the important interest groups in the Federal Republic.

The Business Interests

The business groups in the Federal Republic are organized into three major organizations or *Spitzenverbände*: the Federation of German Industries (B.D.I.), the Diet of German Industry and Commerce (D.I.H.), and the Federal Union of German Employers Associations (B.D.A.). In addition, there are separate associations for banking, insurance, wholesale and foreign trade, retail trade, shipping, transportation, handicrafts, and others. Serving as a coordinating committee for all these central associations is the Joint Committee of German Trades and Industries (*Gemeinschaftsausschuss der deutschen gewerblichen Wirtschaft*). This Joint Committee attempts to iron out difficulties among its member organizations and provide public representation for the business community as a whole.

The wealthiest, most influential, and most active of the three top organizations is the B.D.I. Its membership consists of 36 nationwide industrial trade organizations which in turn are subdivided into more specialized organizations. The B.D.I. has 12 regional offices which coordinate activities of the trade associations at the Land level and conduct public relations and lobbying *vis-à-vis* the Land governments. Policy for the B.D.I. is set by its Assembly, in which its 36 member associations are represented with a voting strength roughly proportional to the total number of employees employed by the member firms of each association. Under this arrangement, the heavy indus-

²²Ehrmann, *op cit.*, p. 111

²⁴Karl Dietrich Bracher, "Germany's Second Democracy—Structures and Problems," in Henry W. Ehrmann, ed., *Democracy in a Changing Society* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 135

²⁵Deutsch and Edinger, *op cit.*, pp. 91–92

try of the Rhine-Ruhr area has the greatest voting strength in the Assembly.²⁶

The B.D.I. is governed by its Central Committee, which elects a smaller Executive Committee, and this body in turn elects a Presidium of 16 members which seems to be the most important of the elective bodies for day-to-day decisions and which is empowered to make decisions for the Federation in an emergency. Finally, the B.D.I. has a large professional staff, directed by a general manager and the President of the Federation. The B.D.I. is thus far more inclusive and more centralized than is its counterpart in the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.). Power in the B.D.I. is concentrated in its central organs, in its permanent bureaucracy, and in its 36 constituent trade associations which are themselves highly centralized. Since its formation in 1949, the B.D.I. has been under the control of a moderate leadership, despite a minority which has been demanding a more nationalistic foreign policy and a stronger line toward labor.

The contacts of the B.D.I. with the government have been direct and effective. As one observer has pointed out, the B.D.I. committees and their staff have direct access to their opposite numbers in the Bundestag committees and the Ministries:

In the fiscal year 1954-55, around 200 formal communications were submitted to these agencies by the B.D.I. . . . One cannot escape the impression . . . that there is a constant stream of influence from the professional staffs of the B.D.I. and the trade associations directly into the appropriate units in the ministerial bureaucracies charged with the recommendation of legislative policy, the formulation of regulations, and the execution of public policy.²⁷

²⁶For these and the following points, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Politics of German Business," in Hans Speier and W. Philip Davison, *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957), pp. 212-217.

²⁷Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

A more specialized organization is the Federal Union of Employers Associations (B.D.A.), which concentrates on matters of labor and welfare policy. This group is also organized on a regional and functional basis. Its units do not themselves carry on collective bargaining, but develop the employer's position for this purpose and mobilize support for industries affected in the event of a strike. As in the B.D.I., the regional and central organizations of the B.D.A. between them attempt to influence relevant legislation at the federal and Land levels.

For major tasks of public relations, the B.D.I. and the B.D.A. collaborate in employing the German Industry Institute (D.I.I.). The D.I.I. disseminates the view of industry through a large number and variety of publications. These range from books to two semi-monthlies, three weeklies, a semi-weekly service for the press, and a daily sheet for radio stations. Special publications are directed to the business community itself, such as the "Letters to Entrepreneurs" (*Unternehmerbriefe*) and the "Lecture Series," which have exhorted businessmen to become more active in politics. The D.I.I., like other business organizations, generally favors the C.D.U. In 1957, the "Letters to Entrepreneurs" urged its readers to "see to it by all permitted and available democratic means that . . . no party cheats the voter by a pact with Socialism after the election."²⁸

Another public-relations organization disseminating the viewpoints of business management was founded in 1952 and styled "The Scales (*Die Waage*), League for the Promotion of Social Equity." This organization specialized in placing paid advertisements in the press on a very large scale. These advertisements were uniform, and they were published in time of labor disputes or impending "collectivist" legislation. By 1954, the organization claimed that its advertisements had appeared in 70% of all German newspapers, constituting 90% of total

²⁸*Unternehmerbriefe*, May 23, 1957, cited in Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

newspaper circulation. During electoral campaigns, these somewhat weighted "Scales" aided the major non-Socialist parties by taking large amounts of advertising space for brief statements in support of the Adenauer coalition's policies, without mentioning the parties by name.²⁹

The main financial organs of the business community in dealing with political parties are the Sponsors' Associations (*Förderergesellschaften*), and their more modern version, the Civic Associations (*Staatsbürgerliche Vereinigungen*). Sponsors' Associations were founded in 1952 for the purpose of mobilizing the financial resources of business for the 1953 electoral campaign, and to strengthen the position of businessmen against the competing claims of the various non-Socialist parties. Instead of being asked for support by several parties, many businessmen could make their main contributions in a single payment, and perhaps obtain better political conditions for their money. The Sponsors' Associations were in a position to check on the proposed expenditures of each party that asked for their support, to insist that the non-Socialist parties should not waste their money in fighting one another during the campaign, and to demand at least informal assurances that none of these parties would enter a coalition with the S.P.D. on the federal level—a practice which presumably has had to be modified, at least temporarily, due to the formation of the C.D.U.-S.P.D. coalition government in 1966.³⁰

Who then are these business leaders? A survey of 47 leaders of German business organizations in 1956 revealed a group of relatively old men (two-thirds had been born before 1900), predominantly Protestant (with professed Protestants outnumbering Catholics two to one), strongly recruited from Western Germany (38%), well educated (44% with a university

education), but with only a very doubtful anti-Nazi record: only two men claimed such a record, while three listed themselves as prominent business leaders during the Hitler period, and the remaining 42 kept silent on this point.³¹

Farmers' Organizations

The chief farm organization is the League of German Farmers (*Deutscher Bauernverband*), which in 1952 reported 1.3 million members, comprising 77% of all independent farmers. German farm organizations have considerable political influence, which has been directed effectively toward specific demands such as agricultural subsidies and prices. As a result, German farming has been remarkably well protected and it has been effectively compensated for its high costs. Accordingly, in the fall of 1962, wheat prices in West Germany were almost 30% higher than in the Netherlands, and almost 50% higher than in France. However, France's powerful bargaining position in the Common Market has since led to a significant decrease in the common price for wheat, and under a 1966 Common Market agreement, French, Italian, and Dutch agricultural products are to be admitted more freely to the German market from 1967 onward. At the same time, however, German agriculture is likely to continue to be effectively compensated for its high costs through governmental actions.

The Labor Unions

There are three large labor unions in the Federal Republic, which together have enrolled as members approximately 41% of the wage earners, 21% of the white-collar employ-

²⁹Almond, *op. cit.*, pp. 215–216, see Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 304–305.

³⁰Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 207–218.

³¹Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, p. 100. On the relations of much of the German business community to the Nazi regime, see John D. Montgomery, *Forced to Be Free* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 94–125, and Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), *passim*.

ees, and a staggering 99% of the civil servants. The most important of these is the German Confederation of Trade Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, D.G.B.), with 6.5 million members in 1964. The D.G.B. includes all wage-earners' unions, and is also the largest organization of white-collar employees and civil servants. About 41% of all wage earners, 13% of all salaried employees, and 46% of all civil servants belong to the Confederation. Since the wage earners are much more numerous than the other groups, they form more than four-fifths of the D.G.B. membership, with white-collar employees furnishing another 11% and the civil servants the remaining 6%. The Confederation is dominated by the large wage-earners' unions, and it tends to stress the similarities between the wage earners and the white-collar employees and the civil servants in regard to their interests in the labor market. Within the Confederation, the large enterprises are most thoroughly organized and most highly represented. The member unions of the Confederation follow industrial or craft lines. The strongest industrial union, I.G. Metall, accounts for one-quarter of the membership of the entire Confederation.

Second in size to the Confederation among white-collar employees is the German Employees Union (*Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft*, D.A.G.), with half a million members, or about 10% of all white-collar employees. This union has tended to stress the quasi-professional characteristics of white-collar employees—their separate status and their distinct interests—in contrast to those of the wage earners. Nevertheless, in practice the D.A.G. has found itself often pressing economic demands very similar to those advocated by the D.G.B.

The German Federation of Civil Servants (*Deutscher Beamtenbund*) is the most nearly professional and nonpolitical of the three great interest organizations. With 517,000 members in 1955, it included about 43% of all civil servants.

A sample of 16 leaders of the major West German trade unions in 1956 showed them slightly younger than the employers' representatives. Half of the union leaders came from Western Germany, another fifth from South Germany. Protestants and Catholics were evenly divided between the few union leaders who indicated their religious preference. Nearly one-third (31%) of the union leaders had an anti-Nazi record.³²

Since the majority of the German Confederation of Trade Unions, consisting of the old secular, S.P.D.-oriented unions of the Weimar period, is offset by a minority, consisting of the bulk of the former Catholic unions, it is impractical for the Confederation to lean quite so heavily and openly toward the S.P.D. as was the case in the Weimar period. Nevertheless, the S.P.D. has remained the main channel of trade-union representation in West German politics. About 40% of all Bundestag members in 1957–61 were union members; 30% were in the ranks of the S.P.D. deputies; and another 10% were union members in the C.D.U. delegation, where they formed the core of a Left wing within the party. Of all trade-union deputies in the Bundestag, four-fifths were members of the German Confederation of Trade Unions.³³

The Churches

Other groups besides economic interest groups have contributed major influences to recent German politics; foremost among them have been the churches. Since the role of religious groupings has already been discussed, only a few facts need to be recalled here. Although there are somewhat fewer Roman Catholics than Protestants among the population of the Federal Republic, there are far more Catholics than Protestants in church on most Sundays, and there are far more Catholics effectively

³²Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

³³Heidenheimer *The Governments of Germany*, p. 83.

organized for political action. Between 50% and 60% of the nominal Catholics attend church once a week, while only about 10% of urban Protestants—and 20% of rural Protestants—attend church at least once a month.³⁴

About 11 million Catholics, or one-quarter of the German electorate, can be found at mass on any Sunday in the year. Thus every week the Catholic clergy can reach a larger audience than all German politicians taken together could secure by their own efforts. The 10 million weekly circulation of the Catholic Church press reinforces these possibilities, and the 3 to 5 million Catholics who are adherents of Catholic lay organizations or youth groups are 10 times as numerous as the total membership of the C.D.U. During electoral campaigns, these Catholic audiences are vigorously exhorted by bishops, the lower clergy, the Church press, and lay organizations to vote, to vote as a duty to their conscience, to remember the great merits of the C.D.U. government, and not to vote for irreligious parties, such as the S.P.D. and the F.D.P. Typical of the pastoral letters that Catholic bishops send out, and which are read to a quarter of the electorate on pre-election Sundays, is the following: "Do your electoral duty! Vote only for men and women whose basic Christian principles are well known and whose public activity corresponds to these principles." In effect they are being urged to vote for the C.D.U., and the evidence for the continuing effectiveness of the appeal seems overwhelming.³⁵

Catholic groups in West Germany embrace almost all activities from cradle to grave—from Catholic kindergartens to Catholic young farmers' leagues, traders' associations, a Catholic Woman's League, and many more. Unlike the churches and their organizations in the United States, England, and France, whose financing comes from voluntary contributions, in Germany the churches are financed by the state,

which levies a tax on all those individuals who were baptized in a particular denomination and have not officially withdrawn their membership.

Outstanding among church-related groups for their political work—which is thus in part indirectly financed by the state—are the Catholic Workers' Movement and the Kolping Family. The Catholic Workers' Movement (*Katholische Arbeiterbewegung*, K.A.B.) has been directly active in electioneering, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia, where four-fifths of its 150,000 members are concentrated in the three dioceses of Munster, Paderborn, and Cologne. Thirty members of the K.A.B. were elected to the 1957–61 Bundestag. The German Kolping Family—called before 1933 the "League of Catholic Artisan Journeymen"—is the counterpart of the K.A.B. on the skilled worker-to-lower-middle-class level. It has about 210,000 members, nearly as many as the C.D.U. Since half of the Kolping members are unmarried young men, they are able to lend very active support to the C.D.U.; and the ways in which they could and did do so have been discussed in the literature of their movement. In the 1957 campaign, their help appears to have been effective. 32 of their members entered the Bundestag. Since 11 of them were at the same time also K.A.B. members, the combined Bundestag strength of these two organizations consisted of 54 members.³⁶

The Protestant Churches are unlikely to have been attended by more than 2 million people on any Sunday during the month before the 1957 election, and the weekly circulation of their church press was below 5 million. Moreover, no organ of the Evangelical Church government issued any statement in support of any of the parties during the election.³⁷ A relatively large number of the top leaders of the Protestant Churches come from East or Central Germany, and many have strong anti-Nazi records. Their Churches have remained far more con-

³⁴Kitzinger, *op cit*, p. 223

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 225–228

³⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 230–231

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 239

cerned with the political issues of peace and reunification, because these Churches include the Protestants of both West and East Germany—with about 25 million being in the Federal Republic, 1.6 million in West Berlin, and 15.5 million in the G.D.R. Thus in 1965, in the face of the government's inaction on the questions of Germany's Eastern frontiers and of her present and future relationship with her East European neighbors, it was the German Evangelical Church that publicly took its stand in a widely discussed memorandum, favoring more active and accommodating negotiations with the East, and thereby helped bring that issue back into the political arena.

*The Mass Media of Communication:
Audiences and Elites*

Germany is a country of newspaper readers. In the mid-1950's, 91% of all adults in the Federal Republic read a newspaper at least once a week, while 55%, two-thirds of them men, read one every day. Three-quarters of West Germans polled in March, 1955, said that they followed local news; less than half—or 46%—followed domestic politics; and less than two-fifths—only 39%—followed political news from abroad. The difference between the sexes, however, was striking. While 70% of the men followed domestic politics and 64% paid attention to international events, the corresponding figures for women were only 26% and 18%, respectively. An important part of the solid electoral support for the C.D.U.'s foreign policy between 1949 and 1965 thus came from women who paid relatively little attention to its details.³⁹

—women almost as much as men—read each month at least one copy of some periodical.⁴⁰ The radio audience was, if anything, somewhat larger. In the mid-1950's, about 80% of adults listened for at least an hour each day; 79% said they liked to listen to newscasts; 46% paid attention to political commentaries, but only 33% cared to listen to reports of events abroad.⁴⁰ Television is less well established. In 1960, only 30% of respondents had watched a telecast on the preceding day, but 72% had done so at least once during the preceding four weeks.⁴¹

The West German press, consisting of more than 1,400 dailies with a total circulation of 16 million—or 318 per 1,000 West Germans—thus remains the major channel of political information. The editors-in-chief of the largest dailies and periodicals—those with over 100,000 circulation—form a relatively small group. Together with the chief editors of a few smaller but influential periodicals and a few directors of radio networks, this group in 1956 numbered 41 persons and constituted a fair sample of the mass communications elite of the Federal Republic. On the whole, this elite was younger and markedly more liberal than the business and C.D.U. elites, or than the bureaucratic elite surveyed later in this chapter. About 92% had at least secondary-school training, and 42% held doctorates. Only 22% claimed military service, 10% in the First and 12% in the Second World War. As many as 42% had major anti-Nazi records; 38% had been imprisoned by the Nazis and another 5% had been in exile.⁴²

Nazi records. Later, when licensing ceased in the early 1950's, many of these publishers and editors maintained themselves by means of their ability and their established position in the field, and during earlier years also by means of continuing Allied, and particularly American, support. This support was given through a Newspaper Leases Control Board, controlled by the Allies, which watched over printing contracts of newspapers whose printing plants might be owned by old-line nationalistic or pro-Nazi interests, and further help was given to pro-Western papers through a Press Fund, supported largely through money provided by the United States government.⁴² The Allies licensing policy also called for the decentralization of the press, establishing all newspapers on a local level and resulting in the fact that today the nearest counterpart to newspapers with a national reputation and readership, such as the *New York Times*, are such local papers as, first of all, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, and, next to it, Hamburg's *Die Welt*, and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* of Munich.

Nor surprisingly, the leaders of the West German press and of many of the radio networks are, on the whole, more in tune with mass opinion than are the members of the bureaucratic and the business elites. The mass media are more energetic in opposing any remnants of Hitlerism, in demanding the dismissal of Nazis who have slipped back into high level public-service positions by concealing their records, and in pressing for the prosecution and punishment of Nazis who are found to have committed wholesale murders, acts of torture, and similar crimes under the Hitler regime. Significant parts of the press are also more critical of the Federal government, the military establishment and the demands for nuclear weapons for the Army, and they criticize what

some of them consider the unnecessarily rigid policies of Bonn toward Britain and the United States, as well as its attitude toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Bloc.

On the other hand, chains of newspapers have begun to grow again, and their publishers are once again being tempted to appeal to nationalism and sensationalism, in accordance with the time-honored formula which holds that a successful news story needs only three ingredients: 'blood, sex, and the national flag.'

The Bureaucratic, Diplomatic and Military Elites

There are roughly 1.1 million professional civil servants employed at the national, Land, and local levels of government in the German Federal Republic, in addition to another 1.3 million clerical and manual workers in public employment below the formal level of civil servant.⁴⁴ These civil servants have a strong, caste-like sense of tradition, responsibility and privilege. Many of them are skeptical of democracy, of popular participation in the government, and of outsiders entering the service.⁴⁵ This bureaucracy is the only social group that has retained its substantial share of power without major interruption from the days of the late nineteenth-century German Empire through the two World Wars and three changes of political regime. Its members have become more pliable and more willing to serve efficiently and conscientiously whatever regime may be in power. They are less apt to insist on any old traditions of monarchist, nationalist, or ultra-conservative ideology, but they have retained their sense of role and duty, of separate-

⁴²See Table 10 in Chapter V.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 119. Henry P. Filgert, "Press, Radio and Film in West Germany, 1945-1953, Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1953, pp. 21, 43, 50-52, 64, 101.

⁴⁴For these and some of the following points, see the revealing study of John H. Herz, "Political Views of the West German Civil Service," in Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison (eds.), *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy*, (Evanston, Ill. Row, Peterson, 1957), pp. 96-135, also Karl Hochschwender, *German Civil Service Reform after 1945*, Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1961.

ness as a social group, of revulsion from Communism, and of distrust of Western liberal and democratic innovations.

They are more strongly organized in defense of their immediate interests, such as career security, pensions, salaries, status, and prestige, than any other large social group in the country. As we saw above, fully 99% of their number are organized in two organizations: 53% in the somewhat exclusive German Federation of Civil Servants (*Deutscher Beamtenbund*), and another 46% in the German Confederation of Trade Unions. Beyond this, however, they have demonstrated a good deal of informal but effective solidarity. Thus they have successfully opposed and eventually rendered ineffective a great part of the Allied efforts at denazification and Civil Service reform, and have preserved largely intact their hold on the higher ranks of public employment.

Surveys of 67 high civil servants, 44 diplomats, and 54 high-ranking military men in the mid-1950's showed several similar traits for each of these three groups. They were well-educated and recruited largely from families of a similar background. They included a relatively large share of Protestants and of natives of Central and East Germany. They included very few persons—12% of the diplomats, 4% of the military, and 2% of the civil servants—who reported in their biographies any major anti-Nazi background, but many of them had served the Nazi government—including half the diplomats in the sample, and all the military leaders.⁴⁶ The political opinions of these bureaucratic and military elite groups differ markedly from the mass opinion recorded by the usual public opinion surveys. They are somewhat more strongly in favor of German rearmament within N.A.T.O., of Germany's membership in

the Western Alliance, of the major treaties pointing toward Western European integration.⁴⁷

There are some indications that these elites favor particularly those policies that will preserve for the Federal Republic the shelter of the American, N.A.T.O., and West European Alliances, as well as the economic opportunities of the Common Market, as long as these increase the national capabilities of the Federal Republic in economic as well as military matters. The demands of Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss for nuclear weapons for the Army, either under collective N.A.T.O. auspices or as an eventual part of West German national military equipment, has found some support among the military, even though the much-discussed "Generals' Memorandum" in 1960 on this topic actually seems to have represented an effort on the part of the civilian Strauss to bolster his previously expressed views by inducing the generals under his authority to produce the kind of expert memorandum he wanted.⁴⁸

In any case, the political and economic weight of the West German military elite seems likely to grow to the extent that the defense sector grows within the German economy, that the Army approaches its half-million manpower goal planned originally for N.A.T.O., and that troops have come to outnumber the American and British forces in the territory of the Federal Republic. At the same time, the bulk of West German mass and elite opinion is likely to remain cool to any great increases in armament; and by 1967, cutbacks in military spending and manpower from its current level of 470,000, were in the center of public discussion.

⁴⁶For details, see Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-86, 133-140, 270-275; also Montgomery, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-83; and the excellent brief study by Ralf Dahrendorf, "Deutsche Richter: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Oberschicht," in his *Gesellschaft und Freiheit* (Munich: Piper, 1962), pp. 176-196.

⁴⁷Surveys by Daniel Lerner and Suzanne Keller, M.I.T. Center for International Studies, October, 1957, multi-graphed, cited in Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

⁴⁸Helmut Schmidt, *Verteidigung oder Vergeltung: Ein deutscher Beitrag zum strategischen Problem der N.A.T.O.* (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1961), pp. 197-199.

A Test Case of Elite Conflict: The Spiegel Affair

In October, 1962, the West German Federal Police arrested Rudolf Augstein, the publisher of the well-known West German news magazine, *Der Spiegel*. This periodical—a kind of stepped-up counterpart to *Time* magazine—was somewhat closer to the views of the F.D.P. than to those of any other party, but it had built up its half-million circulation by sensational though generally well-informed reporting in a hard-boiled and iconoclastic style, well suited to the skeptical and disillusioned mood of many of its readers.⁴⁹

The journal had long carried on a feud against Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss. In its issue of October 10, 1962, *Der Spiegel* featured a report of instances of inefficiency or unpreparedness in the West German armed forces as allegedly revealed in recent N.A.T.O. maneuvers. So serious were these faults, the paper claimed, that “the Bundeswehr”—after almost seven years of rearmament, and after six years of tenure in office of its Supreme Commander Strauss—still bore the lowest of (four possible) N.A.T.O. ratings. “conditionally suited for defense.”⁵⁰

The response of the federal authorities was spectacular. During the night of October 26—by coincidence, at a time of extreme international tension over the Cuban crisis between Russia and the United States—agents of the federal police raided and sealed the editorial offices of *Der Spiegel* in Bonn and Hamburg, and arrested Augstein and four other executives of the magazine on charges of treason and bribery. Bail was refused them, on grounds of possible collusion, and thus they faced the prospect of

being kept in jail on suspicion until their trial, which might be months away.

The Federal Prosecutor's office could have treated the charges made by the magazine as untrue, and prosecuted its publisher and editors for slander, or for undermining the morale of the armed forces. Instead, the authorities chose to prosecute for violation of state secrets, taking the view that some of the details of the charges must have come from secret West German military documents which the paper could have obtained only by bribery. Judged by American standards, this legal interpretation seemed to admit that there might be some truth to some of the facts alleged by the paper, but it threatened its publisher and staff members with far more severe penalties for treason.⁵¹ Actually, West German law uses the label of “treason” far more loosely, including under it also the publication of any untrue statement which, if it were true, would injure, in the opinion of the federal government, the interests of the Federal Republic. The language of the law is so broad that it could be used to punish many journalistic practices which in the United States would be considered lawful and a legitimate exercise of the freedom of the press. In the case of the German law, much depended on the spirit in which it would be applied, and the *Spiegel* case might well become a precedent of far-reaching importance.

The *Spiegel* affair dramatically posed four issues before the public. The first of these, common to all free countries, was the issue of legitimate government secrecy, particularly in matters of defense, as against legitimate journalistic enterprise in getting out the news, and in taking advantage of whatever documents some individuals or factions within the bureaucracy may be “leaking” to the press. This issue would be for the courts to decide, where *Der Spiegel*, with its long record of disrespect

⁴⁹For a critical review, see Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “Die Sprache des Spiegel,” in his *Einzelheiten* (Frankfurt Suhrkamp, 1962), pp. 62–87.

⁵⁰*Der Spiegel*, 16 41 (October 10, 1962), p. 33 1

⁵¹*The New York Times*, November 3, 1962, pp. 1, 2, 3, November 5, 1962, 3 13; *Der Spiegel*, 16 43, November 7, 1962, *Time*, 80 19, November 9, 1962.

for authority and of frequent attacks on members of the judiciary with a Nazi past, could count on very little sympathy from the usually conservative judges.

The second issue was one of the police methods used. Henceforth, "the man who presses our doorbell in the early morning hours," said the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, "is not necessarily the milkman. It might be the political police."⁵² In a country where people remembered all too well the night raids of the Nazi Gestapo and were well aware of the continuing police-state methods in the Communist-ruled G.D.R. to the East, these methods seemed "wholly repugnant—and wholly unnecessary—in a democratic society."⁵³

The third issue was political, and in the end it helped bring down the Adenauer Cabinet. The prosecution had been set in motion, and the raids and arrests had been carried out without the knowledge of the Minister of Justice, F.D.P. member Wolfgang Stammberger, under whose responsibility the matter ordinarily belonged. Minister of Defense Strauss had delegated his responsibilities in the matter to his subordinate, State Secretary of Defense Volkmar Hopf, in order to avoid, as he said, an appearance of his personal bias against the magazine that had attacked him. Subsequently, as *The New York Times* reported, State Secretary Hopf "has assumed the responsibility for having told" the State Secretary of Justice, Dr. Walter Strauss—who is not related to the Defense Minister—that he should not inform his superior, Minister of Justice Stammberger, of the planned raids and arrests.⁵⁴

The Minister of Justice thus had been bypassed in his own Department by his subordinates, and possibly with the knowledge of some Cabinet members and perhaps the Chancellor. Minister Stammberger thereupon submitted his

resignation; the F.D.P. threatened to withdraw its four Ministers from the Cabinet and to bring down the government coalition which since the 1961 election again depended on the votes of the F.D.P. delegation for its Bundestag majority. The F.D.P. insisted not only on the dismissal of the two State Secretaries, Walter Strauss and Wolfgang Hopf, by way of satisfaction for the humiliating treatment meted out to its Minister of Justice, but it also demanded new guarantees that its voice henceforth "would be heeded in the Cabinet, and that Dr. Stammberger would be placed in charge of the investigation into *Der Spiegel*."⁵⁵

The F.D.P., in short, saw the issue as a threat to its equality of status as a coalition partner. However, the resulting shake-up of the cabinet, in which Franz Joseph Strauss and Dr. Stammberger were replaced, allowed the F.D.P. to continue in the coalition government—though its position became increasingly tenuous.

The fourth and last issue posed by the *Spiegel* affair was that of the relative power and prestige of two contending elites, the government bureaucracy, civilian and military, on the one hand, and the press on the other. In the United States, the press is highly respected, not only in terms of its acknowledged power but also in terms of the status and respect accorded to its publishers and writers. The American division of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, together with a long tradition of press freedom, further guarantees and enhances this freedom and high status of the press in American politics, society, and culture. In West Germany, by contrast, there is no such long tradition of a free press. Under the parliamentary system of Bonn, there is far less of a separation of powers between the federal government and the Bundestag dominated by the government parties, and the German judiciary traditionally has regarded itself not so much as a coordinate and

⁵²Cited in *Time*, *op. cit.*

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴Sidney Gruson, "Adenauer Trying To Save Coalition," *The New York Times*, November 5, 1962, 1:3 and 3:1–3.

⁵⁵*Ibid.* Also see, Loewenberg, *Parliament in the German Political System*, *op. cit.*, pp. 257–258.

equal branch of the government, but rather as a subordinate part of the executive power.

Civil servants, military officers, and judges all traditionally had served the same monarch. From this old tradition, many of these groups still derive social status, prestige, and solidarity. Newspapers and journalists, on the contrary, traditionally had been looked down upon in Germany as creatures of the gutter and spokesmen for the mob. Often they had been considered failures who lacked the brains, character, or breeding to qualify as civil servants, and who thus had become hack writers in the hire of commercial purveyors of cheap gossip and sensations. This traditional contempt for newsmen has been dying very hard, although it is deeply inimical to the effective functioning of democracy. Despite the American-backed innovation of judicial review and stronger press freedom, these traditions of democracy are still young and weak in Germany. Many judges still see themselves as servants of the executive power, and a large part of the public still looks upon journalists as impudent upstarts who deserve a sharp rebuke.

By the end of 1962, the *Spiegel* affair had already produced a number of changes in West German politics. A wave of popular protest against any revival of high-handed police methods had arisen, cutting across party lines and insisting on greater respect for the freedom of the press. In an opinion poll, 54% of respondents demanded the resignation of Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss; only 31% wanted him to stay in office; the rest were undecided or uninformed.⁵⁷ The Federal Cabinet resigned. Chancellor Adenauer formed a new one, supported by the same coalition, but with one-third of the old Ministers dropped, including both Franz Joseph Strauss and Wolfgang Stammberger. Strauss' post as Defense Minister went to a North Protestant C.D.U. leader, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, who until then had been Prime Minis-

ter of Schleswig-Holstein and who had a reputation for correctness in his administrative methods and for Right-of-Center sympathies in politics. Stammberger was replaced as Minister of Justice by another F.D.P. member, the South German Liberal, Dr. Ewald Bucher, with a reputation of particular concern for civil liberties. Most of the new Ministers were a good deal younger than their predecessors. The party and denominational balance of the Cabinet was preserved, except that the influence of the Bavarian C.S.U. seemed somewhat weakened.⁵⁸

Before the reorganization of the Cabinet, the Chancellor and the C.D.U. had negotiated with the Social Democrats about a possible "grand coalition" of the two major parties and about a possible change in the electoral law which would wipe out the F.D.P. This threat in turn made the F.D.P. more willing to enter the new Cabinet and to accept the continuing predominance of the C.D.U. within it. The results of the affair thus included the temporary eclipse of Franz Joseph Strauss, a slight increase in the political stature of the S.P.D., which had been treated publicly as a possible partner in the national government, a limited gain in the stature of the F.D.P., offset in part, however, by the threat of a possible "grand coalition" of the C.D.U. and S.P.D. and, perhaps most important of all, a definite upsurge of public opinion in favor of press freedom, democracy, and constitutional legality—a striking affirmation of the changes that had occurred in German political culture since 1945.

As of late 1967, the *Spiegel* case itself was still pending, and the manner and substance of its outcome were likely to have far-reaching effects. It would sharply illuminate the continuing struggle between the old and new traditions. If the paper were squelched, it would serve as a warning to all others. Journalists and publishers would then walk in greater fear, and government officials in greater assur-

⁵⁷See German press commentaries in *The German Tribune*, Hamburg, 139 (December 29, 1962), pp. 3-5.

⁵⁸*The New York Times*, November 24, 1962.

ance. If the paper should win its case, or lose it only after a scrupulously fair trial, free from any taint of high-handed methods, a free press and the right of citizens and of minority groups and parties might emerge strengthened. Whatever the outcome of this particular confrontation between opposing political forces, others would be likely to follow. For the time being, the *Spiegel* affair showed once again how much the balance of power between the different West German elites was still in flux, how much the political culture and traditions of the Bonn Republic were still the subject of struggle, but also how significantly popular attachment to democratic liberties had grown in strength.

The Common Characteristics of Bonn's Elites

The elites that we have surveyed vary widely in their composition, interests, and outlooks. Yet there are a number of significant views which they share with one another, as well as with a majority of mass opinion in the country. No major elite group has any illusion that it alone could run the country, or that Germany alone could have her will prevail in Europe or the world. There is a sober recognition in each group that it must live in an environment of other groups and interests with whom it must make the best terms it can get. No group has cut itself off from reality by wrapping itself into some impenetrable private ideology or doctrine. The groups share many

of their images of reality. Even those critical of the United States remain mindful, for the most part, of the vast American capabilities. Even the most intense anti-Communists—and almost all West Germans are anti-Communists to some degree—do not ignore or deny the reality of very substantial Soviet strength. All groups are aware of the limitations of their power, both in domestic and international affairs. All feel that they have much to lose, and that changes should be approached with caution.

Yet, all these groups are moving toward change. They are moving toward it, not necessarily by choice, but by the logic of events. In economics, the growth of the West German economy has made it more competitive in world trade, but also more vulnerable to the fluctuations of the business cycle. The institutions of the 1950's, which dealt successfully with the limited foreign-trade problems and the moderate waves of boom and recession of that period, may not prove sufficient for the greater international economic problems and for the more severe bouts of recession or depression that the 1960's and 1970's are likely to bring. More powerful institutions of international economic cooperation and of domestic economic guidance and control may have to be devised—and it will be the task of West Germany's political parties, interest groups, and elites to work out the new political consensus needed to devise and sustain these new policies and institutions.

VIII

The German Federal Republic Today ...and Tomorrow

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, Germany must make basic decisions about its economic and employment policies, its labor relations and welfare services, and it must adapt its economy to a world market that may be more competitive, to the underdeveloped countries that may need more economic aid, and to a business cycle that may be more severe in its downswings. It must also establish a military policy. Will Germany accept as her share in the common defense effort of the West the provision of moderately strong conventional forces within the limitations of her treaties of the 1950's? Or will she press for nuclear weapons and a more competitive role toward other Western powers?

A TURN AWAY FROM THE ARMS RACE

In mid-1967, the leaders and voters of the German people seemed to have made such a decision, at least for some time to come. An overwhelming majority of 93% of West German leaders in an elite survey in 1964 had expressed their view that a national nuclear deterrent for the Federal Republic would not be worth its cost. Similar high majorities had added that such national nuclear weapons would not increase the Republic's prestige, would not be essential for its independence, and would not be credible to its potential enemies. The proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (M.L.F.) within a N.A.T.O. framework divided the German leaders down the middle: 34% favored it; the same proportion expressed opposition; and the rest were indifferent or uninformed. A number of the minority of German leaders who backed a N.A.T.O.-controlled M.L.F. said that they did so because they were willing to go along with the wishes of the United States government, which at that time

had seemed to be vigorously promoting the project. Its proponents in Washington at that time had been arguing that the M.L.F. was necessary to head off a supposed strong desire for national nuclear weapons. On closer study, no such German desire was discovered; important United States objections to the M.L.F. developed; and by mid-1967, the project had been quietly shelved.¹

An alternative project of a purely European multilateral nuclear force was turned down in the same survey by 83% of the German leaders. Strong majorities of both elite and mass opinion endorsed the relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. German elite and mass opinion also backed further American-Soviet agreements on arms control and against the spread of nuclear weapons, even if the Federal Republic should not be consulted about them—and still more so, of course, if it were.

The West German leaders and masses by 1967 saw the best guarantee for the security of their country in a firm alliance with the United States, and they had come to accept the concept of a "division of labor," in which moderate West German conventional forces would be backed by similar American and British forces on West German soil, and by the great nuclear striking power of the United States. Second to the American alliance, they wanted good relations with France, whose elites—by no means only President de Gaulle—overwhelmingly abhorred any thought of German access to nuclear weapons, in whatever form. Since the foreign policies of France and the United States clearly were not in harmony during most of the 1960's, the most promising area for German-French collaboration remained within the field of economic policy within the Common Market; and here close collaboration with France (and, if possible, the early admission of Britain)

were endorsed at all levels of opinion, within the limits of preserving the essential sovereignty of the nation-state.

The full restoration of a German national state—that is, national reunification of the populations and territories of the present G.F.R. and G.D.R.—consistently was named in mass-opinion polls as the most urgent single task before the Federal Republic. In 1965, as during most of the preceding decade, a majority named such national problems as their top concern, either as "national reunification" (47%) or "Berlin" (4%). They outnumbered more than 15:1 the mere 3% who had named as their most urgent political concern unification of Europe.² At the same time, majorities of both masses and elites believed that no early gains in these matters could be expected from any policy of threats or violence against the East; and they appeared predisposed to explore new approaches toward negotiation and limited accommodation with their Eastern neighbors and the Soviet Union, provided that essential German claims and interests could be preserved.

The actual policies of the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition government in 1966 and 1967 corresponded closely to these mass and elite opinion trends. By mid-1967, the government had made it clear that the Federal Republic did not want nuclear weapons, and that it was more interested in reducing somewhat, rather than increasing, its military manpower contribution and defense expenditure, provided that this could be done within a continuing alliance with the United States and in agreement with its government. Contemporaneously, Bonn had taken some steps to reduce tensions *vis-à-vis* Eastern Europe. It had opened diplomatic relations with Rumania; it had improved trade relations with other Soviet-bloc countries. Chancellor Kiesinger declared that his government considered as invalid the infan-

¹For data on the foregoing, see K. W. Deutsch, *et al.*, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York: Scribners, 1967).

²K. W. Deutsch, L. Edinger, R. Macridis, and R. Mettritt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance*, p. 246.

mous Munich agreement of 1938, by which, under Hitler's threats of war, the governments of France and Britain had handed over to him Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland on the eve of World War II. This belated gesture from Bonn was meant to go some way toward reassuring the Czechoslovak government, which repeatedly had expressed intense concern about the efforts of some German refugee politicians in the Federal Republic to treat that agreement as a valid base for political claims in the post-war period. Czechoslovakia, however, had wanted Bonn to agree that the Munich treaty—to which the United States had never been a party—had been invalid from the outset; while the German refugee politicians felt that Chancellor Kiesinger had gone too far even in accepting that the treaty was invalid now. Efforts to reduce tensions with the Federal Republic's Eastern neighbors are likely to be plagued by such conflicting claims and pressures for some time to come.

In regard to its most immediate neighbor, the Communist-ruled German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), to a limited extent Bonn's policy aimed at reducing conflicts and obtaining humanitarian improvements, while persisting in its basic claims. For the first time, some communications from the G.D.R. were accepted and answered in 1967 at the Cabinet level, with careful explanations that this was not to imply any legal recognition. Technical consultations among lower-level officials of the G.F.R. and G.D.R. were somewhat improved; mutual press attacks became slightly less vitriolic; and some works by authors living in the G.D.R., and critical of both parts of Germany (such as Rudolf Friess' East-West beatnik novel, *The Road to Oobladob*), were published in the Federal Republic and were well received there. When the United States and the Soviet Union in August, 1967, submitted identical drafts for an international agreement against the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which then were not possessing them, it seemed clear that this agreement was likely to be accepted, and indeed

welcomed, by the overwhelming majority of West German political opinion at both the mass and elite levels. As of mid-1967, most of the people and the leaders of the German Federal Republic had chosen to stake their future hopes upon a continuing alliance with the United States within a world of peace.

The political course pursued by the voters and leaders of the Federal Republic in 1963–67, however, was not the only one which had been urged upon them. Other policies were and are available to them, and these continue to have their advocates among interest-groups and leaders. Though these alternative policies today are only supported by minorities, usually of less than one-third of West German voters and leaders, such political alignments may change once again in the future, as they have done so often in the past; and these West German minority views of the mid-1960's still deserve to be borne in mind by the Federal Republic's neighbors and allies.

The first of these possible alternative policies would be for the Federal Republic to strive to gain access to nuclear weapons, to seek eventual qualitative equality with the nuclear superpowers, and to return to a highly competitive, rather than cooperative, course of action in world politics.

A POSSIBLE RETURN TO BIG POWER COMPETITION?

One of the most prominent spokesmen in the late 1950's and early 1960's for the nuclear armament of Western Germany, the then Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss, made it clear that, *this policy did not necessarily imply* any inclination toward military adventures, despite repeated charges to that effect from Soviet-bloc sources. All that it does imply, Strauss has insisted, is a desire to make West Germany so strong as a military and nuclear power that she will become an indispensable

preference for one another's goods that has occurred. In 1890, France and Germany bought such relatively large shares of total world exports that the total amount of goods which they bought from each other was 35% *less* than what it would have been if they had been merely quite indifferent to one another and had bought each other's exports in strict proportion to their total purchases in the world market. By 1959, however, other countries had greatly increased their shares of the world market, while the share of world exports purchased by France and Germany had shrunk. Thus already in 1954, when the percentages of the *national* exports of each country, sent to the other, were the same as in 1890, they now represented a much higher degree of mutual preference. Germany now bought from France 46% *more* than she would have done on the basis of mere indifference; and France bought 30% *more* goods from Germany than would have corresponded to the general French share of goods accepted from

the world market. In 1959, the Indices of Relative Acceptance for the trade between the two countries were still higher. Some further details and references are given in Table 8-1. Here it must suffice to say that the analysis in terms of Indices of Relative Acceptance shows that substantial strides toward limited French-German economic integration have been taken since the end of World War II.

The figures in Table 8-1 show the gains in aspects of integration between Germany and France, as the key example of the integration between Germany and all the other Common Market countries. They show that these gains are real but limited. Thus far, these advances are much more limited than the enthusiastic publicity for the integration of Europe would suggest—a publicity that is understandably inclined to take future aspirations for present accomplishments.

The gains appear still more limited if we consider that in large, highly developed coun-

TABLE 8-1

Two Measures of German-French Trade Integration, 1890-1959

Year	1890	1913	1928	1938	1954	1959
Average percentage of mutual share in each other's mail ^a	15 ^b	12	5	4	4 ^c	9 ^d
Average percentage of national exports: ^e						
France to Germany	9	13	11	7	9	14
Germany to France	7	8	7	4	7	12
Index of relative acceptance (percentage plus or minus of amount exportable under conditions of indifference):						
France to Germany	-35	-27	+0.008	-27	+46	—
Germany to France	-35	-9	+3	-25	+30	—

tries, such as Germany and France, exports represent only a fraction of the gross national product. Trade with France, taking both imports and exports together, amounted in 1959 to less than 3%, and trade with the entire Common Market to less than 10%, of the gross national product of the Federal Republic.

To date, the freeing of trade under the Common Market has not affected the ability of the federal authorities to maintain acceptable levels of employment, prices, availability of credit, and general stability and rate of economic growth. In the boom years of the 1950's, relatively little government action was required for these ends, and the powers of the Bonn government—and thus indirectly of the West German electorate—were ample for the purpose. As Western European integration progresses through the late 1960's, however, the time will arrive when the powers of the Bonn government and the national institutions of the Federal Republic no longer will suffice to maintain the levels of prices, employment, credit, and value of the national currency, in the face of possible fluctuations. By that time, the business cycle may put more severe demands on the capabilities of the federal government to conceive, execute, and maintain effective policies of economic stabilization. But by that time, European integration may have so weakened the powers of national governments, including the powers of the Federal Republic, that only common West European institutions, supported by the common will of the West European elites and electorates, would be able to take the necessary action.

How willing are the West German voters to accept such common European institutions and to surrender their national sovereignty to them, both in form and in substance? In 1955, only 32% of poll respondents were willing to cede the ultimate power of decision to a European Parliament; a larger number, 42%, insisted on reserving that power to a German Parliament,

and 26% were indifferent or uninformed. In 1960, a somewhat differently worded question left only 8% undecided. The rest were divided in nearly the same proportion, between 42% adherents of a European government and 50% presumably upholders of national sovereignty. Between 1955 and 1960, the net proportions between the "Europeans" and the defenders of the nation-state had shifted only by about 2%, an insignificant amount in view of the different wording of the question. However, by 1967, fully 78% favored a "United States of Europe." And significantly enough, the young and middle-aged (between 16 and 44 years old) approved of the idea more frequently than did those over 60—82% versus 68%. Similarly, some 90% of those with at least a secondary education preferred a United Europe compared to 75% of those with an elementary school education.⁴

Yet at the same time it must be recalled that an even higher proportion (around 90%) favored German reunification, and as already noted, the latter was by far and away seen to be the most important problem facing West Germany. Taken together, all these figures suggest two conclusions. The idea of actual European integration, here and now or in the near future, has become an important issue in West German politics. Never in German history before World War II has so large a majority of Germans backed it. The second conclusion sounds a caution. For the twin goals of German reunification and European integration appear to be singularly incompatible—at least for the foreseeable future. Whatever the chances for reunification with the Communist regime of East Germany, they would become even smaller if West Germany were to become part of a non-Communist "United States of Europe."

In the meantime, the Bonn government has moved away from its rather rigid policy of 1961–62 toward the entry of Britain into the

⁴D.I.V.O. Institut, *Umfragen*, Vols. 3–4, pp. 18, 36, Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach, October, 1967.

Common Market. During these years, the governments at Paris and Bonn insisted that Britain accept in essence their policies and bow to their will. Britain, they seemed to insist, should drop most of her ties to the Commonwealth and to the United States, and she should expect that her entry into the Common Market should be only a prelude to her early surrender of a substantial part of British sovereignty to a European political union, shaped largely in accord with French and West German desires.

These demands of the French and German governments, together with their refusal of any major concessions to special British needs, delayed the entry of Britain into the Common Market through the fall of 1962, and allowed France in early 1963 to veto Britain's entry without arousing strong German opposition. German readers smiled broadly at cartoons showing the German Chancellor guarding the raised drawbridge which was keeping the British troubadour out of the castle of Europe. Some of them even felt a thrill of power over Britain, which had been a victor in World War II and one of the occupying powers of Germany until the 1950's. Yet neither the economic nor the political institutions of the German Federal Republic had as yet shown anything like the stability of their British counterparts, which had stood the tests of boom and depression, of defeats and victories, with unwavering firmness. This contribution of tested and dependable stability, and of "unflappable" good sense, even more than Britain's military contributions at Berlin and at the Rhine, still seemed essential for the security and stability of Europe, and not least of West Germany.⁵ In the mid-1960's, West German attitudes toward Britain improved somewhat. Mass opinion, elite opinion, and Bonn's official policy all favored, at least mildly, Britain's entry into the Common Market on more lenient terms—though not at the

price of a West German test of wills with France. The Federal Republic's European policy, like its democracy at home, was still in need of further consolidation.

THE POLITICAL DREAMS OF THE NEW GERMAN LITERATURE

On the surface, and to its critics, the Bonn Republic looks prosperous and stolid, enthusiastically dedicated to economic success, to conventional middle-class values, to a fair amount of efficient mediocrity, to a fear of innovation and experiment, to a longing for protection by superior authority, to the solidarity of its national in-group, and to a prudent disinclination to probe or question too deeply its own past, present, or future. But after all these reassuring successes, there recurs the little question: "And then . . .?" What is there to dream about, to remember from the past, or to long for in the future? If men must seek a wider horizon and a deeper meaning for their lives, they must reach out beyond the conventions and taboos that have become installed in much of West German life together with the "economic miracle."

This broadening of perspectives is just what a new generation of West German writers is trying to do. They question the past and insist that it be brought up again for unflinching examination. Writers born in 1929, like Günter Grass, who were adolescents when Hitler's regime fell, now recreate in their writings the years in the early 1930's when the Nazis rose to power. They portray, as in an X-ray picture, the sick culture that produced these events, and they and their readers seem to think that these are relevant things to write and think about amidst the prosperous forgetfulness of Bonn.

Here, again, we encounter the problem of differential rates of change. The economic, political, and military burdens on the Federal Republic, and on the consensus among its citizens,

⁵See Viggo Graf Blücher, *Der Prozess der Meinungsbildung* (Bielefeld: E.M.N.I.D., 1962), pp. 118-119.

may grow faster than the Republic's capabilities to meet them, or faster than its citizens can initiate and carry through needed policies. Since we can at present only guess at the speed with which men learn to act effectively and in concert to attain the goals and values they already seek, so we can also only guess at the speed and direction of their movement toward new goals and new values.

This subtle shift toward new goals and new values may be one of the least conspicuous and yet most important aspects of West German politics. Individuals, groups, and whole nations sometimes change their goals and even their character. When they do so, changes in their actions follow. Are there any signs of such changes in the German Federal Republic? If so, her artists and writers might be most likely to give us some hints of the changes that are now going on quietly but that may become manifest later. Theirs are more than merely private dreams. Their books are very widely read, and thus they also say something about the minds of their countrymen who find their writings relevant.

The images of the new writers usually are not images of Europe or of the Atlantic world. Rarely are they dreams of a reunited Germany. Most often—as in Uwe Johnson's *The Third Book about Achim*—they are poignant visions of the mounting barriers to understanding that are rising between the two parts of one people that are becoming every day more different from one another. Johnson communicates his revulsion at the regimented life under the East German dictatorship, but he insists that a new generation of nonfanatical but committed collectivists is growing up there, and he conveys his longing to understand them and to keep open the last remaining opportunities for communication between them and their neighbors to the West. Johnson's book is more subtle and penetrating than those of the more popular writers on the German East-West problem. Among the latter, Hans Helmut Kirst, author of an earlier best-

selling trilogy of war novels, has written, in *The Seventh Day*, an uncomfortably plausible scenario of an East German uprising, followed by a border clash between West German and East German troops and ending in the destruction of Europe by the nuclear weapons of the allies of both sides.⁶

Most often, the new writers deal with West Germany herself and with the people and the spirit that are developing within her borders. They begin with the insistent demand that Germans face the hidden and intolerable past. In *The Tin Drum*, Gunter Grass brings back this past, using as his memory-triggering device the persistent drum rhythms of a stunted child who has refused to grow up into the kind of adult world that has confused and frightened him through all the years of Hitler, the war, and post-war Germany. Post-war Germany is portrayed in the image of the elegant "onion bar" at Dusseldorf, where prosperous executives and intellectuals pay for a serving of breadboards, knives, and large raw onions, and proceed to chop up the onions in order to regain their lost capacity for shedding tears.⁷

A Catholic writer, Heinrich Boll, introduces us to a civil engineer and structural expert who deliberately blew up the great abbey which his father had designed and built, and whose son now in turn hesitates to accept the offer of a job to rebuild the structure. In the same novel, *Billiards at Nine Thirty*, one meets the successful organization man and police torturer of the Nazi era, now once again a high-level executive, offering small favors to those of his victims who happened to survive.⁸

In Gerd Gaiser's *Final Ball*, Soldner, the demobilized veteran and teacher without cer-

⁶Uwe Johnson, *Das dritte Buch über Achim* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1961); Hans Helmut Kirst, *Und Keiner kommt davon* (Munich: Desch, 1957)—English translation, *The Seventh Day* (New York: Doubleday and Ace Books, 1959).

⁷Gunter Grass, *The Tin Drum* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963).

⁸Heinrich Boll, *Billiard um halbzehn* (Köln-Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1959).

tificate, observes, in the teeth of the economic miracle of the city of Neu-Spuhl, that "an automobile is a means of transportation; the utterly ignorant consider it a badge of rank." Later, Soldner walks out on teaching and on his love, and prospers in business. "I go along with being rich," he says, "until the next time of poverty comes." And there is Gaiser's final symbol, "the day of the dragonflies":

Suddenly I noticed that something was moving in the morass: unrecognizable dirty life. . . . I suddenly saw that an apparent twig, covered with mud, was in reality a large ugly larva. The larva pushed with an awkward unquenchable force to a dry place and lay there in obvious exhaustion.

Many such larvae are crawling out of the mud. And now something happens to one.

The grey husk burst, and a body, gleaming wetly, arched itself with blue and green rings. Then with a quick pull, it came long and slim out of the tube; a dragonfly was sitting on the stalk and trembling imperceptibly. Its tremendous, rapacious eyes still seemed dead, while from somewhere, perhaps out of the air, substance seemed to flow into the slack body and helped fill it. In the air there also were hardening the crumpled, finely veined wings; they began to stretch out, taut and brittle. The eyes began to shine, as if some blinding dust was disappearing from them. They became illuminated from within. Finally I saw the first dragonfly hovering above the water. A flash; it stood hovering; it sped away, a blue spark. . . . Wherever we looked, we saw pushing and slipping out. The brown pool seemed a place of transformation. They crawled and rose. Everywhere a straining upward and a slipping out. . . . We saw newly emerged ones laboriously straining, and we saw others spread their wings that had turned hard and glassy, and saw others shoot upward with a whirl. *Ima, o.* This is the way it will be.

and glassy out of the warm mud of the money-minded city of New Spuhl? Gerd Gaiser is a former fighter pilot of the Luftwaffe of World War II. Does he envision the metamorphosis of an insect which emerges from its husk only as an exact repetition of the pattern of the preceding generation? Is this a poetic way of saying: "The day will come"—*Es kommt der Tag*—when the uniforms, the machine guns, the pistols, and the fighter planes come once again? Or is this meant to be an image of the rebirth of human beings and of a human community, a human spring beyond the fatal repetition of the biological cycle of the seasons and the dragonfly—a truly new birth and a new beginning?

No one inside or outside Germany can tell for certain. The riddle of her future is part of the riddle of our own. At the beginning of the interplanetary age, all the world's nations are unfinished once again. Their past is inescapably real, and yet the meaning and power of that past is in question. Their national institutions are once again being melted and recast. Their political bodies and souls are strained by the pressures for change, and they may yet be born again. More or less, this is true of all the great nations—but perhaps it is most true of Germany, the Germany beneath the surface of its so recently consolidated institutions and behind the highly gifted German people of whom no one, not even they themselves, yet knows what they will become.

profound commitment to spiritual and human values than before.

Some of Germany's successes, however, are beginning to create new elements of crisis. Its symptoms have become most clearly visible in the West German universities. New students, sometimes with weaker academic preparation, are thronging the universities in larger numbers, while the universities in many ways have not kept pace. Lecture rooms, laboratories, and other facilities are badly overcrowded. Many students feel neglected and abandoned, facing subject matter which seems too difficult, or meaningless, and their professors sometimes seem too few and too remote to fulfill their traditional role as authority figures who can serve as models for imitation or as specific targets for revolt, so that frustration seems to come from an anonymous "system."

Another change cuts still deeper, perhaps, and not only in the universities. The young Germans of the late 1960's have grown up in an atmosphere of democratic values and beliefs, and of higher standards and expectations—both material and moral—than any generation before them. The gap between what they have learned to expect and reality seems to many intolerably wide. They have heard again and again about the "crime" of silence and blind obedience, which so many of their elders committed in Hitler's day, and many of the young now feel a sense of personal responsibility and a need to speak out against wrong or evil.

All these and other conditions may have combined to produce the sense of crisis in the West German universities, which was evident in 1967 and early 1968, and which seems unlikely to end soon. Some students—perhaps as many as 40 percent—are responding to alienation and conflicting pressures by seeking once again a sense of security and belonging in the authoritarianism of the traditional duelling fraternities. Many others—though their numbers are hard to estimate—seek to affirm their identity by various forms of protest or sympathy

for protest. A few outdo their counterparts in the United States in gestures of rebellion and bearded defiance of convention and authority; others throw themselves into more serious varieties of radical protest politics. They demand quick reforms in the German universities, and an end to the United States military effort in Vietnam. They have picketed some meetings of the major parties. They have challenged and debated leaders of the older generation. They also turned out in large numbers in June, 1967, to picket the Shah of Iran during his visit to the Opera in West Berlin, because they considered him a dictator who had helped destroy constitutional government in his own country. Police repressed them with a violence that smacked of panic. One student, Benno Ohnesorge, was killed in front of the Opera House by a policeman's bullet—the first such student victim in the history of the Bonn Republic. About one-third of the students at many West German universities were reported to have taken part in a silent demonstration at the time of Ohnesorge's funeral, and the police chief of West Berlin resigned shortly after "for reasons of health." Most young people in West Berlin and West Germany clearly continue to prefer the Western, democratic way of life to what they have seen of the dictatorial regime in the GDR, but by early 1968 the active discontent of many among them has become a factor to be reckoned with in the political and cultural life of the Federal Republic.

More than other large countries, the Federal Republic depends for its stability upon the actions of foreign powers—East and West—and upon the civic support of its people, particularly its young. The specific attacks of the radical right, the diffuse frustrations of the intellectuals and of the young, and the ever-present probability of a new international economic or military crisis may well present increasingly serious challenges to the democratic skills, loyalties, and institutions which have been developed during the preceding two decades.

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THE SOVIET UNION

Vernon V. Aspaturian

I

Introduction

In 1848, when two young German intellectuals, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, both in their mid-twenties, wrote the *Communist Manifesto*, Communism was simply a startling idea, but one which the two youthful authors declared was "a specter haunting Europe," destined to inspire a fundamental reorganization of society which would sweep away the civilization created by capitalism. Within the short space of 50 years, Marxist Communism had spawned influential Socialist and Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe and a multitude of splinter and sectarian political groups. One of them—the Bolshevik or radical wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party (later renamed the Communist Party), led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin—used the ideas of Marx to shape a revolutionary party that seized power in one of the great nations of the world, the Russian Empire. For the first time, the world witnessed the establishment of a social, economic, and political system that was frankly and boldly inspired by the ideas expressed in the *Communist Manifesto*.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 constitutes one of the great watersheds in the evolution of human history. The multiple revolutions and transformations that have taken place throughout the world in the past four decades have been profoundly shaped and influenced by the ideas behind this revolution, and the power of the Soviet state which it brought into being. A little more than a hundred years after the appearance of the *Communist Manifesto*, Communism is no longer a simple idea, but is a way of life embracing 14 states with a population of nearly a billion people, occupying approximately one-third of the earth's total land surface. Within this bloc of nations are to be found over 200 different nationalities and ethnic and linguistic groups, most of the races of mankind, and numerous cultures and religions. Furthermore, Communist Parties, large and small, exist

in more than 75 additional countries on five continents, ranging from minuscule illegal groups to large mass parties like those found in France and Italy. All these parties are dedicated to establishing Communism as a way of life in their own countries.

THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

In 50 years, Communism has transformed Russia irrevocably, but in the process the ideas of Communism have also been subjected to a profound revision. The Communism that haunts or challenges the world in the mid-twentieth century is not the utopian vision of Marx and Engels, nor even the modified version conjured up by Lenin, but rather the concrete realities of the new social order forged in the Soviet Union during the past four decades.

The Soviet challenge has a dual character. First of all, the Soviet system emerges as a rival *process* of industrialization and modernization, a process which before the success of the Soviet system was historically the monopoly of capitalism. Secondly, it is a rival *way of life* to that of the West, whose civilization and institutions it seeks to supersede. Thus, the Soviet challenge is simultaneously a promise and a threat. What Communism has done for Russia during the past 50 years is to enable it to meet successfully the challenge of rapid modernization, which excites underdeveloped countries eager for quick modernization and industrialization, but repels the advanced and modernized societies, which prefer their own social and political systems to that developed in Russia.

SOVIET RUSSIA AS A FORMER UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY

Before 1917, Russia was a giant with feet of clay. Although a huge sprawling empire stretched across both Europe and Asia and one

of the great powers of Europe, its prestige was in rapid decline because it failed to meet the imperatives of the modern industrial era. The most significant feature of the Imperial Russian state was not that it was a despotic autocracy, but that it was a country with a great potential which remained unrealized. In both Germany and Japan, autocratic governments took the initiative in adapting their societies to the industrial age, but not in Russia.

In 1914, Russia ranked last among the great industrial states of the world, but by 1960, the Soviet Union had already surpassed all the great industrial powers of Western Europe (and Japan) in the basic indicators of industrialization, and was second only to the United States, which it avowedly aims to equal and overtake.

In 1914, Russia was militarily weak; she had suffered defeat in one war after another after 1850, and in 1905 was humiliatingly beaten by an upstart Japan. Her rapidly declining military strength was further verified by defeat, occupation, and revolutionary convulsions during World War I. Today, however, Russia continues to rival the United States for military supremacy although it has fallen behind in recent years.

In 1914, Russia had a vast unskilled and illiterate population. She produced a few outstanding individual scientists, but in general was lagging far behind the rest of Europe in educational, technological, and scientific advancement. By 1960, the Soviet Union had achieved virtually 100% literacy. Today, the Soviet Union has over three times as many students enrolled in higher education as Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany combined. It now annually graduates more than four times as many engineers as the United States. In many respects, it has established an educational system second to none.

The story is virtually identical in the field of social services, particularly in medicine. In 1914, Russian medical science was woefully retarded, and medical care was available only to

the very wealthy. The number of physicians and dentists before the Revolution was 28,000. By 1965 it was over 554,000, which gives the Soviet Union today the largest number of doctors in proportion to the population of any country (except Israel) in the world. Today, every Soviet citizen was entitled to free medical care. Life expectancy in Russia has gone up from an average age of 32 before the Revolution to about 70, which gives Russia one of the longest average life expectancies in the world. The number of hospital beds has also increased: from 207,300 before the Revolution to over 2¼ million in 1965.

As in many pre-industrial societies, pre-Revolutionary Russia did not provide many opportunities for women. Today in the Soviet Union, 53% of all Soviet citizens with some secondary education are women. Before the Revolution, 10% of the medical doctors were women; today, more than 75% of all physicians in the Soviet Union are women. The situation with respect to teachers is almost identical. Women are to be found in all walks and all levels of Soviet cultural, professional, and scientific life in increasing numbers and in higher proportions than in any other country.

These are substantial achievements, and they transcend ideologies and social systems, for industrial power, military strength, literacy and education, scientific and technological progress, medical care, and the emancipation of women are universally desired goals. These are the undeniable marks of a modernized, industrialized, and Westernized society. They symbolize power, prestige, and dignity for the communities which bear them. The underdeveloped countries are interested in results, for they have no vested interest in doctrines or dogmas, and they are attracted to that process which promises to accelerate their entry into the modern technological age. In the Soviet experience, they see the concrete fulfillment of the dreams and aspirations of a previously underdeveloped country.

Also significant is the fact that the Soviet achievement was not only spectacularly quick, but was practically a do-it-yourself operation against overwhelming odds. For more than 30 years, Bolshevik Russia was an isolated pariah in a world of antagonistic capitalist states. The Bolsheviks inherited a country ravaged by war, occupation, and economic disorganization. She industrialized herself in the face of severe external impediments and internal convulsions. After 1933, she was the avowed object of conquest by Germany and Japan, she survived the Nazi attack, and, although most of her developed areas (virtually half of European Russia) were occupied and despoiled, she was able to mobilize a counterattack which broke the back of the German Army and set the stage for Germany's ultimate defeat.

Soviet Communism thus emerges as a process for the accelerated metamorphosis of backward agrarian and semifeudal states into advanced industrial societies. It promises the "quick switch": the rapid transformation of illiterate populations into educated communities, and of raw, unskilled peasants into skilled technicians and workmen; the swift elimination of disease; the early emancipation of women; and rapid improvement in the standard of living. But, above all, it promises the speedy acquisition of power, influence, and dignity for emerging national communities whose aspirations exceed their capacities. The larger the population of a given underdeveloped country and the more diversified and extensive its natural resources, the more applicable the Soviet experience is apt to be. The largest underdeveloped national community in the world, China, has already embarked on the same process. China, under Communism, enjoys greater power and prestige in world affairs than at any time in the past 200 years.

In short, Soviet Communism offers a seductive and effective way to meet the demands of the "revolution of rising expectations" that is sweeping the underdeveloped lands.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM

The Soviet social order, taken as a whole, is unique, but its political system has certain features in common with both modern and ancient autocracies and dictatorships. Undue preoccupation with the political institutions and practices of the Soviet system in isolation from its social institutions and ideological goals serves to place the Soviet dictatorship in the company of the Nazi and Fascist totalitarian systems. While the Soviet Union shares with these two systems certain political practices, the ideological principles and social goals of the Soviet state are sharply divergent from those of the Nazi and Fascist orders. A proper understanding of the Soviet system, therefore, requires that its political system be examined within the context of its ideological goals.

Modern dictatorships that mobilize and manipulate the masses and demand their active support are called "totalitarian dictatorships," to distinguish them from the traditional personal dictatorship or dynastic autocracy which sought to justify or preserve their rule without the active involvement of the masses.

While Soviet spokesmen reject the labels of totalitarianism and personal dictatorship, they accept the notion of a "class" dictatorship and until 1961 defined the Soviet regime as a "dictatorship of the proletariat." But they claim that the dictatorship of the proletariat is essentially democratic, since it embodies a system in which a majority (the workers and their allies) rule over a minority. Indeed, they reject the Western idea of democracy as being a "bourgeois" or capitalist democracy; that is, democracy for the few—the capitalists. In their eyes, then, Western democracy is a dictatorship over the working masses, while Soviet democracy is a dictatorship over the former capitalist ruling class.

Democracy as a symbol has always played an important role in Soviet policy and doctrine because of its obvious appeal. Even at the height of the Stalinist terror, Soviet authorities described the Soviet system as "the most democratic system" in the world. After Stalin's death, however, Khrushchev conceded that the Soviet Union under Stalin, at least from 1934–53, was in fact a personal dictatorship.

The political life of the Soviet Union is monopolized by a single party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is the only legal political organization in the country. Highly centralized in its organization, the party, as the custodian and interpreter of the official ideology, actually governs the country. Its membership currently amounts to only 5% of the total population, but it furnishes or selects the key personnel in all political, economic, military, and cultural institutions. Thus not only is the official ideology "total," but control is total as well, since the party does not permit the appearance of any political or social force that could challenge its monopoly of power in the Soviet system.

The Soviet economy is also "total" in the sense that it is almost entirely public in character. In response to the ideological norms of Marxism, the Soviet state owns outright all the land, water, natural resources, industrial establishments, and financial institutions of the country. None of these can be privately owned. Virtually the entire urban working population is employed by the state or by state- and party-directed institutions. In the countryside, most of the rural population works on collective farms, which are theoretically cooperative enterprises. The state owns the land, however, and the collective farms are closely governed by state laws and regulations.

Control of the economy is considered to be an indispensable prerequisite to a centrally directed and planned economy. The Soviet state, upon instructions from the party, determines the economic development of the coun-

try. The state decides what shall be produced and how much. It sets the market price of commodities as well as the wages and salaries of employees and managers. Collective bargaining and strikes are unknown in the Soviet Union. Everything is determined from the top and at the center.

No less under the control of the Soviet state than the economy is the cultural life of the country. The party and state institutions own or control all the media of communications and distribution, all schools and universities, museums and recreational facilities, libraries, newspapers, printing and publishing establishments, radio and TV stations, motion-picture studios, and theaters. Control over culture and communications ensures that the party and state can condition and manipulate the minds of their citizens by controlling their access to information. In the Soviet Union, it is assumed that the interests of society must prevail against those of the individual and that the latter can find true freedom only as a member of society. The individual, by definition, thus cannot have rights and interests in opposition to those of the state and, in the event of conflict, those of the individual must give way.

The decision of the party under Stalin to modernize and industrialize Russia quickly collided with the inertia and interests of vast sectors of the population. In order to impose the state's ideological goals upon an unwilling population in the name of building a socialist and Communist society, Stalin resorted to the use of terror and violence. The modernization of Russia was quickly achieved, but at tremendous cost in human lives and liberty. Soviet Russia became a vast police empire of terrorized citizens, whose main incentive for working was not the prospect of a better life but sheer survival.

Since Stalin's death in 1953, the terroristic

aspects of the Soviet system have been largely eliminated. The secret police have been considerably reduced in numbers, many of their veterans have been removed or executed, and the concentration camps have been emptied of their prisoners. Soviet citizens are allowed considerably more freedom of thought and movement, although the basic features of the Soviet dictatorship and the fundamental structure of society remain fundamentally intact. Most serious observers agree that the Soviet system can no longer be described as totalitarian, while many others perceive the progressive development of pluralistic tendencies in Soviet society.

The Soviet system offers, as we have said, a way of quickly overcoming the poverty, illiteracy, and backwardness of the underdeveloped countries—but it is a short-cut which exacts a terrible tribute for its advantages. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders boast that in the twentieth century all roads lead to Communism because it has already demonstrated its superiority in achieving rapid and concrete results. Unless the Western world, led by the United States, is able to renovate and export the values and institutions it cherishes, and can demonstrate an alternative that will deliver both the quick results of the Soviet pattern and the freedoms of Western civilization, then the attractiveness of Communism, and with it its international impact, will grow. (It is to be admitted, however, that in recent years the diplomatic and economic setbacks of the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the generally drab character of the Soviet standard of living, to which more and more visitors have been exposed, have tarnished somewhat the luster of the Soviet achievement—which, while impressive in itself, has nevertheless fallen considerably short of official claims, boasts, and promises. Consequently, some of its former appeal to underdeveloped countries has been eroded.)

II

The Russian

Political Heritage

When Lenin and the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government in November, 1917, they thought that the umbilical cord with the past had been irrevocably severed. The Soviet system was to begin with a clean slate; Russia's past was to be repudiated, and the future would be inspired by the ideological vision of Karl Marx in which nations would melt into one another to produce an authentic international community.

THE RUSSIAN "NATIONAL CHARACTER"

Nations, however, cannot dispose of their heritage so easily. The latitude of action permitted to the Bolsheviks was severely limited by the human and physical resources with which they had to work. The Soviet state, territorially, was a truncated version of the Russian Empire; it inherited the same geographical location, the same exposed frontier, and the same enemies, who still looked upon her territories with envy. Most importantly, Soviet Russia inherited the same population, most of whom were Russians. The people of Russia, then, with their religions and languages, knowledge and ignorance, skills and superstitions, memories, fears, anxieties, and customs were the raw human material out of which a Communist society was to be fashioned. The Bolsheviks also inherited Russia's potential, and this was enormous both in terms of natural resources and of population. The most tenacious element of the legacy the Bolsheviks inherited was that elusive thing called the Russian "national character." Russia presents a unique illustration of both the tenacity and plasticity of national character and traditions. An avowed objective of the Bolsheviks was to transform the people of Russia by radically reorganizing the coun-

try's social and economic order. Yet many of the qualities of pre-Revolutionary Russia persist in contemporary Soviet society. Indeed, the Russian culture has been extended to nearly 100 million non-Russians within the Soviet system.

Being the most numerous and influential element in the population, the Russians inevitably became the instruments for disseminating the culture, language, and traditions of the Communist doctrine to the non-Russian nationalities. The Russian language became the *lingua franca* of the Union, while the Cyrillic alphabet (in modified form) became the vehicle for reducing other languages to writing. Of all the nationalities of the U.S.S.R., only the three Baltic nations, Georgia, and Armenia (whose numbers total less than 12 million out of 232 million) do not use the Cyrillic alphabet. Russian cultural attainments have become the common treasures of all the peoples of Soviet Russia, and while their own cultures, languages, and traditions have also been permitted to flourish (within definite limits, however), they have been relentlessly exposed to Russian cultural norms for more than four decades. The Soviet Union today is thus simultaneously more and less "Russian" than ever before, because, under Soviet rule, Russian culture has been converted from a purely national phenomenon into a multinational civilization. The only conspicuously Russian cultural institution which has not been universalized is the Orthodox Church.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Autocratic and Byzantine Legacy

Indigenous Slavic states of a tribal character flourished on the soil of modern Russia as early as the seventh century, but it was the Kievan state of Rus, founded by Norse marauders under Rurik the Red in the ninth

century, that marks Russia's formal entry into recorded history. The Kievan state, located in the territory of the present-day Ukraine, was in every way comparable in the development of its civilization to that of the feudal states of Western Europe, but its principal outside contacts were with the Byzantine Empire, with which it quickly established intimate and fruitful commercial, political, and cultural connections.

The Byzantine influence on Russia was the earliest and most pervasive of all alien influences on Russian political development. Byzantine culture was an amalgam of Roman, Greek, and Near Eastern elements. From Rome, through Byzantium, Russia inherited the imperial title of "Tsar," a corruption of "Caesar"; from the Greeks, the Russian language gained the Cyrillic alphabet, from the Near East, Russia adopted the institution of the God-Emperor in its specific Byzantine Christian adaptation known as Caesaro-Papism, whereby the authority of the Pope and the Emperor are amalgamated in the person of the Tsar.

A further important Byzantine influence on Russia was the notion of Messianic orthodoxy—the idea that the orthodox faith was the one and only vehicle of eternal salvation, to be extended dogmatically and with undiminished fervor. Constantinople was the "Second Rome," and its Emperors the successors to the Roman Empire. Twenty years after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks (1453), the Grand Dukes of Moscow proclaimed themselves as successors to the Tsars of Byzantium, arrogated the headship of the Orthodox Church, proclaimed Moscow to be the "Third Rome," pre-empted the Byzantine double-headed eagle, and invested themselves with the title, "Tsar, autocrat, chosen by God."

The Church of Old Rome fell [wrote the Russian monk Theophilus shortly after the fall of Constantinople] because of its heresy; the gates of the Second Rome, Constantinople, have been hewn down by the axes of the infidel Turks, but the Church of Moscow, the Church of the New Rome,

shines brighter than the sun in the whole Universe. . . . Two Romes have fallen, but the Third Rome stands fast; a fourth there cannot be.¹

MONGOL-TATAR DOMINATION: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF BARBARISM. The second major alien influence on Russia was that of the Mongols and Tatars. The Kievan state of Rus was easily overwhelmed and destroyed in the thirteenth century by the Mongol conquest, and the Russian lands passed under control of the Khans from 1234 to 1460. Mongol-Tatar rule was indirect; native princes and bishops, if they chose to cooperate, were reduced to vassalage but allowed to rule their own subjects and to maintain their property and serfs. They were forced to deliver annual tribute to the Khans, which they exacted from their own subjects with the same cruelty and barbarism they experienced in dealing with their masters.

The 200 years of Mongol-Tatar domination not only re-enforced the despotic qualities borrowed from Byzantium, but also cut Russia off from contact with Western Europe, retarding not only her social and economic development, but also insulating her from the liberating currents of the Renaissance and the Reformation which swept through the West.

The chief legacies of Mongol-Tatar domination were essentially psychological and administrative: the refinement of despotic arts; the cultivation of cruel and insensitive methods of rule and rebellion; the premium placed on centralization of power, enforced national unity, and ideological conformity; the tradition of backwardness and the efforts of the rulers to overcome it.

THE LEGACY OF MUSCOVITE ABSOLUTISM. Under the Khans, Russia's center of political gravity shifted to the Moscow region, whose princes gradually rose to prominence beginning in the twelfth century. A succession

of unusually able but unscrupulous rulers expanded Moscow's power over the other princes and enhanced its influence at the Tatar court. Ivan I, known as *Kalita* or "Moneybags" (1325-41), maneuvered himself into the job of collecting the tribute from the other princes for the Khans, and his successor, Simeon I (1341-53), managed to be appointed Chief Prince over the others. As Muscovite absolutism increased, the power of the Khans was correspondingly eroded. Ivan III, the Great (1462-1506), finally overthrew the Tatars completely in 1480. (In 1472, Ivan married Sophia, the last Byzantine Emperor's niece, thus claiming succession to the Byzantine Emperors.)

Centralization of political power and its absolute exercise—two persistent features of contemporary Soviet rule—thus have an ancient legacy. Only through ruthless centralization of power could Moscow overthrow the Khans, and subsequent history has demonstrated that when this power was fragmented or seriously challenged by an internal opposition, Russia was exposed to invasion and defeat. The idea that decentralization is tantamount to anarchy and weakness and that dissent is treason is firmly rooted in Russian history. Stalin recognized the importance of this tradition on the occasion of Moscow's eight hundredth anniversary in 1947:

Moscow's service consists first and foremost in the fact that it became the foundation for the unification of a disunited Russia into a single state with a single government, a single leadership. . . . Only a country united in a single centralized state can count on being able to make substantial cultural-economic progress and assert its independence.²

The Consolidation of Autocratic Rule

Throughout Russian history all attempts to limit the absolute power of the Tsar failed, and the Russian autocracy was preserved

¹Cited in Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 171.

²*Pravda*, September 11, 1947.

virtually intact down to the 1917 Revolution itself. As in other feudal societies, the monarch could be effectively opposed only by the hereditary nobility, whose members jealously sought to cultivate authority in their own domain, and occasionally to aspire to the throne itself. Sharing power with the Tsar was the Duma of Boyars, comparable to the House of Lords in Britain. The boyars struggled against the absolutism of the Tsars for their own personal and class advantage, but met their match in Ivan the Terrible (1533–84), that half-mad genius both feared and beloved by the common people as their protector against the cruel boyars. He eventually broke the power of the boyars by various stratagems, including the formation of the first Russian secret police organization, the dreaded Oprichnina, which ruthlessly liquidated all opposition to the Tsar.

Ivan also introduced an embryonic "House of Commons," the Zemsky Sobor, in 1549, a quasi-representative assembly made up of the lesser nobility, upper clergy, landed gentry, and urban bourgeoisie, to counterbalance the strength of the boyars. The Zemsky Sobor successfully limited the power of the boyars, and during the "Time of Troubles" (1584–1613), it played a significant role in governing Russia, when the country was plagued by false pretenders to the throne and threatened with foreign intervention by the Poles. Its most important act was the election of Prince Michael of the Romanov family as Tsar in 1613. The Zemsky Sobor was unable to maintain its authority, however, and degenerated in a manner similar to the French Estates-General. Both it and the Duma of Boyars gradually deteriorated and were abolished by Peter the Great.

Subsequent attempts to limit the power of the Tsar were either instituted by the Tsar himself or forced upon him by revolutionary pressures. Peter the Great (1689–1725), for instance, sought to "Westernize" and modernize the autocracy so as to increase the power of

Russia and render its absolute government more efficient. He introduced a bureaucratic system based on merit, and faithful service to the state by the landowners or gentry could earn them titles of nobility or promotion to higher status. A hierarchy of 14 ranks was organized for the armed services, the courts, and the Civil Service, each with its own distinctive status, with promotion awarded to the most able. The system, eventually corrupted by nepotism, bribery, and favoritism, lasted down to 1917, when it was abolished—only to be resurrected in new and expanded form by Stalin in 1943, when all branches of the Soviet bureaucracy were once again organized into ranks, replete with uniforms and special privileges.

Peter also created the Imperial Governing Senate in 1711 to replace the Duma of Boyars. Officially an advisory body akin to a cabinet (it was made up of nine members, including the royal governors of the provinces, appointed by the Tsar to coordinate and direct the administration of the state), it was actually a supine creature of the Tsar. Directly under the Senate were eight departments of government, each run by a committee of three to five men, which reduced the possibility that any one person would become too powerful in administering the country. Peter abolished the Russian Patriarchate and placed the Church under the direction of a Holy Synod (1721), which was dominated by the "eyes and ears" of the Tsar, the Procurator, a trusted layman. Many of Peter's reforms served to strengthen both the autocracy and the country as a whole. Under him, Russia continued her expansion in all directions, finally absorbing St. Petersburg and thus acquiring her long-sought "window" on the Baltic.

Under Catherine the Great (1762–96), elective municipal councils (*dumas*) were established, although the elections were severely limited to the propertied classes. And, under this former German princess the steady infiltration of German ideas and bureaucrats into

Russia was accelerated, and the Romanov dynasty was soon all but Germanized.

During the reign of Alexander I (1801–25), Michael Speransky was commissioned to draw up an elaborate plan of governmental reform providing for the indirect election of local, intermediate, and provincial assemblies, ultimately to be climaxed with a National Duma, or Parliament. Speransky's efforts led only to the creation of a marginal organ, the Imperial State Council, half the members of which were appointed by the Tsar, and the other half elected by special social groups. Virtually all its members were drawn from the nobility, and it merely served as another administrative coordinating body. After 1905, it became the Upper House of the Imperial Legislature.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, a system of local self-governing bodies (the *Zemstvos*), based on and authorized by popular elections, was established, but their powers were limited and their authority restricted essentially to such local matters as sanitation, roads, hospitals, and schools. Elections were frequently rigged, and the *Zemstvos* were usually dominated by the local gentry. Under Alexander III (1891–94), the executive committees of the *Zemstvos* were controlled by provincial governors. These organizations, which continued to attract reform-minded and progressive members of the nobility, constituted the only school of local self-government in the entire history of the Russian autocracy.

The Fear and Attraction of Anarchy

Throughout the history of Russia runs an elusive but detectable thread of anarchism. Superficially, this seems to contradict the spirit of absolutism that has animated Russia's rulers, but, in fact, the two may be complementary. The relaxation of authority has, in the past, threatened to plunge the country into anarchy, so a strong central government has been neces-

sary to keep the people under control. During the nineteenth century, latent anarchistic forces gave rise to various movements designed to destroy the state, in the hope that society would reformulate itself spontaneously into a stateless socialistic community. It is perhaps more than fortuitous that Marxism emerged as an ideology tailor-made to fit the contradictory impulses of both absolute order and anarchy, for Lenin's Bolshevism imposed the necessary order, while Marx's vision of a classless society promised a community in which the state would ultimately "wither away."

The Revolutionary Tradition

The concentration of absolute power in the hands of the Tsar meant that change and reform could come about only by initiative from above or revolution from below. Reforms from above were few and far between and usually followed by a period of repression. As the pressure built up for revolution, underground groups increased their violent and terroristic methods. All the accumulated resentments, disappointments, sufferings, and sublimated hopes of nearly a thousand years seemed to explode in the Revolutions of 1917.

The Revolutions of 1917 did not develop without precedents. Previous revolutions, however, were limited in character, either geographically or socially. Characteristically, down to the twentieth century, revolutions were directed against the harsh social and economic order. The Tsar and the autocratic system itself were by-and-large immune, for the Tsar was viewed as a benevolent patriarch who would have instantly intervened had he known the miseries and agonies of his people. In times of external crises, the Tsar was a powerful symbol around whom all classes of Russians rallied.

The Russian faith in the autocracy was reinforced by a deep and primitive faith in the power and majesty of God, from whom the Tsar claimed divine sanction. The Orthodox Church

had been completely subordinated to the state after a brief and unequal struggle between the Patriarchate and the Tsar, and it became one of the basic instruments of autocratic rule. The Orthodox priests cultivated in the minds of the Russian peasants a fatalism about their earthly conditions of life and thus increasingly became a principal bulwark of the autocracy, blessing and sanctifying its endeavors and activities, even to the extent of pressuring ordinary priests into the service of the secret police. The ferocity of the Bolshevik reaction against the Orthodox Church must always be assessed with this perspective in mind, for the Orthodox Church was not a "free church," but an indispensable and willing instrument of the autocracy in its oppressive rule over the people of Russia.

IVAN THE TERRIBLE'S "REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE." The earliest popularly supported "revolution" in Russia was, in fact, a "revolution from above," executed by Ivan the Terrible. In 1564, as a consequence of his conflict with the boyars, led by Prince Kurbsky, Ivan abandoned Moscow for a small village and denounced the boyars and upper clergy as traitorous, corrupt, and evil, at the same time absolving the urban bourgeoisie and the common people. Without abdicating, he announced that he had given up his kingdom and would let God determine his future course. When asked to return, by a delegation sent by the middle classes and the common people, he laid down a number of conditions, including the right to establish a special institution called the Oprichnina, over which he would have personal jurisdiction. In effect, the Oprichnina became a vast secret police empire, untrammelled by law and subject only to the jurisdiction of the Tsar.

The ultimate objective of the Oprichnina was to destroy the power of the boyars, by arresting and exiling them to remote parts of the country and expropriating their estates. The methods and tortures employed by the Oprichniki were worthy precedents for the subsequent

secret police systems in Russia: the Imperial Okhrana, and the Soviet Cheka, G.P.U., N.K.V.D., M.G.B., and the current K.G.B. These measures against the boyars were by no means unpopular among the common people, who saw in the Tsar their protector against the hated landlords.

Ivan's assault against the boyars set the stage for the gradual destruction of an independent Russian nobility, whose power and status supposedly stemmed not from the grace of the Tsar, but, like the Tsar's, from divine right transmitted by heredity from one generation to the next. Many of the boyars were scions of princely families, who considered themselves to be the peers of the dynastic line itself, and, in fact, challenged the existing dynasty in its right to rule. Through the Oprichniki, Ivan inundated the ranks of the boyars by creating a new landed aristocracy and court nobility, the *pomeschiki* and the *dvoriane*, who were obligated to render service to the state in return for their grants of land and serfs, seized either from the boyars or from newly conquered territories. Unlike the boyars, the new nobility owed both its power and status to the Tsar. This nobility was further expanded by Peter the Great, who swelled its ranks with additional recruits who had performed with loyalty and competence either on the field of battle or in the state bureaucracy. Thereafter, the Imperial land-owning nobility never constituted a threat to the power of the Tsar.

THE DECEMBRIST REVOLT. Of much greater significance was the so-called Decembrist Revolt of December 26, 1825, which was a movement directed against the autocracy itself rather than against "abuses" and "corruption." The Decembrist uprising was an attempted palace revolution by the officers among the Tsar's own guards. Inspired by the ideas of both the American and French Revolutions, and organized into secret societies and conspiracies, these liberal-minded but politically unsophisticated

young officers were united in a common determination to sweep away the autocracy as the chief obstacle to progress in Russia. They were not clear about what should replace it, however. Some advocated a constitutional monarchy, others a republic; some wanted to retain a centralized state, others argued for a federation; still others agitated for a democracy, while some demanded a benevolent dictatorship.

THE REVOLUTIONARY INTELLIGENTSIA. The Decembrist Revolt was quickly crushed by the new Tsar, Nicolas I, and Russia was subjected to a renewed period of reaction and oppression. The Revolt became, however, the inspiration for many revolutionary movements and terroristic groups, all of which had to go underground because political parties and movements were outlawed by the autocracy. Hounded and infiltrated by the Tsarist secret police, provoked to premature action by *agents provocateurs*, many of these revolutionary groups were driven to extreme and violent action because of the unhealthy atmosphere in which they were forced to operate. Their agents, in turn, infiltrated the Tsarist secret police, and double agents and even triple agents were not unusual. A few individuals did not really know whether they themselves were primarily revolutionaries or agents of the Tsarist police.

The most oppressive institution in early nineteenth-century Russian society was that of serfdom, which embraced most of the rural population of Russia. The serfs tilled the soil and were owned by the landed aristocracy. Extensive studies of the condition of the serfs had been commissioned by the Tsars, but little had been accomplished to alleviate their virtual slavery.

It was only in 1861 that serfdom was abolished by the liberal-minded Tsar Alexander II. Although its abolition was an important step in the social evolution of Russia, it did little to stem the growing tide of revolutionary sentiment that had gripped the Russian intellectuals

and university circles, which became increasingly inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution, the idealistic philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, Kant, and Hegel, and the utopian socialism of the French philosophers.

The intelligentsia were drawn from all classes of Russia—the bureaucracy, the gentry, the peasantry and working class, the merchants and professions—but they considered themselves to be without class, irrespective of their social origins. They were united not so much by common ideas or philosophy, but by a common passion to reform the social order, so that Russia might fulfill her physical and spiritual potential. Some thought that Russia's best course would be to adopt the technology, philosophy, and institutions of the West, and they were called Westernizers. Others emphasized the unique spiritual and psychological traditions of Russia and insisted that Russian civilization was actually superior to Western culture, and that the country's salvation lay in freeing the true Russia which had been all but suffocated by successive layers of foreign ideas and institutions. These members of the intelligentsia were labeled "Slavophiles." Still others of the intelligentsia maintained a foot in each camp, trying to bridge the two in an endeavor to create a synthesis made up of the best of both worlds. Both groups were essentially utopian in outlook, and the Slavophiles were also profoundly messianic in their orientation, for some felt that Russia had a mission to emancipate not only herself but the entire world from the materialistic philosophy of the West. Yet, even the Westernizers reflected a messianic faith in Russia's destiny.

The same spirit animated Stalin in 1917, before the Revolution, when he argued against the notion that Russia had to take second place to the industrialized countries in blazing the path to Socialism:

The possibility is not precluded that Russia will be the country to lay the road to socialism. . . .

We must cast aside the obsolete idea that only Europe can show us the way³

THE NARODNIK MOVEMENT (POPULISTS). Intellectual ferment gave way to political organization after the emancipation of the serfs, principally in the Narodnik movement, whose various sects and factions were influenced by the ideas of both the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. The Narodniki were initially drawn from student and intellectual groups who were motivated by a desire to achieve an agrarian socialist society uncorrupted by Western industrialization, capitalism, and materialism. According to the Narodniki, the Russian peasant, organized in the ancestral *mir*, or village commune, was naturally socialist in his inclinations, and once the oppressive autocratic system and the iniquitous feudal order were destroyed, Russia would spontaneously be reorganized as a vast association of agrarian cooperative communities. The Narodniki favored appealing directly to the people living in their village communes, enlightening and educating them, ministering to their wants, winning their confidence, and inspiring them to revolt against the existing order.

The peasants, however, viewed many of the Narodniki, who settled in the villages as teachers, nurses, and counselors, with deep mistrust and suspicion, often reporting their activities to the Tsarist authorities and, in some instances, taking direct action against them. The failure of the peasantry to respond to their good intentions, and the increasingly repressive measures employed by the government, resulted in fragmenting the Narodnik movement into a variety of underground and illegal organizations ranging from pacific anarchism to terroristic nihilism. The more the peasants failed to respond to the Narodnik program, the more convinced were the reform leaders that the revolution could be accomplished only by a militant el-

ite—a view which later powerfully influenced Lenin's brand of Marxism.

REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM. Broadly speaking, the revolutionary groups emerging out of Narodism tended either toward some brand of anarchism or to the view that some sort of progressive state was necessary to replace the Tsarist autocracy. Portions of these groups advocated peaceful measures, but the rest cried for violence and even for terrorism. The peaceful anarchists wanted to dissolve the state in favor of a giant association of peasant communes. The best-known representatives of violence were Peter Tkachev, and Bakunin and his protégé Nechayev, the latter of whose views were grimly set forth in the *Catechism of the Revolutionist*.

The revolutionist is a doomed man. He has no personal interests, no affairs, sentiments, attachments, property, not even a name of his own . . . He despises and hates the present-day code of morals with all its motivations and manifestations. To him, whatever aids the triumph of the revolution is ethical, all which hinders it is criminal. . . . All tender softening sentiments of kinship, friendship, love, gratitude, and even honor itself must be snuffed out in him by the one cold passion of the revolutionary cause. . . . The Association has no aim other than the complete liberation and happiness of the masses.⁴

The first revolutionary party, *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom), was oriented toward violence. It in turn split into two factions, the *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will), which specialized in bombings and assassinations, and the *Chorny Peredzel* (Black Redistribution), which called for the peasants to seize the land from the landlords. Members of the first group were responsible for the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, and to this movement belonged Lenin's older brother Alexander Ulyanov, who was executed in 1887 for complicity in a plot to

³J. V. Stalin, *The Road To Power* (New York: International Publishers, 1937), pp. 20–21.

⁴Quoted in Max Nomad, *Apostles of Revolution* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1939), pp. 228–233.

assassinate Alexander III. The execution of his brother profoundly intensified Lenin's own political fanaticism.

The *Chorny Peredyel* is noteworthy because the first Russian Marxists were among its members. Because Russia was essentially an agrarian society, the ideas of Karl Marx appeared to be largely irrelevant to her social and economic problems. Before 1865, the working class in Russia was virtually nonexistent, and a political movement dedicated to representing the interests of the proletariat would have been an anomaly. After the emancipation of the serfs, opportunities were created for the development of capitalism in Russia, and by 1890 the new social class of proletarians numbered some 2,400,000 members (up from 200,000 in 1865). Mostly concentrated in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Baku, and the Donetz Basin, this class was quickly courted by revolutionaries disillusioned by the political inertia of the peasantry.

The Development of Marxism in Russia

The first Russian Marxist organization was founded abroad in 1883 by George Plekhanov, Vera Zasulich, Axelrod, and Deutsch, and called itself the Emancipation of Labor. It translated the works of Marx and Engels into Russian, struggled against the views of the Narodniki, repudiated the whole concept of Russian agrarian socialism, and maintained that the industrialization of Russia would soon create a revolutionary proletariat. It wrote off the revolutionary potential of the peasants and advocated instead an alliance between the liberal middle class and the working class to bring about a revolution to establish a middle-class constitutional and representative democracy.

Marxist groups sprang up in the urban centers of Russia between 1883 and 1894, including one in 1895 in St. Petersburg, headed by Lenin. During the same period, Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin) was active in Tiflis and the Caucasus, while Leon Bronstein (Trotsky)

was to become politically active a few years later in St. Petersburg. In 1898, representatives of some of these groups convened a "Congress" in Minsk, attended by nine people, which issued a Manifesto announcing the formation of the Russian Social Democratic Party, modeled after the one in Germany. Although no party was actually organized and no program was issued, the foundations were prepared for active Marxist political organization and agitation.

The growth of industry in Russia and the attraction of Marx's ideas all but obliterated the Narodnik movement. Those who still retained faith in agrarian socialism merged with others in 1901 to form the Social-Revolutionary Party, one of the largest in the country, whose program of land redistribution represented the interests of the peasantry more than that of any other party. Following this, middle-class intellectuals, members of the professions, and progressive elements of the bourgeoisie and nobility supported the formation of an association called the Union of Liberation, under the leadership of Paul Milyukov. Because they favored essentially a renovation of the autocracy into a constitutional monarchy patterned after the British model, they later adopted the name Constitutional Democrats, or Cadets. A middle-class party *par excellence*, it played a significant role during the decade of the Duma that followed the Revolution of 1905, and in the events leading to the March Revolution of 1917.

BOLSHEVIKS AND MENSHEVIKS. At the second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party, which was convened in Brussels and then moved to London in 1903, the Party split into two factions over questions of membership, organization, and principles of action. Lenin managed to secure a small majority as a result of procedural technicalities and the faction led by him was called the Bolsheviks (majority), as opposed to the Mensheviks (minority). The labels stuck, and the two wings of the Social Democratic Party were to be known

henceforth as the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Ironically, it was the Bolshevik faction that was subsequently most often in the minority.

Lenin presented a proposal (based on his work *What Is To Be Done?*) that had been published just prior to the meeting. In essence, he called for an entirely new kind of non-parliamentary party, one whose objective was not to win votes at the ballot box (which in any event did not exist in Russia at the time), but to seize power on behalf of the working class and to establish a "dictatorship of the proletariat." The party was to be restricted to a hard-core elite, made up of professional revolutionaries and organized along militant lines rather than as a mass party. Its guiding principle was "democratic centralism," whereby the authority of the party was to be concentrated in the hands of its central committee, in which, in turn, the minority would bow to the majority. In *What Is To Be Done?* Lenin wrote.

I assert: (1) that no movement can be durable without a stable organization of leaders to maintain continuity, (2) that the more widely the masses are spontaneously drawn into the struggle and form the basis of the movement and participate in it, the more necessary it is to have such an organization, and the more stable must it be (for it is much easier for demagogues to side-track the more backward sections of the masses); (3) that the organization must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession; (4) that in a country with an autocratic government, the more we restrict the membership of this organization to persons who are engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to catch the organization; (5) the *uiider* will be the circle of men and women of the working class or of other classes of society able to join the movement and perform active work in it.⁴

Lenin pressed his views in the newspaper *Iskra* (*The Spark*) and in numerous pamphlets. He eventually succeeded in creating just such

an organization of dedicated professional revolutionaries, while his rivals in the Menshevik faction continued to emphasize democratic principles of organization and nonviolent principles of action. Although the two factions constituted distinct organizations, both continued to operate within the framework of a single political party. As long as neither was in power, Lenin's principles were restricted only to his group. Many individuals freely migrated from one faction to the other, while some, like Leon Trotsky, remained as it were suspended between the two during the years before 1917. Once the Bolsheviks seized power, however, Lenin's ideas were applied to the entire country, and the foundations of totalitarian politics were firmly laid. The ban on factional opposition was transformed into a prohibition of other political parties and organizations; the principle of the subordination of the minority to the majority was converted into a condemnation of dissenting political views; terrorist and conspiratorial methods used in pursuing the revolution were transformed into instruments directed against counter-revolution. What were originally the principles governing a small sectarian party were eventually extended to command the lives of millions in a vast empire.

The Revolution of 1905

After 1900, Russia was once again on the verge of revolution. A severe economic crisis stimulated strikes in the cities and rebellions in the countryside. Thousands of real and suspected revolutionaries were imprisoned or exiled either abroad or to Siberia.

The Japanese attack on Port Arthur in 1904 temporarily postponed the inevitable revolutionary outburst, but on January 9 (Bloody Sunday) of the following year, when soldiers fired on a peaceful procession of workers bearing a list of grievances to the "Little Father" (the Tsar), killing hundreds and wounding thousands, an amorphous revolt broke out in

⁴V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2 (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), pp. 138-139.

the capital. The workers went out on a general strike, the sailors on the ship *Potemkin* mutinied, and peasants rebelled in scattered rural localities. Soviets, or workers' councils, were established in the cities to direct the strike. The most important council was the St. Petersburg Soviet, one of whose leaders was a youthful 26-year-old revolutionary, Leon Trotsky. The St. Petersburg Soviet called for the amelioration of social and economic conditions and for moderate political reforms: a constitution, elections, a national parliament, and freedom for political parties. The aim of the 1905 Revolution was to achieve middle-class political reforms comparable to those that had been won in Western Europe.

THE REFORMS OF 1905: THE DECADE OF THE DUMA. The revolution was easily quashed, but not until after a frightened Monarch issued his famous October Manifesto, promising a constitution, political parties, elections, a national Duma, and civil liberties. Although the reforms that followed were more formal than real, differences in political conditions before and after 1905 were substantial and should not be minimized. The open organization of political parties and national elections in themselves were important achievements, even if the Duma was more a debating society than a law-making body and the Tsar's absolute power remained virtually intact. The introduction of such civil liberties as freedom of speech, assembly, worship, and movement, the relaxation of censorship, parliamentary immunity, and political agitation, while frequently violated in practice, made the Russia after 1905 a less oppressive society than the Russia before. Besides the political parties already mentioned, political organizations of the Right also materialized, ranging from the conservative Octobrists to the reactionary Union of the Russian People.

In addition to the popularly elected Duma, the Tsar established the Council of State as an upper chamber, half of whose members were

appointed by the Tsar and the other half by the bureaucracy, upper clergy, and nobility. The Council of Ministers, the bureaucracy, and the armed forces remained under the control of the Monarch. All bills, before they could become law, had to have the approval of the Council of State and of the Tsar, who retained the power of absolute veto. The Tsar kept the exclusive right to initiate modifications of the fundamental law and controlled the Duma through his power to convene or dissolve it at his discretion. He also retained the title of Supreme Autocrat and in this capacity could govern by decree during periods of emergency, which he had the authority to declare.

The first Duma was elected in 1906, but was dissolved after 73 days because it outspokenly advocated further and immediate reforms. A limited agrarian reform program, however, was implemented by decree. The government tried to control the elections to the second Duma, but it proved to be even more radical than the first, and it, too, was dissolved, after 103 days of existence. A new electoral law, adopted in violation of the constitution, severely limited the suffrage in favor of the propertied classes and served as the basis for the election of the third Duma. The fourth Duma, elected in 1912, demonstrated considerable vitality in spite of its overwhelmingly conservative character. The Constitutional Democrats, particularly, were active far out of proportion to their numbers, and criticism of the government by opposition radical and reform parties was spirited.

The outbreak of war in 1914 once again arrested the eruption of revolutionary violence, for all the parties, with the exception of the Bolsheviks, supported the war against Germany in an outburst of patriotic feeling. The incompetence of the government in prosecuting the war was quickly revealed as Russia suffered severe reverses at the front. The Duma was convened to deal with the situation, but its suggestions for military, economic, and political reforms were disregarded. The Imperial Court was dominated by the Siberian monk Rasputin

through his influence over the Tsarina, and his venality infected every agency of the state, including the military. Ministers were appointed and dismissed upon his advice, and even strategic war plans were influenced by his "nocturnal visions." Russia's difficulties, however, had more profound causes, and Rasputin's assassination in 1916 did little to help the deteriorating situation.

The Revolution of 1917

Defeat in war, repressive measures at home, the incompetence and corruption of the Court, the ineptitude of the Tsar, espionage, bribery and treason in high places, general war weariness, the disaffection of the border nationalities, the breakdown of the transportation system, bread riots and strikes in the cities, demoralization and desertion at the front, and peasant rebellions in the countryside climaxed a millennium of frustration and resentment, which erupted in the violent upheavals of 1917.

The occasion was characteristically inauspicious. When the "Progressive Bloc" in the Duma, made up of liberal and moderate elements, demanded that the Duma be given more power in order to restore the confidence of the country in the government, the Tsar refused and, instead, ordered the Duma dissolved. Refusing to disband, the leaders of the Duma organized a provisional executive committee. The Tsar was advised to abdicate in favor of his brother, who declined to accept the throne. As a consequence, the provisional committee of the Duma became the Provisional Government of Russia, and the Revolution became an accomplished fact. The Bolsheviks played no direct part in the "overthrow of Tsarism," for all their leaders were either in exile or were imprisoned in Siberia, although they were soon allowed to return to the capital by the political amnesty issued by the Provisional Government.

During the first days of the Revolution, local revolutionary councils, or soviets, sprang up all

over Russia, in villages, towns, and in the armed forces. Unlike the soviets of 1905, which were restricted to the workers, those of 1917 also included soldiers and peasants, and accurately reflected the revolutionary mood of the country. The most significant of the soviets was the Petrograd Soviet, controlled by the moderate Left. (St. Petersburg, the Imperial capital, was renamed Petrograd in 1914; after Lenin's death in 1924, it was renamed Leningrad; and the Bolsheviks re-established Moscow as the capital of Russia in 1918.) From the very beginning, the Petrograd Soviet proved to be a formidable rival to the Provisional Government, an essentially middle-class regime whose goal was political reform and a constitutional monarchy rather than the profound social and economic changes and the creation of a republic demanded by the Soviet. The immediate consequence was dual power, a dyarchy in which political power was divided between a legal Provisional Government and a spontaneous representative institution, the Soviet. The Provisional Government actually enjoyed little popular support, and in an endeavor to eliminate the awkward dyarchy, it invited Alexander Kerensky of the Petrograd Soviet to join the Government as Minister of Justice.

Although the Soviet voted confidence in the Provisional Government, Lenin's return to Russia in April produced an explosive crisis. Lenin issued his famous April Theses, in which he denounced the Provisional Government, calling for its overthrow and the immediate transformation of the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" into a "proletarian" revolt. His defiance caused great consternation among the other revolutionary parties and even among his own followers in the capital, including Stalin, who had been supporting the Provisional Government in *Pravda*, the Bolshevik newspaper. Lenin demanded immediate land reforms, and Russia's withdrawal from the "imperialist" war. "Land, Peace, and Bread" became his social program, and "All Power to the Soviets" his political objective. Lenin recognized in the

soviets the future institutions and organs of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and exhorted the Bolsheviks to infiltrate and win them over.

The Bolshevik program of land for the peasant, bread for the worker, and peace for the soldier hit a responsive chord in the masses. The Provisional Government's determination to carry on the war, while popular with Russia's allies, was becoming increasingly unpopular at home. Its ambiguous position on land reform also earned it the distrust of the peasants, who were already seizing the property of the landlords and wanted their expropriations legalized. By July, Kerensky had become Minister of War in the Provisional Government; the influence of the Octobrists had vanished, while that of the Constitutional Democrats was waning. Clearly, the program of moderate, constitutional reform was too little and too late. With the installation of Kerensky as Prime Minister, the Provisional Government faced the increasing discontent of the soviets.

The Bolsheviks stepped up their activities, encouraging the soldiers to desert, the workers to strike, and the peasants to expropriate land. In July, Lenin was indirectly implicated in an attempted revolt by unruly and hungry soldiers and workers in Petrograd, and an order went out for his arrest. He fled to Finland and temporarily directed operations from there. The Bolshevik strategy was to use the Soviets, which came increasingly under their control, to dislodge the Provisional Government. The doom of the Kerensky Government was sealed in August, when his army commander, General Kornilov, demanded that the Soviets be abolished, and attempted to overthrow the government in favor of a Right-wing dictatorship. Kerensky had few reliable troops at his disposal and was compelled to ask Lenin's Red Guards to aid him in suppressing the military coup. Once the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets passed to the Bolsheviks, Lenin knew that the time was rapidly approaching when the Bolsheviks could make an open bid for power.

On the night of November 6-7,⁶ Lenin ordered the Red Guards to surround all government buildings and arrest the members of the Provisional Government. The Provisional Government was dissolved, and Lenin proclaimed that all power had passed to the Soviet and its Central Executive Committee. A Council of People's Commissars, with Lenin as Chairman, Trotsky as Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and Stalin as Commissar of Nationalities, was established, and the Soviet Republic was born. Only the Left wing of the Social Revolutionary Party supported the Bolsheviks. The elections for a Constituent Assembly took place in the following month. Of the 808 deputies elected in Russia's only democratically organized election, the Bolsheviks had only 168 members. In January, 1918, they disbanded it!

The Bolsheviks, contrary to official mythology, did not displace an oppressive Tsardom but a democratic regime that had allowed the greatest amount of political and civil liberty in the entire history of Russia during its brief period of existence. By postponing reform, the Provisional Government lost the support of the masses, and it lost the confidence of the Russian nationalists and the army through its inability to prosecute the war successfully. The only realistic alternatives to the Kerensky Government appeared to be either a dictatorship of the Right or the Left. The Right made its bid for power in August and lost; the Bolsheviks succeeded two months later. There seemed to be no middle ground between the Rightists, who promised despotism and order, and the Bolsheviks, who promised despotism and social justice. No strong liberal middle class had developed in Russia.

⁶At the time, Russia was using the old Julian Calendar which differed by 13 days from the present one. Thus the Bolshevik Revolution occurred on October 24-25 of the old calendar (Old Style) and on November 6-7 of the new (New Style). Similarly, the first Revolution of 1917 took place in either February or March, depending on the calendar employed.

III

The Foundations of Soviet Politics

The Soviet Union, like the Tsarist Empire it superseded, is the largest intercontinental state in the world. Sprawling across two continents, Russia embraces the eastern half of Europe and nearly the entire northern half of Asia. Within the boundaries of some 8,500,000 square miles (approximately one-sixth of the total land surface of the earth) are to be found more than 230,000,000 people, representing more than 100 different racial, ethnic, national, and linguistic groups, which range from the most advanced level to the most primitive nomadic tribes. At its widest point, the Soviet Union stretches some 6,000 miles around the Northern Hemisphere, or about twice the distance from New York to San Francisco, while from north to south the maximum points are about 3,000 miles apart. More than a dozen states (including Japan) border on the Soviet Union, whose frontier is the longest and most exposed of that of any state, totaling nearly 38,000 miles in extent.

Inside the Soviet Union are to be found an extraordinary diversity and range of climates, land features, and natural resources, more variegated than those of any other state in the world. In many ways, the Soviet Union is a microcosm of the world.

ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS

Natural Resources

Russia is one of the richest countries in the world in natural resources and is considered second only to the United States in natural potential; new finds of mineral deposits are discovered virtually every year, and it is not inconceivable that she may soon exceed the United States in known deposits of strategic minerals. Russia possesses deposits of almost every important mineral, and, like the United

States, is practically self-sufficient in the production of food.

According to a report submitted to the American government in October, 1960, "Russia has nearly twice the conventional energy sources of the entire free world, without considering recent oil discoveries in the Soviet Union."¹ Imperial Russia's known coal deposits amounted to only 3% of the world's total, but today the U.S.S.R. claims 57% of the world's coal deposits and 60% of its peat. Recent oil discoveries raise Russia's share of known oil reserves from 55% to nearly two-thirds of the world's reserves. She also claims 28% of the world's water power and one-third of its timber.

Russia's reserves of minerals and chemicals are no less impressive. Pre-Revolutionary Russia's iron-ore deposits amounted to less than 4% of the world's total, but today she claims 53.5%, more than the rest of the world combined and three times as much as the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany together. She claims no less than 88% of the world's manganese, 54% of its potassium salts, and 30% of its phosphates, and claims to be first in the known reserves of copper, lead, zinc, nickel, bauxite, tungsten, mercury, and sulphur. The only major resources that she lacks in quantity are tin and natural rubber. Russia's vast resources have enabled her to achieve second place only to the United States in the production of steel, pig-iron, coal, and oil. (Since geological explorations continue on a massive scale, these statistics are subject to constant revision upwards.) And, about 25% of the Soviet territory still remains geologically unexplored, and nearly 250 million acres of rich black soil remains to be taken advantage of.

As Soviet resources are converted into production items, the entire political and economic balance of power in the world may be fundamentally altered. Already, the Soviet Union has invaded the world oil market, backed

by her tremendous reserves and accelerated production (3 million barrels per day in 1960, exceeded only by that of the United States), and undersells the prevailing market price by from 20 to 30%. From shipments of only 35,000 barrels a day in 1953, the Soviets exported at the rate of 500,000 barrels per day in 1961.² While the Soviets produced 140 million tons of oil in 1960, by 1966, they produced 243 million tons.³

Industrial Growth and Power

The foundation of modern national power is industrialization, a fact which Joseph Stalin, the architect of Russia's modern power, recognized at an early date. In 1928, soon after he established his control over the Soviet state, Stalin introduced an ambitious Five Year Plan designed both to socialize and industrialize Russia in order to secure national strength and to provide a strong base from which the ideological goals of world Communism could be pursued.

The first of the three pre-war Five Year Plans was supposed to concentrate on heavy industry, the second (1933-38) on consolidating the gains of the first, and emphasizing quality, while the third (1939-44) was to shift over to light industry and the production of consumer goods. The rise of Hitler in Germany, and the designs of Japan in the Far East, however, forced Stalin to alter this program of industrialization in favor of accelerating the expansion of heavy industry and increasing the military capacity of the Soviet Union. The third plan was disrupted by World War II and was never completed. After the war, Stalin inaugurated a new series of three Five Year Plans designed, respectively, to repair the war devastation and restore the country to a sound state, to overtake the advanced industrial states of Western Eu-

¹*The New York Times*, January 22, 1961.

²*The New York Times*, January 13 and 22, 1961.

³*Pravda*, February 20, 1966.

rope, and to close the gap between the Soviet Union and the United States.

By 1951, the Soviet Union had fully recovered from the destruction of the war and had already developed an atomic bomb and was on the verge of producing the H-bomb. Although Soviet recovery was hastened by the \$10 billion in reparations exacted from Germany, and by her exploitation of the satellite states of Eastern Europe, the recovery was largely dependent on her own resources. The rapid post-war recovery of the Soviet economy is even more remarkable in light of the damages suffered not only by the economy during the war but by the population as well. The Germans occupied fully half of European Russia, including some of her most important industrial centers and food-producing regions. Judging from the 1959 census (the

first in 20 years), the Soviet Union lost more than 25 million killed, plus the 20 million or so who were not born as a result of the deaths and dislocations of the war. These war losses were concealed by Stalin to prevent the exposure of Soviet weakness to the outside world.

Only in 1961 did the Soviet government permit the publication of statistics showing the magnitude of the damage to Russia by the war (see Table 3-1). By 1942, the second year of the war, industrial production dropped to a level about equal to that of 1928-32. Steel production dropped from 18,300,000 metric tons to 8 million though by 1944 it rose again to nearly 11 million. The production of iron ore, as vital as steel in modern war, dropped from about 30 million metric tons in 1940 to 22 million in 1942, and to little more than 18

TABLE 3-1
Indexes of Basic Industrial Production in the U.S.S.R.,
1913-1970 (In millions of tons)

Item	1913	1928	1940	War years	1950	1955	1959	1965	1970 (planned)
Steel	4.2	4.3	18.3	8.0	27.3	45.3	60.0	91	124-129
Pig iron	4.2	3.3	14.9	—	19.2	33.3	43.0	66	94-97
Iron ore	9.2	6.1	29.9	18.0	39.7	71.9	95.0	153.4	—
Rolled steel	3.5	3.4	13.1	—	20.9	35.3	49.0	70.9	95-99
Coke	4.4	4.2	21.1	—	27.7	43.6	56	67.5	—
Coal	29.1	35.5	165.9	75.0	261.1	391.3	507.0	578	665-675
Oil	9.2	11.6	31.1	—	37.9	70.8	129.6	243	345-355
Gas*	17.0	336.0	3,392.0	—	6,181.0	10,356.0	37,200.0	129,200.0	840-850,000
Peat	1.7	5.3	33.2	—	36.0	50.8	60.5	46	—
Electricity*	1.9	5.0	48.3	—	91.2	170.2	265.0	507	840-850
Cement	1.3	1.8	55.7	—	10.2	22.5	38.8	72.4	100-105
Machine tools (1,000 units)	1.5	2.8	63.1	—	79.6	136.5	175.8	219.4	270-280
Gross nat'l prod.*									
Total					124	174	226	333*	425*
Per capita					688	889	1,081	1,418*	1,750*

Source: *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo S.S.S.R. v 1965 Godu* (Moscow, 1966). *Pravda*, February 20, 1966.

*Millions of cubic meters.

*Billions of KWH.

*Total in billions of dollars, per capita, in dollars.

*1966 (*New York Times Magazine*, March 19, 1967).

*Projected.

million in 1943–44. Coal production was also cut in half, from 166 million tons to 75, although by 1944 it climbed back up to more than 121 million.⁴

The losses in agriculture were equally severe. Only 60% of the area sown in 1940 was planted in 1942, while livestock suffered a sharp decline in numbers. Pigs were reduced from 27.5 million in 1941 to a low of 5.6 million in 1944; horses from 21 million to less than 8 million; cows from nearly 28 million to less than 14 million in 1943, to 16.5 million in 1944. The number of sheep and goats declined from 91.6 million to a low of 62 million in 1943, while cattle dropped from 54.5 million to a low of 28.4 million in 1943. In view of these admissions, the \$11 billion of lendlease aid that had been given to the U.S.S.R. by the United States may well have provided the margin of survival.

By the time of Stalin's death, however, in March, 1953, the Soviet Union was well on the road to becoming the second industrial power in the world, and (for a time, at least, if not from time to time) the first in space and rocket technology. In 1946, Stalin announced what in retrospect appeared to be modest industrial goals to be achieved by 1961. Steel production was aimed at 60 million tons, pig-iron at 50 million, oil at 60 million, and coal at 500 million. These projections were ridiculed by many foreign observers as ambitious and unrealistic, designed primarily for propaganda purposes. Yet some of these goals were *exceeded* by 1960: steel production, for instance, was 71.5 million tons. And by only 1959, oil production in the Soviet Union reached 129 million tons, and coal production totaled 507 million tons.

The growth of the national power of the Soviet Union is systematically planned. The equilibrium between production for national power and private consumption is tightly controlled and manipulated by the state. Under

Stalin, the public sector of the economy was developed at the expense of the private sector. Consequently, the Soviet standard of living lagged far behind the rate of technological advance. Since the death of Stalin, his successors have devoted more attention to raising the standard of living, although it remains a poor second to the country's capital investment in national power.

Although the total production of goods and services in the United States is more than two times that of the Soviet Union, a substantial proportion is devoted to private consumption, while the amount devoted to maintaining and enhancing national power is only about equal to that of the Soviet Union in absolute terms, and in some key areas has been less. Since 1961, however, the proportion devoted to national power and public services has been considerably increased.

The standard of living in the Soviet Union had thus been deliberately depressed in favor of other priorities set by the regime. Since Stalin's death, however, successive Soviet leaders—Malenkov, Khrushchev, and the Brezhnev-Kosygin team—have promised the Soviet public to alter the priorities in favor of producing consumer goods, though somehow this promise has always been at least partially subverted by the continued priority for defense requirements. During the Khrushchev decade (1955–65), the Soviet standard of living experienced a substantial rise, but not at the tempo of his exaggerated promise (made at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961) to outstrip the United States by 1975; although consumer-goods production increased, real wages for factory and office workers were increased, medical and educational facilities were expanded, the work week was reduced to 41 hours, and the income of collective farmers was raised, since all of this was not accompanied by a parallel increase in productive efficiency, the Soviet economy developed unevenly, and its rate of productive growth actually *dropped*—by

⁴*The New York Times*, January 2, 1961.

1963, from about 9% to between 3 and 4% annually (However, in the heavy industry sector the 1965 targets of Khrushchev's Seven Year Plan were in many cases achieved.)

Khrushchev's diplomatic failure during the Berlin crisis of 1961; his retreat from Cuba in October, 1962; his demoralizing reorganization of the Communist Party in the same year; the growing dispute with China, his mismanagement of the economy; the agricultural failures of 1963; and his tendency to ignore the Central Committee, culminated in his sudden removal in October, 1964. The ills of the Soviet economy were frankly conceded by Brezhnev in March, 1966.

In recent years such negative features have become manifest as reduced growth-rates in production and in the productivity of labor, lower efficiency in the use of fixed assets and investments . . . The Central Committee C.P.S.U. analyzed the state of affairs in the economy after the October (1964) Plenum, and laid bare the causes of these negative manifestations and indicated ways of overcoming them. Defects in management and planning, the underestimation of the methods of running the economy at a profit, and the underuse of material and moral stimuli, all contributed to the lowering of economic growth rates. The forms and methods of management, planning, and the use of economic stimuli, were not in accordance with the new, higher level of the country's productive forces, and had begun to check their development.

At the same time, however, he promised the patient Soviet consumer that the new regime was even more dedicated to his immediate needs than was Khrushchev:

For that reason, while the preceding 5-year period group A (heavy industry) was increased by 58 percent and group B (consumer and light industry) by 36 percent, in the next five years we plan a 49-52 percent increase in the production of the means of production and a 43-46 percent increase in the output of consumer goods.³

³*Pravda*, March 30, 1966.

Foreign travelers to the Soviet Union consistently report a steady though modest rise in the Soviet standard of living every year, and this increase will continue to be steady and modest. The Soviet leaders no longer boast about how soon they will catch up with and surpass the United States in productivity. In absolute terms, however, Soviet industrial growth remains impressive. On the eve of World War II, the industrial output of the Soviet Union accounted for but 10% of the world's total, whereas in 1965, with only 7% of the world's population, the industrial output of the U.S.S.R. accounted for 20% of it.

Agriculture and Food Production

Soviet and non-Soviet observers universally agree that agriculture constitutes the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy. An adequate food supply is just as vital as industrial production in contributing to national power, but agricultural production is not as susceptible to rational planning and control as is industrial production.

The weaknesses of Soviet agriculture are not all due to the vagaries of the climate. The very process of rapid industrialization and urbanization within the span of a single generation was bound to dislocate the equilibrium between town and country life. Top priority was given to industrialization, in accordance with Marxist principles, at the expense of agriculture and the peasants if necessary. Badly needed factory workers were drawn from the farms. Since the Soviet regime could not secure financial assistance from the capitalist countries in the form of loans or gifts, it had to rely on agricultural exports to accumulate enough capital to import foreign machinery and technicians to start the industrialization of Russia. The diminishing labor supply in the countryside and the drain of agricultural exports reduced the country's food supply to below the subsistence level.

Stalin was thus confronted with a dilemma of

serious proportions, a dilemma that inevitably confronts every underdeveloped country wishing to industrialize rapidly. How to resolve it is one of the supreme political problems of the modern age. Stalin's method of increasing agricultural production consisted of three parts: collectivization, mechanization, and political control. Collectivizing the farms satisfied both the Marxist demand for the socialization of agriculture and the demands of efficiency, for small individual farms were replaced by large state-supervised collective farms. Mechanization of farm equipment helped compensate for the reduced labor supply, and the state's retention of the ownership of the land and agricultural machines, together with its exclusive power to set agricultural prices and buy agricultural commodities, insured that the peasants would remain under the thumb of the government.

The net result of Stalin's program was a disaster for rural Russia. The Kulaks (the wealthy peasants) ferociously resisted collectivization; they burned their crops, slaughtered their livestock, and destroyed their implements rather than surrender them to the state. The food supply diminished catastrophically. The disaster was magnified by the world-wide economic depression which knocked the bottom out of the market prices for agricultural commodities, causing the Soviets to export more for less return. During the height of the crisis, a severe drought hit the Ukraine, which further reduced agricultural production. Famine stalked rural Russia as millions died of starvation, and vast numbers of Kulaks were "liquidated."

Rural Russia has never fully recovered, and Soviet agricultural production has only recently exceeded the production registered in 1916. Per capita production for the total population is still not much better than nearly 50 years ago, and lags considerably behind that of the United States. The number of livestock, in particular, dropped tremendously, and only after 1950

did the Soviet Union manage to reach the figures of 1916.

The Soviet government has endeavored to raise agricultural production through the more intensive use of existing farm lands and by an expansion of the acreage under cultivation. In attempting to get more productive use of present farm lands, the Soviet government has steadily enhanced the mechanization of agriculture, fostered greater scientific research, and increased the production of fertilizer, even copying some techniques from the United States.

The most ambitious attempt to expand the area under cultivation has been underway since 1955, when Khrushchev inaugurated the so-called "virgin lands" project whereby enormous tracts of uncultivated lands in western Siberia and the Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan were plowed up and planted. The program involves enormous risks, because the climate on these plains is so unpredictable. A large amount of capital has been invested in the program, and energetic efforts and inducements have been made to get farmers to settle in the new lands. Every year hundreds of thousands of Komsomols (members of the Communist youth organization) and university students "volunteer" to spend a year or two working in the area. Life is very hard, and even the modest amenities of ordinary Soviet life are largely absent in the great tent cities that have been erected on the Central Asian steppes.

The "virgin lands" program has undoubtedly increased the total production of grain, but whether on balance it has been worth the effort and cost is still debatable. Three crops years out of the first five were adjudged failures, and the careers of important Communist Party and government officials have suffered with each failure.

The most conspicuous political victim of the near-disasterous crop failures of 1963-65 was Chairman Khrushchev, who prided himself on being an agricultural expert. One by one, his

short-cut attempts to increase Soviet agricultural production failed, and in 1963 the Soviet government was forced to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in scarce gold and hard currency to purchase grain from the United States and other "capitalist" countries to satisfy the needs of its own population and to meet its commitments to some underdeveloped countries. Agriculture was thus the most glaring failure: not only did it fall considerably below the target goals of the plan, but its rate of growth was even less than in the preceding five years.

Khrushchev, of course, was blamed for the failures which, according to Brezhnev, resulted from neglecting the role of material incentives for the farmers, who were often paid less for their commodities than their actual cost of production; serious shortcomings in procurement procedures, insufficient investment of funds and material and technical resources. Brezhnev and Kosygin introduced new procurement procedures, increased state prices for agricultural commodities, lowered prices of manufactured goods to conform with prices charged in the urban areas, and gave the collective farmers a guaranteed annual income. Although the Soviet Union experienced a severe drought in 1965, there was some improvement as a consequence of the reforms. The new 1966-70 plan called for an increase of 25% in overall agricultural output over the previous five-year period, with grain slated for a 30% increase. In 1966, with the cooperation of the weather, the Soviet Union harvested a bumper crop—the largest in its history by far (171 million tons). Meat, milk, and egg production also went up, but whether good fortune will continue to smile on Soviet agriculture remains as uncertain as ever. The abandonment of some of the unproductive virgin lands, the increase in income for the farmers, greater investment, and the expansion of fertilizer production all will have a beneficial impact on Soviet agricultural production.

POPULATION

A nation's demographic configuration reveals a great deal about its power and potential. If we examine the size and growth of the Soviet population, its territorial distribution, sex and age, skills, talents and literacy rates, social composition, and finally its ethnic diversity, we will learn much about the current capabilities as well as the future prospects of the U.S.S.R.

At the outset, perhaps we should outline the general profile of the present Soviet population. As a result of World War II, today there are 45 million fewer citizens of the U.S.S.R. than there might have been had there been no war. Whereas before the war the population of Russia was 46% larger than that of the United States, presently it is only 18% larger. During the entire era from 1914 to 1960, Russia's population rose from 159 million to 209 million, an increase of only 50 million. During this same period, the population of the United States shot upward from 92 million (census of 1910) to 180 million (census of 1960). World War II left the Soviet Union with 20 million more women than men (the most unbalanced ratio of any country save East Germany), and this has resulted in social, economic, and military problems of an acute character. The age structure of Russia's population was also drastically affected. In the United States, the war produced a "boom" in babies, but the precise opposite took place in Russia, which, consequently, faces a diminished supply of workers and soldiers during the years of the immediate future.

Because of advances in science, medicine, and sanitation, the life expectancy of the Soviet citizen has increased to the point where it equals that of the United States and is one of the highest in the world. Much of Russia's rapid

growth in population up to 1960 was thus due to the declining death-rate. But this means that the future population of Russia will show a higher proportion of old people. The Soviet birthrate, in the meantime, has declined sharply since 1959, dropping from 25 per thousand to about 18 in 1966. Industrialization has brought about a revolution in the urban-rural ratio of the Soviet population. Today, 54% of Russia's population is urbanized (that is, lives in towns with over 3,000 population), and the Soviet educational effort has transformed a nation of illiterates into one of the most literate countries in the world. The Soviet Union now has virtually 100% literacy, and all children attend school.

Besides the population movement from country to town, there has been a corresponding movement of population eastward. The overall population increase from 1939 to 1959 was only 9.5%, but all the regions east of the Urals registered increases of more than 30%, with the Soviet Far East showing a high of 70%. Some of the western border regions, however, have actually decreased in population, owing both to the war and migrations eastward. One result of this movement eastward has been the spread of the Slavic nationalities among the non-Slavic populations of Central Asia. In the Kazakh Republic, according to the census of 1959, the Kazakhs have been reduced to a minority in their own Republic.

Perhaps the most unique characteristic of the Soviet population is its ethnic diversity. The people of the Soviet Union remain divided among more than 100 different nationalities, of which the Great Russians account for more than half the total. The language and literacy data of the 1959 census reveal two important modifications of the ethnic situation in the Soviet Union. The first is the increasing "russification" of many of the smaller non-Russian nationalities; the second is the virtual establishment of Russian as a second spoken language for all

non-Russians. An impressive number of small non-Russian nationalities had more than 50% of their members list Russian as their mother tongue. The compulsory teaching of Russian in all non-Russian schools has resulted in a bilingual population, virtually all of whom speak and read Russian in addition to their native language. The Soviet population, in spite of its ethnic diversity, is thus a far more homogenized population than it was some two decades ago.

Size and Growth

For all practical purposes, the Soviet Union and the United States are in the same population class, both being considerably overshadowed by two demographic giants, China and India. Since the gap between the population of the U.S.S.R. and that of the United States has decreased over the past decades, the competitive struggle and rivalry between the two countries will increasingly turn on which country most effectively marshals and mobilizes its human and natural resources. The population of the United States is not expected to reach the current Soviet size before 1970. With immigration into the United States practically at a standstill, the U.S. must now rely on natural increases to replenish its demographic resources.

According to current official estimates, the population of the United States in 1966 was approximately 196 million, while that of the Soviet Union was 233 million (Table 3-2). In 1957, the rate of natural increase for the United States was 15.7 per thousand per year, as compared with 17.5 per thousand for Russia. When compared with the 1940 rates of 8.6 and 13.4, respectively, we see the remarkable advance chalked up by the United States. The Soviet increases were caused by a rapid decline in the death rate and a slight decline in the birth rate; the increases for the United States according to

TABLE 3-2

Population Growth of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., 1913-1966 (In millions)

	1913	1920	1926	1930	1940	1950	1960	1966	Overall rate of increase	(Projected) 1975
U.S.	96 ^a	106		123	132	151	180	196	104%	213-225
U.S.S.R.	159		147 ^b		191	179 ^c	209	233	47%	247-259

^aInterpolated from 1910 and 1920 census returns^bApplies to Soviet boundaries existing before September, 1939^cEstimated

an authoritative source resulted not only from a declining death-rate but from a 30% spurt in birth rates.⁶

Age and Sex

The ratio of men to women in the Soviet population has steadily decreased since World War I. In 1926, the number of males per 100 women was 93.4; in 1939, 91.9; and, according to the 1959 census, the percentage has dropped to 81.9. During the same period, the number of males per 100 females in the United States declined from a small surplus of 103.1 to a small deficit of 98. The lack of men in Russia deprives about 21 million women of husbands and children and forces many women into heavy manual labor and other unskilled work, a situation that often shocks Western observers.

Equally if not more serious is the aging of the Soviet population (Table 3-3). Note that the number of people over 70 in 1959 was 179% of that in 1939, the sharpest increase of any age group.

Distribution

The population of neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is distributed equally throughout the country. In the United

States, the bulk of the population is found east of the Mississippi, in the U.S.S.R., the overwhelming proportion of the population is west of the Urals. In both countries, there has been a steady movement of people from the more densely populated areas to those that are relatively sparse in people. Vast stretches of territory remain virtually unpopulated in both countries. Much of Soviet Asia is inhospitable and incapable of supporting large populations.

Excluding the ancient settled regions of

TABLE 3-3

Age Structure of the Soviet Population, 1939 and 1959

Age	(Number of people in millions)		Percentage of total		1959 percentage of 1939
	1939	1959	1939	1959	
0-9	43,476	46,363	22.8%	22.2%	107%
10-15	28,365	17,133	14.9	8.2	60
16-19	13,030	14,675	6.8	7.0	113
20-24	15,786	20,343	8.3	9.7	129
25-29	18,520	18,190	9.7	8.7	98
30-34	15,598	18,999	8.2	9.1	122
35-39	12,958	11,590	6.8	5.6	89
40-44	9,603	10,408	5.0	5.0	108
45-49	7,776	12,264	4.1	5.9	158
50-59	12,533	19,146	6.6	9.2	153
60-69	8,535	11,736	4.5	5.6	137
Over 70	4,462	7,972	2.3	3.8	179

Source: Narodnoye khozyaystvo S.S.S.R. v 1959 Godu

⁶See Joint Economic Committee Studies, Vol. 1, pp. 31-94

Central Asia, Russia east of the Urals, including Kazakhstan, around the turn of the century contained a little more than 8 million people. By 1926, it had more than doubled to 17.4 million. In 1939, it had risen to 22.7 million, and, according to the latest census (1959), the total population of Siberia and Kazakhstan is now approximately 34 million. These increases are almost all due to the migrations from the western regions of Russia.

Since the Revolution, the Soviet government has sedulously planned the movement of the population eastward, for essentially three reasons: (1) to increase the proportion of European Slavs in Soviet Asia and thus to reduce the possibility that the non-Russian groups in Asia would defect; (2) to more effectively tap the rich natural resources of the region; (3) to protect Soviet Asia against the ambitions of a predatory Japan and against the possibility of population pressures from China. Much of the Soviet Far East was once a nominal part of China, which lost its hold on the area largely because of the activities of various Russian adventurers, beginning in the seventeenth century and continuing down into the nineteenth.

Russian population movements eastward have, by-and-large, not been voluntary. A substantial part of the shift has resulted from forcible deportations. During the Stalinist era, millions of Russian and Ukrainian peasants were deported to Central Asia and the Soviet Far East, and millions were herded into vast concentration camps. When released, most of the ex-prisoners were obliged to remain in the area, or found it convenient to begin life anew in Russia's Asian provinces.

Since Stalin's death, most of the slave-labor camps in the Soviet Union have been disbanded, and compulsory emigration to Soviet Asia has been stopped. Now the government is inducing people to move eastward, especially to the "virgin lands" of the Kazakh Republic and western Siberia, by offering them long-term

financial support on generous terms, large and potentially fertile farm lands, wage bonuses, and other rewards.

In spite of these impressive attempts to spread Soviet population to the east, nearly 70% of Russia's population is still found west of the Urals. Soviet Asia, with 75% of the land area of the Soviet Union, supports only about 25% of the population, or 56 million people (compared with only 14 million in 1897). The Soviet government intends to continue the migration eastward, and the current Seven Year Plan allocates substantial capital investments for the development of Soviet Asia, which also reflects the government's anxiety about Communist China's possible desires on the scantily populated regions of the Soviet Union bordering on her territory.

URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION. More dramatic than the movement of the Soviet population from west to east has been the shift of people from country to town. In 1926, the total urban population of the country was only 26 million, which by 1939 had grown to more than 60 million (Table 3-4). In 1966, the urban population of Russia amounted to nearly 25 million, or 54 per cent of the population. Urbanization has taken place throughout the country, but in the Asian regions, it has increased by more than 100%. The Soviet Far East and some of the Central Asian Republics have registered increases of 150%, as against an average of 30% for the western areas.

Between 1939 and 1959, 503 new cities and 1,354 new urban-type settlements were created. As an indication of the continuing character of Soviet urbanization, 153 cities and 478 urban-type settlements came into being during the seven years between 1959 and 1966. Today, the Soviet Union has a larger number of cities with a population of 50,000 or more than has the United States. Of cities with populations in excess of 500,000 in 1960, the U.S.S.R. had 25

TABLE 3-4
Urban Growth in the U.S.S.R., 1926-1966

Settlements	1926	1939	1941	1951	1956	1959	1966
Cities	709	923	1,241	1,451	1,566	1,679	1,832
Urban-type settlements	1,216	1,450	1,711	2,320	2,423	2,940	3,418
Cities							
(50,000-100,000)	60	94	—	—	138	156	183
(100,000-500,000)	28	71	—	—	113	123	162
(Over 500,000)	3	11	—	—	22	25	30
Total urban population	26,300,000	60,400,000	60,600,000	71,400,000	86,600,000	99,778,000	124,749,000

*Sources: *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo* • 1959 Goda • 1965 Goda

(up to 30 in 1966), while the United States had only 21. The United States leads in super-cities, however; we have five with 2 million inhabitants or more to Russia's two, Moscow and Leningrad. It should be emphasized that the Soviet government has, by law and administrative action, prevented the development of overcrowded and swollen city populations. Moscow today has more than 6 million people, Leningrad a little more than 3.5 million, followed by six other cities, including Kiev and Baku, with over 1 million each.

Thus, while the increase in population from 1939 to 1966 was about 23 per cent, the urban population during the same period more than doubled. Between 1926 and 1959, villages of mud huts and straw-covered houses were transformed into modern towns, and the empty plains and valleys of Soviet Asia saw the erection of giant new cities, whose populations were busily exploiting the natural resources of Siberia. Imposing industrial centers like Karamay (490,000) and Magnitogorsk (352,000) did not even exist before 1926.

Although the image of the Soviet Union as a vast land populated by peasants has long been outdated, the rural population of Russia still accounts for 46% of the population, or about 108 million people.

Ethnic Composition and Distribution

Like Imperial Russia before it, the Soviet Union is a country of many nationalities and tribal groups who speak a variety of languages and dialects. The 1959 census tabulates more than 100 nationalities, tribes, and linguistic groups. This ethnic heterogeneity renders any purely quantitative analysis of Soviet population based on size, growth, territorial distribution, age structure, sex ratios, etc., grossly misleading unless it is accompanied by an ethnic analysis as well.

The Great Russians occupy the continental interior of Eurasia, and they are fringed on all sides by a belt of non-Russian nationalities that forms a buffer around the borders of the Soviet Union. Most of the Baltic coast is inhabited by Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, while the Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and Moldavians occupy the territories bordering Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. In the Caucasus, the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaidzhani Turks inhabit the regions next to Turkey and Iran. In Central Asia, the Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kirgiz live in the border areas adjacent to Iran, Afghanistan, and the Sinkiang Province of China, and a multitude of Turkic,

Mongol, and Tungusic tribes occupy the border regions near Outer Mongolia. Only in the Soviet Far East do Great Russians inhabit territories adjacent to the international frontiers of the U.S.S.R., and this is a region remote from the heartland of the Russian nation.

Of the more than 100 nationalities enumerated in the 1959 census, 22 number more than 900,000 each, and these account for 95% of the total population (Table 3-5). The other 80 nationalities amount to less than 10 million.

TABLE 3-5
*Major Nationalities of the U.S.S.R., 1939
and 1959*

Nationality	1939	1959
Russians	99,019,000	114,500,000
Ukrainians	28,070,000	36,981,000
Byelorussians	5,267,431	7,829,000
Uzbeks	4,844,021	6,004,000
Tatars	4,300,000	4,969,000
Kazakhs	3,098,000	3,581,000
Azerbaidzhanis	2,274,805	2,929,000
Armenians	2,151,884	2,787,000
Georgians	2,248,566	2,650,000
Lithuanians	—	2,326,000
Jews	3,020,141	2,268,000
Moldavians	—	2,214,000
Germans	1,423,534	1,619,000
Chuvash	1,367,930	1,470,000
Latvians	—	1,400,000
Tadzhiks	1,928,964	1,397,000
Poles	626,905	1,380,000
Mordvins	1,451,429	1,285,000
Turkmen	811,769	1,004,000
Bashkirs	842,925	983,000
Kirgiz	884,306	974,000
Estonians	—	969,000

Source: *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo . . . v 1959 Godu.*

The demographic contours of the Soviet population thus vary widely from one ethnic group to another, and this unevenness is of fundamental significance in assessing Soviet power and political behavior. The mosaic of nationalities in Russia has had, and continues to have,

an important impact on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, its internal constitutional structure and political processes, and its social and cultural development. The geographical balance and distribution of the Russian versus the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union is thus of crucial importance. The Great Russians occupy the continental interior of Eurasia, and they are fringed on all sides with a virtually uninterrupted belt of non-Russian nationalities who form a buffer separating the Russian inhabited territories from the international borders of the Soviet Union. Because of the strategic location of the border nationalities, the loyalty and reliability of these nationalities to Moscow and their relationship to the Russian people have always been a vital factor in Russian and Soviet security considerations. The failure of the Tsars to earn the loyalty of the non-Russian nationalities contributed significantly to the military inefficiency of Russia during World War I, and their dissatisfaction under Tsarist rule contributed materially to the Revolution, while Bolshevik promises of national self-determination was an important factor in Lenin's successful seizure and preservation of power. The nature and intensity of the loyalty and political reliability of the various nationalities of the Soviet Union vary from nationality to nationality, with the Russians—as would be expected—being the most intensely loyal and patriotic. During the war, Stalin retaliated against five of the very small nationalities by dissolving their autonomous Republics and deporting their populations to Siberia, on grounds that they went over to the Germans. This action was denounced by Khrushchev in 1956, and their Republics have since been revived and their populations relocated.

The numerical balance between the Slavic and non-Slavic nationalities in the Soviet Union is shifting in favor of the latter in terms of natural increases of births over deaths, for behind the overall Soviet average birthrate, it should be noted that birthrates in Central Asia

and the Caucasus continue to be sustained at a very high rate (over 30 per thousand), while in the Western Slavic parts of the Union, they have slipped to below 10, just barely above the death rate.

LITERACY AND EDUCATION

According to the census of 1959, the Soviet Union has achieved virtually 100% literacy, with less than 2 million people between ages 9–59 reported as being unable to read and write. This cultural revolution in Russia during the past 40 years is one of the most significant transformations achieved in the social history of any nation. "In the organization of a planned society in the U.S.S.R.," reads the 1959 report of the first United States official educational mission to the U.S.S.R., "education is regarded as one of the chief resources and techniques for achieving social, economic, cultural and scientific objectives in the national interest. . . . They are convinced that time is on their side and that through education and hard work they can win their way to world acceptance of Communist ideology."⁷ The Soviet Union has recently established eight years as the minimum schooling for children. Until a few years ago, the government was able to guarantee only a four-year education in many of the rural areas of the country.

Another feature of the Soviet educational effort merits attention: adult classes. An adult-education program, on the job and in the evening, was inaugurated soon after the Revolution to combat illiteracy. That battle having been won, its place has been taken by factory schools, correspondence courses, and evening classes, whose primary purpose is to provide opportunities for working people to learn new skills or improve old ones. It is perhaps worth noting that Nikita Khrushchev could neither read nor

write until he was over 20 years old and thus owes his rise to this adult education program of the Communist Party. In 1966, the total Soviet student enrollment in higher educational institutions was nearly 4 million, about two-thirds that in the United States but four times that of Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, and France combined. More than half of all Soviet students in institutions of higher education are enrolled in night classes or in correspondence courses (569,000 and 1,708,000, respectively).

Before the Revolution, 76% of the people were illiterate, including 88% of the women. Virtually complete illiteracy prevailed among the indigenous populations of Siberia and Soviet Central Asia. Indeed, more than 40 languages had not been reduced to writing at all. Prior to the Revolution, only 290,000 Russians possessed any kind of higher education, whereas the 1959 census reported that more than 13 million citizens had some higher or specialized secondary education, and more than 45 million people had 7–10 years of education.

Before the Revolution, 80% of the children of Russia were deprived of educational opportunities, and all instruction, with but few exceptions, was in the Russian language. Today all Soviet children must attend school, and instruction is provided in no less than 59 indigenous languages, although Russian is the universal and virtually obligatory second language. Raising the literacy rate from 24% to 98.5% within the span of a single generation for more than 200 million people would be an achievement in itself if only one language were involved, to say nothing of the severe problems posed by a multilingual society.

In 1914, only 127,000 students were enrolled in 95 institutions of higher learning; in 1966, there were nearly 3.86 million enrolled in some 756 institutions of higher education, and 3.66 million in 3,820 technicums (nonprofessional technical colleges), and other specialized secondary schools (Table 3–6). Over 50 million people were enrolled in all types of

⁷*Soviet Commitment to Education* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1959), p. 1.

TABLE 3-6

School Enrollment in the U.S.S.R., 1914-1966 (In thousands)

Schools	1914-15	1927-28	1940-41	1945-46	1956-57	1960-61	1965-66
General schools (Grades 8-11)	9,656	11,638	35,552	26,808 ^a	30,127 ^a	36,186	48,255
Technical and special secondary schools	152	170	2,571	1,091 ^a	6,136	5,121	12,688
Higher education	54	189	975	1,008	2,107	2,060	3,659
	127	169	812	730	2,001	2,396	3,861

^aLow figures represent birth-deficit years caused by World War II.

schools in 1966 as compared with less than 10 million people in the years 1914-15.

Educational institutions of every level have been established in all the Republics and in areas inhabited by other major nationalities (Table 3-7). Instruction is offered in both the native language and in Russian. The quality of these institutions varies considerably, with the venerable Universities of Moscow and Leningrad setting the highest standards of excellence in the country. Although a non-Russian can acquire a higher education in his native language, it is to his advantage to master Russian if

he wishes to enter one of the national universities, apply for the diplomatic service, or work outside his native Republic.

To detail the massive character of the Soviet educational effort in Central Asia, the Uzbek Republic, which is the most advanced of the Central Asian areas today, as it was in pre-Revolutionary Russia, provides an apt illustration. Before the Revolution, only 2% of the population was literate. There were no native engineers, doctors, or teachers with a higher education. In short, Central Asia was no different in this respect from most of the colonial dependencies of the European powers, and worse off than many.

Today, in the Uzbek Republic alone, there are 32 institutions of higher learning, more than 100 technicums, 50 special technical schools, 12 teachers' colleges, and 1,400 kindergartens. Nearly 2,500,000 children attend school, and more than 50% of its teachers have had some higher education.* In addition, the Republic has an Academy of Sciences and an Academy of Agricultural Sciences. The rate of literacy is over 95%. The Republic before the Revolution possessed no public libraries; today there are nearly 5,000. The number of books printed in the Uzbek language in 1913 was 118,000; today it approaches 19 million. When this record is compared with that of Iran, Afghanistan, the Arab countries, the states of Southeast Asia, or even Turkey, all of which were at a comparable or more advanced level of

TABLE 3-7

*Institutions of Higher Learning in the Non-Russian Republics, 1914-1966**

Republic	1914	1927	1966
Ukraine	27	39	132
Byelorussia	None	4	27
Uzbek	None	3	32
Kazakh	None	1	39
Georgia	1	6	18
Armenia	None	2	11
Azerbaijan	None	3	11
Lithuania	—	—	11
Latvia	—	—	10
Estonia	—	—	6
Moldavia	—	—	7
Tadzhik	None	None	7
Kirgiz	None	None	8
Turkmen	None	None	5

*Does not include technical or special secondary schools.
Source: *Narodnye Vuzy i Universitety* 1959 and 1960 Gdz.
and 1963 Gdz.

^a*Ibid.*, p. 3.

educational attainment in 1914, the achievement is impressive.

Not only has the Soviet government assiduously developed the human potential among the non-Russian nationalities, but it has also paid serious attention to the education and training of women. In 1960, 49% of all Soviet citizens with some higher education were women, and 53% of those with some secondary education were also women. In 1966, women accounted for 50% of all students in special secondary schools, and 44% of enrollment in higher education. Soviet women are being educated in practically all fields of science, culture, technology, and the professions in rapidly increasing numbers.

COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

One of the earliest acts of the Bolshevik regime was to abolish the private ownership of newspapers, book publishing firms, radio stations, and other mass-communications media and subject them to the control of the Soviet state. Although Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution guarantees the Soviet citizen "freedom of speech . . . press . . . assembly, including the holding of mass meetings . . . street processions and demonstrations," the exercise of these "rights" is severely limited by the constitutional admonition that these rights shall be allowed only "in conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the Socialist system." All media of public communication in the Soviet Union are thus directly or indirectly owned or controlled by agencies of the government and the Communist Party, whether they be national or local in scope.

Soviet Control of Information and Opinion

Within the framework of the Soviet system, communications media, like the educational system, are considered instruments of

indoctrination and propaganda rather than vehicles of information and recreation, and they are utilized to reshape the minds of the Soviet people into the mold of Communist ideology. All information coming from abroad is rigorously censored by the government, and information originating within the U.S.S.R. is revised to further the objectives of the system.

As the Soviet system increases in power and stability, the mass media are allowed to relax their drive for indoctrination. Ownership and control, however, remain in the hands of the state and the party, although greater latitude may be permitted individual editors and writers who can be relied on not to publish anything that would consciously injure the Soviet system. But the party remains vigilant and has the last word.

By the time of Stalin's death, the widening gap between an increasingly educated public and a communications system dedicated to propaganda and monotonous indoctrination could no longer be perpetuated without seriously damaging the Soviet system. Stalin's successors have been more lenient because they have greater confidence in the political reliability of the Soviet people and their loyalty to the system. Since 1953, publishers and journalists have been permitted a wider range of discretion, and some have produced works they knew beforehand would not be welcomed by the regime. Errant writers are no longer likely to be expelled to Siberia or executed, although they are still often subjected to harsh criticism and are asked to revise their material.

After Khrushchev's removal, ideological controls and censorship were intensified somewhat, arousing fears that the liberalization process might be reversed. Liberal writers and poets were subjected to harsh criticism, and in some cases to administrative harassment. Although they continue to travel abroad in response to invitations, it is with less certainty in the expectation of receiving permission from the authorities. On the eve of the Twenty-Third Party Congress, which was convened in March,

1966, 26 prominent Soviet intellectuals addressed a letter to the Central Committee, opposing the possible rehabilitation of Stalin at the Congress—an act which was apparently widely feared among Soviet intellectuals. The harsh sentences meted out to Sinyavsky and Daniel, two Soviet writers who published satirical accounts of Soviet society abroad under pseudonyms, also agitated the Soviet intellectual community, and appeared to many to be little more than an artless attempt to intimidate independent-minded authors. And in May, 1967, the prominent Soviet writer Solzhenitsyn (*A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*) addressed a letter to the Writers' Congress, then meeting in Moscow, in which he complained of administrative harassment and persecution, the confiscation of his manuscripts by the Secret Police, the refusal of publishing houses to publish his material, and the rejection of permission to travel abroad. He called upon the Writers' Congress to defend and protect writers against administrative restrictions, and demanded that it condemn the existing system of bureaucratic censorship for which there was no warrant in the Soviet Constitution.

Although Solzhenitsyn's letter was not published in Russia, but abroad, the Writers' Congress did come to his assistance, and his manuscripts were retrieved from the Secret Police. The situation thus remains in flux, though the general long-range trend is in the direction of greater freedom and liberalization.

Newspapers and Magazines

Newspapers and magazines are the chief printed media for the dissemination of information and propaganda in the Soviet Union. The printed word in the U.S.S.R. appears in nearly 70 different languages, 60 of them being in tongues spoken by Soviet nationalities. In 1966, nearly 8,000 newspapers were published, with a combined circulation of over 103 mil-

lion, or nearly one copy for every two Soviet citizens. Since Stalin's death, a calculated effort has been made to infuse greater liveliness and individuality into periodicals, but variety is still depressingly absent.

Of the nearly 8,000 newspapers in Russia, less than 25 are national in character, and they account for more than one-third of the total circulation. Of these, the most important and well-known are *Pravda* (the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) and *Izvestia* (the official journal of the government). *Pravda's* circulation in 1967 was listed as 7,130,000, *Izvestia's* as about 5 million. The organ of the Young Communist League, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, under the aggressive editorship of Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law, managed first to outstrip *Izvestia's* circulation and hit over 7 million in 1967.⁹ (Adzhubei later became editor of *Izvestia*, and was dismissed upon the ouster of his father-in-law.)

Every Union Republic and national ethnic group, and all large cities publish their own local newspapers. The overwhelming number of Soviet journals are local publications, including nearly 3,000 collective-farm newspapers. National, or all-Union, newspapers are essentially organs of various organizations: *Krasnaya Zvezda* is published by the Red Army, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* by the Union of Writers, *Trud* by the trade unions. *Pravda*, as we have seen, is the official organ of the Communist Party, *Izvestia* of the government. All Soviet newspapers must thus speak for some legally recognized group, since privately owned newspapers are prohibited. Dissident elements are thereby effectively deprived of any opportunity to employ the printed word. Needless to say, the policies of the state are never subject to attack except in the rare instance when the leadership is divided and various newspapers are con-

⁹Cf. Walter B. Kerr, "The House of *Pravda*," *Saturday Review*, December, 9, 1967, pp. 60-61.

TABLE 3-8

Production and Number of Radio and TV Sets in the U.S.S.R., 1940-1959 (In thousands)

Item	1928	1940	1945	1950	1955	1958	1960	1965
<i>In use</i>								
Radios	70	1,123	475	3,643	6,097	21,694	27,811	38,228
Wired speakers	22	3,853	5,589	9,685	19,544	27,000	30,800	35,638
TV sets	—	0.4	0.2	15	823	3,000	4,800	15,693
<i>Production</i>								
Radios					3,530	3,900	4,165	5,160
TV sets					496	1,000	1,726	3,655

Source: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo* * 1965 *Goda*

trolled by contending factions. Once the struggle for power is resolved, total conformity is again imposed.

Russia is a land not only of newspapers, but of periodicals as well—political, scholarly, and popular. In 1965, Soviet sources reported the publication of 3,846 periodicals (total circulation: over 1½ billion), of which about 800 were magazines, the others being bulletins, circulars, and throw-aways. Soviet magazines are published in nearly 60 languages, of which 41 are languages of Soviet nationalities. Like the newspapers, magazines in the Soviet Union are printed and published by recognized organizations and agencies.

It should be noted, and perhaps emphasized, that the only foreign newspapers and magazines sold in the Soviet Union are those published in Communist countries (except Albania and China) and by friendly Communist parties in non-Communist countries. Thus, non-Communist newspapers and magazines are not available at Soviet news outlets, and are available in libraries only by special permission. Most of the Communist states of Eastern Europe, however, allow non-Communist foreign newspapers and magazines to be sold on a restrictive basis which varies from one country to another. Thus, aside from the news available through foreign radio broadcasts, Soviet citizens remain essentially a captive audience of the regime.

Radio and Television

From the very inception of the Soviet regime, radio was envisaged as one of the most important instruments of indoctrination and propaganda. The Soviets zealously began to construct broadcasting facilities and to produce radios and distribute them to the people. They even devised a method to prevent the Soviet public from hearing foreign radio broadcasts, by creating elaborate systems of wired speakers in central meeting and assembly areas that could receive only official programs. As more people acquired their own sets, however, this system became increasingly inadequate, and the government resorted to jamming unwanted foreign broadcasts. But this was an extremely costly and often ineffective device and foreign radio broadcasts are no longer systematically jammed. The news and other programs of the B.B.C. and the Voice of America can now be tuned in by Soviet citizens without interference—although, ironically, the abusive broadcasts from Peking continue to be jammed. The number of receivers in the Soviet Union now outstrips the number of wired speakers, and in 1966 virtually every urban family had its own receiver, usually capable of receiving foreign broadcasts, which are very popular in the Soviet Union.

Television is still in an infant stage of development in Russia. As of 1966, there were more than 15 million sets in use, with 120 TV stations in operation. Television transmission is still limited to the large cities, but the government is planning a rapid expansion of television broadcasting, since not only does it offer greater political and educational possibilities than radio, but is less subject to outside intru-

sion, at least in the present state of electronic technology. Nearly 4 million TV sets were produced in 1965, and some 40 million sets are slated for production up to 1970. In March, 1965, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with France whereby the Soviets agreed to develop the French color TV system, and thus ultimately enable Soviet citizens to watch foreign TV programs.

IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL MARX

Ideological Foundations

The official ideology of the Soviet Union is called Marxism-Leninism to distinguish it from other varieties and interpretations. As a philosophical system, Marxism owes its origin not only to the great fund of accumulated Western philosophy, but more immediately to many of the currents and ideas that were prevalent in the nineteenth century. The century that produced Marx also produced Comte, Darwin, J. S. Mill, Spencer, and others, all of whom were preoccupied with the development of comprehensive theories about history and society. Marx and his group of followers imagined that just as Darwin had discovered the "laws" of evolution, Marx had discovered the "laws" governing the development of history and society.

Three ideological strands merged into Marxism. (1) German philosophical idealism, particularly that of Hegel, from whom Marx derived his dialectical method of history. (2) French revolutionary and utopian doctrines, to which Marxism owes its revolutionary militancy and its doctrine of a classless and stateless society; (3) British classical economic theory, especially that of Ricardo, from whom Marx appropriated his labor theory of value. As a comprehensive philosophy, Marxism purports to explain everything. It encompasses theories of human nature, society, history, economics, politics, ethics, esthetics, knowledge, and logic. It simultaneously seeks to explain the world (a theory of analysis or reality) and to change it in conformity with certain preconceived social norms (a normative theory or theory of utopia). Thus Marx boasted before he was 40 years old

that "the philosophers have *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point however is to *change* it."¹

The Dialectical Process

Dialectics is a process of discovering the truth (intellectual or factual) by revealing the contradictions in an opponent's argument or ideas, or in nature itself. Hegel's dialectic gave primacy to the inner conflict of ideas and their synthesis within the recurrent triadic formula of thesis (idea), antithesis (counter-idea), and synthesis (fusion of idea and counter-idea), which automatically becomes a new thesis. For Hegel, the conflict of ideas shaped the development of the physical world, which was its reflection, and thus Hegel's system is sometimes called *dialectical idealism* to distinguish it from Marx's *dialectical materialism*. The chief characteristic of the dialectic is its dynamic quality, for the world is viewed as being in a state of constant transformation and motion, in contrast to the normal tendency to view reality as static or evolutionary. Thus Marx describes the dialectical process as "the science of the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of human thought."²

In contrast to Hegel, whose movement was divinely inspired, Marx's dialectic is *naturalistic* in that change is inherent in reality itself and results from the energies released by internal contradictory forces, not from something external, like a prime mover or God.

The Marxist Theory of History

Marx appropriated Hegel's dialectic, but gave it a materialistic content. Claiming that he found Hegel's system standing on its head and restored it right side up, Marx asserted that instead of the earthly world being a re-

flection of the dialectical development of ideas in conflict and synthesis, the ideas were in fact a reflection of the dialectical process working itself out in the physical world.

The application of Marx's dialectical method to the study of history and society is called *historical materialism*. For Marx, history moves neither in a straight line nor in a circle nor fortuitously, but rather moves upward through predetermined stages. By apprehending the laws of social development, it is possible, on the basis of the past and present, to predict several stages of development in the future.

Each succeeding stage of history is more progressive than the preceding one, and hence the special meaning of "progress" in Marxist-Soviet terminology must be understood in terms of movement along the historical dialectic. Thus a slave society is more progressive than primitive Communism, a feudal society superior to a slave-based economy, a capitalist society preferable to a feudal order but in turn inferior to a socialist society, which in turn is less progressive than a Communist society. Accordingly, each historical stage contains the seeds of its own destruction and constitutes the womb out of which its successor emerges. Each phase makes its contribution to civilization, a part of which is carried over from one stage to the next, thus giving an organic unity to the historical movement and to human civilization.

The Class Struggle

The fuel that powers the historical dialectic is manufactured by the class struggle. The two conflicting classes are those who own the land and the means of production and those who must work and operate them in order to live. Those without property are forced to deliver their labor in return for a bare subsistence living. According to Marx's "surplus labor" theory of value, all value is created by labor, which is expropriated by those who own the means of production, who pay out in wages just

¹Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 473.

²Cited in Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol II, p. 17.

enough to keep the workers alive. This is the Marxist meaning of "exploitation of man by man." Thus an irreconcilable conflict between classes prevails which is resolved by revolution, only to reappear in new form. Capitalism, Marx wrote, is the last historical society in which exploitation of man by man will exist. With the advent of the proletarian revolution, the expropriation of the capitalists, and the establishment of Socialism, humanity will finally emancipate itself from exploitation and the class struggle. In the words of the *Communist Manifesto*:

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word oppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstruction of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. . . . In our epoch . . . society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat.³

Economic Determinism

The specific form of the class struggle is determined by the way in which society organizes the instruments and means of production. Thus, in the Marxist scheme, the given economic order constitutes the foundation of society and determines the character of the social, political, ethical, and legal "superstructure" which it supports. When the economic foundations change, the "superstructure" inevitably crumbles, to be re-established in conformity with the contours set by the new economic relations. At any stage of history, those who own the instruments of production constitute an exploiting class, which seeks to preserve the given economic order from which it benefits.

But the economic foundations of society are fluid and cannot remain fixed, for, in accordance

with the dialectical laws of contradiction, man, in his eternal search for more efficient instruments of production, renders the existing system increasingly obsolete and automatically subverts the prevailing order. Those who stand to gain most from the new methods of production are inevitably shaped into a class hostile to those who benefit from the existing system. The class struggle is thus joined. The old class is overthrown; the new is enthroned, and the entire superstructure of society—social relations, political institutions, morals, etc., is then automatically adjusted to correspond with the new economic foundations of society. In a famous passage from Marx:

In the social production of their means of existence men enter into definite, necessary relations which are independent of their will, productive relationships which correspond to a definite state of development of their material productive forces. The aggregate of these productive relationships constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis on which a juridical and political superstructure arises, and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of the material means of existence conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, it is their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development the material productive forces of society come into contradiction with the existing productive relationships, or, what is but a legal expression for these, with the property relationships within which they had moved before. From forms of development of the productive forces these relationships are transformed into their fetters. Then an epoch of social revolution opens. With the change in the economic foundation the whole vast superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.⁴

It must be understood that these changes in the fundamental economic structure of society, according to Marx, proceed irrespective of man's will or cognizance and can be determined

³Emil Burns, *A Handbook of Marxism* (New York: Random House, 1935), pp. 371-372.

⁴Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 205-206.

with scientific accuracy.⁵ They are inevitable, and movement from one stage of history to the next cannot be prevented, although man can intervene to speed up or delay the process, providing he has become aware of the dialectical laws governing the movement of history. Marx called his Socialism "scientific" because the society he had been anticipating was destined to come inevitably, not because of man's hopes and wishes (as with utopian Socialism).

The Proletarian Revolution

The most relevant aspect of Marxism for us here is, of course, the transition from capitalism to Socialism and the processes by which this is accomplished. Under capitalism, according to Marx, society is divided into two great contending classes: the capitalists—owners of factories, business enterprises, financial institutions, and other means of production—who become constantly smaller in numbers as they grow wealthier; and the proletariat, which becomes more impoverished as it grows more numerous. With the increasing concentration of wealth into fewer hands and the increasing misery of the vast majority, the downtrodden proletariat becomes conscious of its historical mission, which is to overthrow the capitalist ruling class, not only in its own interests but in the interests of society as a whole.

The proletarian revolution was thus supposed to take place in an advanced industrialized society, in which "the lower strata of the middle class—the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants—all these sink gradually into the proletariat . . . and . . . the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population."⁶ In contrast to "all previous historical movements [which] were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities . . . the proletarian movement is

the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority."⁷

The consequence of the revolution is the elevation of the proletariat as the ruling class and the establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat," whose primary purpose is to expropriate the capitalists in favor of the state and to suppress the overthrown bourgeoisie and eliminate it as a class, as a prelude to the elimination of classes, class struggles, and exploitation generally. Ultimately the state would "wither away."

The Theory of the State

"The State," wrote Lenin, "inevitably came into being at a definite stage in the development of society, when society had split into irreconcilable classes . . . ostensibly standing above society," but in fact protecting the interests of the property-owning classes. All states, therefore, are class states; i.e., they are instruments of the ruling economic class, whose interests they serve. The idea that the state is an impartial agent standing above society and classes as a referee or umpire is rejected as a myth inspired and perpetuated by the ruling class as part of the prevailing ideology. A society's legal system and courts, its philosophy, religion, education, morality, and even art all play their role in disguising the class nature of the state by rationalizing, justifying, and sanctifying the existing social order. The state, with its legal monopoly of the instruments of coercion (army, police, law, courts, etc.) preserves the *status quo*, by force if necessary.

LENIN: THE EMERGENCE OF VOLUNTARISM

The dialectical movement of history was asserted by Marx to be independent of man's will. It is this imperative of inevitability

⁵See Friedrich Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.).

⁶Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 213.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 217.

party in 1903, Leon Trotsky (only 23 years old at the time) subjected it to scathing and prophetic criticism:

The organization of the Party takes the place of the Party itself; the Central Committee takes the place of the organization; and finally the dictator takes the place of the Central Committee.⁹

Although its primary purpose was to maximize the effectiveness of revolutionary action, the principle of "democratic centralism" harbored the germ of what subsequently emerged as Soviet totalitarianism, because after the Revolution the principles of Bolshevik Party organization were extended to the whole of society.

Lenin's Theory of Revolution in Russia

Lenin was primarily interested in bringing about a proletarian revolution in Russia. But Russia was overwhelmingly backward culturally, and it had basically an agricultural economy and was feudal in its political organization and practices. Marx had predicted that the proletarian revolution would take place initially in advanced industrial societies like England and Germany.

Lenin, however, argued that since the revolution was inevitable, it was unnecessary to await the full maturation of capitalism. Rather than wait for the proletariat to grow and develop a class consciousness, which might take an intolerably long time, the party could act for the proletariat, and thus a proletarian revolution could take place as soon as any society embarked upon the road of capitalist development. This doctrine was little more than a disingenuous rationalization for a revolution in Russia, at a time when the country had just entered the phase of capitalism.

In order to compensate for the fact that the

Russian proletariat was no less a minority of the population than the bourgeoisie and to provide moral justification for a revolution executed on behalf of a minority class, Lenin contrived the formula of an "alliance" between the working class and the peasantry. The Communist Party could then carry out a revolution on behalf of the proletariat in alliance with the peasants. In this way, Lenin sought to impart the color of "democracy" to the Revolution. It was not his intention, however, that the peasants would share power with the proletariat or its party, for although a government of workers and peasants would be established, the party would retain a monopoly of power on behalf of the proletariat and would dictate the policies of the government.

Lenin's Theory of Imperialism

One of Lenin's most significant contributions to Marxist doctrine was his theory of imperialism, formulated just prior to the Revolution while he was in exile in Switzerland. While his short book, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, remains of utmost importance because not only did it provide Lenin with a further rationalization of the revolution in Russia, but it also served to explain why certain of the Marxist predictions about revolutions did not materialize in Western Europe. Lenin's *Imperialism* remains one of the basic documents upon which the Soviet perception of the world still rests, and it has become particularly relevant in understanding Soviet policies in the underdeveloped and ex-colonial countries of the world.

According to Lenin's *Imperialism*, Western capitalism had managed temporarily to delay its inevitable doom through revolution by the device of colonial imperialism. By establishing overseas dependencies, the major capitalist powers of Europe were able to invest capital in the colonies and, in return, receive raw materials for processing which were then re-exported

⁹Cited in Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York: Dial Press, 1948), p. 253.

as manufactured goods. In this way, Lenin concluded, new outlets were found for surplus capital, old jobs were preserved for the workers and new ones created, and new markets were found for goods which could not profitably be absorbed in domestic markets.

The transformation of capitalism into imperialism, Lenin wrote, resulted in several important consequences. (1) The standard of living of the upper strata of the working class in the major capitalist countries was raised, thus blunting their class consciousness and diverting them away from revolution and into trade unions and preoccupation with higher wages and better conditions of work. According to Lenin, these elements of the working class had become unwitting allies of the capitalists in exploiting the colonies and could no longer be relied upon to bring about a revolution. (2) The Socialist revolution in the advanced countries was temporarily delayed, but new internal strains and stresses were introduced into the capitalist system, which was transformed from a national system in each individual country into an international system, involving the entire world, both backward and advanced areas. In Lenin's view, imperialism was the final, overripe stage of world capitalism, the phase in which all the devices contrived to prolong the existence of capitalism were exhausted, making it ready for revolutionary conflagration. (3) The internationalization of the capitalist system created entirely new revolutionary possibilities completely unforeseen by Marx and Engels. The class struggle, instead of now being the individual affair of each country, was internationalized, and the focus of revolutionary contradictions shifted away from the advanced industrial centers to their periphery in the colonial and semi-colonial societies, which were subjected to ruthless exploitation by international capitalism. (4) The division of the world into colonial empires of the various capitalist states not only internationalized the class struggle, but wars as well, which were transformed into

world-wide conflicts as the capitalists fought over the division and redistribution of markets and colonies.

In accordance with this analysis, Lenin maintained that prior to the existence of imperialism, the class struggle and the impetus to revolution proceeded more or less independently in each country, depending on its economic development. Now, however, capitalism had become world-wide through the formation of international monopolies and cartels, and the advanced countries used their advantage to arrest the development of the less advanced regions of the world. The greatest possibilities of revolution were to be found, not in the industrial countries, but at the "weakest link" in the world capitalist chain, where the "front" of capitalism was exposed and the revolutionary ferment was most intense. Not the size of the proletariat, but its revolutionary consciousness and zeal would determine the location of proletarian revolutions.

Lenin believed that Russia was in 1917 this "weakest link" and that an uprising in Russia could plunge the entire world into a revolutionary convulsion. The "imperialist" war (World War I), he thought, could be transformed into a world-wide civil war in which the proletariat of Europe would join with the colonial populations against their imperialist rulers. The failure of the revolution to spread, however, soon produced a new crisis in the theory of Communism.

STALIN: THE HARDENING OF TOTALITARIANISM

Lenin died in 1924, and his successors were confronted with an uncertain future. Neither Marx nor Lenin had provided a precise blueprint for maintaining a revolution in isolation in a predominantly agricultural country. If Lenin converted Marxism into a revolutionary formula for seizing power in virtually any soci-

ety with a vast dispossessed and discontented population, it was left to Joseph Stalin to further transform Marxism into an instrument of industrialization and modernization of backward societies.

"Socialism in One Country"

The idea of building a Socialist society in a backward country like Russia seemed to some of the Bolshevik intellectuals and leaders, particularly to Leon Trotsky, as both impossible and a deviation from Marxism. Stalin, however, was a man endowed with extraordinary talents for organization, administration, and political intrigue. He occupied the post of General Secretary of the party, which he quickly converted into a powerful and strategic springboard for seizing control of first the party apparatus, then the party itself, and then the state. Considered by most of his colleagues to be an intellect of mediocre calibre, Stalin possessed a sharp mind with a firm grasp of the situation. He understood power and men and possessed an exceptional ability to size up a situation immediately, reach quick decisions, and implement them with an implacable determination.

To silence his opponents, Stalin contrived the idea of "Socialism in one country" and shrewdly ascribed the theory to the dead Lenin, whose loyal and faithful disciple he repeatedly claimed to be. The theory found a responsive echo not only among the Communist rank and file, but among ordinary citizens of the country as well. They preferred constructive promises linked with Russia's national security and national development to the anxieties and turmoil promised by the policy of "permanent revolution" advocated by Trotsky, in which Russia was to spearhead revolution in the name of Communist internationalism. The people of Russia were tired of war and revolution; they wanted peace and an opportunity to reconstruct their homes and country.

Stalin was determined to modernize and in-

dustrialize Soviet Russia, not only that it might become a powerful country in its own right, but also that it might serve more effectively as a base for expanding the Communist revolution. Socialism was to be developed through a series of five-year plans, which required singleness of purpose and concentrated effort for their successful fulfillment. Stalin's modernization program was based on three principles. (1) First priority went to the construction of heavy industry, which would enhance the military power of the state. (2) Agriculture was to be collectivized and mechanized in order to destroy the capitalist system of private farming in the countryside, increase agricultural production, and permit the siphoning off of labor into the cities and factories. (3) A large reservoir of scientific personnel and skilled workers was to be created through a centrally planned and directed program of education. Once the state-owned heavy-industrial base had been constructed and stabilized, the farms collectivized, and an appropriate level of educational and technological achievement reached, Soviet Russia would automatically enter an era of Socialism.

Stalin's powerful resolve to impose his program of "Socialism in one country" against all opposition, internal and external, profoundly affected the entire theoretical structure of Soviet Marxism, to say nothing of its concrete application. The Marxist-Leninist doctrines on the organization and functions of the party, the nature and role of the state in a Socialist society, the destiny of the world revolution, and the delicate balance between Communist internationalism and Russian nationalism, were all subjected to radical revision.

From Party Dictatorship to Personal Dictatorship

In 1903, Trotsky had predicted that Lenin's theory of party organization and leadership logically would culminate in the es-

establishment of a personal dictatorship. Under Stalin, this is, in fact, what actually happened. In his secret speech before the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev finally conceded what had been widely known and acknowledged both outside and inside the U.S.S.R.: that the Soviet Union under Stalin was governed by the most brutal and capricious form of personal dictatorship, masquerading as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" under the leadership of the party.

After the party seized power in 1917 and established a monopoly over all political activity and organization, expulsion from the party meant political extinction. Since all rival parties were dissolved and declared illegal, the only opposition to the party line could come from within the party itself, and, as a result, various factional groupings, "oppositions," and deviations developed within the party against that of the majority view. As long as opposition was expressed *before* a decision had been taken on a particular question, it was considered by Lenin to be legitimate, but once a vote had been taken, the minority was duty-bound to subordinate its views to the majority.

Stalin started out in the same way, but once he had solidly entrenched himself in power, he applied measures, reserved by Lenin for the outside enemies of the system, to his rivals *in* the party. His major theoretical contribution in this connection, if it can be so described, was the concept of the "enemy of the people," which meant that any person so designated was charged with counterrevolutionary and treasonable activities and then executed, imprisoned, or banished, with or without trial. Thus, according to Nikita Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin before the Twentieth Party Congress:

Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proved, this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legal-

ity, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations¹⁰

It should be noted, however, that despite what developed in practice, Stalin never repudiated the principle of "collective leadership," but always maintained that he was simply the spokesman for the Central Committee or the Politburo of the Party. Nor did he countenance the formulation of a theory of personal rule, although in practice and in ceremony he both fostered and demanded sychophantic adulation, which, in the words of Khrushchev, transformed him "into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behavior."¹¹

Stalin's Theory of the Soviet State

The 1936 proclamation of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. required some fundamental revisions of the basic doctrine of the state. Since, theoretically, the class struggle and exploitation by the ruling classes had been eradicated, what was to be the function of the Soviet state? In 1930, at the Sixteenth Party Congress, Stalin boasted that the Soviet state was the mightiest in all history, and that well before it would, like all other states, inevitably "wither away," it most assuredly would become even more powerful. But the issue of a mighty leviathan in a Socialist society continued to haunt the Communist Party. Stalin himself raised the problem at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939.

It is sometimes asked: We have abolished the exploiting classes, there are no longer any hostile

¹⁰Khrushchev's secret speech on "The Cult of Personality," full text reprinted in Bertram D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (New York: Praeger, 1957).

¹¹*Ibid.*

classes in the country; there is nobody to suppress; hence there is no more need for the state; it must die away. . . . Now, the Marxist doctrine of the state says that there is to be no state under Communism. Why then do we not help our Socialist state die away?¹²

Stalin then proceeded to review the Marxist literature on the "withering away" of the state, and concluded that classical Marxist doctrine is applicable when Socialism has been established in a number of countries simultaneously, but it is not applicable when it is being built in just a single country. By 1950, in another major theoretical disquisition, Stalin finally concluded that the Soviet state represented the interests of society as a whole. Indeed, under Stalin major emphasis was put on strengthening the state.

Stalin and World Revolution

Stalin's doctrine of "Socialism in one country" was not a repudiation of world revolution. As long as Soviet Russia was weak, Stalin believed, it could not actively promote world revolution. But if Russia were transformed into a strong industrial and military power, it could effectively support revolutionary movements elsewhere, with the assistance of the Red Army if necessary. To ensure that Russia would be converted into a base for world revolution, the Communist International (Comintern) and Communist Parties in all countries were required to give first loyalty to the Soviet Union as the only fatherland of the world proletariat, and were thus forced to submit to the complete discipline of Moscow. Those foreign Communists who resisted the centralization and domination of the Comintern by the Soviet Party were expelled, and gradually the Comintern was completely subjugated to the dictates of Stalin; foreign Communist Parties became willing instruments of Soviet policy, and acted as fifth columns by engaging in espionage and subversion.

¹²Stalin, *Leninism: Selected Writings*, pp. 468-469.

Stalin proclaimed that the world revolution was impossible without the Soviet base and that consequently the interests of the world revolution were identical with the interests of the Soviet Union. Therefore, anything that strengthened the Soviet Union promoted the world revolution; anything that reacted adversely against Moscow retarded the world revolution. In this way, the interests of the Soviet Union as a state were irrevocably fused with the interests of promoting world revolution, and the interests of all Communists in the world were tied to the preservation of the Soviet nation-state.

After World War II, when Communist Parties were installed in power in Eastern Europe, Stalin insisted that Communist leaders would have to continue to sacrifice the interests of their own countries to the greater glory and power of the Soviet Union, which remained the base of the world revolutionary movement. Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia rebelled against this view in 1948, advocating instead that individual Communist parties owed first loyalty to their own country; otherwise the Stalinist principle of "proletarian internationalism" would be nothing short of Soviet imperialism, with the most powerful Communist country exploiting the weaker and smaller ones. Communist leaders in the other satellite states of Eastern Europe who were suspected of harboring views similar to those of Marshal Tito were removed (many were imprisoned or executed, after the manner of Stalin's earlier victims), although they were leaders of foreign countries. Between 1948-52, a succession of bloody purges and executions swept the entire satellite world.

Stalinism and the Russian Heritage

Not only did Soviet totalitarianism reach its full flowering under Stalin, but the doctrine of "Socialism in one country" also

caused the traditional cultural and historical forces of Russia to blend with the new dynamics of Marxism. Marxism profoundly altered Russia, but itself was profoundly altered in turn. Marxism gave order to the primitive anarchical impulses of Russia, while Russian traditionalism succeeded in channeling Marxism into a unique secular religion, at once both terrifying and effective.

Many of the influences of the Russian tradition upon Marxism were inevitable. After all, Socialism was not being built in a vacuum but in Russia—in historic Russia, with its cultural traditions, geography, and people. The language of Russia became the language of Socialism and Communism, and the vanguard of the world proletariat was to become the Russian working-class, with its own memories and responses. A backward country, Russia was to be transformed into the *first* country of Socialism.

In order to tap the spiritual and physical resources of the Russian people, Stalin, beginning in 1934, systematically resurrected Russia's past glories and grandeur, even to the point of retrospectively refurbishing her Tsars and territorial conquests with progressive intentions and consequences. In his characteristically ingenious way, Stalin saw in Russian nationalism the ultimate key to the success of his policies. With the support of the Russian people, his program might succeed, without that support, it was doomed. Russia's past was rewritten as a reflection of the Soviet present, and both Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great were recreated in Stalin's image. In this way, Stalin was made into a legitimate extension of Russia's long history.

The revival of Russian nationalism reached its zenith during World War II, when the very survival of the Stalinist regime depended on the loyalty and patriotism of the Russians, which could be most effectively exploited by an appeal to Russian nationalism rather than by Marxist slogans. Virtually all the old Marxist clichés vanished, while Russia's past heroes and

their military exploits were resurrected. Traditional ranks and titles were reinstituted in the Civil Service, diplomatic corps, and military and police forces, and gilt-edged shoulderboards reappeared on Tsarist-type uniforms. Numerous medals were struck honoring the Generals and Admirals of Russia's past, and Stalin himself was appointed first a Marshal of the Soviet Union and then Generalissimo of the Armed Forces. The war itself was called the Second Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, the first being the national resistance against Napoleon in 1812. "The war you are waging is a war of liberation," Stalin urged four months after the German attack. "Let the manly images of our great ancestors—Alexander Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi, Kuzma Minin, Dmitri Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov—inspire you in this war!"¹²

SOVIET IDEOLOGY SINCE STALIN

The death of Stalin unleashed new ideological forces in the Soviet Union which cracked the shell of Stalinist dogma. Innovations in both internal and foreign policy took place almost immediately after his death, culminating in the denunciation, at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, of the old tyrant himself and of the personal dictatorship and terror which he established (called the "cult of personality" in Soviet jargon).

The Post-Stalin Party and State

The repudiation of the "cult of personality" and the so-called restoration of "collective leadership" required no modifications of doctrine, since Stalin had always presented himself as simply the "wisest of the wise" in the

¹²J. V. Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (New York: International Publishers, 1945), pp. 37-38.

executive organs of the party, and claimed that all his policies represented the decisions of the party and its Central Committee rather than his personal whim. Since his death the dictatorship has been continued, but in the form of an ever-rotating and expanding oligarchy rather than an absolute autocracy and it is no longer appropriate to characterize the Soviet system as totalitarian.

Two important Stalinist doctrines were renounced: the concept of the "enemy of the people" and the theory that class struggle became more intense as Soviet society moved closer to its ultimate objective of Communism. Both ideas were important props supporting the Stalinist terror. When the Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovich faction in the Party Presidium failed to oust Khrushchev in June, 1957, the plotters were removed from the leading organs of the party, not as "enemies of the people," but as an "anti-party group." They were neither expelled completely from the party, nor imprisoned. All have since been given important, although demeaning (in view of their past eminence) positions in accordance with their specialities. And the members of the "anti-party group" were given the opportunity to propound their views before a special meeting of the Central Committee, which issued the order of expulsion.

At the Twenty-Second Party Congress, Khrushchev introduced some new theoretical refinements concerning the nature and destiny of the Soviet state, which can be summarized as follows:

1. The dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and is now being gradually transformed into "a state of the entire people . . . expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole."

2. The dictatorship of the proletariat is withering away, but "the state as an organization of the entire people will survive until the complete victory of Communism."

3. The organs and institutions of the state will be gradually converted into "organs of public

self-government" as it embarks upon the road to oblivion.

4. In the meantime, government officials will be systematically rotated out of office at every election and at all levels, so that leading officials as a rule will hold office for not more than three consecutive terms, unless they are unusually gifted.

5. The military power of the Soviet state will continue to be strengthened to fulfill "its international duty to guarantee . . . the reliable defense and security of the entire Socialist camp."

Soviet Ideology and the External World

The most dramatic and immediate modifications were made in Stalinist views of the outside world. Of greatest significance was the abandonment of the Stalinist dogmas of "capitalist encirclement" and of the "inevitability of wars," and of his view that the world is divided into two camps, poised in military readiness for the inevitable Armageddon that would decide for all time the issue of Communism versus capitalism.

The doctrine of "capitalist encirclement" was one of the foundations of the Stalinist terror, since the danger of "capitalist attack" justified the brutal and ruthless dictatorship. Although the expansion of Soviet power into Eastern Europe after World War II and the Communist victory in China created a buffer against "capitalist encirclement," Stalin refused to alter his position and, instead, extended the terror to the entire Communist orbit.

Closely related to the idea of "capitalist encirclement" was the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine that wars are inevitable as long as capitalism and imperialism continue to flourish. Stalin insisted on this dogma even when nuclear weapons introduced a factor unforeseen by Marx or Lenin. As far as Stalin was concerned, nuclear technology was simply another stage in the development of weapons and could not in any way alter the course of historical development, whose direction was irrevocably deter-

mined by scientific and objective laws discovered by Marx and Engels.

Wars, according to Stalin, were neither the result of accident nor of human will, but were rooted in the capitalist system itself. They would end only with the elimination of capitalism. Stalin's post-war policy was thus predicted on an inevitable conflict with the West, which was clearly going to be led by the United States.

Both the doctrines of "capitalist encirclement" and the "inevitability of wars" were repudiated at the Twentieth Party Congress. "The period when the Soviet Union was . . . encircled by hostile capitalism now belongs to the past,"¹⁴ a reluctant Molotov was forced to say at the Congress, and in March, 1958, Khrushchev added a new twist to the entire encirclement concept:

At the present it is not known who encircles whom. The Socialist countries cannot be considered as some kind of island in a rough capitalist sea. A billion people are living in the Socialist countries, out of a total of 2.5 billion . . . Thus, one cannot speak any more about capitalist encirclement in its former aspect.¹⁵

The Stalinist "two-camp" image was replaced by a "three-camp" image. A third "anti-imperialist" group of powers, which had been released from the decaying colonial empires but had not joined the Communist cause, was recognized by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress. Stalin's inflexible two-camp image needlessly threatened to alienate these new states and force them back into the bosom of capitalism.

The Soviet leaders hoped to woo the underdeveloped world first into the Soviet diplomatic orbit and then eventually into the Communist ideological camp. Anticipating that the demands of the emerging nations for rapid

modernization and industrialization would conflict with the interests of the capitalist powers, the Soviet leaders expect that the hostile or apathetic reaction on the part of the West will drive the poorer countries into their arms. Castro's Cuba is considered to be the prototype of this kind of process. According to the Soviet view, Cuba moved from being dependent on the United States through a non-capitalist, non-Communist stage, and was finally forced into the Communist orbit because of the hostility of the United States.

The new Soviet leaders have scrapped Stalin's bellicose policy in favor of a formula of "peaceful coexistence" between capitalism and Communism, which calls for nonviolent forms of competition between the two forces until Communism wins its inevitable victory. Wars are still considered to be possible, because of the instability of the capitalist system and the chance that war might be triggered accidentally, but they are not thought to be inevitable. Russia still intends to remain strong militarily, and her leaders believe that the development of their rocket and nuclear technology and the psychological impact of their space achievements may have given them an irreversible advantage in the cold war. In Khrushchev's view, the capitalist countries would not resort to war, not because they had become more humanitarian, but because they realized that the Soviet Union was capable of laying waste the entire American landscape. Soviet leaders may still think that victory for them is only a matter of time.

The ultimate objective of Soviet policy theoretically remains the attainment of world Communism, by peaceful means or violent, by fair methods or foul, although the current Soviet view is that it can be achieved nonviolently. The intensity with which this goal is pursued appears to have diminished considerably since the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962, and the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in July, 1963. The vigorous pursuit of

¹⁴Moscow Radio, February 20, 1956.

¹⁵Interview with Serge Groussard in *Le Figaro*, March 19, 1958.

world Communism which tended to provoke periodic confrontations with the United States and maximized the chances of nuclear war has increasingly been viewed by Soviet leaders as suicidal. And the demands of important segments of the Soviet public (elites and non-elites alike) for a reduction in international tensions, friendly relations with the United States and the West, and the diversion of money and resources away from heavy industry and military expenditures to the increased production of consumer goods and food, have also played an important role in the waning of Soviet ideological fervor in Soviet policy. Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet conflict and the progressive dissolution of the Soviet bloc have brought into serious question even the desirability of world Communism, particularly if it might fall under the control or influence of Red China—which has not only challenged Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement, and even questioned her ideological orthodoxy, but also has laid claim to some 500,000 square miles of Soviet territory in the Far East and Central Asia. Little wonder that, as the world Communist movement has fallen more and more outside the control of Moscow, both its utility as an instrument of Soviet interests and foreign policy, and Soviet enthusiasm to prosecute it, have correspondingly diminished.

As a consequence of these developments, Soviet leaders have found it expedient to redefine the role of the Soviet Union in bringing about world Communism. Cautiously but methodically, they first abdicated its position as the leader of the movement. Then they relinquished its role as a "center" or "base." Now they offer it merely as a model society to emulate. In order to minimize the ideological disarray which would result therefrom, instead of explicitly disavowing world Communism, the Soviet leaders have condemned the "export of revolution," maintaining that they can best discharge their ideological commitment to world Communism by raising the Soviet standard of living:

It is the internationalist duty of the Communists of the Socialist countries to build the new society well and successfully, to develop the economy, to strengthen defense capability, to consolidate the Socialist camp, and to strive to insure that through practical implementation the ideas of Socialism become increasingly attractive to all working people.¹⁶

While the contradiction between Soviet security interests and ideological goals in foreign policy has long been recognized by observers of the Soviet scene, the contradiction between enhancing economic prosperity at home and fulfilling international ideological obligations is a new variable in Soviet policy. This new factor has not gone unnoticed by the Chinese, who accused Khrushchev of abandoning Soviet ideological and material obligations to international Communism and the national-liberation movement in favor of avoiding the risks of nuclear war and building an affluent society to satisfy the appetites of the new Soviet "ruling stratum":

The revisionist Khrushchev clique has usurped the leadership of the Soviet party and state and . . . a privileged bourgeois stratum has emerged in Soviet society. . . . The privileged stratum in contemporary Soviet society is composed of degenerate elements from among the leading cadres of party and government organizations, enterprises, and farms as well as bourgeois intellectuals. . . . Under the signboard of "peaceful coexistence," Khrushchev has been colluding with U.S. imperialism, wrecking the Socialist camp and the international Communist movement, opposing the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations, practicing great-power chauvinism and national egoism, and betraying proletarian internationalism. All this is being done for the protection of the vested interest of a handful of people, which he places above the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Socialist camp and the whole world.¹⁷

The same charge has also been leveled at Khrushchev's successors, who, Peking maintains, are simply practicing "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev."

¹⁶*Pravda*, April 3, 1964.

¹⁷*Jen Min Jih Pao*, July 14, 1964.

V

The Soviet Social Order

In the Soviet Union, private ownership of the land, of the means of production, and of distribution has been abolished in favor of total and permanent public ownership. Ownership is permanently vested in an institution, the state, or in an abstraction, "society." The state, however, is the executive and administrative arm of the Communist Party, which allegedly represents the social will of the working class and is the source of all policy formulation. Control of the party assures control of the state, and through it control of the land, the economy, the coercive instruments of society (the armed forces, police, courts, and legal system), the means of transportation and distribution, and the media of communication. No matter who controls the party, ownership of the means of production is never an object of the struggle for power, for it remains permanently vested in the state.

According to Article 1 of the Soviet Constitution, "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a Socialist state of workers and peasants," which is defined in Article 12 as a society in which "work . . . is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen," and which is organized in accordance with two principles: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat," and "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." According to official dogma, the Soviet Union has been a Socialist society since 1936 and is now well advanced on the road to Communism, in which distinctions between "workers" and "peasants" will cease to exist and society will be governed by the principle of Communism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

Contrary to a widespread misconception, the Soviet Union does not claim to be an egalitarian society; social differentiation exists, and definite and often rigid hierarchical lines divide one social group from another. Soviet society is not defined as a *classless* society, but is officially

described as a society in which *class conflict* and exploitation of man by man have been eliminated. Two classes are recognized, the workers and peasants, and they are supposed to work together in harmony and peace; the intelligentsia, which is not mentioned in the Constitution and is not officially designated as a class, is a part of the upper social layer of the working class. The intelligentsia, however, constitutes the social and political elite of Soviet society and from its ranks spring those who struggle for control of the party, the state, and the economy. Although the state is a "dictatorship of the proletariat," it is defined constitutionally as a "Socialist state of workers and peasants," which, according to Article 2, "grew and became strong as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists."

The initial function of the Soviet "dictatorship of the proletariat" was to establish proletarian control over the former ruling bourgeois class in order to eradicate it as a class and pave the way for a classless society in which the state would ultimately "wither away." This becomes possible only when the proletariat seizes power and nationalizes all means of production. Article 4 of the Soviet Constitution states:

The economic foundation of the U.S.S.R. is the Socialist system of economy and the Socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production, firmly established as a result of the liquidation of the capitalist system of economy, the abolition of private ownership of the instruments and means of production, and the elimination of exploitation of man by man.

Article 6 further specifies that:

The land, its mineral wealth, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, soil, water and air transport, banks, communications, large state-organized agricultural enterprises (state farms, machine and tractor stations, and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of the dwelling-houses in the cities and industrial localities are state property—that is, belong to the whole people.

Aside from state-owned property, the Soviet Constitution recognizes cooperative and

collective-farm property as a form of Socialist ownership, since it is collectively exploited by groups. All land, however, belongs to the state and is only leased to cooperative and collective groups "in perpetuity." Private property exists only in two forms: (1) individual peasants' and artisans' establishments in which production is based on the owner's own labor (hiring others for personal gain is constitutionally defined as "exploitation" and is severely punished as one of the most serious crimes against society), and (2) personal property, including individual homes, articles of personal and household use, and savings.

The current organization of Soviet society, however, is as much an outgrowth of the social realities of Russia at the time of the Revolution as it is of the social theories of Marx and Lenin. "Socialism" in Russia is the society that emerged as a result of Stalin's industrial and agricultural transformation of a backward rural nation within the span of a single generation. Its characteristics are as unmistakably Russian as they are Marxist.

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIA

Before the Revolution, Russia was a semifeudal society with rigidly distinct class divisions. At the top was a small stratum composed of the landed gentry, the court nobility, the upper clergy, and the Imperial Family, which together owned most of the arable lands of the country and controlled the state. At the bottom was a large land-hungry, superstitious, illiterate, and sullen peasant population, only recently emancipated from serfdom, whose ugly moods periodically threatened to disrupt the social order. Sandwiched between the top and bottom was a small middle class, made up of merchants, civil servants, professional people, intellectuals, and students, who, however, did not constitute a true bourgeoisie in the Marxist sense (capitalists who owned the means of pro-

duction), because most of the industrial and financial enterprises in Russia were owned by foreign capitalists. Alongside the small middle class was a slightly larger working class population, recently uprooted from the countryside, alienated from society, and living in incredible squalor in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Baku, and the Donetz Basin.

In 1913, more than 78% of the population was made up of peasants, divided between those with no land or small plots (about 66.7% of the population) and rich peasants, or *kulaks* (about 11.3%). Of the 367 million hectares of agricultural land (1 hectare - 2.471 acres) owned before the Revolution (within the pre-1939 borders of the U.S.S.R.), the poor and moderately well-off peasants possessed altogether only 135 million hectares, while the great landlords, the Imperial Family, and the Orthodox Church, amounting to only 3% of the population, owned 152 million hectares. The rich peasants owned the remaining 80 million hectares. Thirty percent of the peasants possessed no land whatsoever, while another 34% owned no agricultural implements or livestock. The middle class accounted for about 6% of the population, while the urban workers amounted to about 13% of the total.

"WAR COMMUNISM" AND THE N.E.P.

The original intention of the Bolshevik regime was to establish a Communist society by an executive fiat nationalizing all the land, natural resources, financial institutions, and factories of the country, thus expropriating the land-owning and capitalist classes. All class distinctions were abolished, as were the official ranks in the government and the armed forces. Workers and peasants were instructed to seize the factories and lands on behalf of the state, and were ordered to establish direct control over production and distribution. During this initial period of "War Communism," equality

was the rule: equality of social status and equality of income, irrespective of the quality and quantity of work performed.

Under these conditions, the economy of the country was reduced to a shambles as the workers proved incompetent to manage factories and other enterprises. They embarked upon a "Roman holiday," voting themselves unrealistic increases in wages and absurdly numerous holidays. The economy in the cities came to a virtual halt, workers threatened riots when the customary payday arrived and the payroll did not materialize. Famine once again stalked the streets of the urban areas as the peasants refused to accept the worthless printing-press money of the state and demanded manufactured goods of comparable value, which were being turned out in increasingly diminished quantities.

Lenin called a halt to "War Communism" in 1921, and introduced the so-called New Economic Policy, or N.E.P., which authorized the temporary revival of small-scale capitalist enterprises. Small factories and retail establishments, privately operated and based on incentives, quickly sprang up and flourished in the cities. Equally desperate was Lenin's decision to abolish state-imposed prices for agricultural goods in order to spur agricultural production. The peasants were required to deliver a certain amount of grain to the state, but they then could sell whatever they produced in excess of this amount on the open market at whatever price they could exact. This program resulted not only in reviving the economy, but also in the re-emergence of a small entrepreneurial class, the "Nepmen", in the cities, and a powerful and numerically significant rich-peasant (*kulak*) class in the countryside.

The N.E.P. was introduced as a purely temporary measure and was not intended to be permanent. The state retained the "commanding heights" of the economy, from which it subsequently descended upon the hapless Nepmen and kulaks. Banks, large industrial and economic enterprises, communications media

and transportation systems, foreign trade, natural resources, and the ownership of land remained in the hands of the state. This guaranteed that the state would at all times be complete master of the situation. But it was becoming increasingly clear that either the N.E.P. would have to become a permanent characteristic of the Soviet system or it would have to be abandoned in favor of Socialism. After the death of Lenin, a "great debate" ensued among his successors as to Soviet Russia's future course, and this issue became an integral part of a complicated struggle for power.

Stalin emerged as the new Soviet leader, outmaneuvered his opposition, and, by 1927, felt sufficiently confident to press for an ambitious Five Year Plan designed to erect a heavy industrial foundation for Russia's economy and to mechanize and collectivize agriculture—in short, to bring about a cultural and technical revolution in the U.S.S.R. The scope of his plan, particularly with respect to the peasants, brought him into direct conflict with the more conservative members of the party, who wanted to proceed cautiously in the countryside, even at the expense of delaying industrialization. Stalin had the majority, however, and administrative measures were initiated against the kulaks, who were withholding grain from the market, threatening the cities with famine. Originally, the Five Year Plan called for the collectivization of only 20% of the country's agriculture, but Stalin changed his mind once the program was under way and decided to destroy all the kulaks.

THE "REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE" (1928-1933)

The overall objective of the Five Year Plan that came into effect in 1928 soon became nothing less than a "second revolution," whose goal was to completely transform Russia from a

backward agrarian country into an industrialized and modern Socialist society. Stalin had to achieve eight objectives if his ambitious project was to succeed: (1) the elimination of the residual capitalist classes, in particular the kulaks; (2) the collectivization of agriculture; (3) the creation of a large army of industrial workers out of raw, untutored peasants; (4) the creation of a heavy industrial base; (5) the creation of a corps of cultural and technical specialists out of the working class who would be capable of coping with the demands of an industrialized society; (6) the rapid mechanization of agriculture to make up for the reduced rural labor supply necessitated by the industrialization program; (7) the cultural and educational transformation of Russian society; and (8) the preservation of his own power at all costs.

Stalin realized that this period would not see a rise in the standard of living, for it was to be a period of sacrifice, with the possibility that food, shelter, and clothing would be reduced to a bare subsistence level. The magnitude of Stalin's ambitions was matched only by the forces that almost overwhelmed him: (1) the hostility of the capitalist world, which hopefully expected him to fail; (2) the opposition of the peasants, particularly the kulaks, to collectivization; (3) the opposition of his rivals within the party; (4) the shortage of foreign exchange which was required to purchase necessary machinery and to hire foreign technicians and specialists and which could be earned only by selling agricultural commodities on the world market, thus further reducing the home supply; and (5) the fundamental inertia of a backward, illiterate, superstitious, and overwhelmingly agricultural population.

Stalin's plan succeeded, but largely at the expense of the peasant population (which still remains the most exploited and downtrodden of Soviet Russia's social classes). Millions died through starvation, exposure, deportation, and execution so that Russia might be industrialized.

The estimates of the number of people who

died during the farm-collectivization program range from 3 million to 15 million, and Russia's total population deficit for this period is set at about 20 million. The catastrophe was further intensified by a drought which blighted the land during the height of the collectivization drive, and by the world economic crisis which depressed the world market price for grain. The memories of this era are indelibly etched in the minds and psychology of the Soviet population in both town and country, while the physical scars are still evident in lagging production statistics, the depressed living conditions of the peasantry, the decimated livestock population, and the sullen and passive resistance of the collective farmer.

By 1934, the kulaks had been destroyed and 90% of the peasants transformed from a class of individual farmers into a collectivized group held in bondage by the state. The transformation was later described as a "second revolution" or a "revolution from above," because it was stimulated by the government against the people rather than generated from below against the regime. With the collectivization of agriculture and the liquidation of the kulaks, the residual manifestations of private ownership over the means of production had been eliminated. Stalin could thus report in 1935.

The landlord class . . . the capitalist class . . . the kulak class . . . and the merchants and profiteers . . . have ceased to exist. Thus all the exploiting classes have now been eliminated. There remains the working class . . . the peasant class . . . the intelligentsia.¹

The "second revolution" introduced a new dynamic quality into what had been essentially a static society. By 1937, the working class was nearly double that of 1928, while the intelligentsia was nearly quadrupled during the same period. The number of the peasantry was reduced by about 20%.

THE STRATIFICATION OF SOVIET SOCIETY

Officially, there are only two classes in present-day Soviet society: the working class and the collective-farm peasantry. The intelligentsia is not called a "class" but a "stratum" and is considered the upper layer of the working class. Yet it is this "stratum" which is the most significant social group in Russia today and is itself divided into a number of substrata or elites. The relative numerical size and political influence of these three social groups have been in a state of flux since 1928 and are continually changing.

Until the early sixties, it was impermissible for Soviet scholars to tamper with the orthodox Marxist-Leninist approach to social structure, but it was becoming increasingly obvious to many Soviet observers that the oversimplified doctrinaire class division of Soviet society into "workers" and "peasants," along with a "stratum" of intelligentsia, was inadequate to explain the differences and divergencies of interests, attitudes, social outlook, and behavior of various strata of the Soviet population. In order to cope with this problem some Soviet scholars are now emphasizing the importance of "intra-class" differences in Soviet society, hoping in this manner to meet the imperatives of both the official preconceived doctrine and the demands of empirical social realities, without subverting the former or neglecting the latter. Thus, one Soviet writer points out:

Interest in the problems of the social structure of Soviet society has grown noticeably in recent times. In this connection, literature has been remarking more and more insistently on the need for studying not only the class structure but the intra-class structure as well. It is justly pointed out that class structure does not coincide with social structure; that the latter can exist even in a classless society and that the creation of a socially

¹Stalin, *Leninism: Selected Writings*, p. 382.

homogeneous society pursues a twofold course: the elimination of both interclass and intraclass differences . . . Perhaps the chief shortcoming of our sociological literature is the underevaluation of intraclass differences.²

These pioneering Soviet scholars, who refer to their field as "complex sociological research," come perilously close to employing "interest-group" analysis within a "structural-functional" framework, and to that degree their approach has undoubtedly been influenced by the work of American scholars. Thus, another prominent Soviet sociologist argues that whereas *class* structure may be slated for extinction, *social* structure and social stratification are an ineradicable feature of any organized society:

Social structure is an extremely broad concept, embracing the totality of social groups (classes, strata, collectives, nations, etc.) and the sphere of social relations, which have their hierarchy of numerous structure organizations, based on the dissimilarity, the divergence, of people's position in society. The social structure exists and will exist throughout all of man's history. Specific social organisms have systems of structural organization inherent in them . . . differences in people's socio-economic position have been of decisive importance in the system of social differences; the highest expression of these differences is the class differentiation of society. Subordinated to class differences (yet possessing relatively independent social importance in themselves) are the socio-economic differences between city and countryside, between persons engaged in mental and physical labor, and finally, intraclass differences. It is these last differences we are singling out from the totality of social differences.³

While Soviet sociologists refrain from drawing political implications and conclusions from their emphasis on "intraclass" differences at this point in their investigations, they do suggest

²Yu V. Arutyunyan, "The Social Structure of the Rural Population," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 5 (May, 1967), pp. 51-52.

³O. I. Shkaratan, "The Social Structure of the Soviet Working Class," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 1 (January, 1967), p. 29.

that economic interests, social attitudes, and social behavior are shaped by one's socio-functional role and socio-structural status in society:

What then is the dominant, determining factor of intraclass division? In our opinion the nature of the social group within the class and in society as a whole is determined by the nature and quality of the labor performed by members of the given group. The nature of labor lies at the basis of intraclass differentiation.⁴

And another Soviet scholar warns against "the tendency to deny the existence of significant differences between these social groupings."

The insolvency of such assertions are obvious. The present-day stage in the development of Socialist social relations is still attended by differences between social groupings. The differences can lead to certain nonantagonistic contradictions, which are resolved on the basis of the social, political, and ideological unity of Soviet society.⁵

Since the Revolution, the industrialization of Russia has increased the size of the working class and proliferated its skills. The cultural, educational, and technological advances have similarly expanded numerically the intelligentsia, which has become the most differentiated social group in Soviet society and actually consists of a constellation of social and political elites, from which the economic and political decision-makers are recruited. In the process, the number of peasants has been drastically reduced by nearly half (Table 5-1). It has largely gone unnoticed that these socio-economic transformations of Soviet society have not simply upset the balance between town and countryside, but have also drastically restructured Soviet rural society in the process, giving rise to a distinctive rural social structure which is only now attracting the attention of serious Soviet scholars.

⁴Arutyunyan, *op. cit.*

⁵M. Rutkevich, "Changes in the Social Structure of Soviet Society," *Pravda*, June 16, 1967.

TABLE 5-1
Changing Social Structure in the U.S.S.R., 1913-1966 (In percentages)

Class	1913	1928	1937	1939	1955	1959	1966	1966 numerical totals
Nobility, upper-class bourgeoisie, clergy, military officers etc					0	0	0	(zero)
Kulaks	3.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(zero)
Middle class	11.3	4.6	0	0	0	0	0	(zero)
and intelligentsia	6.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(zero)
		4.0	14.0	17.5	58.3	22.8	75.4	175,000,000
Workers	13.0	13.6	22.2	32.2		45.5*		
Collective farmers	0	2.9	57.9	47.9	41.2	31.4	24.6	57,000,000
Individual peasants and artisans	66.7	74.9	5.9	2.6	0.5	0.3		(zero)

Sources: *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, v 1959 *Godu* and 1965 *Godu*; *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 12, 1960, pp. 3-21.
Includes several million Sovkhoz workers and other rural working-class elements.

Rural Society: The Farms

As of 1966, 46% (107,100,000) of the Soviet population was still rural in character, although only about 22% (52 million) consisted of collective farmers and their families. The remaining 24% that made up the rural population were rural "workers and employees" and their families, which includes workers on the state-owned farms and other state-owned enterprises and institutions, and members of the rural intelligentsia and their families.⁶

The two main rural institutions of Soviet society, then, are the *kolkhoz*, or collective farm, and the *sovkhoz*, or state-owned farm. The *kolkhoz* is considered by Communists to be a relatively low form of Socialist organization in contrast to the more ideal commune and *sovkhoz*, which the regime originally supported as the more sustainable forms for a Socialist society.

THE KOLKHOZ. The dominant type of collective farm, the *kolkhoz*, is neither a genuine cooperative nor a state-owned enterprise. It can be best described as a compulsory cooperative that has been established and is supervised and controlled by the state. Most of the agricultural land is pooled together, but the peasant is entitled to retain his own house and a small garden plot, upon which he can grow vegetables and fruits to sell in the open market. The peasant is also authorized to keep small flocks of fowl, and a private cow. Under no circumstances can the peasant hire anyone but members of his own immediate family to work in his private garden. The existence of these private gardens (which, incidentally, virtually all workers, farmers, and intelligentsia in the countryside appear to have) and the time which peasants spend on them have been a source of continuing anxiety and concern to the regime, and have even been responsible for heated ideological controversies in the highest councils of the state and party. The chief worry is that they keep alive feelings of private ownership and capitalist

⁶A. Amvrosov, "The Countryside and the Times," *Izvestia*, August 11, 1967.

psychology which the regime would like to eradicate.

The kolkhoz is supposed to be governed by its members, who meet in a general assembly that is theoretically empowered to elect an executive committee and a chairman or director to manage the farm. The general meeting, according to the kolkhoz charter, supposedly confirms the farm's production plan, admits or expels members, and establishes the general regulations governing finance and administration. Actually, the director is "elected" after he is appointed by party and state officials. Soon after the replacement of Malenkov as Premier in 1955, some 30,000 new collective-farm chairmen were appointed in accordance with a directive from Moscow, and all were duly "elected" by their respective collective farms. The executive committee is normally selected or confirmed by local party and state officials.

The "voluntary" character of the collective farm and the theoretical control of the general meeting by the peasants are easily refuted by an examination not only of how the system works in practice but also of the freedom allowed it by law. The first legal restriction is that the land is owned by the state. In return for its use, the farms, before 1957, were forced to deliver a certain quota of their output to the state, at prices fixed by the state that were well below the price at which the state resold the commodities on the market. Forced deliveries were abolished in 1957, and the state has warned the farms that they no longer can be assured an automatic market; the state now purchases only what it needs at competitive prices. As long as agricultural commodities are in short supply, however, it is unlikely that collective farms will remain without buyers, and the farms have been receiving higher prices than before.

Before 1958, there was a second restriction on the initiative of the farms, in the form of state-owned Machine and Tractor Stations (M.T.S.), which "rented" their heavy agricultural machinery to the farms under "contract," in

return for payment in kind. Thus, the state owned not only the land but the principal means of production as well. The power to withhold an M.T.S. contract gave the state an effective instrument of control over the farms, since the state had to be satisfied with a farm's work norms, plan schedules, programs of forced deliveries, and use of scientific techniques before it would grant the farm a contract. The M.T.S. were abolished in 1958 and their equipment sold to the collective farms, but the farms must now first pay installments to the state for the machinery and meet all other financial obligations to the state for loans, technical assistance, and new types of seed before they can distribute the "profit" of the farm among its members.

The peasant receives payment in cash and kind for his services on the farm, in accordance with the number of "labor-day" units he has accumulated during the year. The "labor day" is an arbitrarily fixed production norm established by law and is based on a complicated formula involving both quantity and quality of work performed. All income is computed in terms of "labor days," which need not correspond to the actual labor performed during a work day, but it does provide a basic unit which can be readily divided and multiplied and applied to various types of rural labor. In 1948, nine different labor-day norms were established, the lowest being rated at one-half a "labor day" for a whole day of actual work for the least skilled work performed on the farm, and the highest being set at 2.5 "labor days," or five times that of the lowest.

Since the peasant can make more by intensively working his own tiny garden plot, sometimes illegally expanded by various ingenious devices, the state in 1939 made it compulsory for the peasant to meet his "norm," or suffer criminal and financial penalties, and to accumulate a minimum number of "labor-day" credits during the year or face exile to Siberia. The criminal penalties were abolished in 1956, but

not the financial ones. Even with financial penalties, however, some peasants still find it more profitable to work their own plots, where they can grow whatever they wish to fulfill consumer demand and sell it on the open market for high prices. The peasant cultivates his own plot with great care, and what he produces is often of much higher quality than that produced by the farm, where he grudgingly reports for work. In some categories of agricultural production (3% of the arable land, 17% of total production) the tiny plots altogether produce more than the collective farms themselves—for instance in 1966 they accounted for 60% of the potatoes produced, 68% of the eggs, 39% of the milk, and 40% of the meat!

Although the minimum wage in the countryside has been raised from 27 to 40 rubles (1 ruble=\$1.10) and about 75% of the collective farmer's income is now in cash (up from 42% in 1955), the collective farmer's average annual income is only about 535 rubles, of which about one-fourth is in kind. Half of his cash income is derived from produce raised on his private plot. It should be noted that the income of the collective farmer has increased from about 350 rubles in 1958; this suggests the deplorably low level of life which the collective farmers have had to endure. In an endeavor to provide a subsistence wage for the collective farmers, the regime has promised to introduce a guaranteed monthly income, has integrated them into the state pension system, and permits them greater flexibility in working their small private plots.

The highest-paid individual on the farm is normally the director, who receives a certain number of "labor-day" units to begin with, based on his experience and on the size and type of farm he manages. Like the factory manager, he can earn bonuses and other financial rewards for exceeding production norms. The rural intelligentsia, "stakhanovites" (workers who habitually exceed their norms by substantial amounts), and other skilled workers are also relatively well paid.

THE SOVKHOZ. The state farm is described as the highest form of Socialist agriculture in Soviet society, and is the regime's favored form of agricultural organization—but the peasants hate and fear it even more than they do the collective farm. Whereas the average collective farm embraces about 5,000 acres, the average sovkhoz runs to about 15,000 acres. The tendency is for the collective farms to become larger and the sovkhozes to diminish in size, so that eventually distinctions in size, will be rendered irrelevant. In recent years many collective farms have been transformed into state farms, and thus while the number of the latter increases, that of the former decreases (see Table 5-2). The sovkhoz is managed by a director who is appointed by the Minister of Agriculture, and his status is comparable to that of a large factory's manager and is usually more important than that of the kolkhoz director. He is also likely to have more experience and formal education than the kolkhoz director. Workers are hired directly by the state, and receive wages. They are not described as peasants in the official literature but are listed among "workers and employees." Several farms may be grouped together in a larger administrative unit, the *trust*.

Many of the sovkhozes are located in remote areas, and most of the new lands brought under cultivation (the "virgin lands") are organized into state farms. Like the collective farm, the sovkhoz is a self-contained rural community with its own recreation centers, schools, medical clinics, laboratories, agricultural machinery, animals, and implements. Many sovkhozes specialize in certain crops and often are centers of agricultural experimentation, with their own scientific and technical personnel. The average wage of a sovkhoz worker is about 700 rubles plus what he grows on his private plot, which is usually smaller than that of the collective farm.

OTHER STATE-OWNED AGENCIES. It is often overlooked that in rural sectors, the state

TABLE 5-2
Kolkhozes, Sovkhozes, and M.T.S., 1928-1966

	1928	1940	1953	1957	1959	1960	1966
Kolkhozes	33,300	236,900	93,300	78,200	54,600	44,900	36,900
Sovkhozes	1,407	4,159	4,857	5,905	6,496	7,375	11,681
M.T.S.	6	7,069	8,985	7,903	34	23	(zero)

Source: *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo . . . v 1959 Godu and . . . v 1965 Godu.*

employs some 15 million workers and employees in a wide variety of nonagricultural work: education, health, culture, science, industry, construction, communications, trade, and transportation. About 3 million of these employees are members of the intelligentsia, about 4 million are engaged in low-level "mental" labor, and the remainder (8 million) perform some type of physical labor. The precise social status of these nonagricultural workers in the rural areas is difficult to determine, as is their assimilation and accommodation to the state and collective farms, which are often self-contained units.

Rural Social Stratification

Five distinct social strata flourish in Soviet rural society: about 60% of the rural population are (1) ordinary peasants, and the remaining 40% consist of (2) the rural intelligentsia, (3) rural foremen, (4) the rural "working class," and (5) other workers and employees in state-owned enterprises and institutions.

THE DIRECTORS. The rural social pyramid has at its apex the directors of the collective farms and the sovkhozes, who are invariably not native to the locality in which they serve. The director, whether of the kolkhoz or the sovkhoz, represents the interests of the party and the state, to which he is beholden for his position, his salary and bonuses for superior production records, and his professional and political future. His primary goal is thus to sat-

isfy the demands of the party and the state and not the peasants, who often become mere instruments of production. The director usually cultivates the popularity of the peasants and caters to their interests only if it will enhance production and is conducive to efficient management. As an agent of the regime, the director is responsible for seeing that the state receives its proper share of farm produce, that the property of the state is safe from pilferage, and that an indoctrination program is given the peasants (in cooperation with the local party organization) to insure that they faithfully execute all the state and party directives. In the words of one Soviet scholar, because of "the very structure of today's rural society . . . the chairman [kolkhoz director] must combine two utterly different roles in his day-to-day work: organizer of production, and 'leader' of the village society."⁷

The director is often the most powerful administrative and political personage in the rural locality, not excluding the local party secretary and the chairman of the local soviet, with whom he shares local political power. The latter two individuals have powerful inspection and auditing authority, and they are also responsible for the formal transmission of party and state directives—but they are not invested with managerial or administrative authority over the farms. The director himself is frequently the most powerful political individual in a local

⁷*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 2, 1967.

TABLE 5-3
Rural Social Structure

<i>Social Category</i>	<i>Number</i>
<i>Intelligentsia</i>	3,701,810
Directors and Executives	99,405
Sovkhoz Directors	11,681
Kolkhoz Directors	36,583
Sovkhoz Deputy Administrators	36,763
Kolkhoz Deputy Directors	14,378
Technical Intelligentsia	503,000
Sovkhoz	161,000
Kolkhoz	185,000
'Other' Employees	157,000
Other Intelligentsia* (estimated)	3,000,000
<i>Rural Foremen</i>	396,684
Sovkhoz	127,634
Kolkhoz	269,050
<i>Rural "Workers"</i>	15,199,000
Sovkhoz	1,291,000
Kolkhoz	1,908,000
Other* (estimated)	12,000,000
<i>Farmers</i>	28,915,000
Sovkhoz	6,815,000
Kolkhoz	17,600,000
(Part time)	4,500,000
Grand Total	48,212,494

*Includes military specialists, executives and administrators of other state-owned enterprises, and cultural, educational, health and other professional personnel in rural areas.

*Includes members of the armed forces and workers, low level "mental workers," and service personnel in industrial, construction, communications, and other state-owned enterprises in rural areas.

district by virtue of his long experience and membership in the party. In 1960, more than 95% of the directors were party members. The director, party secretary, and soviet chairman often constitute a local "troika" or directorate, and the three together virtually pre-empt all political power in the rural locality.

In 1959, the number of kolkhoz chairmen and their deputies was given as 102,800, but by April, 1966, in conformity with the planned

amalgamation of collective farms, the numbers had been reduced to 51,000, of which 36,583 were listed as directors and 14,378 as assistant directors. As the collective farms are increased in size, the complexities of management and the importance of political reliability increase. The amalgamation process, which has been under way since 1950, does much to explain the higher percentages of technically qualified and politically motivated collective farm directors. The number of Sovkhoz directors in 1966 was 11,681, and, since many of the larger state farms are divided into a number of sectors for administrative purposes, these officials were assisted by 36,763 deputies and assistants.

THE PEASANTS The ordinary peasantry itself is divided into three groups, the first being those (about 6,800,000) who work on the sovkhozes and by-and-large perform some special task. The second group consists of about 2 million collective farmers who also pursue some type of specialization in crop production. The third group is made up of some 20 million full-time and part-time muzhiks without any type of specialization, who constitute the overwhelming bulk of the collective farmers and rest at the bottom of the rural social structure, and indeed at the bottom of the Soviet social and economic order as a whole. The sovkhoz farmers enjoy the highest status of the three. Their cash income ordinarily is much higher than that of the kolkhoznik, although on some of the rich collective farms the collective farmers are better off.

The Soviet peasantry in its entirety, numbering about 70 million people (including families) on both collective and state farms, still rivals the working class as the largest single social class in Soviet society. Although the peasant works longer and harder than his urban counterpart, he receives less than any other class in terms of education, medical care, sanitation, transportation and communication facilities, consumer goods, recreational

facilities, and other ordinary amenities of Soviet life. In terms of real income, even Soviet data reported in 1956 that the income of the Soviet peasant "in cash and kind" was only three times that of the peasant before 1913, which was described as "extremely low." This indicates that millions of peasants earned little more than the subsistence amount represented by the then legal Soviet minimum wage of 27–35 rubles (30–38 dollars) per month. By 1964, the minimum wage was raised to 40–45 rubles (44–50 dollars) per month and had been established in virtually all sectors of the Soviet economy.

As a political force, the peasantry has little direct influence. Unlike the workers and various sections of the intelligentsia, who have not only their trade unions but various guild and professional organizations, the Soviet peasants have, as the only legal rural organization permitted them, the collective farm—and thus the Soviet peasantry is deprived even of the Soviet version of a "pressure group." Their only recourse is to malingering, refuse to meet quotas, spend more time on their own little garden plots, and in general "drag their feet"—all of which they have been doing very well. The situation had become so serious by mid-1962 that the regime ordered an extraordinary increase in the price of butter and meat. This increase, which represented a 25–30% rise, offered the collective farms higher prices for their commodities as a spur to greater production. After Khrushchev's ouster, further inducements were made in the form of higher prices, and in the granting of certain minor yet attractive privileges—such as more freedom in using the private plot.

In the meantime, social mobility on the farm has become sluggish. With the end of the era of rapid industrialization, economic and social opportunities have seriously decreased. Peasant youth are no longer encouraged to migrate to the cities; in fact, urban dwellers are urged to move back to the farm. Since educational op-

portunities for the children of collective farmers are less than those for workers and the intelligentsia, the peasantry is entering a period of social stagnation. Opportunities for direct movement from the peasantry to the intelligentsia within a single generation are few. The ranks of the intelligentsia are being filled increasingly from within itself and from the workers. Since mobility from peasant status to that of worker is itself becoming more difficult, direct movement from peasantry to the intelligentsia is virtually impossible. Although the seven-year school was recently made compulsory for all rural areas, in the cities the 10-year school is the rule, with ample opportunities for attendance at institutions of higher learning, or specialized secondary schools. Table 5–4 literally speaks for itself.

The Workers

According to the census of 1959, the social category "workers and employees," together with their families, accounted for nearly 143 million people, or more than 68% of the Soviet population. By 1966, however, the percentage had increased to 74.5 (175 million). The 1959 census reported a total of 99 million people actually employed (about 47% of the population), with more than 81% of all employed people being engaged in "productive" work and 14.6% involved in services and other nonproductive labor. Of the total employed, 78,635,000 (79.3%) were engaged in physical labor, while 20,495,000 (20.7%) were engaged in "mental work." Women accounted for 48% of all those employed and 54% of those engaged in intellectual labor. In the Soviet Union, virtually the entire adult population of the country is gainfully employed, with 54% of all males and 41.5% of all females actively working.

The total Soviet labor force (the able-bodied, working-age sector of the population) in 1966 was estimated at nearly 123 million, of which about 110 million were actually employed,

TABLE 5-4
Urban-Rural Educational Levels, 1939-1959 (In millions of people)

Educational level	1959 total	1959		Percentage rural		Per 1,000 1959		Per 1,000 1939	
		urban	rural	1959	1939	urban	rural	urban	rural
Complete higher	3,778	3,170	608	16%	20%	32	56	16	17
Incomplete higher	1,738	1,332	406	23					
Specialized secondary	7,870	5,446	2,424	31	30	344	188	162	37
Complete secondary	9,936	7,426	2,510	25					
Incomplete secondary	35,386	20,254	15,132	45					

Source: *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo v 1959 Godu*

distributed as follows (1) approximately 3 million in the armed forces, (2) 39 million in agriculture, (3) over 27 million in industry; and (4) over 40 million in other nonagricultural sectors of the economy (construction, transportation, communications, education, science, culture, health, and service categories). Of the totally employed in the civilian part of the economy, 77 million were classified as "workers and employees," 25 million were rated as workers on collective farms, including some 4.4 million classified as "other," mainly part-time or seasonal workers in private plots and collective farms. Of the 77 million workers and employees, 26 million were classified as "mental workers," leaving 51 million to be categorized as "physical workers." Of this group, about 8 million were on state farms. Nearly 2 million equipment operators and maintenance personnel were also to be found on collective farms. Thus, we can arrive at an estimated figure of 46.3 million for the entire "working class," including 3.3 million equipment operators and maintenance personnel on the farms.

Soviet data since the 1959 census does not provide complete information on the separate classification and statistical breakdowns for

"physical labor" and "mental labor," but provides statistics only on the distribution of "workers and employees," including both "physical" and "mental" by sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, the growth in the number of "workers and employees," and their changing distribution in the Soviet economy, are significant indicators of Soviet economic development, as Table 5-5 demonstrates.

The general trend in Soviet employment distribution is for the proportion of collective farmers to diminish in relation to state farm workers, and for agricultural labor to diminish in relation to nonagricultural work. In the latter category, the general trend is for unskilled work to diminish (it has vanished in industry and was only about 16% in construction in 1966), as the categories of both skilled and semiskilled labor increases. In 1925, only 18.5% of the workers in industry were considered skilled; by 1950, the proportion had increased to 49.6%, and in 1961 it was 64.6%. During the same period, semiskilled workers accounted for 41.3%, 47.9% and 35.4% respectively, the residual being considered unskilled. On the farms, in contrast, 42% of those on state farms and 76.6% on collective farms possessed no

TABLE 5-5

Distribution of Soviet "Workers and Employees" in the Soviet Economy, 1928-1966

<i>Economic Sector</i>	1928	1940	1950	1959	1966
Industry	3,773	10,967	14,144	20,207	27,070
Construction	723	1,563	2,569	4,800	5,620
Transportation	1,270	3,425	4,082	5,972	7,295
Communications	95	478	542	691	1,010
Trade (all forms)	583	3,303	3,325	4,389	6,030
Public Health	399	1,507	2,051	3,245	4,290
Education	807	3,024	4,029	6,030	9,260
Administration	1,010	1,825	1,831	1,273	1,440
Housing-Communal	147	1,221	1,210	1,713	2,410
Agriculture	1,735	2,976	3,881	6,190	9,435
"Other" (residual)	248	903	1,231	1,999	3,040
Total	10,790	31,192	38,895	56,509	76,900

skill at all. *It should be particularly noted, however, that the overwhelming proportion of unskilled workers in the Soviet economy is made up of women, who perform much of the arduous and menial labor in the Soviet Union.*

Another important trend in Soviet employment is for the balance between "physical" and "mental" labor to change in favor of the latter as the Soviet economy becomes more sophisticated and moves in the direction of a consumer-oriented "affluent" society. In 1966, 26 million "workers and employees"—over 23% of the totally employed (including members of the armed forces)—were classified as mental workers (84 million were "physical"), an increase of 5.5 million over 1959 (when 78.5 million were "physical").

TRADE UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT. The Soviet working class is organized into trade unions whose membership currently exceeds 80 million. Unlike workers' organizations in most other countries, these unions are not truly voluntary organizations representing the economic, social, and more often political interests of the workers, but are more-or-less compulsory mass organizations under the complete control and supervision of the state and party. (As a social group, the working class enjoys far

greater representation in the party than does the peasantry, and the opportunities for working-class children to move upward socially via higher education are definitely superior to those of the peasant.)

The advantages of union membership are so obvious that it is virtually universal. Actually some of the so-called social and economic rights guaranteed to the Soviet citizen by the Constitution can be exercised only after joining a trade union. Also, union members receive twice the sickness and disability benefits paid to other workers; they can apply for special loans and grants from union funds; and their likelihood of spending a vacation at one of the various sanatoria and health resorts on the Crimean or Caucasian shores of the Black Sea is greater. And, only members can take advantage of the trade unions' elaborate networks of cultural, educational, and recreational facilities, in the factories and elsewhere.

All these benefits notwithstanding, of course, members of Soviet labor organizations cannot have a role in political life outside the framework of the Communist Party. Although the worker has a formal "pressure group" in the form of a union, he is shorn of any independent political leverage. However, because of his close proximity to the centers of power, and his

access to party membership, he does have an opportunity to exert individual pressure through his union, his local party organization, or his local soviet—or simply by writing a letter to the newspapers.

Workers do not strike in the Soviet Union, not because they "own" the factories, as today's Soviet leaders fatuously maintain, but because they would suffer violent repression. Strikes are not technically illegal, but the penalties for "sabotage" and "counter-revolutionary activity" are very severe, and strikes called without the approval of party or trade-union authorities would be so designated. However, workers are relatively free to pick their own jobs, unlike in the grim days of the Stalin era when many workers were prevented from leaving their places of work or were assigned to new jobs and locations for trivial infractions such as absenteeism and being late for work.

In spite of changes in the responsibilities and authority of the trade unions, introduced between 1959 and 1965, the paramount objective of the plant union leader remains virtually identical to that of the plant director and the factory party secretary. This factory "troika" encourages the workers to fulfill or exceed production goals established by the regime, so that the workers and the "troika" can collect bonuses and enhance their professional careers. The unions also engage in sham "collective bargaining" and actually sign a "contract" with the director, covering working conditions, individual grievance procedures, and the general administration of their specific plant or enterprise. Under no circumstances are the workers allowed to complain against the established economic or labor policies of the government, but they may "expose" corruption, collusion, inefficiency, and negligence on the part of management if they feel sufficiently courageous. Since Stalin's death, workers have more often exercised their right to complain about work norms, promotions, transfers, dismissals, job classifications, application of proper wage

scales, overtime pay, sick leave, severance pay, etc. Dissatisfied employees may now even appeal the decision of a labor disputes board to a public court for a review of the dispute or grievance.

The administration of the factory is the sole responsibility of the director, and although his performance is watched and checked by both the plant party secretary and the trade-union leader, they cannot interfere with his direction unless they wish to make formal charges of mismanagement. The three normally work cooperatively with one another and are not ordinarily in professional competition with each other. The plant director is normally a technically trained specialist (usually an engineer), though this is not the usual background of the party and union officials.

INCOME AND WAGES. In industry, the quality and number of skills have gradually expanded through on-the-job training and special vocational schools, which continue to train millions of new workers every year. The more skilled, talented, and educated the worker, the greater is his reward. The ideal citizen of the future in the Soviet vision is the worker-engineer who works with both hands and brain.

Like others in Soviet society, workers are paid according to their skill and the amount (and quality) of their work. Each skill has its basic pay scale, based on production norms established by the regime, with extra pay for fulfillment and overfulfillment of the quotas. The minimum wage for urban workers established by law in 1957 was 35 rubles per month, which was raised in 1964 to 45 rubles. About 8 million workers were making less than 35 rubles per month in late 1956, and the 1957 law raised their pay to the new minimum. The average monthly earnings of *all* wage and salary earners in 1965 was about 95 rubles (\$105.56), but a range of 60–80 rubles per month, including incentive bonuses, appears to be the norm of the urban worker.

ple, would consider itself fortunate if it had two small rooms to itself and shared a kitchen with one or more families. Indeed, according to the 1959 census, the majority of families live in one-room apartments. Only 23.5% had private kitchens—36.5% shared kitchens, and 22.3% were without kitchens at all. Some 11% of the families used the kitchen as a dwelling place as well. Average apartments in many crowded metropolitan areas would be considered slums, or at least sub-standard housing, in the U.S. and in Western Europe. Maintenance and repair are almost always inadequate or nonexistent.

The occupancy density of Soviet apartments, according to 1965 figures, was 2.33 persons per room—down from 2.78 in 1960 (1.5 person per room is considered excessive by Western European and U.S. standards). In 1958, there were 5.40 square meters (less than 60 square feet) of dwelling space per urban inhabitant; in 1965, this had been raised to 6.42 square meters (less than 70 square feet, exclusive of kitchen and bath) per occupant, although the official norm is supposed to be 9 square meters. In Moscow alone, 40% of the housing was considered substandard in 1964 by Soviet standards, with tenants forced to share common kitchens and bathrooms. While the space per capita has not shown much improvement, there is more privacy now for Soviet citizens. New apartment rooms are smaller and have fewer people per room, and more private baths and kitchens.

Housing usually is assigned in accordance with the individual's status in the economy and social hierarchy. Needless to say, perhaps, the intelligentsia monopolizes the most decent housing in the cities, but even this is quite modest—usually two rooms and a kitchen. Even the best-paid and most noteworthy members of Soviet society rarely have apartments exceeding four or five rooms. The celebrated Yuri Gagarin, the first Soviet astronaut, for example, was moved from an old two-room apartment to a new four-room dwelling after his history-making venture into space.

The Soviet worker spends about 50 to 70% of his income for food, while the peasant spends virtually none. Food prices for ordinary staples are cheap, but the staples are not always available. Of course the intelligentsia can afford more and better food, not only at home, but in restaurants, where prices are very high.

The Soviet Intelligentsia

The Soviet concept of the intelligentsia embraces not only members of the arts, sciences, and professions, but engineers, lawyers, technicians of various kinds, government officials, doctors, journalists, university students, and a wide spectrum of "white-collar" employees. The intelligentsia are all considered to be "mental workers"—a term we have used several times already.

After the Revolution, the intelligentsia was to be made to serve the new ruling class—the proletariat. Virtually all "nonpolitical" technical and specialist posts were filled with members of the old intelligentsia, pending the creation of a new corps of technicians and specialists from the proletariat. The government bureaucracy, the Army, and educational and medical establishments continued to rely on the old intelligentsia for their operations. As the new Soviet intelligentsia grew in numbers, the remnants of the old were gradually retired, purged, or isolated in innocuous enterprises. Surprisingly, however, the suspicions of the working class, the peasantry, and the regime against the intelligentsia did not abate completely, and the existence of a privileged stratum in a society that cherishes the cult of equality continues to nag the system.

Between 1939 and 1965 the number of mental workers increased from 9,600,000 to about 26 million, with the greatest increment being registered in the lower ranks (Table 5-8). Of course it would be absurd to classify all "mental" workers as members of the Soviet intelligentsia proper, which comprises only about 13 million.

TABLE 5-8
Soviet "Mental Workers," 1939-1965

	1939	1959	1965
Totals	9,600,000	20,495,000	26,000,000
Executives in state administration, public organizations, and their departments	445,000	392,100	
Executives of enterprises and their departments	757,000	955,000	
Collective farm chairmen and their deputies	(278,800)*	(102,800)	
Engineering and technical personnel	1,656,500	4,205,900	
Engineers (excluding executives)	(247,300)	(834,300)	
Designers and draftsmen	(103,900)	(297,100)	
Foremen	(267,000)	(753,500)	
Technicians	(274,000)	(513,000)	
Laboratory assistants	(156,500)	(436,200)	
Agronomists, zootechnicians, vets, foresters	294,900	477,200	
Scientists and educators in higher education	111,600	316,400	
Heads of educational institutions	(73,100)	(114,900)	
Other teachers, educators, scientific workers	1,368,400	2,403,700	
Senior physicians and medical executives	46,500	44,000	
Physicians	122,300	337,900	
Dentists	14,000	31,700	
Interns, midwives, nurses	332,400	1,058,200	
Planning, auditing, accounting personnel	3,102,000	3,501,900	
Economists, planners, statisticians	(282,100)	(308,300)	
Accountants, bookkeepers	(1,785,400)	(1,816,900)	
Cashiers, clerks	(279,300)	(413,500)	
Inspection and audit personnel	(755,200)	(963,200)	
Literature and publishing	58,000	104,100	
Cultural workers	285,000	462,000	
Librarians	(87,000)	(239,000)	
Arts	143,300	190,600	
Lawyers, judges, prosecutors	82,600	101,700	
Communications personnel	265,400	476,400	
Trade, restaurants, etc.	1,626,000	2,268,220	
Directors, etc.	(244,900)	(334,800)	
Secretarial personnel	489,400	535,900	
Public and social services personnel	202,500	277,100	
Agents and expeditors	176,400	146,000	
Unaccounted for (probably includes military, etc.)		1,875,000	

Source: *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 12, 1960

*Figures in parentheses are included in the total of the general category

The intelligentsia occupies a crucial and powerful position in the Soviet economy. Virtually all economic and political power is concentrated in this group. Those who control the party and state are automatically part of the intelligentsia. All the managerial, technical, and scientific skills are concentrated in the intelligentsia, for, by definition, any person who possesses these skills is a member of the intel-

ligentsia. The intelligentsia plans production, establishes national goals and purposes, allocates rewards, and makes, executes, and enforces the law. If the intelligentsia were in permanent control of the economy and other institutions of society and could transmit this control from one generation to the next, it would meet all the formal requirements for being a "ruling class," but it does not have this

power. Its individual members have no legal right to their social status, nor can they hope to keep it through material wealth; to belong to the intelligentsia, one must actively perform certain specialized functions *and* demonstrate ideological conformity.

A better index to the size of the Soviet intelligentsia proper would begin with the total number of specialists with higher and specialized secondary education employed in the national economy (see Table 5-9). As of November 15, 1965, these persons numbered 12,066,000 (17,200,000 if the military, pensioners and others not employed in the national economy are included). The distribution of these specialists by specialization, on November 15, 1965, was as follows:

TABLE 5-9
*Distribution of Intelligentsia
by Specialization, 1965*

Higher Education

Engineers	1,630,800
Agricultural technicians	302,800
Economists, statisticians	301,100
Trade specialists	35,000
Lawyers	84,600
Physicians	500,800
Teachers, librarians, cultural specialists	1,859,500
Total	4,891,000

Specialized Secondary Education

Technicians	2,886,700
Agricultural technicians	465,000
Planners, statisticians	571,000
Trade specialists	291,000
Lawyers	16,400
Medical specialists, including dentists	1,453,600
Teachers, librarians, cultural specialists	1,282,300
Total	7,174,900
Grand Total	12,065,900

WOMEN IN THE INTELLIGENTSIA. In 1959, women made up 54% (11,055,000) of the "mental workers." Within the intelligentsia itself, women are overwhelmingly represented in some sectors, only sparsely in others. Among state, party, and economic executives, the number of women is very small, while in areas like teaching, medicine, and in the offices of economic planning bodies, they dominate. But when these categories are more closely scrutinized, we find that whereas nearly 70% of the teachers are women, only about 22% of the school principals are women; although 38% of the scientific workers in 1965 were of the female sex, their proportion diminished rapidly as the status, prestige, and importance of the position increased. Thus, of the 48,900 junior research workers and research assistants, 25,000 (51%) were women; of the 28,700 senior research workers (research associates), 8,300 (28%) were women; of the 48,000 docents (associate professors), 9,500 (19%) were women; but of the 12,500 academicians and professors, only 1,100 (8%) were women. And, although in 1965 women accounted for 73% of the physicians and 92% of all medical specialists, most of the important administrative positions in medical establishments were occupied by the few men in the field. Thus, while individual women can aspire to any social level in Soviet society, from membership in the Party Presidium or a government Ministry to the lowest cleaning occupations, the more significant the political or power implications of the position, the narrower their opportunities. Further, as in most other societies, women have virtually no access to the main instruments of coercion in Soviet society, the armed forces and the secret police.

NATIONALITY COMPOSITION OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA. Although the Russians account for 55% of the total population of the U.S.S.R., they make up more than 62% of the intelligentsia. Of the other nationalities, only the

Jews, Georgians, and Armenians reflect a higher ratio in the composition of the intelligentsia than their share of the population. The other nationalities, in varying degrees, are under-represented, the most extreme cases being in Central Asia. Tremendous progress, however, has been registered in creating a national intelligentsia for each nationality, as is shown in Table 5-10.

Generally speaking, it is the policy of the regime to bring about a numerical correlation between a nationality's proportion in the total population and its share of the intelligentsia. As a consequence, the underrepresented nationalities show a more rapid rate of growth in the size of their intelligentsia, while the over-represented nationalities (except for the Russians) show a corresponding decrease in their relative share of the intelligentsia. Table 5-9, which is a further statistical refinement of the Soviet intelligentsia by sex and levels of educational and intellectual achievement, shows

the relative ranking of the various nationalities at different levels of achievement, and the proportion of women at each level.

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION

Every society develops its own special avenues to higher rewards and status, although as the society "matures" and the opportunities for its evolution and differentiation within the existing socio-political framework are narrowed, those roads tend to be blocked by law, custom, and advantages of birth. During the early years of the Soviet regime, when it was struggling for survival, virtually the only channel for social movement upwards was through political loyalty and ideological conformity. Access to positions of responsibility and to higher education and training was available only through the party or its preparatory insti-

TABLE 5-10
*Distribution of Intelligentsia by Nationality,
Level of Educational Attainment, and Sex, 1965*

Nationality	Population, 1959	Specialized Secondary Education		Higher Education		Scientists	
		Number	Women	Number	Women	Number	Women
Russians	114,500,000	4,361,400	65%	2,679,400	57%	441,000	
Ukrainians	36,981,000	1,067,100	60	667,200	49	70,800	
Jews	2,268,000	159,700	54	322,700	48	53,100	
Byelorussians	7,829,000	216,400	64	126,200	49	12,800	
Georgians	2,650,000	80,700	58	106,900	41	12,900	
Armenians	2,787,000	72,300	54	91,400	42	13,500	
Tatars	4,968,000	105,800	65	67,200	55	7,700	
Azerbaijanis	2,929,000	68,200	37	61,500	29	8,600	
Uzbeks	6,004,000	72,900	28	72,600	26	6,700	
Kazakhs	3,581,000	57,000	36	49,800	31	4,500	
Lithuanians	2,326,000	59,500	67	40,100	49	5,700	
Latvians	1,400,000	47,100	63	31,800	55	4,300	
Estonians	969,000	36,000	64	24,000	52	3,500	
Moldavians	2,214,000	27,600	60	16,700	42	1,400	
Tadzhiks	1,397,000	16,600	19	15,500	17	1,400	
Turkmen	1,004,000	13,300	18	14,400	15	1,200	
Kirgiz	974,000	13,800	34	13,100	28	1,000	
Total (incl. other nationalities)		6,702,100	62%	4,547,600	52%	664,600	51%

tutions. However, once it was realized that political loyalty and ideological conformity were insufficient to ensure the technical competence and professional knowledge necessary for the economic and cultural transformation of society, political and ideological tests were de-emphasized for positions which were relatively nonpolitical in character, but required special ability, knowledge, and skill. It was only demanded that the individual not be actively hostile to the regime. Naturally, the rarer the skill and the knowledge, and the fewer the individuals with special aptitudes, the greater the immunity from political and ideological tests.

Political Conformity and Professional Competence

In due time, two separate but parallel avenues of social advancement were established: those of political loyalty and technical competence. When the two are combined, success is virtually assured in the Soviet system. Competence alone is sufficient to assure high status and rewards, but not the highest; loyalty alone is rarely sufficient, since, by itself, it is always in plentiful supply. However, whether one embarks on the ideological-political or technical-professional road to success, higher education is the common vestibule through which all must first pass. Access to higher education, and the rewards it promises, is thus fundamental, since mobility upwards in Soviet society is almost impossible without it.

The best avenues of social mobility are still through politics, but the risks are correspondingly higher. The more remote one is from politics, the more secure is his status. For this reason, many people eschew "political" careers entirely, immersing themselves in the sciences and mathematics, the study of foreign languages, ancient history, literature, and a host of other fields widely divorced from political reality. High social rewards in Soviet society

are thus possible in certain technical and specialized areas, even without membership in the Communist Party. Large numbers of outstanding scientists, professors, and artists deliberately remain outside the Communist Party and consciously avoid involvement in politics, relying only upon their abilities and talents to achieve success.

Even within the sciences and professions and arts, however, there is the "political" scientist, professor, or artist, who may have achieved some distinction in his field, but is not of outstanding caliber and propels his movement upward by joining the party and accepting the inherent risks and corresponding opportunities. Administrative and supervisory positions in bodies like the Academy of Sciences are likely to be bestowed upon the savant who chooses to become involved in party activities, rather than the most eminent personalities in the given field of endeavor.

If loyalty and competence are the two primary personal factors involved in social mobility, there are a number of peripheral or secondary considerations which can affect social mobility adversely or advantageously. They are: social origins, nationality, and sex.

SOCIAL ORIGINS. Social origin plays a crucial role in relation to accessibility to higher education and one's advancement after its attainment. During the early years of the regime, social origin played an important negative role, with definite preferences being shown toward those of working-class and peasant parentage. Today, having a kulak, priest, merchant, or even a nobleman as an ancestor is no longer a social crime, although it is slightly more respectable to be of working-class, peasant, or "toiling intelligentsia" background.

Social origin, once again, is assuming an important influence on the contours of social mobility. All things being equal, the children of members of the intelligentsia will have greater opportunities for remaining in the privileged

stratum or advancing upward within it than will children of working-class and peasant parents. As Soviet society becomes more routinized and stabilized, the normal patterns of family connections and favoritism inevitably exact their tribute in gaining admission to schools, acquiring preferred geographical assignments, and gaining promotions. Children of "working-class" origin still have ample opportunity for higher education, provided they have demonstrated ability, but they labor under the normal disadvantage of not having the superior cultural, environmental, and psychological preparation which the children of the intelligentsia enjoy.⁸

Children of peasant origin, particularly on the collective farms, have fewer and fewer opportunities. Although compulsory education in rural areas is now seven years, this is insufficient to allow them to compete equally with children in the urban areas, who are now assured of 10 years of schooling. Most of the children of peasant parentage are doomed to stay on the farm and can hardly aspire to more than a modest advance into the rural "working-class" or rural foreman group.

NATIONAL ORIGIN. Even if not admitted, national origin does influence the social mobility of an individual. Membership in certain nationalities automatically creates definite limitations, while membership in other nationalities provides better opportunities which are equally accidental in character. All things being

equal, a Great Russian is endowed with greater advantages than citizens of other nationalities. Russian is the official language of the party and state, the medium of instruction in all of its most important institutions of higher learning, the language of the most numerous and powerful nationality, the language of the most influential culture. An absolute command of the Russian language is an indispensable prerequisite for social mobility beyond the purely local national level, and this is a special barrier which the native Russian does not have to overcome. The opportunities for Ukrainians are also fairly abundant. Smaller nationalities, like the Georgians, Armenians, Jews, and Germans, have also enjoyed special advantages because of a relatively higher rate of educational attainment and acquired skills, although both Jews and Germans have suffered discrimination and prejudice for political reasons—namely, suspicions of divided ideological and psychological loyalties. While many Jews are found in the arts, sciences, and professions, they appear to be systematically excluded from sensitive areas like the diplomatic service, and informal quotas have been established limiting their numbers in institutions of higher learning.

The Moslem nationalities have had fewest opportunities of all, not only because of a heritage of backwardness (which was real enough), but also because of suspected political unreliability and the inevitable residual cultural prejudices which continue to divide Christian and Moslem nationalities. With the accelerated educational and cultural transformation of these nationalities, their opportunities have correspondingly increased, and prejudices resulting from national origins will continue to diminish progressively in the future.

⁸For a recent Soviet study of this problem, cf. M. N. Rutkevich, "The Social Sources of the Replenishment of the Soviet Intelligentsia," *Voprosy Filosofii*, June, 1967, pp. 15-34.

VI

The Communist Party

The ultimate power in Soviet society is vested in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Political action outside the framework of the party is illegal and thus subject to the harshest penalties. The monopoly position of the party in the Soviet system is given juridical expression in Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution:

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union . . . is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build a Communist society and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state.

As the ultimate repository of power in the Soviet system, the symbol of legitimacy, and the organization through which are disseminated the policies of the Soviet leadership, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emerges as the arena in which social, ideological, and political conflicts are resolved into decisions. Although the nature and composition of the party have undergone significant change, there has been little alteration in its formal organization and structure. The membership of the party has been substantially expanded, its institutions and organs periodically rearranged, and qualifications for membership adjusted, but in its outward form and in its basic principles of organization, the party shows remarkable continuity.

Article 19 of the 1961 party statutes outlines the principal characteristics of party organization as follows:

The guiding principle of party organizational structure is democratic centralism, which means:

- a. Election of all leading party organs, from the lowest to the highest organ.
- b. Periodic accountability of party organs to their party organizations and higher organs.
- c. Strict party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority.
- d. The decision of the higher organs are absolutely binding on lower organs.

The principal "democratic" feature of the party organization is the theoretical right of the rank-and-file membership of the party to elect the representatives of the lowest party organs directly. Those lower organs in turn select representatives to the next higher body, and so it goes, on up through the pyramidal structure of the party, culminating in the Central Committee, the Presidium, and the Secretariat.

At the bottom of the party pyramid are the myriads of primary party organs, which remain the only party units organized along functional lines (Fig. 6-1). The structure of the party follows the territorial-administrative pattern of the state, which is divided into both territorial-administrative and ethno-administrative units, which frequently overlap. Thus, whereas the primary party units elect delegates to the next higher territorial organizations—the rayon and city organs may send delegates directly to oblast, Autonomous Oblast, kray, or Autonomous Republic party conferences, as the case may be. In the case of some of the smaller Union Republics, the territory is divided simply into rayons, and the rayon organizations elect delegates directly to the Union Republic Party Congress.¹

Theoretically, each party organization, at whatever level, elects its own executive officials and secretaries, but they are held to be accountable not only to the organ which elects them but to the next higher organ as well. Since the party rules read that "the decisions of the higher organs are absolutely binding on lower organs," officials and secretaries of lower organs

reflect the will, not of the bodies which elected them, but of the organ directly above them. Accountability of officials to their own party organizations thus amounts to little more than faithful and efficient execution of decisions handed down from above.

The total number of party organizations in 1967 was over 342,000, embracing 12,135,100 party members and 549,000 candidate members, for a total membership of over 12½ million people—an increase of about 2,500,000 since the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961. The party organizations in 1967 were distributed as follows.²

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Number</i>
Union Republic	14
Kray	6
Autonomous Republic	20
Oblast	133
Autonomous Oblast	8
National District	10
City	747
Borough	417
Rayon	2,746
Primary party organizations	337,915

THE PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

The primary party organizations (P.P.O.), formerly called "party cells," are found at every level of Soviet society. Ranging in membership from three to 3,000 people, they are formed at a place of work, except in rural areas where they may be organized at a place of residence or in a housing administration. These party cells are found in factories, farms, schools, universities, research institutes, stores, cultural institutions, government bureaus and offices, armed forces and police units. In any Soviet

¹In 1962, Khrushchev reorganized the party at the regional levels, dividing it into agricultural and industrial sectors with twin parallel organizational structures which were merged at the level of the Union Republic. This doubled the number of regional and local party secretaries and party organs, diluted the power and authority of existing party officials and bodies, and generally disoriented many party workers. Immediately after Khrushchev's removal in October, 1964, this double-headed organizational monstrosity, which never functioned properly or effectively, was dissolved and the territorial production principle of organization was restored.




FIGURE 6-1 *The organizational structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.*

institution or enterprise in which there are at least three party members, a primary organization may be formed.

As the basic unit of party organization, the party cells are in direct contact with the rank-and-file membership of the party and are thus the final organs for the dissemination of party policies and decisions. In the performance of this function, the party cell "carries out mass agitation and propagandist work, educates the masses in the spirit of Communism," and further "organizes workers to implement Communist construction tasks, leads Socialist competition to implement state plans and pledges, mobilizes the masses . . . and strives to strengthen labor discipline, to achieve a steady increase in labor productivity and improvement of production standards, and to protect and in-

crease communal property in enterprises and on collective and state farms." Primary party organizations also check to ensure that the enterprises or institutions in which they are located are performing in accordance with party dictates, and the cells are supposed to "promptly inform the party organs of any shortcomings in the work of the establishment or individual workers, regardless of their positions."

Communist Party cells thus resemble permanent vigilante committees; they must show more zeal and enthusiasm for the Soviet cause than ordinary citizens, and very often their self-righteous exhortations irritate many sectors of the Soviet population. Since many Soviet citizens become party members for opportunistic reasons, their ideological enthusiasm is

often superficial. The meetings, lectures, parades, and cultural programs constantly being organized by party cells to disseminate the party's ideological propaganda are not always well attended, and are far from popular.

REGIONAL AND UNION REPUBLIC PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

All party organizations above the primary units are territorial in character and parallel the territorial-administrative divisions of the Soviet state, they supervise and inspect the work of all Soviet institutions, enterprises, and activities within their territorial unit.

The U.S.S.R. is divided into 15 Union Republics, which are the highest territorial-administrative divisions in the country. The larger Republics are divided into *oblasts*—the basic provincial unit—and some also include lesser nationality units called Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Oblasts, and National Districts, in descending order of importance. The smaller Republics and the oblasts are divided into rural units called *rayons* and city administrations. Normally, the administrative chain of control would be from All-Union to Republic to oblast to rayon and city. The largest Republic, the R.S.F.S.R., also has six special territorial units called *krais*, which are indistinguishable from the oblast except that five of them contain National Autonomous Oblasts. Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Oblasts are subordinate directly to the Union Republic or kray within whose boundaries they are located.

The organizational hierarchy is thus from primary party organizations to rayons and city organizations, to oblast, Autonomous Republic, and kray organizations, then, to the 14 Republic and kray organizations, one for each of the non-Russian Republics. The R.S.F.S.R. does not have a separate party organization, and its party affairs were directed by a special Bureau of the

Central Committee, whose chairman was Nikita Khrushchev. The R.S.F.S.R. Bureau, which was a Khrushchev power base, was abolished at The Twenty-Third Party Congress (1966), and its functions transferred to the Secretariat and Politburo.

All party organizations contain five organs: (1) a constituent body, "the highest governing organ of party organization," which is called the "General Meeting" in the primary party organizations, the "Party Conference" at the rayon, city, oblast, and kray levels, and the "Party Congress" at the Union Republic and All-Union levels, (2) a delegated governing body—called a "Committee" at lower levels, and the "Central Committee" at Republic and All-Union levels—which is elected by the constituent body to act for it between its sessions, (3) an executive decision-making organ—called the "Bureau" at all levels except that of the All-Union and in the Ukrainian Party organization, where it was called the "Presidium" (now Politburo)—which is elected by the appropriate delegated governing body, for which it substitutes when that body is not in session, (4) a permanent administrative organ, called the "Secretariat" (elected by the appropriate Committee or Central Committee)—consisting of several Secretaries and their staffs, including a First and Second Secretary at higher levels—which handles the day-to-day work of the party organization and makes up the powerful network of permanent officials called the "Party Apparatus"; (5) a body called the "Auditing Commission" at lower levels and the "Central Auditing Commission" at the All-Union level, which inspects the work of the party organization itself.

To understand properly the formal structure of party organization, at the local and state level, the following points should be kept in mind:

1. While constituent bodies are called the "highest governing authority" of party organizations and theoretically "elect" their committees,

the members of the committees are, in effect, selected by the bureaus and secretaries from among the most prominent government, party, cultural, and economic personalities in the area under their jurisdiction.

2. Since constituent bodies and their committees meet only infrequently and are relatively large and cumbersome, they abdicate their authority to the bureaus and secretaries. The bureaus and secretaries are themselves selected by the next higher party organization.

3. The members of the bureaus who are not party secretaries normally have other administrative responsibilities which occupy most of their time and efforts. These members thus do not exercise continuous administrative control over their party organization.

4. The party secretaries are full-time party officials and are the most permanent officials in the party. They are frequently members of the committee of the next higher organization and thus constitute a bridge between higher and lower organs.

5. As the permanent official of the party organization, the party secretary speaks and acts for the organization more or less continuously.

6. Since the party secretary is selected by the next higher secretary in the hierarchy, he tends to look up to him for instructions and advice rather than to his own committee, to which he transmits orders from above.

7. As the permanent links between higher and lower organizations, the secretaries make up a chain of power that becomes the master of the party rather than its servant. This chain of power is called the "apparatus," and its members are called the *apparatchiki*.

8. The decisions of higher organs are absolutely binding on lower organs, which means the decisions of higher secretaries, beginning with the General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Leonid Brezhnev), are absolutely binding on lower party secretaries.

INNER-PARTY DEMOCRACY

Party Elections

All elections within the party are theoretically by secret ballot. Each candidate is supposed to be voted upon separately and is considered elected if he receives at least 50% of

the vote. In practice, however, all candidates are approved by officials of the next higher organization.

The party rules adopted in 1961 introduced some innovations. To frustrate the revival of "the cult of personality" (dictatorship), the "principle of the systematic renewal of the membership of party organs" was incorporated into the party statutes. At least one-fourth of the All-Union Central Committee membership and its Politburo were to be changed at each election. Politburo members "as a rule" were to be elected for not more than three *consecutive* terms (a total of 12 years), although certain "outstanding" leaders could be elected for more than three consecutive terms if they received not less than three-quarters of the vote. At least one-third of the membership of the Central Committees of the Union Republics and of the oblast and kray committees, and at least half of the committees of lesser organizations, had to be changed at every regular election. These innovations were, in turn, subjected to significant modifications by Khrushchev's successors at the Twenty-Third Party Congress. The provision calling for the *mandatory* replacement of party officials was abolished.

Criticism and Self-Criticism

The party rules have always stipulated that party members have both rights and duties. The cherished Bolshevik principle of "criticism and self-criticism" is conceived as the self-regulating mechanism that prevents a party with a monopoly of power from degenerating into a static, complacent, and corrupted organization; at the same time, it is supposed to preserve the "democratic" character of the party. As a duty, party members are obliged "to develop criticism and self-criticism; boldly expose shortcomings and work to eliminate them; fight against exhibitionism, conceit, complacency, and localism; decisively rebuff all attempts to sup-

press criticism, and oppose any activities prejudicial to the party and report them to the party organs, right up to the C.P.S.U. Central Committee."

Under the section on the rights of party members, the party statutes authorize the party member

to discuss freely at party meetings, conferences, congresses, party committee meetings, and in the party press questions regarding party and practical activities, submit proposals, and openly express and defend his opinion before the organization adopts a decision. . . .

Elsewhere, Paragraph 27 of the new party rules reads:

Free and businesslike discussion of the questions of party policy in individual party organizations or in the party as a whole is an inalienable right of a party member and an important principle of inner-party democracy. Criticism and self-criticism can be developed, and party discipline . . . strengthened, only on the basis of inner-party democracy.

Beginning with Khrushchev's reforms, the bounds of discussion have been widened considerably. The new rules spell out what rights of criticism the party members have, although a nebulous area of ambiguity still exists between what is permitted and what will not be tolerated.

The incompatibility of democracy and centralism under conditions of a one-party monopoly remains as valid as before; the real difference is not that there has been more democracy since Khrushchev, but rather that centralism is implemented less barbarously and in more humane and rational ways. The Soviet system and party life remain as undemocratic as before, but the terroristic aspects of Bolshevik totalitarianism have been lifted or suspended. The right of those in control to stigmatize undesirable criticism and discussion as "anti-party" in character, while not as grim in its consequences as

Stalin's formula of "enemy of the people," preserves for them the ultimate authority to narrow or expand the area of discussion and criticism at will

THE CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE PARTY


In the Soviet system, a functional division of labor exists between the institutions of the party and the state, which are interlocked at every level of power and administration. The function of the party is to translate ideological norms into policies and decisions, which are then transmitted to the organs of the state for their execution and administration as formal laws and official acts of the state. The party performs a further function in supervising and checking on the execution of its decisions through corresponding state institutions. The party, however, is warned "not [to] supplant administrative, trade union, cooperative, and other social organizations of working people and not [to] tolerate confusion between the functions of the party and other organs, or superfluous parallelism in work." However, it has not always been easy to separate the functions of the party from government and other institutions, and the relationship between party and state organs has exhibited remarkable fluidity in the past, depending on personalities, problems, and events.

The Communist Party's function of translating ideological, policy, and personality conflicts into decisions is performed by the All-Union organs of the party, which stand at the pinnacle of the party pyramid. These decisions are then transmitted to the central institutions of the state for their execution and administration as formal acts and laws of the state. The interlocking of state and party organs is traditionally symbolized at the apex by fusing the leadership of the party with the leadership of the government in a single personality. This

interlocking relationship at the highest level is periodically and temporarily sundered after each succession crisis. Thus, during the prolonged succession crisis following Lenin's death (1924-34), the two positions were separated and continued to be occupied by different personalities even after Stalin's consolidation of his personal dictatorship. Only in 1941, on the eve of the German attack upon the Soviet Un-

ion, did Stalin assume the Chairmanship of the Soviet Government and fuse it with his authority as General-Secretary of the Party, a condition which persisted down to his death in March, 1953, when the two positions were again separated until Khrushchev reunited them again in his person in 1958, after he had defeated and expelled members of the opposition factions from the Soviet hierarchy. With

FIGURE 6-2 *The central organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, April, 1966.*



Khrushchev's removal in October, 1964, the two positions have been once again separated.

At the summit, the party is divided into the same five functional divisions of responsibility as are the lower party organizations. These are (see Fig. 6-2). (1) a constituent body, the All-Union Party Congress, (2) a delegated constituent body, the Central Committee, (3) an executive decision-making organ, the *Politburo* (called *Presidium* from 1952 to 1966); (4) a permanent administrative body, the central *Secretariat*, headed by the General Secretary; and (5) a self-inspecting body, the *Central Auditing* (or *Inspection*) *Commission*.

The Party Congress

In theory the most exalted, but in practice the most important of the central party institutions is the All-Union Party Congress, which is described in the party statutes as "the supreme organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." Traditionally, the most important pronouncements on Soviet ideology and policy are reserved for meetings of the Party Congress which, according to the party statutes, "determines the party line on questions of domestic and foreign policy and examine and decide on the most important problems in the building of Communism." In actual fact, the Party Congress is little more than a rubber stamp whose delegates have been carefully picked and screened from above through the apparatus of the party, and thus it simply confirms decisions made by the party leadership, adopts resolutions introduced from above, and, in general, provides the ritual of ideological sanctification demanded by the Soviet system.

The formal authority of the Party Congress has remained relatively unchanged throughout the history of the party and is reflected in Article 33 of the 1961 party statutes as follows:

reviews, amends, and approves the party program and statutes, (c) determines the party line on questions of domestic and foreign policy and examines and decides on the most important problems in the building of Communism, (d) elects the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission

According to the party statutes, the Congress must be convened regularly every four years. The Congress is considered to possess full authority if at least half the party members are represented in it. Special sessions of the Congress may be convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative or at the request of one-third of the party members represented at the last Party Congress. Convocations of regular Congresses must be announced at least six weeks in advance, extraordinary (special) sessions can be convened on two months' notice.

Representation in the Congress is based on territorial constituencies. Each Party Congress of the 14 non-Russian Republics sends a delegation, as do the Conferences of Oblast, Kray, and Autonomous Republics of the R.S.F.S.R., which does not have a separate Party Congress. Moscow and Leningrad were authorized to send delegates to both the Twenty-Second Party Congress (1961) and the Twenty-Third (1966), who were elected by borough and rayon conferences. Members of the armed forces are represented through delegations from the territorial constituency in which they are stationed, while those stationed abroad are allowed separate unit representation.

The statutes read that "the proportion of representation at the Party Congress is established by the Central Committee," which means that the latter body possesses the authority to define the territorial constituencies which shall elect delegates as well as the size of the Congress itself. Delegates are of two types: (1) those with full voting rights, representing members, and (2) those representing candidate members who have participating rights only (and are hence called "candidate delegates"). As the size of the party has increased, so has the Congress

The Congress (a) hears and approves the reports of the Central Committee, the Central Auditing Commission, and other central organizations, (b)

itself. At the Congresses held in 1952 (Nineteenth) and 1956 (Twentieth), delegates (both voting and nonvoting) were elected on the basis of one seat for each 5,000 party members and candidate members, respectively. At the extraordinary Twenty-First Party Congress held in 1959, the ratio was one delegate per 6,000 members. The Twenty-Second Party Congress (1961) reflected a radical change in the ratio of representation, whose full significance still remains to be evaluated. Although membership in the party reached the record level of nearly 10,000,000, instead of reducing the ratio of representation so as to keep the size of the Congress uniform, the ratio of representation was stepped up to one delegate per 2,000 members and one nonvoting delegate per 2,000 candidate members. This raised the size of the Party Congress to 4,813 delegates (of which 405 were nonvoting), no less than three and a half times the size of the three preceding Congresses! This trend has been continued with the Twenty-Third Congress, but with one delegate for every 2,500 party members or candidate members respectively. The size of the Congress correspondingly expanded to nearly 5,000 delegates as a result.

As the Congress has grown in numbers, and hence increasingly unwieldy, its significance and power have correspondingly diminished (Table 6-1).

During the Leninist era, the Party Congress met every year (1918-25), but after 1925 the intervals between each succeeding Congress were extended, first to two years, then to three, and finally to four, which remains the current rule. In patent violation of his own rules, Stalin not only shot a majority of the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress, but refused to convene a Party Congress after 1939 (Eighteenth) until 1952—an interval of 13 years—although the party rules still required a session every four years.

In recent years, the main constitutional and reviewing activity of the Congress has been to

act as a sounding board for the speeches delivered by members of its Central Committee and Politburo, which are duly ratified and approved unanimously. The agenda of the Congress is set by the Central Committee, and every regular Congress includes a Report of the Central Committee (called the Main Report), which is divided into three parts on the (a) external situation, (b) internal situation, and (c) state of the party. This Report is normally delivered by the most important figure in the party hierarchy. A second report, which appears regularly, is that of the Central Auditing Commission, which is perfunctory and technical in character. A third regular item is the election of central party organs. Other business on the agenda is determined by the Central Committee and can include virtually anything. The only special Congress in the history of the party, the Twenty-First, held in 1959, listed only one item on its agenda: the goals for the seven-year economic plan (1959-65).

Since 1930, all decisions by the Congress have been unanimous. By approving the "reports" and resolutions introduced by the leadership and by confirming all acts performed in the name of the party since the preceding Congress, the Congress "establishes the line" of the party.

The Congress elects the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, supposedly by a secret ballot cast individually for each candidate. Voting is held behind closed doors, and the precise electoral procedure remains a secret. Members of the Congress have the right, under party rules, to reject candidates and to criticize them in open discussion. Under the revised rules, the Congress determines the size of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, with all candidates receiving more than a majority of the Congress vote being considered elected. The Twenty-Second Congress established the rule that at least one-fourth of the Central Committee membership be retired at each election and that any

TABLE 6-1

Party Congresses and Party Membership, 1918-1966

Congress	Year	Size of Congress ^a	Party membership ^b
Seventh	1918	46 + (58)	145,000
Eighth	1919	301 + (102) ^c	313,766
Ninth	1920	554 + (162)	611,978
Tenth	1921	694 + (296)	732,521
Eleventh	1922	522 + (165)	532,000
Twelfth	1923	408 + (417)	386,000
Thirteenth	1924	748 + (416)	735,811
Fourteenth	1925	665 + (641)	643,000 + (445,000)
Fifteenth	1927	898 + (771)	890,000 + (350,000)
Sixteenth	1930	1,268 + (891)	1,206,874 + (711,609)
Seventeenth	1934	1,225 + (736)	1,874,488 + (935,298)
Eighteenth	1939	1,574 + (466)	1,588,852 + (888,814)
Nineteenth	1952	1,192 + (167)	6,013,259 + (868,886)
Twentieth	1956	1,349 + (81)	6,795,896 + (419,609)
Twenty-First	1959 ^d	1,269 + (106)	7,622,356 + (616,775)
Twenty-Second	1961	4,408 + (405)	8,872,516 + (843,489)
Twenty-Third	1966	4,620 + (323)	11,673,676 + (797,403)

^aCandidate delegates in parentheses^bCandidate members in parentheses^cThese are the figures given in J. V. Stalin, *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: International Publishers, 1939). Another source, N. Popov, *Outline History of the CPSU*, Vol. 2 (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), gives the figures as 286 and 100, respectively.^dExtraordinary or Special Congress

person who had been a member for three consecutive terms could be elected only if he received three quarters of the vote, but this rule was relaxed by the Twenty-Third Congress.

The Party Congress no longer functions as a constituent body for the party in a real sense. Its present size, nearly 5,000 members, clearly precludes that function—as did, indeed, its more modest size of about 1,400 members at preceding Congresses. Its role has become ritualized as a sounding board for important ideological and policy pronouncements, as a vehicle for disseminating the party line at home and abroad, and as an occasion for formally altering the leadership of the Central Committee and the Politburo. Thus, at the Twentieth Party Congress, in 1956, Khrushchev used the occasion to introduce radical innovations in doctrine, such as repudiating the Stalinist concepts of "capitalist encirclement" and the "fatal inevitability of wars." The Twenty-Second Party

Congress was also used as a platform for denouncing the leaders of the Albanian Party for their adherence to Stalinist positions, for provoking a public ideological dispute with Communist China, and for excoriating once again the "antiparty group" led by Molotov. At the Twenty-Third Congress, Khrushchev's policies were sharply criticized, although his name was not mentioned.

The Congress serves a further function as an institution which imparts formal legitimacy to the acts and decisions of the Central Committee and its Politburo. Thus, at the Twenty-Third Party Congress some rather significant modifications were made in the new Party Statutes adopted in 1961. Unlike the Party Statutes of 1961, which were published in draft form and widely discussed some months before they were adopted in revised form by the Twenty-Second Congress, the 1966 innovations were revealed only at the Twenty-Third Congress

itself. Before the Congress actually convened, rumors were rampant in Soviet circles that the leadership was planning at least a partial rehabilitation of Stalin, which caused considerable anxiety among many Soviet intellectuals and prompted a letter, directed to the Central Committee, signed by 26 prominent intellectuals appealing to the leadership against such a move. Although Stalin was not rehabilitated, it is quite evident that the Stalin "question" continues to agitate the Soviet leadership, which appears to be divided on the issue. Nevertheless, the Twenty-Third Congress, without protest, unanimously agreed to restore the Stalinist title of Secretary-General in place of First Secretary (which Khrushchev had coined in 1953), and the old pre-1952 institution, Politburo, in place of the Presidium (which Stalin introduced just before his death). The leadership justified the restoration of the old institutions as a revival of Leninist norms, but it was still widely feared that the reappearance of Stalin's old title, General Secretary, reflected powerful neo-Stalinist sentiments in the Party leadership.

The Twenty-Third Party Congress also relaxed the rules on the systematic turnover of party officials, abolished the R.S.F.S.R. Bureau, re-established the pre-1934 practice of convening Party Conferences (made up of party officials rather than elected) to meet between sessions of the Party Congresses, tightened the rules on party membership, making it more difficult to become a member, and introduced provisions making it easier to expel errant members. The title General Secretary was for the first time formally incorporated in the party Statutes (this was not the case with Stalin's General-Secretaryship nor with Khrushchev's First Secretaryship).

The Central Committee

With the increasing size of the Party Congress and the diminishing frequency of its meetings, the significance of its delegated body,

the Central Committee, increased for a brief period in the late 1920's and early 1930's. As discussion and debate vanished from the Congress, it slipped behind the closed doors of the Central Committee, where sharp exchanges continued down to about 1936. They were stifled after Stalin (according to Khrushchev's account) "arrested and shot" 98 of the 139 members and candidate members (70%) of the Central Committee elected by the Seventeenth Party Congress.

According to the party statutes, the Central Committee "during the intervals between Congresses directs all party activities and local party organs," and "directs the work of the central state and social organizations." It also "selects and distributes leading cadres . . . organizes various organs, establishments, and institutions of the party and directs their activities; appoints the editorial staff of central papers and journals functioning under its control; and . . . represents the C.P.S.U. in its relations with other parties." In actual fact, the Central Committee is invested with virtually the plenary powers of the Congress during the four-year intervals between its sessions. The Committee is empowered to meet every six months, which it neglected to do in the later years of Stalin's life. The Central Committee has also gradually grown in size until by 1961 its total membership exceeded that of Party Congresses elected during the early years of the Soviet regime.

As it grew in size, so its importance diminished. In 1918, the Central Committee consisted of only 15 members and eight candidate members; in 1927, of 71 full members and 68 candidate members. It was almost doubled in size by the Nineteenth Congress in 1952, and it had a total of 255 full and candidate members. The Twenty-First Special Congress did not elect a Central Committee, but at the Twenty-Second Congress (1961), the size of the Central Committee was expanded to 175 full members and 155 candidate members, for a total of

330 members. It was slightly enlarged in 1966 to 195 full members and 165 candidate members, for a total of 360.

Candidate members are authorized to participate in deliberations of the Committee, but do not possess voting rights. According to the party rules, the full members of the Committee are replenished from among the candidate members in the event of vacancies caused by expulsion, resignation, or death. Meetings of the Central Committee are called "plenums," and frequently joint meetings are held with the Central Auditing Commission.

As Stalin's grip on the party apparatus tightened, plenary sessions were called infrequently, and during Stalin's later years, meetings were not even held with the regularity required by the party statutes. After 1936, the Central Committee, like the Congress, was reduced to a sounding board, and its decisions were in all likelihood unanimous. There is no question but that the Central Committee proved to be as superfluous as the Congress for Stalin, and between March, 1946, and October, 1952, this "directing organ" of the party was convened only three times. Since Stalin's death, its role has been enhanced and its power revitalized. While it failed to meet with the regularity required by the party statutes before Stalin's death, since then it has met more often than required. Thus it was convened five times in 1953, twice in 1954, in 1955, and in 1956; four times in 1957; six times in 1958, and twice in 1959 and in 1960. Since Stalin's death, the typical plenum has lasted two days, with the shortest being a single day and the longest lasting eight days. This eight-day plenum, which ousted the "antiparty group" from the Central Committee, the Presidium, and the Government in June, 1957, has been the most significant of any during the post-Stalin era, except for the alleged plenum which ousted Khrushchev in October, 1964, whose proceedings have never been published even in fragmentary form.

From the evidence of several published

records of Central Committee plenums in the post-Stalin period, the proceedings of the Central Committee appear to deviate little from those of other party bodies. The General Secretary delivers a report on the main item on the agenda, which is then "discussed" by other members. The "discussions" assume the form of speeches delivered by members, which in his time were freely interrupted by Khrushchev, who affirmed, criticized, warned, and even threatened the speakers, who in return meekly made the appropriate gestures. One lower-ranking member of the Central Committee revealed at the Twentieth Party Congress.

At plenums of the Central Committee . . . its First Secretary, Comrade Khrushchev, and other members of the Presidium . . . corrected errors in a fatherly way when we individual members of the Central Committee have made mistakes, correcting us regardless of our posts or reputations.²

At the December, 1958, plenum, 75 speakers "discussed" Khrushchev's report, and Bulganin used the opportunity to denounce himself for his complicity in the "antiparty group" conspiracy to oust Khrushchev from power the preceding year, after scathing condemnation by other members of the Committee.³

The more-or-less placid character of the Central Committee plenums reflected in the published proceedings can be quite misleading, since it is known that many of the post-Stalin plenums have been characterized by stormy controversy and fierce infighting between various cliques and factions. Perhaps the stormiest of the post-Stalin plenums was its longest, held in June, 1957, when the so-called "antiparty group" of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, and Voroshilov, together with Perukhin and Saburov—a clear majority of the Presidium members—was overruled by the

²Speech of Z. I. Muratov at the Twentieth Party Congress, Moscow Radio Broadcast, February 21, 1956.

³Plenum Tsentralnoe Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sotsialnogo Soyuza 15-19 Dekabrya 1958 g. (Moscow, 1958).

Central Committee in its attempt to oust Khrushchev as First Secretary of the party. It was officially reported that 60 members delivered speeches and 115 filed statements in an authentic and acrimonious debate preceding the vote, whose unanimity was tarnished by a single obstinate abstention cast by Molotov—the first and only publicly admitted dissident vote in a Central Committee meeting in almost 30 years.⁵

Other plenums, such as those that ousted Malenkov as Secretary of the party in March, 1953, that expelled and ordered the trial of Beria in July, 1953, that denounced Molotov's foreign-policy views in July, 1955, and that reversed economic policies in December, 1956, and February, 1957, were also charged with violent conflict and clash of opinion. Since the expulsion of the "antiparty group" in June, 1957, the Central Committee meetings have been marred by the expulsion of Marshal Zhukov from the Presidium, by controversy over the pace and tempo of the de-Stalinization program, and by the ideological controversies with China and Albania over foreign policy and the world Communist movement.

The victorious faction in 1957 soon betrayed signs of splitting on a wide range of domestic and foreign policies. The leadership tended to polarize around two main factions: a "moderate" group, led by Khrushchev; and a "conservative" group, whose leaders appeared to be M. A. Suslov and F. R. Kozlov, later apparently supported by traditional elements of the professional military and representatives of heavy industry. Generally speaking, the moderate faction sought a relaxation of international tensions and a *détente* with the United States, even at the expense of alienating China; the conservative faction saw little value in a *détente* with the United States, especially at the expense of alienating the Soviet Union's most important ally. Domestically, Khrushchev and the "moderates" were willing to tolerate greater

relaxation of controls at home and advocated a change in the economic equilibrium in the direction of producing more consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry. The "conservatives" were opposed to further relaxation at home and may have even demanded some retrenchment, and they were virtually dogmatic in their insistence that priority continue to be given to heavy industry over light industry and agriculture. Under these conditions, formalized debate in the Central Committee gave way to a genuine, if largely esoteric, articulation of divergent factional viewpoints, which was also evident from the content of the speeches delivered at the Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Party Congresses, in January, 1959, and October, 1961, respectively.

From the time of the Twenty-Second Party Congress until Khrushchev's ouster in October, 1964, the Soviet leadership was plagued by constant factional squabbles, and these often found expression in the Central Committee plenums. Khrushchev stayed in power only because the factional balance was extremely delicate, with some leaders supporting him on some issues and opposing him on others. Thus, Soviet factional politics was not only institutionally and functionally oriented but issue oriented as well, and it was the existence of issue-oriented factionalism which provided Khrushchev with the margins necessary to stay in power. Khrushchev once again narrowly missed being ousted as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, when his opposition at home and his critics in Peking seemed perilously close to having a common point of view.

Khrushchev's inept handling of the dispute with China, his generally crude and unsophisticated behavior as a politician, and his constant boasting in public apparently finally alienated some of his supporters, who saw in his person an impediment to a reconciliation with China and an obstacle to a rational approach to domestic problems. In October, 1964, he was

⁵See *The New York Times*, July 6, 1957.

ousted, in a coup engineered largely by his own trusted subordinates, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Mikoyan. He was indirectly accused of concocting "harebrained schemes," "boasting," and general ineptness. Khrushchev's ouster allegedly took place at a Central Committee Plenum, but the proceedings were not made public. The manner and abruptness of his dismissal caused considerable commotion and disturbance in other communist countries and parties, whose leaders demanded and received an explanation in a series of bilateral conferences.

Thus perhaps the most interesting plenum of all is the one about which the least is known. The October, 1964, plenum which removed Khrushchev from his positions of authority. There is even considerable doubt over whether such a plenum in fact was ever convened. The only thing certain is that Khrushchev could not be forced or persuaded into making a public confession of error or to debase himself before the Central Committee and "confess his mistakes." Central Committee proceedings which have been published since Khrushchev's removal reveal a more orderly and sober body, but one still charged with controversy and real discussion.

The most important decisions and policies of the party are issued in the form of Resolutions and Decisions of the Central Committee. In times of crisis, or on particularly significant occasions, Decrees are issued jointly with the Council of Ministers, which have the force of state law. The Central Committee thus remains a potentially powerful institution, and, far more than the Party Congress, constitutes a body with authority and power in its own right. This stems from the fact that selected for membership in this body are the most powerful and influential elites and groups in Soviet society. In the Central Committee are to be found the members and candidate members of the Presidium, the members of the Secretariat, the important Ministers of the government, the First Secretaries of the Republic party organizations and Second

Secretaries of important Republic party organizations, First Secretaries of important oblast, kray, and other regional organizations, the most important government officials of the Union Republics, Marshals, Generals, Admirals, Ambassadors, trade-union and Komsomol officials, and leading party ideologists and cultural celebrities. More than any other designation, membership in the Central Committee imparts status and recognition in the Soviet system. While increasing the size of the Central Committee may tend to diminish its power, it also widens the ambit of recognition and status.

Like its two inner organs, the Politburo and the Secretariat, the Central Committee had been subjected to a thorough purge during the era of Khrushchev. No less than 64% of the members of the 330-member Central Committee elected by the Twenty-Second Party Congress were new to this body. Over 50% of the members of the 1956 Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission had been dropped.

In contrast to the turnovers in membership during the Khrushchev period, the Central Committee elected by the Twenty-Third Congress differed very little from its predecessor. The turnover rate in full members was one out of five, as compared to half in 1961 and about four out of ten in 1956.

As the Central Committee stabilizes its membership, its average age increases, and thus threatens to create a generational gap in leadership, and perhaps ultimately a conflict between generations for influence and control. The age of the average Central Committee member is in the late fifties, with 70% more than 50 years old and nearly 25% over 60. Since the new Central Committee is only about 10% larger than its predecessor, this suggests that opportunities for the younger element in the Party are decreasing. What with the abolition of systematic rotation, the average age of the leadership can only continue to increase. Barely a dozen members appear to be in their thirties.

The Politburo (Presidium)

There is no question but that the most important decision-making organ in the party and state is the Politburo of the Party (called, you will recall, "Presidium" between 1952 and 1966). The ultimate authority of the party is entrusted to this organ, although its decisions may be overruled by the Central Committee. The party statutes instruct the Politburo to direct the work of the Central Committee. Members are elected by a majority vote of the Central Committee.

COMPOSITION. Membership in the Politburo, however, is largely determined in fact not by the Central Committee, but by the Politburo itself, which is a self-perpetuating body. The Central Committee merely ratifies the candidates offered by the ruling Politburo, the nominees reflecting the equilibrium of power existing within the Politburo itself. This equilibrium is, of course, further reflected in the candidates put forward for election to the Central Committee and selection for the Party Congress. Thus, whenever a change in the distribution of power takes place in the Politburo, this is usually registered downward through the various party echelons.

Like other party bodies, the Politburo has both full members and candidate members. Only full members are entitled to vote, candidate members are entitled to take part in the discussions. The membership of the Politburo has varied considerably. Stalin kept the membership of the Politburo at about a dozen members, but reduced and expanded it at will and appointed and expelled members according to his whim or fancy. At the Nineteenth Party Congress, he unexpectedly abolished the Politburo and replaced it with an enlarged Presidium of 25 members and 11 candidate mem-

bers. According to Khrushchev, this change "was aimed at the removal of the old political Bureau members . . . and a design for the annihilation of the old political Bureau members." The post-Stalin Presidium was reduced to ten full members and four candidate members. At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, its size was set at eleven full members and six candidate members; after the expulsion of the "anti-party group," it was reconstructed at fourteen full and eight candidate members; at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, it was once again reduced to eleven full and five candidate members. But by early 1963, membership had been expanded to twelve full members and six candidates, and in 1966 the renamed body had 11 full members and 8 candidate members.

In between regular elections, the size of the Politburo has expanded and contracted in response to the struggle for power. Expulsions and elections to the Politburo are technically made by the Central Committee, but, in fact, the Committee often merely ratifies whatever changes have been made by the controlling factions in the Politburo. Removals and appointments, however, are formally announced after Central Committee plenums, the regular election being at the plenum held by the new Central Committee elected by a Party Congress.

The Politburo of the Party represents the fusion of party and state authority at the highest level, as reflected in the interlocking character of its membership. Some members are virtually *ex officio*, like the General Secretary, the Premier, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party, and the Premier of the R.S.F.S.R. Other members are drawn from the Secretariat, the Council of Ministers, and key Republic party and government officials. The precise distribution reflects the equilibrium of power that exists among the various elite groups at any given time. Since the ascendancy of Khrushchev, and particularly since the ex-

pulsion of the "antiparty group," the party apparatus has been the dominant elite represented in the Politburo.

During the years since Stalin's death, there has been a remarkable rotation of personalities at the pinnacles of Soviet power, but virtually no alteration in institutional forms (Fig. 6-3). Since 1952, more than 60 individuals have sat on the Politburo, either as full or candidate members. The number of individuals admitted to membership and candidate membership in the Central Committee must come to nearly a thousand. More than 30 Soviet citizens who have experienced the dizzying heights of the Politburo are now in less responsible positions.

One of the ironies of the Khrushchev era is that although at the Twentieth Party Congress (in 1956) he castigated Stalin for plotting to remove all of the "old members" of the Politburo, by the time of his own ouster he had himself expelled five of the 10 surviving members of Stalin's pre-1952 Politburo. His removal in 1964 was accompanied by a further cleansing of the Politburo of the Stalinist holdovers. Kosygin is the only member of the old Stalin Politburo still at the apex of power. No less than 10 members of Stalin's 12-man, all-powerful Politburo are still living: Kosygin is Premier; Shvernik, Mikoyan, and Voroshilov (three former Chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) remain as members of the Central Committee, while Mikoyan and Voroshilov are also ordinary members of the Presidium of which they were at one time Chairmen. Malenkov (former Premier), in disgrace, presumably is still directing a giant hydroelectric plant in a remote area of the Kazakh Republic; Molotov (former Premier), Kaganovich, and Bulganin (former Premier) are vegetating in disgrace, Khrushchev (ex-Premier) has been unceremoniously but generously put to pasture, Andreyev had already sunk into obscurity during Stalin's last years. Only Stalin and Beria are dead. The survival of so many of Stalin's dread Politburo

after being dethroned is something of a tribute to the way in which Khrushchev "civilized" the Soviet political process. With three ex-Presidents and four ex-Premiers in retirement, the Soviet system finally seems to be firmly on the road to political security and maturity.

HOW THE POLITBURO FUNCTIONS. The post-Stalin Politburo, according to a remark by Khrushchev in 1957, "meets regularly, not less than once a week." In its deliberations, it tries to arrive at a consensus by discussion, but in the event of disagreement, questions are resolved by a simple majority decision. Only full members are entitled to vote, although candidate members participate in debate and discussion. According to Khrushchev and Mikoyan, most decisions are adopted unanimously, and this is undoubtedly true, but the revelations of the circumstances surrounding the expulsion of the "antiparty group" indicate that many Politburo meetings have been stormy and inconclusive.

As an institution, the Politburo, like the Central Committee, has recovered much of its former prestige and authority. It is no longer a mere façade for a one-man dictatorship, but functions as an institution in its own right. The General Secretary, who presides over its meetings as its chairman, continues to be the most powerful and influential personality, but he is more likely to represent a particular faction rather than function as an absolute autocrat. The strong representation of the Secretariat in the Politburo since 1957 betrays the dominant role of the party apparatus at the present time.

The Politburo's procedure has also been changed considerably since Stalin's death. Present indications are that the Politburo works from an agenda prepared in advance, containing items suggested by members of the Politburo that may have in turn been prompted by subordinates and government Ministers. Since all Politburo members have administrative responsibilities in the government or the party, they

FIGURE 6-3 *Evolution of the Party Presidium-Politburo in the Soviet Union, 1952-1967*

		July, 1952	October, 1952	March, 1953	February, 1955
FULL-TIME PARTY FUNCTIONARIES	<i>Secretariat</i>	(Politburo) STALIN MALENKOV KHRUSHCHEV Suslov Ponomarenko	STALIN ARISTOV KHRUSHCHEV MALENKOV MIKHAILOV PONOMARENKO MUSOV <i>Buzdakov</i> <i>Ignatov</i> <i>Proiz</i>	KHRUSHCHEV Ignatyev Pospelov Shatalin Suslov	KHRUSHCHEV Suslov Pospelov
	<i>Provincial Party Secretaries</i>		ANDRIANOV MIENIKOV <i>Pat.Ind. et</i> <i>Pat. et</i>	<i>Malenkov</i> <i>Bazarev</i>	<i>Ponomarenko</i>
	<i>Party Control Committee</i>	ANDRIYEV	SHKIRYATOV		
FULL-TIME GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES	<i>Central Government Officials</i>	STALIN MOLOTOV BERIA VOROSHILOV KAGANOVICH BULGANIN MIKOYAN KOSYGIN <i>Shcherbak</i>	STALIN SHVERNIK BERIA BULGANIN IGNATYEV KAGANOVICH MALENKOV MALYSHEV MIKOYAN MOLOTOV PERVUKHIN PONOMARENKO SABUROV VOROSHILOV <i>Kabanov</i> <i>Kosygin</i> <i>Tetoyan</i> <i>Vysibinsky</i> <i>Zitser</i>	BERIA BULGANIN KAGANOVICH MALENKOV MIKOYAN MOLOTOV PERVUKHIN SABUROV VOROSHILOV <i>Ponomarenko</i>	BULGANIN KAGANOVICH MALENKOV MIKOYAN MOLOTOV PERVUKHIN SABUROV VOROSHILOV
	<i>Provincial Government Officials</i>		KOROTCHENKO KUUSINEN		
	MISCELLANEOUS		CHESNOKOV KUZNETSOV MIKHAILOV <i>Yudin</i>	<i>Shcherbak</i>	<i>Shcherbak</i>

SMALL CAPITALS: Full Member, Politburo, Soviet Communist Party.
Italic type. Candidate member, Politburo, Soviet Communist Party.
 Roman type: Not Politburo members.

February 1956	June 1957	December 1959	January 1964	July 1967
KHRUSHCHEV SUSLOV <i>Brezhnev</i> <i>Furtseva</i> <i>Shchepilov</i> Belyayev Aristov Pospelov	KHRUSHCHEV SUSLOV BELYAYEV ARISTOV BREZHNEV FURTSEVA KUUSINEN <i>Pospelov</i>	KHRUSHCHEV KIRICHENKO SUSLOV ARISTOV BREZHNEV FURTSEVA KUUSINEN MLKHITDINOV IGNATOV <i>Pospelov</i>	KHRUSHCHEV KOZLOV SUSLOV KUUSINEN Demichev Ilyichev Shelepin Ponomarev	BREZHNEV SUSLOV KIRILENKO SHILFPIN <i>Demichev</i> <i>Ustinov</i> Ponomarev Rudakov Kapitonov Kulakov
KIRICHENKO <i>Makbidenov</i>	IGNATOV KIRICHENKO KOZLOV <i>Kaliberzin</i> <i>Kavlenko</i> <i>Mazurov</i> <i>Makbidenov</i> <i>Mzhasanadze</i>	BELYAYEV <i>Kavlenko</i> <i>Mazurov</i> <i>Mzhasanadze</i> <i>Podgorny</i>	PODGORNY VORONOV KIRILENKO <i>Mazurov</i> <i>Mzhasanadze</i> <i>Raibider</i>	SHELEST PELSHE <i>Mzhasanadze</i> <i>Raibider</i> <i>Mazurov</i> <i>Kavlenko</i> <i>Gribin</i>
<i>Shvernik</i>	SHVERNIK	SHVERNIK	SHVERNIK	PSLSH
BULGANIN VOROSHILOV KAGANOVICH MIKOYAN MOLDTOV PERV KHIN SABUROV MALENKOV <i>Zhdanov</i>	BULGANIN VOROSHILOV MIKOYAN ZHLAKOV <i>Kozygin</i> <i>Perisukhin</i>	KHRUSHCHEV KOZLOV MIKOYAN VOROSHILOV <i>Kozygin</i> <i>Perisukhin</i>	KHRUSHCHEV BREZHNEV MIKOYAN KOZYGIN	KOZYGIN PODGORNY POLYANSKY MAZUROV <i>Andropov</i>
	<i>Kozlov</i>	<i>Polyansky</i> <i>Kozlov</i> <i>Kaliberzin</i>	<i>Polyansky</i> <i>Shcherbakov</i>	<i>Voronov</i> <i>Shcherbakov</i>
			<i>Gribin</i>	<i>Shchepilov</i>

must rely on their professional and technical staffs to control the flow of information and problems that reach them from the lower levels of the state and the party. Greater delegation of responsibility to subordinates has also been the rule since Stalin's death, and many problems originating at lower levels of administration are decided before they reach the top.

Specialists and experts, as well as bureau and department heads, are often invited to Politburo meetings when technical or specialized advice is required by the Politburo. Questions relating to party matters flow up through the party apparatus into the Secretariat, where they are handled by the appropriate sections or dispatched upward to the individual members of the Secretariat, some of whom are also Politburo members. Problems relating to some aspect of state administration similarly move upward through the echelons of the given Ministry. Some Ministries, like the Foreign Ministry and perhaps the Defense Ministry, report regularly to the Presidium, although in recent years neither Minister has been a Politburo member.

Another aspect of the Politburo's style of work which distinguishes the present body from those of Stalinist days is the activity of its individual members. During the Stalinist era, neither Stalin nor other members of the Politburo engaged in "grass roots" politics or barnstormed through the provinces to contact the lower echelons of the bureaucracy or the masses of Soviet citizenry. But now this practice, which was introduced by Khrushchev, is widespread, and Brezhnev, Kosygin and other Politburo members are on the move continuously, speaking at local conferences and meetings, collective farms, and professional and cultural assemblies, from one end of the country to the other. There is no question but that all this activity has served to bring both the party and the state closer to the Soviet people, giving them a deeper sense of personal involvement, participation, and commitment to both institutions. Unlike Stalin, but like Khrushchev before

them, Brezhnev (General Secretary), Kosygin (Premier), and Podgorny (Chief of State), also make frequent trips abroad, but with Brezhnev restricting himself generally to Communist countries, Kosygin dealing mainly with Western Europe and America, and Podgorny concentrating on the other countries of Europe and Asia. This is not a hard-and-fast division of labor, but it is obvious that three leaders can cover more ground than one and can be dealing simultaneously with various capitals.

The Secretariat and the Central Apparatus

The Secretariat, as an institution, was established in 1919 along with the Politburo and the Orgburo, and with Stalin's appointment as General Secretary, in April, 1922, he became the only important party leader who was a member of all three bodies. Within the year, Lenin, in his so-called "Testament," written on December 25, 1922, warned that Stalin had already used the position to accumulate unprecedented power:

Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated enormous power in his hand; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution.⁶

In a postscript to the "Testament," dated January 4, 1923, Lenin also suggested that Stalin be removed from this post.

The growth of the party was accompanied by an increase in the activities of the central apparatus and in the size of its staff, but the Secretariat typically consisted of the General Secretary (Stalin occupied this post until his death in 1953) and three or four other secretaries. As a normal rule, Stalin's closest and most trusted cronies were to be found in the Secretariat, but because of its pivotal position as a possible

⁶Full texts of "Testament" and "postscript" are printed in Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, pp. 260-263.

springboard to power, they were often transformed, in Stalin's suspicious eyes, into impatient and impudent successors to his power, who had to be liquidated.

The size of the Secretariat has fluctuated erratically in response to the continuing struggle for power, dropping to a low point of only three members in 1953-54 and reaching its post-Stalinist highpoint of 12 members in December, 1962. At the Twenty-Second Party Congress (1961), the number had been reduced to nine. In 1966, it had 11 members. It continues to fluctuate and to reflect the shifting individual fortunes of Soviet leaders in the struggle for power and influence.

According to the party statutes, the members of the Secretariat are elected by the Central Committee "to direct current work, mainly in the selection of cadres and organization and supervision over fulfillment of Party decisions." As the administrative center of the party, the Secretariat supervises a large and variegated central apparatus, which serves as the staff and technical departments of the Central Committee. Each secretary is in charge of a group of related departments and sections, which are organized along both functional and geographical divisions. Although no formal ranking of the secretaries exists, aside from that of General Secretary, there is reason to believe that an informal ranking does apply, comparable to the second and third secretaries at lesser organizational levels. Normally, the second-ranking man in the Secretariat, the informal second secretary, as it were, handles general administrative supervision over the apparatus under the General Secretary.

As the chief administrative organ of the party, the Secretariat supervises the execution and fulfillment of the party's policies and decisions in all administrative, economic, military, social, cultural, and professional institutions, organizations, and establishments in all parts of the country and at every level, through the hierarchy of secretaries which makes up the

corps of full-time professional party functionaries. What emerges as the *de facto* policy of the party is in large measure what the party apparatus implements in its day-to-day activities.

The Secretariat thus maintains an organizational and hierarchical network of professional functionaries that constitutes a powerful instrument for seizing and maintaining control of the party, the state, and the entire Soviet system itself. In a real sense, it constitutes an *imperium in imperio*, for, in the words of Stalin, "The party cadres constitute the commanding staff of the party, and since our party is in power, they also constitute the commanding staff of the leading organs of the state. . . . Party cadres become the decisive force in the work of guiding the party and the state."

In its operations, the party apparatus gives concrete shape to the decisions and policies of the party because it not only implements the decisions of the party but checks on their execution by other organs, institutions, and establishments. Thus, in summary, the Secretariat and the apparatus perform the following functions. (1) they determine key appointments in all party, state, economic, social, cultural, and military institutions at every level, (2) they explain and implement the policies of the state and party in all sectors of Soviet life; (3) they check and ensure the fulfillment of party and state directives, (4) they mobilize and manipulate the energies and pressures required for the implementation of the party's will, (5) they accumulate and organize information and prepare reports and recommendations for action, which are transmitted to the Politburo, (6) they keep a close tab on public moods and sentiments, report their impressions to the central authorities, and maintain an extensive file of dossiers on party members.

Although the formal authority to make policy is vested in the Politburo, this power is clearly shared with the Secretariat, which at times tends to overshadow the Politburo. The balance of power between the two organs is

reflected in the degree of interlocking membership between them. The rise of Khrushchev to primacy had been accompanied by an increase in the number of secretaries who were also members of the Presidium. Thus, in 1953–54, Khrushchev was the only secretary in a Presidium of 10 full members. After the Twentieth Party Congress (1956), however, the Secretariat was expanded to eight members (five of them new to this body), with five being simultaneously elected to a Presidium of 11 full and 5 candidate members. With the expulsion of the "anti-party group" in July, 1957, all eight secretaries were elected to membership in an expanded Presidium of 15 full and 9 candidate members. The 10 secretaries appointed at the Twenty-First Party Congress (1959) were also elected members of the Presidium. Even more important, of the 14 full or voting members of the Presidium, no less than nine were also members of the Secretariat. This meant, in effect, that the policies and decisions of the Presidium were in reality those of the Secretariat, and that the division of function between the two organs had been all but obliterated.

The composition of the Secretariat and its interlocking membership with the Presidium began to change soon after the Twenty-First Party Congress. Having defeated his Stalinist contemporaries, Khrushchev moved to consolidate his power by purging his own supporters, some of whom may have been overly ambitious or whose loyalty was not matched with compe-

tence. Between 1959 and 1961, Khrushchev supporters (Kirichenko, Aristov, and others) were dropped from both the Secretariat and Presidium. New faces were introduced to the summit at the Twenty-Second Congress—four in the Presidium, five in the Secretariat—but none was appointed to simultaneous membership in both. The interlocking membership between these two bodies was reduced to four veteran leaders (Khrushchev, Kozlov, Suslov, and Kuusinen), leaving Khrushchev formally in charge of both the Presidium and the Council of Ministers, but depriving him of control over the Secretariat, which was reduced to its function of executing the policies of the Presidium, instead of making them. On the whole, however, leaders who made their way to the summit through the party apparatus continue to dominate the Politburo, and they continue to constitute an absolute majority of its membership.

Powerful as the party apparatus is, its relative strength in the Soviet political structure has diminished in response to the steady growth of the economic and military power of the Soviet Union. This growth has resulted in the creation of several parallel hierarchies and structures of power in the Soviet system that challenge the supremacy of the apparatus in the party and compete with it for control over the party and its symbols of authority and legitimacy. It is within the context of this rivalry that conflicts within the party are institutionalized and resolved into concrete decisions.

VII

Social Structure and Political Power in the Soviet System

In all social systems, the social structure has a profound influence on the political dynamics of the system, irrespective of formal institutions and processes. The Soviet Union is no exception to this rule. Since the Communist Party is the only legal political organization in the country, the struggle for power in the Soviet system inevitably resolves itself into a struggle for control of the party. During the early years of the Soviet regime, the struggle proceeded from very narrow social foundations, but after Stalin's death, the conflicting demands made upon the system by the new social groups created by the great transformations of the past four decades erupted into factional strife within the Presidium. Inconclusive struggle in this body led the rival factions to seek support in the Central Committee, below which controversy has not been permitted to filter down. If the factional divisions within the Politburo were formalized, they would crack the party pyramid down to its base and open the way perhaps to an eventual evolution toward a two or more party system operating within the framework of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Under the Soviet one-party system, factional rivalry at the party summit becomes a crude surrogate for a two-party contest, while the relationship between the Central Committee and its Politburo is as we have seen, the nearest approximation to a system of institutional responsibility and accountability.

Conflicts within the party arise as a result both of personal ambitions for power and of differences over doctrine and policy. Personal rivalries and policy disputes are so intricately interwoven that attempts to isolate the two are bound to be a sterile exercise. The rival cliques within the party hierarchy that were formed during Stalin's later years, and may have indeed been encouraged by him in his efforts to play off subordinates against one another, evolved

into factions, each with its own aspirations and social foundations of power outside the party structure.

THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM IN SOVIET SOCIETY

Contrary to the official Soviet view that factions within the party do not arise from social conflicts within Soviet society but are rather the deviationary expressions of personalities seeking power, it is obvious that factions could neither arise nor flourish unless they received nourishment from powerful social forces in Soviet society. Just as party factions do not organize themselves into separate political organizations to challenge the supremacy of the party for political power, so social groups with their own interests do not form separate social bodies to demand formal representation in the party, but rather seek to make their demands on other groups in the party.

In Soviet society where private ownership of the means of livelihood is legally prescribed and where definite limitations are imposed upon the accumulation of any kind of property or tangible material wealth, private property has been eliminated as a social source of power or a basis for social stratification. This is also becoming increasingly true of some underdeveloped countries where private ownership of the means of production are severely circumscribed. Under these conditions, other traditional social sources of power assume decisive significance in the struggle for control over the means of livelihood, and in particular, is this true of functional sources of power such as specialized skills, knowledge and talents.

In the Soviet Union, private ownership of the land and what the Marxists call the means of production, as well as ownership of the media of distribution, communication, transportation and even recreation has been legally abolished

and forbidden in favor of a system of total, absolute and permanent public ownership, whether through the state or state-sponsored societies and organizations. All citizens in Soviet society bear an identical relationship to the instruments of production and the means of livelihood in the sense that they cannot be distinguished as owners and non-owners. This universal relationship to the means of livelihood provides the legal basis for the ideological assertion that the exploitation of man by man has been eradicated in the Soviet system.

While the Soviet system has for the first time in history ruptured the venerable and durable connection between private ownership of property and the possession and accumulation of power, there still remains a highly unequal distribution of power based upon the relationship of various social groups to the *control* of the means of livelihood. Historically, private ownership emerges as one method of control over the means of livelihood and not as the generic source of social and political power as was assumed by Marx and some other writers. In the Soviet Union, ownership of the principal means of production is permanently vested in an institution, the state, or an abstraction, "society," for while the state is a temporary agent, it is, in fact, the executive and administrative arm of the Communist Party. Control of the party assures control of the state and through it control of the land, the economic establishment, the coercive instruments of society (the armed forces, police, courts and legal system), the means of transportation, distribution and communications.

All Soviet legality is thus bound up with the processes and institutions of the state and remains a somewhat intact and self-contained unit, with no rupture of legal continuity or relations, even though control of the Party itself may at any given moment remain an object of strife and struggle. The struggle for power is thus conducted outside the structure of the law, institutions and processes of the state, although

of course the latter may become involved as instruments of the struggle itself. Irrespective of the course and outcome of the struggle, *ownership* of the means of production is never an object of the struggle for power, for ownership remains permanently vested in the state and there is never a redistribution of ownership but only of control. While power vacuums are inevitable in the Soviet system, the possibilities of legal vacuums or lapses of authority are reduced to a minimum, and in any event ownership of property cannot become a source of political power in the Soviet order. The state, for example, is not employed for the purpose of transferring ownership of property from one hand to another or from the state to private possession, or for the purpose of facilitating the accumulation of private property by various individuals or social groups through manipulation of the legal system, or for preserving the existing pattern of property distribution among private individuals and groups in society.

Within the context of Marxist-Leninist ideology, a social group with its own distinctive interests is automatically designated a social class that is, by definition, in conflict with the interests of other classes. After the Revolution, the interests of the working class alone, as determined by the party, were considered to be legitimate, and the interests of other classes were suppressed. The Communist Party was verbally transformed from a party representing only the interests of the working class into one representing the interests of all Soviet social groups. Consequently, Soviet ideology and party doctrine continue to deny the legitimacy of competing interest-groups, and refuse to tolerate their autonomous existence.

In dissecting the political process in the Soviet system, the basic political actors can be isolated as the elites within the intelligentsia. Their informal organizational expressions within the organs of the party are *factions*, while divisions and rival groupings within factions can be called *cliques*. In Soviet parlance, how-

ever, factions are characterized as formalized groupings within the party which engage in cabalistic intrigue, conspire to take concerted action within the party, and offer a program and slate of candidates in opposition to those of the official party line. A faction constitutes, in effect, a "disloyal opposition," since a loyal opposition grouping is not yet recognized as legitimate. True enough, some factions may have very little social support, as is officially maintained, and may represent only the views of individual party leaders.

Social classes and interest groups within them in Soviet society have highly uneven opportunities for articulating their interests inside and outside of the party, although all social classes and many subclasses within are reflected in officially approved institutions, associations, and organizations. Political power in the Soviet system remains largely a monopoly of the intelligentsia, but its distribution among various elites within the intelligentsia is also sharply uneven, and favors those elites which largely coincide with political institutions and are organized into hierarchical structures of power. Unlike the various subclasses within the intelligentsia, none of the subdivisions within the working class or peasantry are permitted separate associational existence. Trade unions are not organized along craft, functional, or horizontal lines, but vertically by enterprises and include managers as well as unskilled workers in the same organization. The only association permitted the peasantry is the collective farm, which is a rural institution designed to control the peasants rather than to articulate their interests. The working class and peasantry are thus effectively decapitated politically, but they do participate or rather are involved in the political process through ritualized periodic elections to the Soviets, in which they are given the privilege of electing to government positions candidates selected for them by the elites who dominate the party. The proliferation and expansion of interest conflict within the intel-

ligentsia, however, could draw the masses more directly into the political process if the latent power of the workers and peasants could be mobilized to good advantage by one faction or another within the party structure. Once the elites openly compete for the "goodwill" of the peasantry and the workers, it will signify their formal entry into the Soviet political system as active rather than passive actors.

Interest groups in the Soviet system do not readily lend themselves to ready-made classifications, and in any case must be related to larger social groupings such as social class. Within the three broad social groupings in Soviet society are to be found three types of interest groups—some of which are purely intra-class while others are interclass in character. The party as a whole can no longer be accurately described as an interest group because of its artificial numerical dilution by working-class and peasant members, who have little tangible common interests with the intelligentsia aside from a vague common ideological bond. The members of the intelligentsia within the party clearly have more in common with those of the same class outside the party than with the workers and peasants within.

The principal (but by no means only) political actors in the Soviet system are four political institutional groups, all found within the intelligentsia, and identifiable with diminishing institutional precision, as: (1) the party apparatus; (2) the professional military; (3) the state bureaucracy; and (4) the managerial-technical bureaucracy, or economic bureaucracy. No attempt will be made here to provide detailed descriptions of the groups nor their internal divisions and political processes. It should be noted at this point, however, that these four institutional groups vary considerably in size of membership, functional diffusion, and institutional coherence. The party apparatus and the professional military are more clearly defined institutional structures, in terms of function and organization, than either the state bureaucracy

or the managerial-technical bureaucracy. The latter is perhaps only marginally an institutional group, but because of its pivotal role in the economic establishment and because the generally uniform training its members have received and the almost deterministic impact which their function in society performs in shaping their social outlook, it is more institutional than noninstitutional in its behavior. Some institutions, like the party apparatus, because of its small numbers, its key location in the party, and its more defined group spirit, have been more successfully employed as instruments of subgroups and individual leaders, while the military has articulated its interests largely as an institution rather than as a vehicle for the specific interests of this or that clique or individual personality. In recent years factional groupings cutting across institutional and functional lines have also polarized around "issues."

The principal distinguishing feature of the state bureaucracy, which separates it from the military and the economic bureaucracies as a group, is that it is the only institutional group which has custody of important symbols and credentials of legality. The state is the source of all law in the Soviet system; it is in fact the corporate embodiment of the Soviet legal order. Only the state can authorize legal rewards and punishments. To the extent that law and legality are associated with legitimacy, the state bureaucracy possesses a powerful political lever of great potential and long-range significance. Whereas in other political systems legitimacy is embodied in the state, in the Soviet system, legality only is embodied in the state, whereas legitimacy is an ideological concept vested in the party. The Soviet state represents physically and psychologically, an extension of the historic Russian state; it possesses a latent force to be ultimately reckoned with.

Stripped of all refinements, the party apparatus represents a structure of legitimacy; the state bureaucracy, a structure of legality; the

professional military, a structure of coercion, and the managerial-technical bureaucracy, a structure of production and distribution. While individuals have freely moved from one structure to another, and considerable overlapping and rotation of personnel continues to take place, these four structures represent distinctive and separate avenues of power in the Soviet system.

Although the Soviet intelligentsia consists of a number of elite groups, all its members have a common desire to perpetuate the Soviet system from which they have sprung and in which they benefit as a privileged group. Within this broad common framework of interests, however, these elites are concerned pre-eminently with the social status of their own group, and they seek to shape doctrine and policy according to their own special interests. They are officially recognized as occupational and professional categories, but they cannot formally organize themselves into political organizations outside the party or as explicit factional groupings within the party. They must exert their influence and make their demands only as amorphous entities inside the Communist Party. Since they cannot legitimately articulate a separate interest as such inside or outside the party, they are inevitably forced into competing for control of the party's decision-making organs, and into presenting their interests in terms of the party and the society as a whole.

Because Soviet ideology demands conformity, conflicts among social elites and their representatives in the party's leading organs cannot be resolved within an institutionalized framework of political accommodation and compromise. Rather, one interest-group or faction tries to assert its supremacy over the others and impose its interests as those of all of society. If one group is unable to subdue the others, an uneasy and temporary coexistence ensues, and the party, under the pressures of diverse groups seeking political articulation, becomes a cover for a conglomeration of interests whose incom-

patibilities are only partially and temporarily obscured by a transparent veneer of "monolithic unity." Ultimately, this pattern may give way to a process of genuine accommodation and consensus formation.

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY

The relationship between social structure and political power in the Soviet system is eloquently revealed by the social configuration of the Communist Party as a whole. It has increasingly become an organization whose membership is overwhelmingly drawn from the intelligentsia (which at times has accounted for more than 70% of its total membership). Representation of the peasantry in the party virtually disappeared at times. In 1967, party membership was predominantly Great Russian (62%), male (80%), urban (78%), middle-aged (50%), and intelligentsia (46%).

The Shifting Composition of the Party, 1905-1967

Before the Revolution, workers consistently accounted for 60% or more of the party, while the intelligentsia, which provided virtually its entire leadership, made up only about one-third of its membership. The peasants, who were neither attracted to the party nor actively recruited, furnished from 5 to 8%. After the Revolution, the balance among these three social groups underwent a substantial shift. From 1917 to 1920, the proportion of the working class was systematically reduced until it reached a low point of 33% while that of the peasantry rose to nearly 37%, to constitute the largest single social group to be represented. The proportion of the intelligentsia also suffered some reduction. The year 1920 was the high point of peasant representation in the party.

The party experienced its first purge in 1921, when party membership was nearly halved from 732,521 members to 401,000. From 1922 to 1931, the proportion of workers was steadily increased until it reached a high of 66.6%, while that of the peasantry was trimmed to 22.3% and that of the intelligentsia was slashed to less than 10%. During the period of the Five Year Plans, the role of the intelligentsia in the industrialization and modernization of Russia was of crucial significance, and, within the complex of incentives and rewards introduced by Stalin, membership in the party assumed cardinal importance. The barriers erected against the intelligentsia were gradually relaxed, and were finally eliminated in 1939. Because of their education and abilities, the members of the intelligentsia easily met the formal qualifications for membership, quickly moved upward in the party hierarchy, and soon monopolized all positions of importance. The proportion of party members drawn from the intelligentsia swelled to well over 50% of the total.

The "proletarian" character of the party was partially restored during World War II, when workers and peasants in uniform were almost indiscriminately recruited into the party, and the percentage of workers may have risen once again to about one-third of the total membership. Immediately after the war, however, another purge hit the party, and those who were hastily recruited into it during the war were

mustered out, most of those expelled being workers and peasants. The intelligentsia in all probability accounted for nearly 70% of the total at this time.

In January, 1962, Soviet authorities published the first comprehensive social breakdown of the party in three decades, probably because for the first time since 1933 the proportion of the intelligentsia in the party dropped to below 50% of the total. As of January, 1967, according to the official data, workers accounted for 38.1% of the total membership and peasants accounted for 16% (Table 7-1). "Employees and all others" accounted for 45.9%, a category which includes the intelligentsia and perhaps the members of the armed forces. The statistics for 1956 were also divulged, and these were 32% workers, 17.1% peasants, and 50.9% "employees and all others."¹ In spite of this influx of workers and peasants in the party, the intelligentsia, which together with their families account for less than 25% of the total population, still provides close to 50% of the membership of the party.

Rural Representation in the Party

The party is predominantly urban in character, with 78% of its membership being drawn from the cities (urban workers and in-

¹*Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 1 (January, 1962), pp. 44-54.

TABLE 7-1

Social Composition of the Communist Party, 1905-1967 (In percentages)

<i>Social category</i>	1905	1917	1920	1932	1956	1961	1967
Workers	61.7%	60.2%	33.2%	64.5%	32.0%	34.5%	38.1%
Peasants	4.7	7.6	36.9	27.8	17.1	17.5	16.0
Intelligentsia	33.6	32.2	22.1	7.7	50.9	48.0	45.9
Total	8,400	23,600	612,000	3,172,215	7,173,521	9,176,005	12,684,133

Source: *Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 7 (April, 1967), pp. 7-8.

telligentsia). It has always been weakly organized in the countryside, not only because of built-in ideological biases, but also for the following reasons. (1) the agricultural and rural proportion of the population has been in steady decline since 1938, and this decline is continuing; (2) educational opportunities in rural areas are limited, and the quality of literacy and cultural life is much lower than in the cities—hence most collective farmers cannot meet the qualifications for membership; (3) incentives on the farms are very low, with the result that most of the ambitious and capable elements of the rural population migrate to the cities; (4) many collective farms have been transformed into state farms. In 1934 more than 50% of the collective farms did not have a single party member, and even by 1939, only 5% of the 243,000 collective farms had primary party organizations, with the membership on these farms accounting for only 153,000 out of almost 2,500,000. With the amalgamation of the collective farms, the proportion with party organizations increased, until by 1953, 85% of the farms had party organizations. At the Twentieth Party Congress, further progress was registered, but more than 7,300 collective farms were still without primary party organizations. By 1961, primary party organizations were to be found on 41,387 collective farms, 5,721 of which were large enough to have party committees, while 9,206 of primary units were located on state farms, of which 2,718 were large enough to have party committees. By January 1, 1965, the number of primary organizations on collective farms had decreased to 38,251, but with 8,630 large enough to have party committees, while primary organizations on state farms rose to 11,601, of which 3,827 were large enough to have party committees.²

The rural population was 106,900,000 in 1966—about 46% of the total Soviet population. Rural party membership, however, ac-

counted for only 22.6% of the total party membership and was spread unevenly among the different social groups in Soviet rural society (Table 7-2). Thus, while more than 95% of the collective-farm chairmen and virtually 100% of the sovkhos directors were party members, little more than 2% of the ordinary collective farmers were to be found in the party.

TABLE 7-2
Social Composition of the Communist Party in Rural Areas, 1965

Category	Number	Percentage
Sovkhos directors and deputies	30,000*	3.4%
Collective farm directors and deputies	45,000*	
Rural intelligentsia and pensioners	408,000*	18.5
Sovkhos foremen, farmers, and workers	687,000*	32.1
Equipment workers on kolkhozes	322,535	15.0
Collective farmers, including rural foremen	672,065	31.0
Total rural Communists	2,164,255	100.0%

*Rounded off to nearest thousand

As of January 1, 1965, there were 2,164,255 agricultural members in the party: 1,285,077 (59.4%) on collective farms, and 879,178 (40.6%) on state farms and other state agricultural enterprises.³ Of this number 520,000 were equipment operators and mechanics (322,535 on kolkhozes and about 197,000 on sovkhoses), while ordinary dirt farmers, including rural foremen, accounted for about 672,000 on kolkhozes and about 500,000 on sovkhoses. The remainder, about 465,000 (21.5%), was drawn from the rural intelligentsia, including farm directors. The leverage that rural society in

²*Partinaya Zhizn*, No. 10 (May, 1965)

general, and the peasantry in particular, has in the Soviet political process is thus very low, and this has been consistently reflected in the low priorities and rewards which have been allocated to the farm areas in Soviet society.

Urban Representation in the Party

As we have seen, the working class has always occupied a significant role in the doctrine and practice of the party. During the period of the great social and economic transformation of the Soviet social order between the two World Wars, the party underwent a profound change. The most able and ambitious members of the working class acquired new skills and education, and thus mustered themselves out of the working class and into the "ruling class" in the Soviet system. While expelling them from the party, or erecting barriers to reduce their ratio of membership, might satisfy the official myth, it would effectively destroy the incentive of the workers. The requirements of reality had to be reconciled with the imperatives of ideology, and the intelligentsia was redefined as a "working" or "toiling" intelligentsia, whose social origin was predominantly proletarian or peasant in character.

The ideological guilt feelings aroused by the transformation of the party into a party of the Soviet intelligentsia was clearly betrayed by the nearly three-decade refusal to reveal the social composition of the party. According to the data released in 1967, the working class accounted for more than one-third (38.1%) of the total membership, an increase from 34.5% in 1961. But this category not only includes industrial foremen, who make up a substantial proportion of the party membership, but also about 700,000 workers on sovkhozes, who are classified as workers in Soviet data. Of the 43 million urban workers in Soviet society, only about 3,600,000 (including foremen) belong to the Communist Party—that is, about 8.3% of

the workers in urban areas. This compares with the more than 22% of the mental workers who belong to the party. In recent years, emphasis has been placed on recruiting party members from "branches of material production," which includes workers, peasants, and intelligentsia occupied in producing goods as distinguished from those in "non-productive" or service enterprises and occupations. As of 1967, 73.3% of all members were engaged in production, while 26.7% were in nonproductive spheres of the economy.¹

By 1967, the Communist Party was well on the road to becoming a mass party, and while Khrushchev's successors have continued the practice of allowing the party to grow, the anxieties of the leadership have been clearly evident in the relatively large number of members who have been expelled and dropped from membership (203,000 between 1962 and 1964; 86,112 in 1966 alone), the tightening of qualifications for membership, and the fact that new members are increasingly funneled through the Komsomol (40.1% of the new members in 1966). As the Party continues to grow in size and becomes more representative, power is simultaneously diffused at the core among the elite interest-groups while simultaneously contracting from the outer periphery of the party as a whole. Thus, we must look not to the party, as such, for the social sources of power within Soviet society, but rather at the constellation of elites within the party—namely, the party intelligentsia.

THE SOCIAL PYRAMID OF POWER

The Distribution of Elites in the Party

As of January 1, 1967, 46% of the Communist Party was made up of the category "employees and all others," which includes the in-

¹*Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 7 (April, 1967), pp. 7-8.




FIGURE 7-1 *The social pyramization of power in the Soviet system.*

telligentsia, including perhaps about 880,000 members of the armed forces (unless they were distributed by occupation), and university students. In 1967, more than 4,671,000 members of the party were classified as "specialists with higher or specialized secondary education," nearly half of whom were engineers, technicians, or agricultural specialists.

In searching for the ultimate social foundations of power in the Soviet system, it becomes necessary to discover where the lines of social power intersect with the political structure. Specifically, the point at which the 5,800,000 members of the party, who are in the "employee and other" categories, intersects with the 26 million Soviet citizens who are classified as "mental workers," must be defined, with due regard given to the distribution in both aggregates by nationality, sex, and age. Increasingly (excepting in the case of the estimated 250,000 (career party officials), one's authority in the party is defined by one's role, status, function,

and influence in the social structure, rather than the other way around—although forces continue to work in both directions and also feed back and forth.

Within the category of "mental workers," we find an even more elite category, designated as "specialists with a higher or specialized secondary education." There were about 17 million of these in 1965, and of these, some 12,065,900 worked in the national economy, the difference being made up of retired people, members of the armed forces, students, and women not employed. As of January, 1965, 4,063,530 (34.6% of party membership; 36.2% of the "specialists" category) were members of the party. It is within this group of whom the great majority (80%) are men, together with the Army, that the social foundations of power in the Soviet system are to be found. It might be termed the Soviet "ruling elite," because it is from this group that all decision-makers in the Soviet system are recruited. Table 7-3 pro-

TABLE 7-3

The Distribution of the Intelligentsia in the Communist Party, 1966

<i>Social category</i>	<i>Total size of social category (employed)</i>	<i>Percentage of social category in party</i>	<i>Party membership^b</i>	<i>Percentage of party</i>
Mental Workers	26,000,000 ^a	20.9%	5,432,196	46.2%
Intelligentsia (women)	11,249,700 ^c (6,940,700)	36.2 (13.0)	4,450,530 (900,000)	37.8 (7.7)
Executives	1,200,000	76.0	423,700	8.6
Administrators			586,656	
Engineer, technical ^d	4,400,000	40.0	1,765,400	15.0
Cultural, Professional, and Scientific	5,200,000	24.3	1,265,700	10.8
Trade, Services, etc.	470,000	4.2	510,592	4.3
Other office workers	14,000,000 ^e			
Armed forces (est.)	3,000,000	29.3	880,000 ^f	7.5
Workers (urban and rural) ^g	51,000,000	8.6	4,385,700	37.4
Collective farmers	30,000,000	6.5	1,940,160	16.5
Total	110,000,000		11,758,169	

^a As of January, 1966.^b As of January, 1965.^c As of November 15, 1964 (12,065,900 as of November, 1965). Includes all "specialists" working in the national economy.^d Includes agricultural personnel.^e Mainly women.^f Primarily officers and senior noncoms; calculated on the basis of military representation at the Twenty-Third Party Congress (April, 1966).^g Includes all foremen and 8 million rural workers on state farms.

vides in greater detail a social profile of the Communist Party and a political profile of the intelligentsia.

The Social Composition of Party Congresses

Throughout the party's history, the largest social groups in the Soviet Union have had the narrowest representation at the top of the party pyramid. Conversely, the groups with a narrow social base have dominated the party. Thus, even in 1905, when 62% of the party was made up of workers, 93% of the delegates to the Party Congress were classified as intelligentsia and only 4% were listed as peasants.

Of the 15 members on the Central Committee in 1918, only one was classified as a worker; about 40% of the Party Congress, however, was composed of workers.

In 1952, the percentage of workers, including foremen, in the Party Congress was less than 8% while the intelligentsia accounted for more than 84% of the delegates (Table 7-4). The situation has improved substantially since Stalin's death. The proportion of workers elected to the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Party Congresses (1961 and 1966) was nearly three times that in 1952, but the number of delegates to the Congresses had quadrupled. Considering that the percentage of workers was tripled, the increase in delegates from the in-

telligentsia was little short of astronomical: in absolute numbers, the increase in the number of delegates from this class was from about 1,114 members in 1952 to 3,248 members in 1966.

Khrushchev and his successors have tried to give greater representation to workers, peasants, women, and the agricultural sectors of Soviet life. Most of the delegates representing the workers and peasants in the Congresses are foremen or supervisory personnel rather than ordinary workers or collective farmers. Even at the level of the Congress, in spite of the ornamental additions of representatives of workers and peasants, imbalance between the size of the class and its power in the party emerges. The intelligentsia as a whole, which accounts for only about 26% of the working population, comprised close to 50% of the party membership in 1966, and accounted for nearly 66% of

the delegates to the Congress (although the percentage was down, from 84.4% in 1952). (See Figure 7-1.)

*The Distribution of Elites
in the Central Committee
and Presidium/Politburo*

Although "workers" and "peasants" are sprinkled throughout party committees at lower levels of organization, their numbers thin out progressively as one moves up the party pyramid, and virtually disappear at the level of the All-Union Central Committee (Table 7-5). Even at the lowest levels, in 1965, only 36.4% of the members of city and borough party committees were "workers" and "peasants," while 24.2% were from the local party and governmental bureaucracies, 18% were engineers, technicians, and professional workers, 12.9%

TABLE 7-4
Social Composition of Party Congress, 1952-1966 (Voting delegates only)

	1952		1956		1959		1961		1966	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total	1,192		1,355		1,269		4,408		4,943 ^a	
Workers	7.8% ^a		12.2%		399	32.0%	984	22.3%	1,141	23.0%
Peasants	7.8 ^b		4.9				469	10.6 ^c	554	11.2
Intelligentsia	84.4		82.9		870	68.0	2,955	67.1	3,248	65.7
Party apparatus			526	37.3 ^d	456	36.0	1,262	28.7 ^e	1,330 ^f	27.0
State officials			177	13.1	147	11.5	465	10.5	539	10.9
Managerial-tech					126	10.0	667	15.0 ^g	756 ^h	15.3
Cultural profess					50	4.0	235	5.3	271 ⁱ	5.5
Military			116	8.5	91	7.0	305	7.0 ^j	352	7.1
Other							21	0.5		
Women	12.3		19.3	14.2	222	17.5	1,073	22.3	1,154	23.3

^aIncludes foremen.

^bIncludes farm directors and rural intelligentsia.

^cIncludes farm directors.

^dIncludes 20 trade-union and Komsomol officials.

^eIncludes 104 trade-union and Komsomol officials.

^fIncludes 260 agricultural specialists.

^gIncludes police officials with military rank.

^hIncludes alternates also.

ⁱIncludes 82 trade-union and 44 Komsomol officials.

^jIncludes 320 agricultural executives and technical personnel.

^kIncludes other.

TABLE 7-5

*Social Composition of the Central Committee, 1952-1966
(Members and candidates)*

<i>Social category</i>	<i>1952</i>	<i>1956</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>February, 1966</i>	<i>April, 1966</i>
Party apparatus	103	117	158 (48.0%) ^a	107 (34.2%)	155 (43.0%) ^d
State and economic officials	79	98	112 (34.0)	115 (36.8)	136 (37.9)
Military officers	26	18	31 (9.3)	31 (9.8)	33 (9.7)
Cultural and scientific			18 (5.4)		15 (4.2)
Police	9	3	2		2 (0.5)
Workers and Peasants					10 (2.8)
Others	19 ^b	19 ^b	9 ^c (3.3)	61 (19.1)	9 (2.5)
Totals	236	255	330	314	360
Women					15 (4.2)
Over age 40					327 (90.8)
New members					121 (33.6)

^aIncludes 9 trade-union and Komsomol officials.^cIncludes a few "workers" and "peasants."^bIncludes cultural and scientific personnel.^dIncludes 10 trade-union and Komsomol officials.

were industrial and farm executives, and 8.5% were from other agencies (probably including the military), and 21% were women.

At the level of the Central Committee in 1966, the party apparatus accounted for nearly half the total membership, while the state bureaucracy, including both administrative and managerial officials, constituted over one-third. Thus the state bureaucracy remains the chief rival of the party apparatus for control of the party, and the power struggles since Stalin's death can be charted through the changing balance and distribution of the elites in the Central Committee and its Politburo. Under Khrushchev, the state apparatus gained substantially over the party apparatus in the composition of the Central Committee but not in the (then) Presidium. The Central Committee elected in 1961 included 48% party officials and only 34% from the state. By February, 1966, the proportions had drastically altered to favor the state apparatus over the party by 36.8% to 34.2%. At the Twenty-Third Party Congress, the old balance was restored some-

what, but the state held on to some of its gains, and the proportions emerged as 43% party and 38% state. The 1966 Central Committee also betrayed a greater sensitivity to the presence of "workers" and "peasants," if only for ornamental purposes: in this Central Committee there was a grand total of two authentic peasants (brigade leaders to be sure) and eight genuine workers (foreman and "honored workers").

When we examine the Central Committee more closely, we discover that the party apparatus is represented by 155 members (127 Republican and local secretaries, 18 central officials, and 10 trade-union and Komsomol functionaries). Of the 134 state officials, 17 were in diplomatic work, 66 were from the central government (including economic ministries), 43 came from local governmental bodies, and eight were regional economic administrators. The military was represented by 33 Generals, Admirals, and Marshals, and the Secret Police by two civilian officials. The cultural-scientific-professional groups totaled a meager 15 (the scientists were mainly administra-

tors, and the cultural representatives were party journalists and ideologists). Two veteran retired members of the Politburo, Mikoyan and Shvernik, were also elected, while Voroshilov was also restored to membership.

As the Soviet leadership divides increasingly over policy issues, institutional cleavages become less significant indicators of group interests as various factions seek representation in Party, state and other institutional organs and bodies, and different majorities dissolve and congeal in response to policy debates and issues. While institutional groupings remain important as structures they are by no means monolithically so in their outlook on matters of policy and/or ideology.

The Politburo, whose membership can be altered by the Central Committee, is peculiarly sensitive to the fluctuations in the balance of power, and is a fairly accurate barometer of the changing political fortunes. Changes in the composition of the Politburo now reflect, to some degree, changes in the factional balance in the Central Committee as groups and individuals maneuver for position and advantage—bargaining, negotiating, and accommodating. The Central Committee's authority becomes crucial, and perhaps even decisive, when the factional balance is delicate. Then, rival groups seek to gain wider support and alter their policies to meet the demands of wider constituencies. Thus, while the Politburo is the more accurate gauge of day-to-day politics, the composition of the Central Committee is apt to reflect more durable, long-range trends.

As the Soviet system matures and becomes inextricably identified with the interests of its various privileged elites, the decision makers must give greater consideration in the calculation of policy to factors affecting the internal stability of the regime; and they will show greater sensitivity to the effects of decisions on the vested interests of the various elites in Soviet society. The rise of powerful social and

economic elites in the Soviet Union, and their insistent pressure for participation in the exercise of political power, could only introduce stresses, strains, conflicts, and hence new restraints into Soviet behavior.

Within the context of an ideology that imposes a single interest representing society as a whole, each interest group will tend to distort ideology and policy in an endeavor to give it the contours of its own interests, the next step is to elevate these to transcendental significance. Under these conditions, Soviet ideology may be constantly threatened with a series of fundamental convulsions if one interest group displaces another in the struggle for the control of the party machinery. Hence, a rational system of accommodating conflicting interests appears to be evolving. As the vested stake of each major group becomes rooted in the Soviet system, the contours of Soviet policy will inexorably tend to be shaped more by the rapidly moving equilibrium or accommodation of interests that develop internally than by abstract ideological imperatives, which may conflict with the concrete interests of specific major elites in Soviet society.

The definitive post-Khrushchev composition of the Politburo was made at the Twenty-Third Party Congress when Mikoyan and Shvernik were retired from the Politburo and Pelse, a Latvian Party secretary, was appointed a full member over the heads of all the candidate members. Immediately after Khrushchev's ouster, two new candidate members were appointed: Kunayev, a Kazakh Party leader, and Masherov, a Byelorussian Party secretary who had become a full member of the Central Committee only in November, 1964—which suggests that he played a key role in the post-Khrushchev factional maneuvering. The composition of the Secretariat remained unchanged, except that Kirilenko, also a full member of the Politburo, replaced Podgorny in the Secretariat, since the latter's new post as Chair-

man of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is traditionally disassociated from the Secretariat.

The restructuring of the party summit at the Twenty-Third Party Congress strongly suggested that Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Party, had strengthened his position and that he enjoyed a factional majority or consensus, but had not assumed the power of a Khrushchev or a Stalin irrespective of the symbolic manipulation of nomenclature at the Congress. Of the 11 full members of the Politburo, four were members of the Secretariat, while of the eight candidate members, two were members of the Secretariat. This meant that six members of the 11-man Secretariat also sat on the Politburo. The clear dominance of the party apparatus in the Politburo was further indicated by the presence of six party secretaries of Republics (Ukrainian, Latvian, Georgian, Uzbek, Byelorussian, and Kazakh) as full or candidate members. This broadened its ethnic base to include representation from six of the 14 major non-Russian nationalities, including two Central Asian Moslem nationalities (the Uzbek and Kazakh), and gave the apparatus a total of six full members and six candidate members of the Politburo, or 12 votes out of 19—a clear majority. In addition to this, career party bureaucrats like Podgorny and Mazurov moved into key state offices.

It is normal practice to divorce membership in the Secretariat from membership in the Council of Ministers, since the Secretariat is supposed to exercise an independent audit of the government's work and check on the execution and implementation of Party directives and resolutions. The only consistent deviation from this practice occurs when the same personality functions as General Secretary (First Secretary) of the Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, as was the case during the later years of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras. Similarly, the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is considered to be incompatible with membership in the Secretariat. Both Brezh-

nev and Podgorny relinquished their membership in the Secretariat upon their appointment as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. It is traditional, however, for the General Secretary to be an ordinary member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet if he holds no other state post, and it is usual for the Presidium to include several other members of the Party Secretariat, thus ensuring party audit and control over its activities. It is also customary for membership in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to be incompatible with membership in the Council of Ministers, since the latter is juridically responsible to the former. Since the death of Stalin, it has been normal practice to include high state and Party officials of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine in the Politburo.

The Secretariat, by its very nature, remains the exclusive domain of the apparatus, and the distribution of power at the summit is reflected in the degree of interlock between state and party officials in the Politburo. Since Stalin's death, the pattern of distribution in the party's highest body has been as shown in Table 7-6.

The Nationality Composition of the Party

The distribution and influence of various nationalities within the party at the national level has been highly uneven. In sheer numbers, Great Russians have always dominated membership in the party. Whereas Russians accounted for only 53% of the population in 1926, they made up 72% of the party only two years earlier. The Ukrainians, in contrast, who provided more than 21% of the population, made up only 6% of the party members. In 1962, the first complete national breakdown of the party in decades was published. Great Russians still accounted for 64% of the total; the decrease in percentage resulted from a determined effort on the part of the regime to increase the representation of other Republics.

TABLE 7-6
Distribution of Elites in the Presidium/Politburo 1952-1966

Category	October 1952	March 1953	February 1956	July 1957	July 1961	October 1961	January 1963	April 1966
Party apparatus*	13 (5) ^b	2 (2)	4 (3)	10 (6)	10 (3)	7 (3)	8 (4)	6 (7)
State bureaucracy								5 (1)
Economic	5 (4)	4	4	1 (2)	2 (1)	2	2	
Non economic	4 (2)	3 (1)	3 (1)	3	2 (2)	2 (2)	2 (2)	
Professional								
Military	0	0	0 (1)	1	0	0	0	0
Police	2	1 (1)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cultural								
Intelligentsia (ideologists)	1 (1)	0	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0	0	0
Totals	25 (11)	10 (4)	11 (6)	15 (6)	14 (7)	11 (5)	12 (6)	11 (8)
Women	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	

*State and police officials, ideologists, and others who were appointed to government positions from the party apparatus are included in this category rather than in their official position. Main career experience determines classification. Thus, M. A. Suslov is classified with the party apparatus rather than with the cultural intelligentsia.

^bFigures in parentheses are candidate members

More than 100 nationalities were represented in the party as of January, 1965. Nationality distribution is shown in Table 7-7.⁵

The representation of the non-Russian nationalities in the higher organs of the party has varied considerably over the years. A score or more nationalities have been represented in the Central Committee of the Party since 1952. Although the proportion of non-Russians, especially Ukrainians, has been steadily increasing since Stalin's death, the Russian presence has been overwhelming, rising as high as 80% of the total membership. At the apex of the party, the proportion of Russians has been smaller, but only nine non-Russian nationalities have found representation on the party's highest body. Of the nearly 90 members or candidate members who have served on the Party Politburo/Presidium for any length of time, over 50 have been Great Russians. Other nationalities have been distributed as follows:

Nationality	Fall	Candidates	Total
Great Russians	38	13	51
Ukrainians	7	4	11
Jews	5	3	8
Georgians	3	1	4
Armenians	1	1	2
Uzbeks	1	1	2
Larvians	2	1	3
Karelo-Finns	1	0	1
Azerbaijani	0	1	1
Poles	1	0	1
Kazaks	0	1	1
Byelorussians	1	0	1
Totals	60	26	86

Statistics alone, however, do not tell the complete story. Although the Ukrainians constitute the second largest nationality in the Union, not a single Ukrainian was admitted to the party's highest body between the years 1938 and 1952. The first Moslem to be admitted was an Azerbaijani crony of Beria's, who was appointed a candidate member in 1953, only to

⁵*Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 1 (January, 1962), and No. 10 (May, 1966), pp. 8-17.

TABLE 7-7

Nationality Distribution of the Party, July, 1961, January, 1965, and January, 1967

Nationality	1961		1965		1967	
	Party members	Percentage	Party members	Percentage	Party members	Percentage
Russians	6,116,700	63.5%	7,335,200	62.4%	7,846,292	61.9%
Ukrainians	1,412,200	14.7	1,813,400	15.4	1,983,090	15.6
Byelorussians	287,000	3.0	386,000	3.3	424,360	3.3
Georgians	170,400	1.8	194,000	1.6	209,196	1.7
Armenians	161,200	1.7	187,900	1.6	200,605	1.6
Kazakhs	149,000	1.5	181,300	1.5	199,196	1.6
Uzbeks	142,000	1.5	193,600	1.6	219,381	1.7
Azerbaidzhani	106,000	1.1	141,900	1.2	162,181	1.3
Lithuanians	42,000	0.4	61,500	0.5	71,316	.56
Latvians	33,900	0.3	44,300	0.4	49,559	.39
Tadzhiks	32,700	0.3	41,900	0.4	46,593	.37
Turkmen	27,300	0.3	32,400	0.3	35,781	.28
Kirgiz	27,300	0.3	35,000	0.3	39,053	.31
Moldavians	26,700	0.3	40,300	0.4	46,562	.37
Estonians	24,100	0.2	33,900	0.4	37,705	.29
Others	866,100	9.0	1,035,300	8.8	1,113,263	8.8
Totals	9,626,700		11,758,200		12,684,133	

be executed about a year later. The first Central Asian, an Uzbek, was admitted to the Presidium in December, 1956, and was replaced by another in 1961, who was joined by a Kazakh in 1966. Under Stalin, the Politburo was in fact

dominated by the Great Russians and the Caucasian nationalities, the latter constituting from one-third to one-fourth of the membership. Since 1956, at least six to eight nationalities have been represented in the Politburo.

VIII

The Soviet Constitutional Order

The Soviet system during its more than four decades of existence has operated under three different Constitutions. The first Constitution, which was restricted only to the Russian Republic—the R.S.F.S.R.—was promulgated on July 10, 1918, it was superseded by the first Constitution of the U.S.S.R., which came in force officially on January 3, 1924. The present Constitution was promulgated on December 5, 1936, and has remained in force since, although it has been amended frequently, especially in recent years. It is virtually impossible to secure an up-to-date text of the Soviet Constitution, whose versions now appear almost with the frequency of a periodical. Amendments to the Soviet Constitution are not conveniently enumerated, as is the case in American constitutional practice, but rather the alterations are inserted directly into the text, so that amendments can be detected only by examining various versions of the Constitution itself.

state of all the people" and "has emerged from capitalist encirclement," to lead "a great community of Socialist states."¹ Although the drafting commission is now chaired by Brezhnev, little concerning its deliberations has been made public.

THE FUNCTIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION

The Soviet Constitution performs the four universal functions of constitutions everywhere: (1) it legalizes the existing social order and makes explicit its ideological principles; (2) it establishes a framework of government and administration; (3) it regulates social and institutional behavior; (4) it enumerates normative Soviet goals and aspirations. In addition, the Soviet Constitution performs another function: (5) it serves as a propaganda document for export abroad.

The Constitution gives legal expression to the basic ideological norms of Soviet doctrine that have been concretely implemented. The most important of these are: (1) the abolition of private ownership of the means of production in favor of state or public ownership; (2) the collectivization of agriculture; (3) the nationalization of natural resources; (4) a centrally directed planned economy; (5) mandatory employment, in accordance with the formulas "He who does not work, neither shall he eat" and "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work"; (6) the legal monopoly of the Communist Party.

Among the normative goals, which are essentially hortatory in character, are: (1) "the aim of increasing wealth, of steadily raising the material and cultural standards of the working people" (Article 11); and (2) "the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic

crises, and the abolition of unemployment" (Article 118). These are general aspirations, expressing hope rather than concrete fulfillment.

Some normative goals in the Constitution, however, have been realized to some degree: (1) "the right to rest and leisure"; (2) "the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness and disability"; (3) "the right to education." In the same category is the principle that "women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men" (Article 122) and the principle of national and racial equality, which asserts the "equality of rights of citizens . . . irrespective of their nationality or race," violations of which are "punishable by law." The implementation of these doctrines has been extremely uneven, often capricious and unreliable. The regime's record concerning the non-Russian nationalities, for instance, has been exemplary in some areas and deplorable in others.

Other principles of the Soviet Constitution can be dismissed as transparent propaganda clichés which are essentially meaningless. Among these are the assertions that: (1) the Soviet Union "is a socialist state of workers and peasants"; (2) "all power in the U.S.S.R. belongs to the working people"; (3) the Soviet Union is "a voluntary union of equal . . . Republics"; (4) the Republics have "the right to freely secede from the U.S.S.R."; (5) "the highest organ of state power in the U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet."

Another category of unrealized principles are those which are purely declaratory in character. These are the principles dealing with political rights of Soviet citizens and the manner in which they are to be exercised. Thus Article 125 asserts that Soviet citizens "are guaranteed by law . . . freedom of speech . . . of the press . . . of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings . . . of street processions and demonstrations," provided that these freedoms are exercised "in conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen

¹*Pravda*, April 25, 1962

the Socialist system." With similar reservations, Article 126 reads that Soviet citizens "are guaranteed the right to unite in public organizations: trade unions, cooperative societies, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies," *but not in political parties or organizations*. Article 126 does not give Soviet citizens even the right to join the Communist Party, which is reserved only for "the most active and politically conscious citizens," and "is the core of all organizations . . . both public and state."

Article 124, concerning the exercise of religion, provides for "freedom of religious worship and freedom of antireligious propaganda." This means that freedom of "religious propaganda" is not guaranteed in the Constitution and, in fact, constitutes a crime under separate legislation. On the other hand, the full power and apparatus of the state and party are mobilized on behalf of "antireligious propaganda," which is a basic freedom in the Soviet Constitution obviously superior to freedom of religion. Since virtually all physical property in the Soviet Union belongs to the state, churches and religious institutions are either nonexistent or in a state of decay and disrepair; clergymen are hounded and persecuted, while "believers" find themselves harassed and insulted and discover that their opportunities in Soviet society are severely limited. "Freedom to worship," in effect, means freedom to worship silently, inconspicuously, and in isolation.

Another group of principles covers "rights" that have been continuously and grossly violated. Article 127 reads that "citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed inviolability of the person [and] no person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a prosecutor," while Article 128 asserts: "the inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law."

These are "rights" that Soviet jurists now acknowledge were systematically outraged dur-

ing the entire period of the Stalinist regime. Ironically enough, the very moment these "rights" were promulgated as sacred provisions of the "most democratic" Constitution in the history of mankind, they were being violated by the Secret Police, which arrested, tortured, and executed hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens and state and party officials of the highest rank, without benefit of public trial, legal counsel, or formal arraignment as provided by the Constitution and legal codes. Since 1956, Soviet jurists have been actively engaged in disavowing the Stalinist violations of the "norms of Socialist legality," the Secret Police has been shorn of its powers and dismembered, the concentration camps have been emptied of political prisoners, and the criminal and procedural codes have been revised in an effort to provide some concrete fulfillment of these universally cherished human rights

SOVIET FEDERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Soviet Union is constitutionally described as "a federal state formed on the basis of a voluntary union of equal Soviet Socialist Republics." Although, juridically, the U.S.S.R. resembles more a confederation than a federation, in practice it is organized as a tightly centralized system.

The Origins of Soviet Federalism

The Soviet federal system does not spring from Marxist doctrine, but rather has its source in the ethnic legacy left by the collapse of the Tsarist system. The Bolsheviks fell heir to a land with more than 100 races and nationalities, which had been absorbed but never digested by the expanding Russian Empire. Long exposed to "russification" and domination, these peoples smoldered with discontent, and their hostility constituted one of the chief political

problems of the Imperial system which was never satisfactorily resolved.

Federalism as an idea was anathema to both Marx and Lenin, for it seemed to be incompatible with the imperative of central economic planning. Furthermore, nationalism—and its moral justification, national self-determination—contravened the Marxist emphasis on class solidarity and a unified international proletariat. In spite of these ideological prejudices against nationalism, Lenin demonstrated his flexibility by recognizing that in the light of the experiences of the nations of the Russian Empire, no political movement could succeed without allowing for the nationalistic impulses which motivated the non-Russian minorities. In 1903, Lenin espoused the principle of national self-determination in spite of his ideological reservations. At first, he tried to interpret it in such a way that it would exclude the right of secession and independence, but by 1913, Lenin recognized that national self-determination “cannot be interpreted otherwise than in the sense of *political* self-determination—i.e., the right of secession and formation of an independent state.”² From that point on, the right of the nations of Russia to secede became a declaratory principle that appears in every Soviet constitutional document.

The Bolshevik stand, it should be made clear, was dictated by tactical expediency, as Lenin frankly admitted:

We, on our part, do not want separation at all. We want as large a state as possible. . . . We want a voluntary amalgamation and that is why we are obliged to recognize the freedom of secession.³

Wherever it could, however, the Soviet regime used the power of the Red Army to prevent secession and to reconquer those areas of the former Russian Empire which took the Bolsh-

evik position seriously and tried to secede. Those border regions that managed to make good their separation, even in the face of an attempted Soviet conquest (i.e., Poland, the three Baltic States, and Finland), remained outside the Soviet Republic.

The Principles of Soviet Federalism

The federal structure of the Soviet state is dictated more by historical necessity than by ideological inspiration. In general, the trend has been toward greater *juridical decentralization accompanied by tighter ideological and political centralization*. While Soviet federalism reflects a conventional pattern of organization in its purely juridical dimension, it also exhibits five unique characteristics:

1. Soviet federal units are based on nationality rather than on regional, economic, or historical distinctions. All federal units are nationality units; hence the Soviet system is primarily a *multinational* federalism.

2. Not all nationality units possess the same degree of national autonomy, but rather a hierarchy of national units exists, with the highest being called a Union Republic and the lowest a National District (okrug).

3. The highest federal units, the Union Republics, have a juridical right to secede, as the ultimate manifestation of their national autonomy.

4. Since February 1, 1944, all Union Republics are constitutionally endowed with the power to engage in diplomatic relations, to sign international agreements, and to maintain separate troop formations. Thus, juridically, foreign affairs and defense are decentralized. Although two Republics, the Ukraine and Byelorussia, are members of the United Nations and engage in limited diplomatic activity and all Union Republics have Foreign Ministries, the diplomatic powers of the Republics remain potential rather than real. In the matter of defense, not a single Republic has ever established a Defense Ministry, appointed a Defense Minister, or organized a separate army.

5. Since December, 1958, the collective head of the Soviet state, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, must have as many Vice-Chairmen as there are Union Republics. By custom, the Chairmen of

²V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 123.

³V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16 (New York: International Publishers, 1945), p. 507. See also V. V. Aspaturian, “The Theory and Practice of Soviet Federalism,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 12, 1950, 20–51.

the Presidia of the Union Republics are *ex officio* Vice-Chairmen of the Presidium of the Union. Similarly, the Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the Union Republics are *ex officio* members of the All-Union Council of Ministers. Thus, in the Soviet pattern, the basic federal units have representation in the central executive and administrative organs of government.⁴

Aside from the unique departures enumerated above, Soviet federalism in its formal dimensions is quite conventional. It follows the principle of federal supremacy, in that all Republic constitutions must be in conformity with that of the U.S.S.R., and federal laws take precedence over Republic laws.

The Hierarchy of National Units

As the Constitution of a federal state, the Soviet Constitution establishes a system of multiple jurisdiction and shared sovereignty. In a strictly technical sense, the federal character of the Soviet Union is restricted to the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Union Republics, of which there are currently 15. Lesser national units enjoy narrower degrees of autonomy. The Union Republics vary in size from the R.S.F.S.R.—which embraces three-quarters of the territory of the U.S.S.R., stretches from the Baltic to the Pacific, and includes 55% of the population of the Soviet Union—to Estonia, the smallest in population (1.3 million), and Armenia, the smallest territorially. According to existing Soviet doctrine, first enunciated by Stalin in 1936, a national territory must meet three physical criteria in order to qualify as a Union Republic:

1. The eponymous population must constitute a majority of the population in the Republic.
2. The Republic must have a population of at least one million.

⁴Numbers 1-4 from V. V. Aspaturian, *The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1960), and "The Union Republics and Soviet Diplomacy: Concepts, Institutions and Practices," *American Political Science Review* (June, 1959), 383-411.

3. The Republic must be located on the international border

According to Stalin.

Since the Union Republics have a right to secede from the U.S.S.R., a republic . . . must be in a position logically and actually to raise the question of secession from the U.S.S.R. . . . Of course none of our republics would actually raise the question of seceding from the U.S.S.R. But since the right to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to the Union Republics, it must be so arranged that this right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper [sic].⁵

The right to secede, of course, is illusory. No Republic has ever attempted it, although non-Russian Soviet leaders have been tried and executed allegedly for plotting to take various Republics out of the Union!

Since the Republics are juridically organized as national states, each has a constitution, a government, and a flag, and also a coat of arms that is a variation of that possessed by the Union. Each Republic has a Supreme Soviet (unicameral instead of bicameral, however), a collective head of state called the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a Council of Ministers with a Chairman (Premier), a Supreme Court, a Procurator, a Foreign Ministry, and provisions for a Defense Ministry. Union Republics have 32 (up from 25 since 1966) deputies in the Council of Nationalities—the second "federal" chamber of the Supreme Soviet.

Immediately below the Union Republic in the Soviet federal hierarchy is the Autonomous Republic, which is reserved for moderately large nationalities that are "culturally advanced" but cannot meet the criteria for Union Republic status. Autonomous Republics, of which there are 20, resemble Union Republics in almost all particulars. They have constitutions and governments virtually indistinguishable from those of the Union Republics, but they do not have the juridical right to secede, are subject to the jurisdiction of a Union Re-

⁵Stalin, *Leninism: Selected Writings* p. 400.

public rather than to that of the Soviet Union directly, are not endowed with international responsibilities, do not enjoy a Vice-Chairmanship on the All-Union Presidium nor *ex officio* membership on the All-Union Council of Ministers, and are entitled to only 11 deputies in the Council of Nationalities.

The Autonomous Oblasts, of which there were eight in 1967, are populated by smaller nationalities, and their juridical status and powers are considerably inferior to those of the Union and Autonomous Republics. The Autonomous Oblasts are entitled to five deputies in the Council of Nationalities. The lowest national units are the National Okrugs, of which all 10 are located in the R.S.F.S.R. These units are populated by very small national, ethnic, or linguistic groups, numbering in the thousands. Altogether, 53 national groups are organized into units. National units can move up or down in the federal hierarchy, but the usual procedure is promotion to higher status: National Oblast to Autonomous Republic, or Autonomous Republic to Union Republic.

Soviet Federalism in Perspective

Since Soviet federalism arose neither as a practical device to restrain the power of the central government nor in response to an ideological compulsion, its true significance is not likely to be found in its functional attributes, but rather in its role as a device for organizing many national groups under a uniform ideology. Federalism is still viewed in Soviet doctrine as a transitional device to centralization, although it has undoubtedly influenced Soviet administration in ways not originally intended. Soviet federalism is a very weak restriction against the power of the central authority. Since the Constitution itself is not designed as a limiting instrument, it is not likely that the federalism it establishes can become an effective limitation on the central government.

While the Soviet policy on nationalities is

deficient in many particulars, the Soviet multinational system is a unique experiment. Western criticism of Soviet nationality policy and Soviet federalism is leveled principally at the uniform ideological content of Soviet life, the totalitarian character of Soviet rule, and the inadequacies of Soviet federalism as a limitation on the state. It remains true, nonetheless, that nationalities were given a modicum of administrative authority and that their cultural self-expression was respected and at times even restored. The party, on the other hand, is anti-federal, and transcends the Constitution itself; it is the single thread that weaves together the entire Union into a compact political monolith. This unification is enhanced by the centralization of economic planning and by the socialization of the means of production by the Soviet state.

The Soviets under the 1936 Constitution

The 1936 Constitution established a pseudo-parliamentary system, although the term "soviet" was retained. All soviets (people's legislative bodies) are elective. All electoral discriminations were abolished in favor of equal, direct, and universal suffrage. Soviets (which literally means "councils") exist at all territorial-administrative levels, from the village through the towns and cities, rayons, oblasts, krais, Autonomous Oblasts, and Autonomous Republics, Union Republics, and finally at the Union level. The soviets at the Union, Union Republic, and Autonomous Republic levels are called Supreme Soviets, while the lesser bodies are called oblast, rayon, city, etc., soviets.

Every soviet elects an executive committee to function as an administrative and supervisory body, with a chairman who in effect functions as the chief administrative officer of the unit concerned. At the Union, Union Republic, and Autonomous Republic levels, instead of an executive committee, there is an elected Presidium

and Council of Ministers, each with a chairman. The soviets are the ultimate repositories of "state power" for the territorial unit which they administer, and in this capacity they exercise control over the courts as well as over the executive, legislative, and administrative branches of local government.

The total number of regional and local soviets is nearly 49,000 (a drop of more than 10,000 since 1957 because of the consolidation and shrinkage of rural soviets) kray, 6, oblast, 105, autonomous oblast, 8, national okrug, 10, rayon, 2,858, city, 1,868, borough, 416, settlement, 3,325; and village, 40,174. All together, these soviets elected over 2 million deputies in 1967 and gave rise to an equal number of executive bodies. These soviets varied in size from 40 to 80 in districts, 70 to 150 in rayons, and 50 to 700 in cities, with as many as 850 in large metropolitan areas. Unwieldy in size and meeting irregularly, they delegate their authority to the smaller executive bodies, whose chairmen are high party officials and whose members are full-time paid officers of local administration. The executive committees exercise the powers of the soviets between sessions and are responsible not only to the soviet but to the executive committee of the higher territorial unit. In instances where the executive committee itself is fairly large, a bureau or presidium serves as an inner executive body.

Immediately below the All-Union level are the Supreme Soviets of the 15 Union Republics, with a total of 5,829 deputies elected in March, 1967; and just below this tier are the Supreme Soviets of the 20 Autonomous Republics, with a total of 2,925 deputies.

It should be noted that the soviets parallel and virtually duplicate the party organizations at all levels, and a close and continuing relationship exists between the two (Fig. 8-1). In theory, the soviets represent the "masses," since they are elected by all citizens, whereas the party represents the "vanguard" or leading element in the population. Consequently, at all

levels of organization there is an overlapping between party and soviet organizations. Party membership among deputies to local soviets in 1967 ranged from an average of 39% in Estonia to over 50% in Azerbaidzhan. As a general rule, the higher the administrative level of the soviet, the greater the proportion of party members, which at the All-Union Supreme Soviet level in recent years has varied from 70 to 85%. (Since the soviets represent the masses, it is only appropriate that a certain proportion of deputies at all levels be ordinary nonparty citizens.)

Table 8-1 demonstrates that, as one moves up the ladder of the soviets, besides the increase in the proportion of party members there is a corresponding increase in the proportion of men and members of the intelligentsia involved. Thus we may extend our general rule to say that the more important the function and status, the more it is male dominated, and the more influential and important the institution, the more it is dominated by male party members of the intelligentsia. Forgetting for a moment the influences of the intelligentsia on our considerations, let us concentrate on the qualifications "male" and "party member" as they together affect the composition of the soviets. The predominance of males and party members is more than conspicuous in the executive committees and directing organs of the local soviets. In 1961, for example, of the 347,101 members of executive committees, 262,990 (75.6%) were men and 252,328 (72.7%) were party members. And of the 49,824 Chairmen of executive committees, 42,136 (84.6%) were men and 45,171 (90.7%) were Party members, while the less significant post of secretary, not to be confused with the Party secretaryship, which is a near male monopoly, was occupied by 29,243 (58.7%) women, and only 18,808 (37.8%) were members of the Party.⁶

⁶Soviet Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya, No. 3 (March, 1963).




FIGURE 8-1 *Interlocking party and state structures.*

TABLE 8-1
Party and Social Composition of Soviets

Level	Total Deputies	Party Members		Men		Intelligentsia	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
All-Union (1)	1,517	1,141	75.2%	1,092	72.0%	913	60.1%
Union-Republic (15)	5,829	3,985	68.4	3,867	66.3	2,983	51.2
Autonomous Republic (20)	2,925	1,953	66.8	1,904	65.1	1,626	55.6
Regional and Local (48,770)	2,045,277	943,314	46.1	1,169,117	57.3	799,884	39.1
Total	2,055,548	950,397	46.23	1,175,980	57.2	805,406	39.2

Source: *Pravda* March 26, 1967

SOVIET ELECTIONS

Under the 1936 Constitution, Soviet elections are direct, universal, equal, and "secret," but since there is only one candidate for each elective position, elections are obviously not designed to provide the electorate with a choice of representatives, but merely a superficial opportunity to ratify and approve the policies of the Communist Party. The Soviet electorate, of 146,000,000 (1967), is one of the largest in the world, with the minimum voting age set at 18. Even though Article 141 of the Constitution stipulates that "the right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, and cultural societies," candidates are, in fact, selected and screened by the appropriate organs of the party, although they may encourage other groups to suggest names as possible candidates.

Elections in the Soviet Union have more the character of a festive occasion than of a serious political event. Since no contest exists, artificial stimulants are required to create a feeling of public participation. Rallies and assemblies are held, "campaigns" are conducted, slogans are coined, speeches are made, banners and pins are distributed, and get-out-the-vote drives are organized. Elections are normally scheduled on a

holiday or non-working day in order to assure maximum turnout. Election commissions consisting of representatives of the party and other organizations are established at all levels, from the precinct to the Union, they administer and supervise elections, certify candidates, register voters, examine complaints, check "irregularities," count the votes, and report the results—in a solemn and serious manner. The number of citizens involved in these electoral bodies runs into the millions.

In order to adhere to the constitutional imperative of a "secret" ballot, polling booths are provided for the voters at voting stations, but since only one candidate exists for each position, the normal procedure is for the voter to simply fold his ballot and drop it in the ballot box in full view of the voting officials. His other choices are not to vote at all or to cross the name off the ballot as a gesture of disapproval. The latter would require that the voter utilize the polling booth. Since use of the booth would arouse suspicion, it is infrequently used, under Stalin, resort to the booth often signified the last election in which the voter would participate for some time. If more than 50% of the voters scratch a candidate's name, he fails election, but rejection by the voters is a rare occurrence and happens only at lower levels and usually only when officially inspired.

Voter participation in Soviet elections is very high, since the social and political pressures to vote are intense. Failure to vote may provoke social criticism and penalties, although it is not against the law to abstain. In a system that relishes and demands unanimity, deliberate abstention is tantamount to a negative vote. Whereas in earlier years the proportion of eligible voters who participated was less than 50%, it has been more than 95% since 1937, reaching 99.97% in 1958, and 99.95% in 1962. In the 1966 elections to the All-Union Supreme Soviet, 99.94% of the 144 million eligible voters took part in the elections; of those who voted, 99.71% cast their votes for the single candidate in each district, with 346,000 casting negative votes against candidates running for the Council of Union, and 289,000 voting against candidates aspiring to the Council of Nationalities. The record is virtually identical in elections to the local soviets, except that the 277,000 negative votes out of a total of more than 146 million cast in March, 1967, managed to reject 129 candidates (119 village, five settlement, three city, and two rayon) out of the 2,045,419 who were running.⁷

Elections to the All-Union Supreme Soviet take place every four years (even-numbered), while elections at all other levels are conducted every two years (odd-numbered).

Since neither in theory nor in practice is it the purpose of Soviet elections to choose a government, what functions are performed by these elections and why are they held with so much fanfare and expense? As we shall see, several very useful purposes can be served by even these manipulative and staged elections.

1. The elections provide a façade of legitimacy and legality for the Communist regime. Since the Soviet system claims to be the most "democratic" in the world, some external evidence of democratic "choice" must be demonstrated. And since the regime is controlled by an

elite party that makes up but a small fraction of the total population, there is a compulsion to provide unanimity in elections to render emphatic the ratification of the party's policies and identify them with the will of the "masses."

2. Soviet elections also impart to the population a feeling of participation and involvement in the political process, and they mobilize the energies and enthusiasms of the people and imbue them with a sense of Communist civic responsibility—i.e., the opportunity to vote for the candidates presented by the regime.

3. Soviet elections can also serve as useful barometers of dissatisfaction for the regime and act as warning devices. While to the uninitiated eye the dreary unanimity of the voting may be unenlightening, the smallest variation from one section of the country to another in the total number of abstentions and negative votes can be very revealing to the regime.

4. Elections also provide ceremonial occasions for the leaders of the regime to make speeches and pronouncements, to establish contact with the general population, to disseminate and popularize the policies of the regime, and to provide a stage for the announcement of new policies and major shifts of personnel in the government.

5. Finally, Soviet elections perform a valuable external propaganda device by providing a spectacular occasion for disseminating propaganda abroad concerning the Soviet Constitution and Soviet electoral procedures and democratic institutions. While these gestures may register little impact on countries that enjoy free and periodic elections, their effect on countries that do not have elections, or whose elections are narrowly restricted or corrupt, may be substantial.

THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R.

According to Article 30 of the Soviet Constitution, "the highest organ of the state power in the U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.," which means that all the constitutional powers in the Soviet system are vested in this body. Elected for a term of four years, the Supreme Soviet superficially resembles a bicameral legislative body of an ordinary federal state (Fig. 8-2). One Chamber—the Soviet

⁷*Pravda*, March 26, 1967.




FIGURE 8-2 Constitutional structure of the Soviet state

session at the direction of the Presidium or upon the demand of one of the Union Republics. In actual practice, until 1955 the Supreme Soviet was normally convened only once a year, and the character and duration of its sessions were extraordinary by any standard. Between 1946 and 1954, this "highest organ of state power" sat for a total of 45 days, with the longest session lasting seven days and the shortest exactly 67 minutes (to confirm the changes made after Stalin's death). Since 1955, a determined effort has been made to use this body more often, and although its sessions still last for only four to seven days, they have taken place at the regular intervals required by the Constitution.

The Supreme Soviet is not a deliberating body; the deliberations take place elsewhere. Nor is it a debating assembly, debates, too, are held elsewhere, if at all. Neither does it formulate policy. It functions essentially as a listening assembly, and most of its "working" time is preoccupied with hearing reports from government Ministers. It listens attentively and with conditioned enthusiasm; if requested, it enacts legislation with rare dispatch, whether the subject be fundamental or trivial. "Debate" is ritualized; proposals and comments from the floor are prearranged with consummate precision. Panegyrics are delivered by a dozen or more carefully selected deputies; the appropriate personalities and actions of the past are roundly condemned, while the wisdom and correctness of the government is widely praised. During the entire existence of the Supreme Soviet, there has never been a single negative vote (or abstention) cast in either Chamber, and no disagreement between the two bodies has ever occurred.

Since 1955, when Malenkov announced his resignation before the Supreme Soviet, calculated efforts have been made to enhance its prestige and to give it a more conspicuous role in the policy process. Meetings of the Supreme Soviet have been more frequent, and it is em-

ployed more often as a sounding board for policies which require dramatization and public dissemination.

The possibility, no matter how remote it may appear at the moment, that ritual and ceremony may some day be replaced with substance, should not be ignored. Lifeless legal bodies, playing a ritualistic role, sometimes come to life under certain conditions and circumstances. The 1966 reorganization of the Supreme Soviet, expanding its nine permanent standing commissions (four in the Council of Union; five in the Council of Nationalities) to 10 each, reflects a basic political tendency in Soviet society in the direction of transferring greater power from the party to the constitutional organs of the state. Increasingly, soviet scholars and even party officials (largely from the non-Russian Republics) are suggesting that the Supreme Soviet be allowed to behave more like an authentic legislative body. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Armenian Republic even had the audacity to suggest that more than one candidate (nominated, however, through the single Communist Party) be offered in some districts to give Soviet citizens a personal choice between two equally deserving candidates.

In some areas of legislative concern, such as education, economic reorganization, health and welfare, judicial procedures, and criminal codes, discussion in the Supreme Soviet has been lively—even gingerly contentious—and has approximated genuine legislative debate. It is too early to make reliable predictions concerning possible changes in the powers and function of the Supreme Soviet, but one important clue will be the role it is assigned in any new Constitution which may be forthcoming.

The Powers and Functions of the Supreme Soviet

Some powers are entrusted exclusively to the Supreme Soviet. Only the Supreme Soviet can pass "laws" or statutes, called *zakons*; only

the Supreme Soviet can "amend" the Constitution (Article 146); only the Supreme Soviet, in joint session, "elects" the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, "appoints" the government of the U.S.S.R. (the Council of Ministers), "elects" the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. (Article 105), and "appoints" the Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R. (Article 114). It also possesses exclusive authority to enact legislation concerning Union citizenship, rights of foreigners, and the determination of the "principles" governing marriage and the family, the judicial system, judicial procedures, and criminal and civil codes.

The Constitution, however, is deliberately ambiguous on the precise demarcation of authority between the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, since Article 14 assigns powers not only to the Supreme Soviet, but also to the "higher organs of state power," which also include the Presidium. Thus the Supreme Soviet must share authority with the Presidium in the following important spheres.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL SECURITY. Representation of the U.S.S.R. in international relations; conclusion, ratification, and denunciation of treaties; questions of war and peace; organization of national defense and security; direction of foreign trade on the basis of a state monopoly.

CONSTITUTIONS. Control over the observance of the Constitution and insuring the conformity of the Union Republic constitutions with the All-Union document; admission of new Republics; confirmation of boundary changes between Union Republics and other administrative-territorial boundary alterations.

ECONOMICS. Determination of the national economic plan; approval of the consolidated state budget; allocations of taxes and revenue between Union and local budgets; determination of land tenure and use of natural resources;

administration, organization, and/or direction of banks, financial, credit, and monetary institutions; administration of economic enterprises, transport, communications, state insurance, and the organization of a uniform system of national-economic statistics.

EDUCATION AND WELFARE. Determination of the "basic principles" of education and public health; determination of the principles of labor legislation.

Normally, sessions of the Supreme Soviet are not devoted to passing "laws" but to confirming the executive orders (*zakons*), of the Presidium, and this it can do quickly. Thus, on a single day—April 26, 1954—the Supreme Soviet managed to ratify 40 *ukazes* of the Presidium, most of which had altered the Constitution. This was accomplished with neither debate nor extensive "discussion." Aside from those which merely confirmed the decrees of the Presidium and introduced minor constitutional alterations of an administrative character, the Supreme Soviet between 1938 and July, 1956, enacted only a total of less than 25 *zakons*.⁹

The Supreme Soviet, although an impotent body, represents primarily the privileged elites of Soviet society and largely duplicates the social membership and even the personnel of the hierarchies in the party, state, economic, and military establishments. For this reason, it should not be surprising that the policies of the party are adopted by the Supreme Soviet with neither questions nor criticisms. Over 79% (1,200) of the deputies were elected to the Twenty-Third Party Congress in 1966.

The social configuration of the Supreme Soviet (Table 8-2) during the post-Stalin period betrays a remarkable uniformity from one soviet to the other. Although the proportion of the intelligentsia has been steadily diminishing, the distribution of the elites within the intel-

⁹*Sbornik Zakonov S.S.S.R. i Ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovno Soveta S.S.S.R., 1938-1956* (Moscow, 1956).

TABLE 8-2
Social Profile of the All-Union Supreme Soviet, 1958-1966

Social Category	1958				C.N.	1962*			C.N.	1966†		
	C.N.	C.U.	Total	Percentage		C.U.	Total	Percentage		C.U.	Total	Percentage
Intelligentsia	119	504	923	67.0%	426	487	913	63.3%	453	460	913	60.2%
Party apparatus	106	167	273	19.8	113	170	283	19.6	129	160	289	19.1
State apparatus	106	94	200	14.5	125	101	226	15.7	131	98	229	15.1
Managerial-Technical	112	135	247	17.9	82	104	186	12.9	83	104	187	12.3
Cultural	72	77	149	10.8	82	80	162	11.2	84	68	152	10.0
Scientific	23	31	54	3.9	24	32	56	3.9	26	30	56	3.7
Armed forces												
Workers	131	153	287	20.8	144	205	349	24.2	181	225	406	26.8
Collective farmers	81	74	155	11.2	82	93	175	12.1	105	72	177	11.7
Others	6	7	13	9	0	6	6	0.4	11	10	21	1.4
Total	640	738	1,378	100.0	652	791	1,443	100.0	750	767	1,517	100.0
Women					175	215	390	27.0%	203	222	425	28.0%
Party membership	488	559	1,047	76.0%	490	604	1,094	75.8	568	573	1,141	75.2
Elected for 1st time					473	534	1,007	69.8	533	482	1,015	66.9
Higher Ed (c & inc)					340	421	761	52.7	406	402	808	53.3
Secondary Ed (G&S)					110	129	239	16.6	134	141	275	18.1
Over 40 yrs of age				70.5	358	471	829	57.4	425	476	901	59.4

*Pravda, April 25, 1962. †Pravda, August 4, 1966.
C.N. = Council of Nationalities, C.U. = Council of Union

Intelligentsia has been relatively constant, with the managerial-technical group showing the greatest decrease in representation in favor of more "workers." Males consistently account for slightly less than 75% of the membership, and party membership seems to hold at slightly above that proportion. The turnover in membership is unusually high, with about two-thirds of each soviet being made up of new deputies. The continuity is represented at the core by the leadership of the regime, which is carried over from one session to the next. Well over half of each soviet is consistently more than 40 years old, while the proportion of deputies with some higher education now consistently holds to more than 50%. In the organization of the Supreme Soviet, virtually every formal officer of the body including the chairmen of more

than half of the 20 standing commissions is a member of the Party Central Committee, and most of the "debate" and "discussion" is thus carried on by deputies who are also members of the Central Committee. Thus the Supreme Soviet, in some respects, represents a selected audience of citizens before which the decisions of the Central Committee are transmuted into legal acts of state, and before which some of the differences in the Central Committee are given a public and esoteric airing.

Since about one-fifth of the Supreme Soviet is made up of Central Committee members, there are bound to be some interesting similarities in the social composition of the country's highest legislative organ. But the differences are even more remarkable. Like the Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet is predomi-

nantly male, but whereas the Central Committee is a near-male monopoly (95%), the usual practice is to elect one-fourth of the deputies from the fairer sex. The age structure of the Central Committee is older than that of the Supreme Soviet, with 70% of its membership in 1966 being over 50 years old. The turnover rate in the Central Committee betrays wide variation and fluctuates in accordance with factional fortunes (in 1966, it was only 15% for full members and somewhat higher for candidates), whereas the Supreme Soviet registers an even turnover rate of about two-thirds each time. Only 2.8% of the Central Committee is made up of "workers and peasants" whereas in the Supreme Soviet, it now approaches 40%. This suggests once again that the proportion of women and workers and peasants in any Soviet institution, organization, or association is a fairly reliable guide to its real power, influence, and status in the Soviet system.

THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is defined in the Constitution as one of the "higher organs of state power" and is vested with a wide and impressive range of both ceremonial and substantive powers, combining executive, legislative, diplomatic, military, and judicial functions. It functions as the collegial or plural chief of state of the Soviet Union, whose closest counterpart in the West is the Swiss Federal Council; otherwise, it is distinctively Soviet in character and is an expression of the party principle of collective leadership and responsibility. The Chairman of the Presidium acts as the ceremonial head of the Soviet Union.

The Presidium is elected by the Supreme Soviet in joint session at the first meeting after new elections, and its tenure is identical with that of the Supreme Soviet which elected it. It is now composed of 37 members: 15 Vice-

Chairmen, a Secretary, and 20 additional members. Since December, 1958, each Republic is entitled to a Vice-Chairman. Before 1958, the allocation of a Vice-Chairman to each Republic was customarily accomplished by electing the Chairman of a Republic Presidium as Vice-Chairman of the All-Union Presidium, and this is still governed by custom. An examination of the composition of the Presidium since its establishment in 1938 reveals that among the ordinary members are to be found high-ranking military officials, representatives of Autonomous Republics, high party officials of Republic organizations, and from four to six full or candidate members of the Party Presidium.¹⁰ As a rule, the General Secretary of the party is elected as an ordinary member of the Presidium when he does not occupy an executive or administrative position in the government. Thus both Stalin and Khrushchev were ordinary members of the Presidium during the period when they held no other government office—as is the case with Brezhnev since Khrushchev's ouster. This practice invests the party leaders with a high official status which can be held in reserve and employed when demanded by protocol.

The Chairman of the Presidium is its most conspicuous member, but not necessarily the most powerful one. Only six individuals have occupied this position. The first was the veteran old Bolshevik and long-time Politburo member, Mikhail Kalinin, who served as the ceremonial chief of state from 1919 until his death in 1946. His successor, Nikolai Shvernik, was a relatively low-ranking member of the party hierarchy (a candidate member of the Politburo) and was picked by Stalin, no doubt, because of his apparent passion for anonymity. He was replaced after Stalin's death by Marshal Voroshilov, a popular military-political leader.

¹⁰See *Izvestia*, August 4, 1966, for the composition of the Presidium. Five members were full or candidate members of the Party Politburo; Brezhnev was the only member with simultaneous membership in the Party Politburo and Secretariat. Of the remaining members, 17 were also full or candidate members of the Central Committee.

Marshal Voroshilov announced his retirement in 1960, but apparently he was forced out because of his complicity in the plot to unseat Khrushchev in June, 1957. His successor was a veteran party functionary and loyal Khrushchev supporter, Leonid Brezhnev, who, like Voroshilov and Kalinin, was a full member of the party's highest body at the time of his appointment. Brezhnev yielded to Mikoyan in 1964, who retired in favor of Podgorny in 1965.

The Chairman of the Presidium is frequently, but incorrectly, referred to as the "President of the Soviet Union." Under the Constitution, his powers are no greater than those of other members. Normally, the Chairman performs all the symbolic and ceremonial acts in the name of the Presidium as a whole, and enjoys the prestige and prerogatives normally enjoyed by a titular chief of state. He presides over sessions of the Supreme Soviet, signs the decrees and other acts issued by the Presidium, and formally promulgates laws of the Supreme Soviet with his signature. He dispatches ambassadors and ministers, receives the credentials of foreign emissaries, and issues acts of pardon and amnesty.

The powers of the Presidium under Article 49 are very broad, but they are even broader in actual practice. As a "higher organ of state power," the Presidium is, in effect, a working legislature and to all intents and purposes exercises the entire spectrum of state power during intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet. It is, in the words of one Soviet authority, "the highest permanently functioning organ of state power of the Soviet Union."¹¹ It issues decrees, which have the force of law throughout the Union, although in theory these decrees must be based on laws enacted by the Supreme Soviet.

Just as it shares legislative authority with the Supreme Soviet, its executive powers overlap those of the Council of Ministers. In its executive capacity, the Presidium convenes and dis-

solves the Supreme Soviet, annuls decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republics (if they do not conform to law), institutes and awards decorations and titles of honor, and, during intervals between sessions of its parent body, releases and appoints Ministers of the U.S.S.R. on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, subject always to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet.

The Presidium's diplomatic and military powers are very extensive. It can order general or partial mobilization, proclaim martial law in separate localities or throughout the Union, create military titles, diplomatic ranks, and other special titles, appoint and remove the high command of the armed forces, and, in between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, is empowered to declare a state of war in the event of military attack, and to fulfill treaty obligations.

The role and function of the Presidium in practice and its relationship to the Supreme Soviet is precisely the reverse of that in theory. Since both the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium are creatures of the party, the relationship between the two bodies depends on the requirements and conveniences of the party. As is the case with the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium is the captive of the party. It is the chief legalizing instrument of the party, since its membership overlaps that of the Party Politburo and the Secretariat.

Party policies and decisions can be almost instantaneously promulgated as decrees of the Presidium. Thus Khrushchev's ouster was promptly legalized on October 15, 1964, when his alleged request to be relieved of his duties was accepted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet one day after his reputed indictment by the Central Committee Plenum. In the complex maneuvering which preceded Khrushchev's fall, Brezhnev gave up the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in July, 1964, to devote full time to work in the Secretariat, and

¹¹V. Karpinsky, *The Social and State Structure of the U.S.S.R.* (Moscow, 1951), p. 122.

was succeeded by A. I. Mikoyan. After Khrushchev's displacement in October, 1964, the influence and power of N. V. Podgorny experienced a rise, and it became necessary to award him a post commensurate with his new political eminence. This position is rapidly emerging as the third most prestigious post in the country (after General Secretary and Premier).

Another indication of the political maturity of the Soviet political system is that of the six people who have been invested with this position, no less than four are still alive—Mikoyan, Brezhnev, Shvernik, and Voroshilov—who are now ordinary members of this organ.

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

The Council of Ministers is described by the Constitution (Article 64) as "the highest executive and administrative organ of state power" in the U.S.S.R. The Council of Ministers, also called the "Government," is invested with the principal responsibility for the *execution* and *administration* of policy, as distinct from its *formulation*, which is, of course, the province of the party summit. The Council is nominally accountable to the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, but in fact is an administrative arm of the Party Politburo with which its membership overlaps. In actuality, the relationship between the Party Politburo and the Council of Ministers in the decision-making process depends more on the degree of interlocking membership between the two organs than on constitutional norms, (see Table 8-3). The same is true for ordinary Ministers as well. Aside from Kosygin, Mazurov, and Polyansky, Voronov and Shcherbitsky (candidate member), who are *ex officio* members of the Council, are also members of the Politburo, while nine Deputy Chairmen, 22 Ministers, and four *ex officio* members are full members of the Central Committee. Twenty-eight Ministers and nine *ex officio* members of the Council of Ministers are can-

didate members, while six other Ministers are members of the Central Auditing (inspection) Commission. Only one Minister (a new appointee) was not a member of the Central Committee or Central Auditing Commission.

Under Stalin, particularly after he became Chairman of the Government in 1941, interlocking membership was virtually complete and was designed to ensure maximum harmony and coordination between party policy and state administration. Distinctions between formulation and execution of policy were blurred and rendered irrelevant, since the Politburo of the party and the Presidium of the Council were almost identical in membership. Stalin, by a simple motion, could transform the same group of individuals from one body to another, since he was the head of both.

Between 1924 and 1941, Stalin chose to rule from his post in the Secretariat of the party, and was thus completely separated from the formal organs of the state and the administration. Shortly before Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, Stalin, sensing an imminent crisis, suddenly assumed the chairmanship of the Council, relegating Molotov—its incumbent since 1930—to full-time duty as Commissar of Foreign Affairs. From being a secondary institution, the chairmanship was immediately invested with an authority that it had possessed only under Lenin. But Stalin also retained his post as General Secretary. Thus, as head of both party and Government, he made policy in one capacity and executed it in the other!

The separation of the First Secretariat from the Premiership after Stalin's death once again drove a chasm between the organs of the state and the party. But Khrushchev's assumption of the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in March, 1958, while still retaining his post of First Secretary, signified that the functions of policy formulation and administration could once again be reunited in a single person. The conflict between the organs of policy formulation (the party) and state administration (the

TABLE 8-3

Interlocking of Government and Party Institutions and Personnel in the Soviet Union, 1967

<i>Other</i>	<i>First Secretaries of Republics</i>	<i>Secretariat</i>	<i>Politburo</i>	<i>Presidium of the Council of Ministers</i>	<i>Presidium of the Supreme Soviet</i>	<i>Premiers of Republics</i>
Shelepin (Trade Union Chairman)	Shelest (Ukraine) Pelshe (Latvia)	Brezhnev (Gen. Sec'y)	Brezhnev	Kosygin (Chairman)	Brezhnev	Voronov (R.S.F.S.R.)
		Suslov	Kosygin Suslov Podgorny Kirilenko Polyansky	Polyansky (First Deputy) (ex officio) Voronov	Podgorny (Chairman)	
		Kirilenko	Voronov Shelepin Shelest	Mazurov (First Deputy)	Shelest	
		Shelepin	Pelshe			
			Mazurov Grishin			
	Mzhvanadze (Georgia) Rashidov (Uzbek)	Demichev Ustinov	Mzhvanadze	Shcherbitsky (ex officio)	Masherev Kunayev	Shcherbitsky (Ukraine)
	Masherev (Byelorussia) Kunayev (Kazakh)		Rashidov Shcherbitsky Demichev Ustinov Masherev			
		Andropov	Kunayev	Andropov (State Security)		
		Ponomarev Kulakov Kapitonov Rudakov	Andropov			

Government) was reduced to a minimum, with Khrushchev standing at the apex of both structures, but with his abrupt removal, the two positions were sundered and the stage set for a possible resumption of rivalry and conflict.

The Council of Ministers, which superficially resembles a Cabinet in a Western parliamentary system, is constitutionally subordinate to the Supreme Soviet, which "appoints" it in joint session (Article 56). It is also "responsible and

accountable" to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet when the Soviet legislature is not in session, which, of course, means about 350 days out of the year. Executive authority in the Soviet government is formally distributed between the Presidium and the Council, with the former exercising appointive, ceremonial, and titular functions and the latter being charged with the actual execution of the law. Administrative power, however, is vested exclusively in

the Council, and although it is formally accountable and responsible to the Supreme Soviet and/or its Presidium, the Council is in reality independent of both organs in the exercise of its authority. Only lip service is paid to the fiction of accountability to the Supreme Soviet.

Under Article 68 of the Constitution, the Council is empowered to: coordinate the work of ministries and other organs of administration under its jurisdiction; direct the work of economic organizations through central and Union Republic institutions; execute economic plans; administer the budget, credit, and monetary system; adopt measures for the maintenance of public order, state security, and the rights of citizens; exercise general guidance in foreign relations; fix the annual contingents to be conscripted into the armed forces and direct the general organization of the military forces. It is also empowered to establish special committees and central administrative organs under its jurisdiction for economic, cultural, and defense matters.

The functions and powers of the Council so modestly outlined in the Constitution are, in fact, only a small part of what the Council of Ministers actually does. The magnitude of its responsibilities is like that which the President of the United States and his Cabinet would have if they had responsibility not only for federal administration but for the duties now performed by the states and also by private businesses and trade unions.

The Council of Ministers is thus the most important organ of the Soviet state and is the chief administrative instrument of the party summit. Under the Constitution, it is empowered to issue decrees and orders in carrying out its functions, but these must be in conformity with laws in operation. It is charged with checking the execution of its own acts, but both the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium are authorized to annul decrees and orders of the Council if they are in conflict with existing law,

or for any reason whatsoever, although no decree or order of the Council has ever been overruled in the entire history of the Soviet system. The decrees and orders of the Council, which are binding throughout the Union, constitute the overwhelming bulk of legislation in the Soviet Union. Although the Council of Ministers, constitutionally, is not a legislative body, it is the chief source of law in the Soviet state.

The composition, but not the operational structure, of the Council of Ministers is established by the Constitution, and these provisions of the Constitution have been subject to more emendations, perhaps, than any other. The Council is directed by a smaller decision-making body called the Presidium of the Council of Ministers (not to be confused with either the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or the former Presidium of the party) and consists of the Chairman and his Deputies, which, as of 1967, included two *First Deputy Chairmen* and nine deputies of lesser party rank. The 84-member Council of Ministers, appointed in August 1966 was made up of the following categories:¹²

1. *Presidium*: One chairman, two *First Deputy Chairmen*; nine *Deputy Chairmen*.

2. *Forty-seven Ministries*:

22 ALL-UNION MINISTRIES: Aviation Industry; Foreign Trade; Gas Industry; Civil Aviation; Machine Building for Light Industry, Food Industry, and Household Appliances; Merchant Marine; Defense Industry; General Machine Building; Instrument-Making and Means of Automation and Control Systems; Transportation; Radio Industry; Medium Machine-Building; Machine Tool and Tool Industry; Machine Building for Construction, Road Building, and Civil Engineering; Shipbuilding Industry; Tractor and Farm-Machine Building; Transport Construction; Heavy Power and Transport Machine-Building; Chemical and Petroleum Machine-Building; Electronics Industry; Electrical Equipment Industry

25 UNION REPUBLIC MINISTRIES: Geology; Public Health; Higher and Specialized Secondary

¹²*Pravda*, August 4, 1966.

Education, Foreign Affairs, Culture; Light Industry, Lumber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood-Processing Industry, Land Reclamation and Water Resources, Installation and Specialized Construction Work; Meat and Dairy Industry, Petroleum Extracting Industry, Defense; Food Industry, Building Materials Industry, Fishing Industry, Communications, Agriculture, Trade; Coal Industry; Finance; Chemical Industry; Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, Ferrous Metallurgy, Power and Electrification

3. *Ten State Committees* Foreign Economic Relations, State Security, State Planning, Material and Technical Supply, Science and Technology, Construction Affairs; Labor and Wages, Vocational and Technical Education; Procurements, Forestry

4. *Four Specialized Agencies:* Central Statistical Administration, State Bank; All-Union Farm Machinery, People's Control Committee

5. *Ex officio.* The 15 Republic Premiers

The enormous size of the Council of Ministers has been accompanied by a corresponding decrease in its power and significance as a deliberating organ. In fact, the Council rarely meets as a body and, when it does, betrays little more animation than listening and applauding various reports. The decision-making functions of the Council have been preempted by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.

The Chairman and Presidium of the Council

The Presidium of the Council is the principal administrative decision-making organ of the Soviet state. It presides over the Ministries and other administrative organs of the government, supervises their work, coordinates their activities, settles jurisdictional conflicts, and decides questions of a general administrative character. Decrees (*postanovleniya*) of the Council of a general character are issued by the Presidium in the name of the Council and signed by the Chairman or First Deputy and countersigned by the Administrator of Affairs,

who is in charge of the drafting and other housekeeping agencies of the Council. Orders (*rasporяzheniya*) of the Council, which are decisions more operational and current in character, can be signed by the Chairman, First Deputy, or a Deputy. Individual Ministers are empowered to issue instructions and regulations that are administratively binding within the agencies under their jurisdiction.

The most influential member in the Council of Ministers is its Chairman, who has always been in the highest rank of the party hierarchy. This office has been occupied by only eight men since its establishment on the day after the Revolution Lenin (1917-24); Rykov (1924-30), Molotov (1930-41), Stalin (1941-53), Malenkov (1953-55), Bulganin (1955-58), Khrushchev (1958-1964), Kosygin (1964-). Of these, all but Lenin, Rykov, and Stalin are still alive; except for Lenin all of the past occupants of this post, whether dead or alive, are in varying degrees of disgrace. Rykov was executed in 1938 after the last of the notorious purge trials, Stalin's corpse has been banished from Lenin's mausoleum and his memory defiled, Molotov, Malenkov, and Bulganin have been explicitly denounced as "antiparty," while Khrushchev has been disgraced as a "non-person."

The size and composition of the membership of the Presidium has varied in response to the vagaries of factional politics. Under Stalin, the Council's Presidium consisted of a dozen or more members, most of whom, after 1949, did not carry ministerial portfolios. Apparently, Stalin operated through an even smaller body, the "Bureau" of the Presidium, whose existence, but not composition, was revealed only after Stalin's death. Immediately after Stalin's death, the secret "Bureau" was abolished, the Presidium was reduced in size, and First Deputies were restored to various consolidated portfolios, as were other members of the party Presidium in the government. In the first post-Stalin government, the Presidium consisted of the Chairman (Malenkov), four First

Deputies (Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin), and one Deputy (Mikoyan)—all of whom were full members of the Party Presidium. The size of the Presidium increased and reached a peak after February, 1955, when Bulganin displaced Malenkov as Premier. Bulganin's Presidium in 1956 consisted of five First Deputies (all members of the Party Presidium) and eight Deputies (including the disgraced Malenkov, who remained a full member of the Party Presidium), and the Council itself expanded to include more than 50 Ministries.

In the following year, however, after the economic reorganization acts of May, 1957, the abolition of 25 economic ministries and other ministerial reorganizations reduced the number of Ministries to less than 20. By 1964, the Ministries had been reduced to 11, but the size of the Council expanded to more than 70 members because of the admission of other agencies and organs.

After Khrushchev's ouster, the elaborate structure of State Committees erected by Khrushchev was progressively dismantled and the Ministry was restored as the principal administrative unit of the Council. By 1967, the government once again included nearly 50 ministries, while the number of State Committees dwindled to 10, thus restoring the pre-Khrushchev equilibrium between these two administrative forms.

MINISTRIES AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS

Ministries in the central government are of two types: All-Union and Union Republic. The All-Union Ministries, of which there were 22 in 1966, are administrative agencies which are completely centralized in the federal government and are limited to matters which are incapable of being decentralized, such as foreign trade, merchant marine, etc. The Union Republic Ministries (25 in 1966) are depart-

ments dealing with matters in which jurisdiction is shared between the center and the circumference. According to Soviet constitutional doctrine and administrative practice, the Union Republic Ministries are governed by a system of dual subordination. The Ministry exists at two levels: in Moscow and in each of the 15 Union Republics. Constitutionally, each Union Republic Ministry is responsible to its corresponding supreme organ of state authority, but, administratively, the Union Republic Ministries in the Republics are subordinated to their counterparts in the central government.

The Union Republic Ministries are primarily functional in character and include what are normally considered to be the most important departments of government: foreign affairs and defense. The Union Republic Ministries are useful devices for decentralizing administration and responsibility, without, at the same time, relinquishing control of policy from the center. Thus, whereas the Union Republic Minister in Moscow is appointed by the All-Union Supreme Soviet and the Union Republic Ministers in the Republics are appointed by their respective Supreme Soviets, Article 76 of the Constitution specifies that the Moscow Ministries direct the activities of the Union Republic Ministries in the Republics. In the case of foreign affairs, this division of authority is only a matter of form, and in the case of defense does not go beyond the printed words of the Constitution. For the Ministries of Culture, Health, Higher Education, and Agriculture, however, genuine deconcentration of administrative personnel and responsibility can be usefully introduced.

The State Committees are organized much like the Ministries and are of two types: All-Union and Union Republic. The main difference is that the department is directed by a Committee rather than by a minister, although in some cases the Chairman may carry the title of Minister. With one or two exceptions (notably the Committee for State Security), the Com-

mittees which have been retained deal with matters which cut across various departments and agencies and thus require coordination, such as Science and Technology. The conversion of the Ministry of State Security (the Secret Police) into a State Committee was calculatedly designed to dismantle the dangerous apparatus built by Beria and to insure that it could not again become an instrument of a single individual.

THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCILS (SOVNARKHOZ)

In May, 1957, virtually the entire network of economic ministries was set aside and their powers deconcentrated into more than 100 regional economic councils, with complete authority over all industrial enterprises within their territorial jurisdiction.

All the councils were established within the boundaries of Union Republics, in order not to offend local sensitivities, although this created problems of an economic character. Large Republics were divided into several regions, while the smaller Republics constituted a single *sov-narkhoz*. In order to overcome the drawbacks of drawing economic regions to correspond with political divisions, the 100 or so economic regions were grouped together into 17 main economic regions.

The *sov-narkhoz* system failed to survive the ouster of Khrushchev, with whom it was intimately associated. While it served the purpose of deconcentrating economic power, and thereby effectively destroyed the power base of the heavy industrial managers, many of whom resisted Khrushchev's economic innovations, it was far from a success from the standpoint of productive efficiency. It stimulated *localism*, and in some cases infused the Republics with a sense of economic nationalism as localities were impelled to produce more in response to

local needs, demands, and interests, than to those of the center. Beginning in March, 1965, a sweeping reorganization was inaugurated as the *sov-narkhoz* system was dismantled and the economic state committees once again transformed into ministries. The Supreme Council of the National Economy, the All-Union Council of the National Economy, and the Republic councils of the national economy and the economic regions were all scrapped, while the State Planning Committee once again was restored as the top planning body of the Soviet Union. Anxiety that the old defects of the restored system might be revived as well was reflected in Brezhnev's caveat at the Twenty-Third Party Congress

We would like to caution Ministry workers against attempts to revive a narrow departmental approach to matters, a fault of which the former ministries were frequently guilty.¹³

HOW "NEW" GOVERNMENTS ARE FORMED

Since the Soviet governmental machinery is organized along pseudo-parliamentary lines, it is not surprising that the relationship between the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet imitates those of parliamentary systems. In the Soviet system, there are four formal occasions when the formation of a "new" government is required. (1) after the election of a new Supreme Soviet (regularly every four years), (2) when the Chairman of the Council resigns, (3) when the Chairman dies or becomes incapacitated, (4) when the Chairman loses the confidence of the Supreme Soviet.

The last occasion has never materialized, but it remains a possibility. From 1941, when Stalin replaced Molotov as the head of the government, until Stalin's death in March, 1953, only the first occasion arose. At the initial meeting

¹³*Pravda*, March 30, 1966

of a newly elected Supreme Soviet, Stalin would submit a written statement "surrendering" the powers of his government to the Supreme Soviet, meeting in joint session, which would be accepted. Almost simultaneously, the Supreme Soviet would then commission Stalin to submit proposals for a "new" government. At the "next" joint sitting (the following afternoon or day), the Chairman of the Presidium would announce the "new" government proposed by Stalin. The announcement would be greeted by an outburst of prearranged odes to Stalin by selected deputies, whereupon Stalin's "new" government "was then voted upon as a whole and unanimously adopted amidst loud applause passing into an ovation in honor of Comrade Stalin, who was elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R."¹⁴

Stalin's sudden death in March, 1953, confronted his successors with the problem of devising a formula for organizing a "new" government for the first time since Lenin and Stalin had ceased dominating the scene. The crisis clearly required supraconstitutional procedures, whose only counterpart elsewhere is the *coup d'état*. In other words, the vacuum created by Stalin's death could only be filled outside the Constitution, because it was a question of power and not a question of law. On March 7, 1953, an extraordinary joint decree was issued over the names of the Party Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which cleverly embraced every conceivable instrument of legitimacy and legality in the Soviet system and included all possible contenders for power.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet received a new Chairman and Secretary (although the Constitution specifies that the members of the Presidium can only be elected by the Supreme Soviet). Malenkov was advanced to Stalin's vacated post of Premier, and other members of the Party Presidium were ap-

pointed First Deputies, deputies, and ordinary Ministers. One week later, on March 15, 1953, the Supreme Soviet, in a breathless session of 67 minutes, approved the *fait accompli*, and the bare bones of constitutional procedure were thus preserved.

"New" governments following resignations of the Chairman have been nominated three times, the first time on February 8, 1955, when a statement was read by the Chairman of the Council of Union on behalf of Malenkov before the Supreme Soviet at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in which he submitted his resignation on grounds of administrative inexperience and incompetence. The Premier of the R.S.F.S.R. moved that the resignation be accepted, which was unanimously approved, and in less than 10 minutes the session was adjourned. At 4 p.m., the Supreme Soviet was reconvened, and Khrushchev, the first speaker, proceeded to nominate Nikolai Bulganin as Malenkov's successor. Five minutes after the session started, Bulganin was unanimously approved as the new Chairman. On the next day, Bulganin delivered his acceptance speech and submitted his list of proposed Ministers.

The second resignation took place in March, 1958, when Bulganin submitted his resignation, which was accepted unanimously. Khrushchev's name was placed in nomination by Marshal Voroshilov, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The First Secretary was approved as the new Premier unanimously by acclamation, and the "new" government was in business less than 24 hours after the convocation of the Supreme Soviet.

The third resignation allegedly took place at the October 14, 1964 Plenum of the Central Committee. No deliberations of this plenum have ever been published, and serious doubts about its actual convocation are widespread. Khrushchev was removed abruptly in a carefully planned coup while he was vacationing on the Black Sea riviera. According to the official version of events, Khrushchev requested of the

¹⁴Karpinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124.

Central Committee (not before the Supreme Soviet) that "he be released from the duties of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, in view of his advanced age and deterioration in the state of his health."¹⁵ The request was promptly granted, and on the next day he was formally relieved of his post by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which then proceeded to unanimously appoint Kosygin in his place. Khrushchev's removal and Kosygin's appointment were then duly ratified by the Supreme Soviet several months later—on December 9, 1964.¹⁶

It should be noted that the procedure employed in Khrushchev's resignation departed significantly from the Malenkov and Bulganin resignation scenarios. Khrushchev did not publicly ask to be relieved, neither did he even appear before the Supreme Soviet or its Presidium, to which he was constitutionally responsible, to make a statement. In fact, Khrushchev has never made a public statement concerning any aspect of his alleged resignation, and furthermore, he has not indulged in any public confession of error, incompetence, or disloyalty, as was the case with his two pred-

ecessors. Another important deviation is that the Central Committee was the first to announce his resignation, not the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. And no account was given of how Kosygin was recommended to the Presidium for appointment, although in December, 1964, Brezhnev formally nominated Kosygin at the ratification session of the Supreme Soviet.

The precision and rapidity with which the Supreme Soviet accepted resignations and approved "new" governments, with neither advance notice nor deliberation, is sufficiently eloquent by itself to demonstrate the nature of the responsibility and accountability of the Council to the Supreme Soviet. Needless to say, the smoothness of the changeovers simply reflects the fact that all the basic questions were decided in the Party Politburo and were then simply formalized in the presence of the Supreme Soviet. In a strictly technical sense, the procedure seems to resemble the manner in which governments are chosen by party caucuses or executive committees in democratic countries, which are then ratified by parliaments, with the very significant exception that the Party Politburo is, as we have seen, the only "party caucus" tolerated in the Soviet system. In the case of Khrushchev's removal, however, the regime came perilously close to violating its own party procedures and constitutional norms which it has so sedulously sought to observe since Stalin's death!

¹⁵*Pravda*, October 16, 1964.

¹⁶*Pravda*, December 10, 1964.

IX

The Soviet Union Today ... and Tomorrow

Although the Soviet system is now more than a half-century old, any attempt to determine with precision its definitive contours would still be premature. Soviet society has been subjected to a continuous process of social and political convulsions that have been engineered from the top in an attempt to achieve the ideological goals of the party leadership. Still, Soviet society today remains an unfinished social order. From the standpoint of the party leadership, current Soviet society represents simply another way-station on the road to Communism. Changes, radical and trivial, will continue to be initiated from above, following the needs of the moment, although what in fact emerges will continue to represent a balance between the imperatives of ideology and the resistance of internal and external forces to change.

In the evolution of Soviet society, significant groups with an interest in arresting further social transformations have continuously emerged, and the present state of things is no different except that the social groups which today have a vested interest in maintaining the present *status quo* are more differentiated, influential, and more firmly rooted than in previous periods. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that they will necessarily be any more successful in arresting further social transformations. External impediments, in the form of differently perceived interests by various Communist states, particularly China, and the successful resistance of the non-Communist world to the expansion of the Communist sphere are just as likely to force a reshaping of the ideological goals of Soviet society as are internal forces. Soviet society thus remains in a condition of flux.

Certain features of the Soviet system have achieved a degree of permanence because they satisfy not only the requirements of ideology, but have won genuine popular acceptance: the

public ownership of the means of production, natural resources, and financial institutions, and state control of communications, information, health, education, welfare, and culture are two examples. The collective-farm system, on the other hand, seems to be universally disliked and represents an unwelcome burden on agriculture and the peasantry. The one-party system finds wide acceptance, although the people would prefer more flexibility in nominations and elections and would like more than one candidate to stand for political office. It might also be noted that some nationalities, particularly the three Baltic countries, would prefer to be outside the Soviet community altogether, and tensions continue to arise over the Communist failure to reconcile completely the conflicts between national dignity and Soviet patriotism, between local national pride and Great Russian nationalism.

PROBLEMS AHEAD

The dilemmas of the Soviet system thus derive from the failure of social realities to correspond with desirable ideological goals which were promised or are claimed (democracy, freedom, etc.), and from the state's efforts to impose undesirable ideological goals (collectivized agriculture, for example) or to transform existing institutions and processes which are acceptable into unacceptable patterns. These dilemmas and problems can be grouped into four general categories: (1) problems arising out of the necessity to falsify or rationalize reality (ideological distortion or false perception), (2) problems arising from the failure to legitimize or legalize the transfer of power; (3) problems of social equilibrium and stabilization; (4) problems arising from the utilization of economic resources and production. Implicit also is the fundamental problem arising from the conflict between the requirements of internal stability and the ideological goals of foreign policy.

Ideological Distortions

The Soviet system continues to be plagued by the agonies of what we might call false perception resulting from ideological distortions of reality. While many of these problems appear esoteric, they are of crucial significance in a society in which a systematically articulated ideology is officially enshrined. In some instances, Soviet leaders and citizens appear to believe many things to be true which are in fact false, and this results in a condition known as "false consciousness," an aberration which infects all societies, but one to which the Soviet is especially prone.

Soviet society is described as "free," "democratic," and without class hostility, although this is patently untrue. It is asserted that the Communist Party represents the monolithic will of all classes, whose interests are unified and harmonious, whereas in fact social groups in Soviet society perceive their interests differently, and the Communist Party articulates the will of the elites rather than that of all social classes. Formulating policy and social behavior in accordance with beliefs which are out of focus with reality results in distorted perceptions of problems and situations and gives rise to misdirected or inappropriate solutions and responses. Problems which in fact exist remain unnoticed and without solutions, while problems which do not exist appear as real and are met with artificially contrived solutions.

Legitimacy and Succession

A perennial and still unresolved problem in the Soviet system is that of the institutionalization and legitimization of political power. Theoretically, the problem does not exist, and, in official doctrine, Soviet leaders and citizens must behave as if the problem is non-existent. Theoretically, power is lodged in

the party and is then delegated to the central organs of the party, which exercise this power in a collective or institutional rather than personal capacity. Power, however, cannot be exercised impersonally, but must be possessed and exercised by individuals, who may be members of bodies or groups.

At any given time in the Soviet system, the institutional seat of power can be defined, but the particular personalities who hold the reins of power cannot. Thus, while Stalin was alive, power theoretically rested in the Presidium of the Party, but in fact was vested in Stalin as a person. When Stalin died, theoretically no power vacuum existed, since the Presidium as a body continued to function. In fact, a profound vacuum resulted because no orderly process had been devised for transferring power. The official ideology refused to recognize the existence of such a problem. In the absence of a legal or predetermined succession procedure, the problem was resolved informally by a struggle for supremacy among various personalities, cliques, and groups, although the existence of such a struggle was itself repeatedly denied. The composition of various party and state organs changed with each phase of the struggle, but no actual transfer of power in the party hierarchy was officially recognized, since, theoretically, the power of the party was always lodged in its central organs.

Although certain unwritten ground-rules seem to be developing governing the struggle for power, these do not enjoy official recognition nor are they explicitly articulated, and unless an orderly system for transferring power is devised, a dangerous vacuum will continue to exist at the very apex of the Soviet system.

Another closely related problem of power is the precise relationship that exists between the party and the state. Again, in theory, no problem is supposed to exist; the party devises policy and transmits it to the state for execution and implementation as law. In fact, however, tensions appear between the two not only be-

cause this functional division of labor is impossible to sustain in a meaningful sense, but also because each inevitably becomes the instrument of power of those who control it. This tension, in practice, is resolved only when both institutions are under the control of a single center of power, reflected usually in the unification of the highest post in the government with the highest post in the party in a single person. Thus, as did Lenin throughout his lifetime and Stalin from 1941 to 1953, Khrushchev between 1958 and 1964 held the position of party leader and Premier of the Government. The fact that the two posts were once again separated after Khrushchev's removal demonstrates that the problem still has not been resolved. As long as the problems of power and succession are not dealt with in their realistic, as opposed to their ideologically distorted, dimension, the Soviet system will continue to be threatened with instability at the very pinnacle of power, and each succession crisis carries in it a potential of disaster.

Social Stratification and the Party

The Communist Party is being increasingly transformed into an arena in which the various Soviet elites make known their demands on one another, articulate their special interests, and try to impose their desires as the unified will of society as a whole. It is clear that one of the most substantial problems of the Soviet social order is how to reduce the inevitable tensions between the desire of a privileged group, the Soviet intelligentsia, to preserve its special status, and the ideological imperative of a classless society to which the party leadership is committed. While theoretically the intelligentsia as an entity is committed to a classless society, in actual fact only the party apparatus appears to have an enduring interest in it. The very function of the party apparatus is to preserve the purity and integrity

of the Communist doctrine. Besides, the apparatus's political power is not likely to be undermined by the implementation of Communist egalitarian principles. On the contrary, it would probably be enhanced since egalitarian reforms would tend to undermine the position of nonparty privileged groups.

According to Soviet doctrine, the intelligentsia is destined to dissolve into the society as a whole. Hence, the idea of recognizing distinct groups within the intelligentsia—although they exist in actuality—is in flagrant conflict with Marxism-Leninism. But since future Communist development will be determined by the ideological commitment of the party and the attitude of social groups, the study of social structure and social stratification is extremely important. There is no question but that the several elites which have crystallized within the Soviet intelligentsia have, on the whole, a vested interest in preserving largely intact the *de facto* social order which exists in the Soviet Union today. They would like nothing better than to receive official recognition guaranteeing the *status quo*. While quasi-autonomous interest groups flourish within the intelligentsia, they do not enjoy either legal or ideological recognition and hence the fiction must be preserved that they do not exist. Only the intelligentsia as a whole enjoys ideological acceptance as a stratum of the working class. Thus a constant friction and conflict between the upper social groups in the intelligentsia and the party apparatus is likely to be the rule in the Soviet society for some time to come. The party leaders will attempt to undermine the vested interests of the intelligentsia, while the latter will try to buttress its social position either by constitutional reform or by capturing the very citadel of political power, the leadership of the party.

Some Soviet scholars, thus, are calling for the recognition of "intra-class" differences based upon social function and the division of labor, which they concede gives rise to divergent social attitudes and interests. They make a sharp

distinction between *class* structure, which is slated for extinction, and *social* structure (and thus *social* stratification), which they argue is an inevitable and ineradicable feature of any organized society. Although the new bourgeoning Soviet field of "complex sociological research" is designed to facilitate the transition to Communist society, it is more likely to rationalize the existing social system, and what one Soviet observer maintains is the function of "bourgeois" sociologists appears more accurately to be an esoteric justification for the new Soviet science of "complex sociology".

Sociologists in the bourgeois world cope perfectly well with the role of "social engineers." Their specific recommendations and forecasts are devoted, as a rule, to improving the existing structures and institutions, to eliminating individual conflicts and contradictions. To put it simply, they devise the lubricants that enable a rusting mechanism to function normally. They boldly disclose contradictions of social organization, but only in order to strengthen its foundations, to heal its ulcers, and prolong its life.¹

The regime clearly recognizes the existence of the tensions between the desire of social elites to maintain their privileges and the ideological imperative of a classless society. The ideological key to the resolution of this dilemma is to raise the level of productivity to the point where it meets total social demand, which then automatically renders superfluous all necessity for establishing priorities in the distribution of rewards. The economic transformation of society, according to the Soviets, will bring about the necessary psychological transformation of man so that "it will become a habit to work to the best of one's ability, not only as a duty, but also as an inner urge," and then both the material and psychological prerequisites for a classless society will have been met. In Soviet jargon, this means that distinctions between physical and mental labor and

¹*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 2, 1967.

between rural and urban life must be eliminated so that "the activity of all workers of Communist society will be a combination of physical and mental work."

It can be safely assumed, therefore, that existing social distinctions and differentials in rewards and status will persist for some time and that privileged elites will endeavor to maintain their privileges, but it can also be expected that the regime will take periodic measures to curb these tendencies so that social mobility in Soviet society will remain relatively high. The intelligentsia will continue to expand in numbers and occupations. It seems hardly credible that privileged elites will disappear voluntarily in Soviet society. Yet the ultimate goal is precisely that. "With the victory of Communism," writes one authority, "there will be no intelligentsia as a separate social stratum."

Raising the Standard of Living

Raising the standard of living in the Soviet Union has crucial ideological significance, since Communist society requires an economy of abundance to provide the material basis for the psychological and moral transformation of man. The tremendous effort devoted to enhancing the productive forces of the country, however, are not all directed to raising the standard of living, for the regime is still determined to enhance Soviet military power and promote the ideological goal of world Communism, although with diminishing enthusiasm. Consequently, the major Soviet economic effort is directed toward three fields, which results in a certain amount of conflict since the Soviet economy is not capable of satisfying the needs of all three simultaneously. The three fields are: (1) heavy industry—the goal is to maintain a high rate of industrial growth for prestige purposes and to accomplish foreign policy objectives; (2) military power—again for purposes of

prestige as well as national security and for the promotion of ideological objectives, in part through foreign military assistance to various countries; and (3) consumer goods and food production.

Production for the consumer has always received the lowest priority in the Soviet Union, particularly in agriculture, and one of the basic tensions of contemporary Soviet society stems from the desire of the people for a more rapid improvement in their standard of living, as opposed to the regime's insistence on assigning priority to heavy industry and military power. Since Stalin's death, greater attention has been devoted to raising the standard of living, and substantial progress has been made, but this has merely whetted the public's appetite rather than satisfied it. Furthermore, the Russian people are now more aware that the standard of living could be even higher if less effort and investment were channeled into the production of heavy industry and rockets.

Agricultural production, particularly, has always lagged far behind industrial growth. While industrial goals are consistently achieved and sometimes exceeded, agricultural production almost always falls short of planned targets. This has created a serious imbalance in the Soviet economy, and, while the Soviet public is not undernourished or on the verge of a subsistence diet, the agricultural sector of the Soviet economy remains a jerry-built structure which can crumble in the face of a serious crisis.

The inefficiency of agricultural production in the Soviet Union stems from two causes: (1) the low priority it receives in terms of investment and effort; (2) the collective-farm system. Admittedly, food production could be significantly increased if the state funneled greater resources in that direction, but this would be at the expense of heavy industry and armament. In early 1962, Khrushchev publicly rejected this alternative in favor of boosting prices for meat and dairy products by 25–30% as an inducement to

the farmers to produce more in exchange for greater profits.² This served only to raise slightly the peasant's standard of living at the expense of the urban standard of life and was not an effective solution.

Altering the structure of Soviet agriculture could also result in greater food production, but again at the expense of redistributing income between town and country. Incentives for greater production within the collective farm system have just about reached their maximum point, and the regime is now confronted with the major decision of accepting stagnation in agriculture or stimulating further growth by greater investment at the expense of industry and armaments or radically revising the collective farm system to give the peasant greater incentives for greater effort. Khrushchev's successors have put more money into agriculture, and this, combined with better efficiency and more incentive for the peasant, has been rewarded with two extraordinary bumper harvests (in 1966 and 1967).

One of the great anomalies of the Soviet system is the vast disparity between its low ma-

terial standard of living and its high level of culture and education. This asymmetry produces psychological tensions which cannot be sustained over a long period of time. As the intelligentsia becomes acutely aware of the imbalances and incongruities of the Soviet system, particularly as it gains knowledge of how its social counterparts in other industrial societies live, it may think in terms of solutions outside the framework of official doctrine, especially if the further implementation of doctrinal goals would have an adverse effect on its station in society. Already there are important signs which indicate that the educated elite of the coming generation will be less inclined to accept at face value the ideological goals of the regime and will be even less predisposed to accept the frequently disingenuous rationalizations and explanations which are advanced to justify existing policies and conditions. While the satisfactions, on the whole, outweigh the tensions in Soviet society, and violent internal upheavals against the regime are not likely, the possibility of a silent revolution which will transform both the internal and external goals of the Soviet system in the direction of greater social stability, greater freedom, and more attention to concrete and material (rather than ideological) problems is a real one.

²At the November, 1962, Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev announced a 30% increase in agricultural investment over 1962.

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Appendix

THE "EUROPEAN COMMUNITY," ENGLAND, THE U.S.A., AND THE U.S.S.R.

In 1967, as was the case in 1962, England had for a second time in five years applied for membership in the European Economic Community (the E.E.C.). Presuming that the oldest industrial power in the world were to join this organization sooner or later, the Common Market as an economic entity would assume an even greater significance. France and Germany, the two major powers in the E.E.C., could in combination with England form an economic unit rivaling the United States and the U.S.S.R. And, given propitious circumstances, the E.E.C. could become a political entity, grouping powers that had been at odds for many centuries. New co-operative arrangements and new "European" political institutions are being developed, and though they are not yet genuinely supranational, they nonetheless are beginning to influence the domestic politics of all the member states.

The student is offered here a sketchy account of "the Six" (the member nations of the Common Market), comparing that organizations' economic development with that of the potential member, England, and with those of the two major powers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

THE E.E.C. AT A GLANCE

The European Economic Community covers an area of 449,000 square miles. In this area live approximately 182 million people—nearly as many as in the United States. The active working population of over 75 million is about as great as that of the United States. The Community is the world's second largest producer of steel and automobiles, next to the U.S., and one of the world's leading agricultural producers. With Britain, as we have said, the Community would rival the U.S. as the world's leading economic power.

The Community can boast of the fastest-

TABLE A-1

Some Comparisons: Community, U.K., U.S.A., and U.S.S.R.



	Community	U.K.	U.S.A.	U.S.S.R.
Area (thousand sq. miles)	449	94	3,600	8,600
Population, 1965 (millions)	181.6	54.6	194.6	230.6
Active working population, 1965 (millions)	74.7	25.7	75.6	104.0
Steel production, 1965 (millions of metric tons)	86	27	123	91
Steel consumption per head of population, 1965 (kilograms)	384	437	671	395
Gross energy consumption per head of population, 1965 (metric tons, coal equivalent)	3.4	5.4	9.2	3.8
Grain production, average, 1963-65 (millions of metric tons)	59.2	11.9	160.7	126.7
Meat production, average, 1963-65 (millions of metric tons)	9.8	2.4	20.4	8.3
Milk production, average, 1963-65 (millions of metric tons)	67.7	13.4	59.4	63.3
Automobile production, 1965 (millions)	5.44	1.72	9.34	0.2
Imports from rest of world, 1965 (\$ millions)	28,562	16,138	21,282	8,054
Exports to rest of world, 1965 (\$ millions)	27,079	13,710	27,003	8,166
Gold and dollar reserves, end-1966 (\$ millions)	20,191	3,100	14,370	2,000*

*End-1964.

growing major economic area of the Western world: between 1953 and 1961, its gross national product increased by 53%, compared with 21% for the U.S. and 15% for Great Britain. Since 1958—the year the Common

Market began—its industrial production has risen by 29%, against 13% for Great Britain and 18% for the U.S. And the Community is the world's largest trader; the largest importer and its second largest exporter. Its total imports

FIGURE A-1 *The Common Market and world trade. Shaded area of each column represents percentage of manufactured goods. (From a publication of the European Community Information Service, No. 101, March, 1967.)*



1958 total
1958 % manufactured

1966 total
1966 % manufactured

from the outside world in 1967 amounted to \$28.5 billion dollars and its total exports to \$27 billion dollars.

The community, welding into one economic unit six European nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, consists of three organizations:

(1) The European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.). Set up in 1952, it paved the way by pooling the six nations' resources of coal,

steel, iron ore, and scrap in a single market without frontier barrier.

(2) The Common Market (officially the European Economic Community, or E.E.C.), whose institutions were set up in 1958, has been in the process of integrating the economics of the six nations in a mass market of over 182 million consumers.

(3) Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community, or E.A.E.C.), set up in 1958, is

FIGURE A-2 *The Common Market countries.*






FIGURE A-3 *The institutions of the European Community.*

helping to endow the Community with an atomic industry pledged to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY

Until very recently, there have been three separate Executives—one in charge of coal and steel, another in charge of atomic energy, and the third overseeing all other economic matters. In addition the European Parliament has operated in a deliberative and consultative

capacity. The dominant body, however, has been the Council of Ministers, consisting of the representatives of the six governments. In the Council, decisions continue to be made by unanimous vote—thus allowing each government a veto power. However, provisions for majority vote are in existence, and it is expected that they will soon become fully operative.

The Executives

THE E.C.S.C. (European Coal and Steel Community) HIGH AUTHORITY. The High Authority's initial task was to establish a common market for coal, steel, iron ore, and scrap, by abolishing all trade barriers, discrimination, subsidies, and other distortions. It now supervises the smooth working of this common market, ensures that the Treaty rules of fair competition are observed, stimulates investment and research, and aids workers threatened with unemployment. In cooperation with the other two Executives, it has worked out proposals for a common energy policy.

THE COMMON MARKET COMMISSION. The Commission's essential task has been to supervise the gradual establishment of a full Common Market, in which trade restrictions of all kinds are abolished and all goods, service, labor, and capital circulate freely. The Commission also prepares policies and—after adoption by the Council of Ministers—implements them for agriculture, transport, and external trade. It is working toward common economic, monetary, and labor policies. In addition to its specific executive powers, the Commission is an initiator of Community action, a mediator between the governments, and the guardian of the Common Market Treaty.

THE EURATOM COMMISSION. The Commission's task is to help create within the Community a powerful industry for the peaceful use of atomic energy, to stimulate scientific

research and the training of specialists, to help administer a Supply Agency through which all nuclear fuel can be channelled, to supervise the nuclear common market, to inspect and control the use of fissionable material, and to safeguard both workers and the population at large by laying down basic standards for the protection of health.

In 1967 all three European Executives were combined into one—the European Commission—consisting of 14 members. Thus the former fragmentation of tasks has been ended and a great impetus in the direction of better overall coordination and planning has been given.

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers consists of government representatives of the six. For coal and steel, the role of the Council of Ministers is chiefly limited to giving an opinion before the High Authority takes decisions: on certain fundamental questions, however, the approval of the Council is required before decisions become binding. For the Common Market and Euratom, the Council of Ministers in most cases take the final policy decisions, but can only do so on the proposal of the Commission, and only modify such proposals by unanimous vote. The Council's decisions on coal and steel are mainly taken by majority vote. Decisions concerning the Common Market and Euratom still must be unanimous; majority voting is gradually being introduced, however, except for fundamental matters of policy. For most majority decisions, votes are weighted. France, Germany, and Italy have four votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands two each, and Luxembourg one. On Commission proposals 12 votes suffice; in other cases, the dozen votes must include those of four countries.

The Council of Ministers remains the policy-making body with ultimate decision-making power. It ensures coordination between the policies of the national governments and those

of the Community as a whole. Council meetings are prepared by a Committee of Permanent Representatives for the Common Market and Euratom, and by a Coordinating Committee for the E.C.S.C.

The European Parliament

Members of the 142-man Community Parliament are at present elected by and from the legislatures of the member countries. The Treaties envisage direct universal suffrage in the future; plans for this have been drawn up by the Parliament and are now before the Council of Ministers. The three Executives must report annually to the European Parliament, which can oust them by a motion of censure, voted by a two-thirds majority. For the Common Market and Euratom, the European Parliament must be consulted before certain specific decisions are taken, and it has a right to scrutinize the Community's budget. The Parliament holds frequent plenary sessions, and maintains 13 standing committees which closely follow the Executives' work. Its members, who are divided into three political groups (Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals), frequently put parliamentary questions to the Community Executives. The members of each political group sit together in the Chamber irrespective of nationality. Though the functions of the European Parliament remain consultative, it is expected that they will be gradually strengthened.

Some 275 cases have been submitted to the Court, which has handed down more than 160 judgments.

Consultative Bodies

In addition to these Community institutions, a number of consultative bodies aid the community's work. These are:

- (1) The 101-man Economic and Social Committee, which advises the Common Market and Euratom Executives and Councils of Ministers on behalf of employers, workers, consumers, and others.
- (2) The 51-man Consultative Committee, which carries out a similar task for the E.C.S.C.'s High Authority.
- (3) The Monetary Committee, which advises the Common Market's Executive and Council of Ministers on monetary problems.
- (4) The Trade-Cycle Committee, which aids the Six in co-ordinating their day-to-day economic policies and in maintaining a steady, healthy rate of economic expansion.
- (5) The Transport Committee, which advises the Common Market's Executive on transport problems.
- (6) The Scientific and Technical Committee, which advises the Euratom Commission on nuclear problems.

TOWARD FULL ECONOMIC UNION

The institutions of the Common Market were set up in 1958. They have undertaken the task of unifying the economies of the six countries and abolishing trade barriers across the 1,700 miles of the Community's internal frontiers.

Removing Trade Barriers

Internal customs barriers and quota restrictions were scheduled to be eliminated in

three stages of four years each, according to the following timetable.

The Common-Market "Timetable"

Stage 1

By the end of this stage (December 31, 1961), total internal tariff cuts on each product amounted to 40%; quota restrictions on industrial goods had been abolished. Export duties had been abolished. Common external tariffs began to be gradually adjusted.

Stage 2

During this stage, which ended on December 31, 1965, total internal tariff cuts on each product amounted to over 65%.

Stage 3

This stage is to be completed by December 31, 1969. *All* internal tariffs and quotas, and restrictions on the free movement of men, services, and capital are to be removed by then. A common external tariff will be established for all goods entering into any of the Common Market countries.

A Common External Tariff

By the end of the transition period (see timetable) the Community will have replaced its members' existing tariffs on imports from the rest of the world with a single external tariff. Except in the case of a specified and limited number of goods, the Community's external tariff levels are based on the arithmetical average of the national tariffs in force on January 1, 1957. The average incidence of the common external tariff is lower than that of the previous national tariffs, and also lower than that of the British and United States tariffs. As a result of the decisions to speed up the Treaty timetable, a first alignment of national tariffs on the common external tariff was made at the end of 1961; a second alignment took place on July 1, 1963. The difference between national tariffs and the common external tariff has virtually disappeared.

Free Circulation

LABOR. Workers will be able to move freely to take up offers of jobs anywhere in the Community by the end of the transition period. Machinery has been set up to enable vacancies and applications for jobs to be collated throughout the Community. Priority is still given to workers from the country in which a vacancy occurs, but after three weeks, vacancies are opened to workers from any Community country. After a four-year stay, workers from other Community countries are entitled to exactly the same treatment as workers of the country in which they are employed.

CAPITAL. The Community in May, 1960, unconditionally freed a wide range of capital movements, and conditionally freed most other types. If capital movements disturb the economies of the member states, however, governments may take defensive measures, subject to authorization by the Commission and approval by the Council of Ministers.

SERVICES. The Common Market provides for freedom of establishment (for firms, branches, agencies, and individuals such as doctors, dentists, architects, etc.) and freedom to supply services (building, insurance, banking, wholesale and retail distribution, and the exercise of the liberal professions) anywhere in the Community, by the end of the transition period. Directives issued in October, 1961, laid down a detailed timetable for the removal of restrictions in the different branches of activity.

Thus the Common Market is more than a customs union. It has provided common rules and common policies for agriculture, transport, and trade; for a common labor and investment policy, and for a common fund to provide aid to the underdeveloped areas that were associated in the past with some of the countries comprising the Community—mainly France.

Common Policies

AGRICULTURE The common policy for agriculture aims at providing greater efficiency in production, a fair return for farmers, stable markets, regular supplies, and a fair deal for consumers, in a single Community-wide market with a common price level. This policy was put into force beginning with a 7½-year preparatory period that started on July 1, 1962, and was scheduled to end December 31, 1969. During that period differing national prices were gradually to be brought roughly into line, levies were established and collected on certain products, though at a falling rate, to counteract price differences.

TRANSPORT. The Common Market Commission in 1961 drafted the basic principles of the common transport policy which, under the Treaty, had to be adopted for intra-Community trade by the end of the transition period. In June, 1962, it forwarded to the Council of Ministers an action program with this aim in view. The Commission aims at ensuring a coordinated transport system free of discrimination and capable of meeting efficiently at the most economic rates, through a common Community investment policy, the growing needs of the Community's rapidly expanding internal trade. The carriers will have Community-wide freedom of operation, and users an unrestricted choice of the available forms of transport.

Economic and Financial Policy

The Treaty binds the member states to consider their economic policy as a matter of common interest, and to consult regularly on joint action in this field. They are aided by a Trade-Cycle Committee. Exchange rate policy is also considered as a matter of common interest, and a Monetary Committee helps to coordinate monetary policy. Should grave balance

of payments difficulties threaten a member state, the Commission will recommend appropriate measures and, if necessary, the granting of mutual aid. In a sudden balance of payment crisis, a government can apply immediate provisional safeguards, but these can subsequently be modified by the Council of Ministers.

HOW IT IS FINANCED. The operation of the Common Market is at present financed by the member governments in the following proportions: France, Germany, and Italy 28% each, Belgium and the Netherlands 7.9% each, Luxembourg 0.2%. The Commission is, however, in due course to submit proposals for replacement of the governments' contributions by independent resources—in particular the revenue from the common customs tariff.

Labor Policy

The Treaty's major provision in the field of labor policy is the setting up of a Social Fund for retraining and resettlement of workers. The Community has proposed the general principles of a common policy for occupational training. It recognizes that an efficient technical training system is a major contribution to full employment in a rapidly developing economy. The Commission also promotes cooperation on subjects relating to employment, labor legislation and working conditions, social security, industrial health and safety, and trade-union rights. The principle of equal pay for men and women was fully applied in 1964 according to the terms of a timetable adopted on December 30, 1961.

Community Task Forces

Three special agencies have been set up, each to perform one of three vital Community tasks.

THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND. Attached to the Commission, this organization promotes employment facilities and the mobility of

workers within the Community. In particular, like the coal-steel readaption fund, it assists, by means of vocational retraining, resettlement, and other aids, in the productive re-employment of workers who have to move or change their jobs. It operates by refunding 50% of expenditure undertaken by each government for these purposes. By the end of 1961 the Fund had paid out nearly \$26 million, of which \$18.5 million was used for retraining workers threatened with unemployment because of the closing down of marginal and inefficient factories; the rest was used for resettlement.

THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (FOR OVERSEAS COUNTRIES). Also administered by the Commission, this organization had a capital of \$581.25 million for the five years 1958–62, to be used for social and economic investment in the overseas countries associated with the Community. It has concentrated on hospitals, schools, and training institutes, as well as specific development projects and production programs. By April 30, 1962, 251 investment projects had been approved, at a total cost of \$303 million; of the total, \$128 million (42%) was for social projects (mainly schools and hospitals) and \$175 million (58%) for economic development (transport, communications, and agriculture). A further \$180 million was granted in 1962. Under the new Convention being negotiated with the associated countries, a new system of development aid is being worked out, and new institutions and procedures are being established, based on full equality between the associated states and the Community.

THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK. With its capital of \$1 billion, this bank aids investments in the Community's underdeveloped regions, and helps finance modernization or new activities of general Community interest. More than half of its loans, which totalled \$160.2 million at the end of 1961, have been for industrial development in backward Southern Italy.

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